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THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE GODHEAD

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THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE GODHEAD

OR

THE APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION AS THE CHRISTIAN CREED

BY

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HODDER AND STOUGHTON
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TO THE SACRED MEMORY
AND BLESSED PRESENCE
OF
A WIFE BELOVED

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PREFACE

This volume is an attempt to express in the language of to-day the content of the Christian faith as the writer has apprehended it, not only by the study during many years of the relevant literature, especially examination of and meditation on the Holy Scriptures, but also by personal experience of the truth and grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, because he believes profoundly that *pectus facit theologum.* He has passed all he has read through his own mind, and has so assimilated all that was congenial to, and congruous with his own theological tendency and still more religious disposition, that it is impossible for him now to trace the varied content of his thought to its different sources. The references to literature given in notes represent a very small fraction of his indebtedness to other thinkers. He owes more than he can express to many minds; but he belongs to no school, and calls no man master; and he cherishes the hope that he may have something to say in his own way which he can claim as his own contribution to the interpretation of the Christian faith to meet the needs of the present hour. He has not only read theologically but also lived religiously through the changes of the last forty years; and thus this volume represents not merely a doctrinal adventure, but a spiritual pilgrimage towards the Zion of Christian vision, in which many a valley of Baca has become a place of springs, and by God's blessing strength has been added on to strength (Ps. lxxxiv. 6-7). In the portions of this volume which deal with the teaching of the Holy Scriptures

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the fewest references to other writers will be found, not because they have been ignored or neglected, but because the writer has done as much independent study of the sources, especially in the New Testament, as he could in the hope that as 'a scribe, who hath been made a disciple to the Kingdom of heaven' he may have brought out of this treasure some things new as well as the old (Matt. xiii. 52).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

LONDON, *9th June* 1925.

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INTRODUCTION

THROUGH FACT TO FAITH

ATTENTION is fixed on, and interest is absorbed in the Social Problem to-day, and especially the economic aspects, as it is generally considered that economic conditions are the most potent factor in determining social relations. The prominence of the economic aspect of the Social Problem, due to the importance of the economic conditions as affecting social relations, can be accounted for by the startling changes in society brought about by what has without any exaggeration been called the Industrial Revolution of the last half of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. The invention of ever more complicated machinery, the use of steam as motive power, the expansion of markets by geographical discovery, and the improvement of the means of transport in railways and steamships—these are but the most outstanding conditions of this industrial revolution, the most serious social consequence of which has been the change in the relations of Capital and Labour, employer and employed. What in dealing with the Social Problem, however, is often ignored, is that these changes have been due to man's increased power over physical forces because of his improved knowledge of natural laws. Behind modern industry and commerce is modern science. Here there has been no less what may be described as a revolution. Not only are men of science discovering the secrets and disclosing the wonders of nature, but science is more widely diffused by means of books, magazines, and newspapers than it ever was. The common thought is being influenced by it in often unsuspected ways, and a habit of mind is being formed under its influence,

which is by no means confined to those who follow scientific pursuits. Ours is an age in which science is a dominant factor of thought and life; for if the theoretical conclusions modify the one, the practical applications affect the other.

I

(1) As religion is not a department of thought and life which can be separated from the rest, and cultivated in independence, but a quality of all human activity, relating its manifold forms to that which is beyond nature, and above man himself, it is evident that religion cannot be unaffected by the predominant interests and tendencies of any age. Theology cannot talk about 'philosophy and vain deceit' (Col. ii. 8), and 'knowledge falsely so called' (1 Tim. vi. 20); it must take account of and adapt its interpretation, commendation, and defence of the beliefs of religion to the current modes of thinking and speaking. While religion lives, moves, and has its being in the regions beyond and above the world, yet it is concerned with the relations of what is in the world with what is beyond and above. As a man thinks of nature and of himself so will he think of God. Even if he have an inheritance of belief from the past, and hold fast to it, he will not hold it, and cannot hold it as those did from whom he inherits. In the Old Testament there is the literature of a progressive revelation of God; and even if the revelation in Christ be conceived as final, and if the progressive and the final revelation be enshrined in a permanent record, yet the way that record is understood and used will vary as human thought and life vary. 'Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and to-day, yea and for ever' (Heb. xiii. 8), and yet to-day we do not interpret Him as He was interpreted yesterday; and in the 'for ever' we hope that 'we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him even as He is' (1 John iii. 2), that '*we who* now know in part shall then know even as *we* are known' (1 Cor. xiii. 12). As there is individual development, so is

there historical progress, and that progress is not in one part alone, but in all the inter-related parts of the whole of man's activities, although the rate of progress is by no means uniform. The religion of an age, because religion by its very character as relating man to eternal reality is conservative, cannot believe itself subject to change, may lag behind the morality and the science ; but in the long run and on the big scale, it is proved that man moves, and moves as a whole.

(2) Among the many departments of human inquiry in which there was a very great increase of knowledge was that of the literature of religion. Not only were the sacred scriptures of the East translated into English, and studied as never before by scholars, but travellers, missionaries, and, in more recent years, anthropologists enlarged our knowledge of the religious beliefs, rites, and customs of the tribes or races without any literature, and the archaeologists are literally unearthing the monuments of the religions of ancient empires that now are dust. (Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian.) In the psychology of religion the endeavour is made to relate all this growing knowledge to the human soul, its characteristic interests, aspirations, and purposes, and in the philosophy of religion to give to it its proper place in the thought and life of man, apprehending its meaning and appraising its worth.[1] There are two general conclusions which emerge from all this research and study : (i) Religion is a necessary function of the nature of man. Unless where he suppresses his impulses, he does relate himself to what is beyond nature, and above himself. (ii) The content of religion, in belief, rite, and custom, is always relative to the total conditions of thought and life. Although it be a relation to the eternal, it always assumes temporal forms ; although by it man may reach out to the infinite, it shares his finitude in its expression ; although the object of belief and worship be God, God is apprehended in the likeness of man. Human limitations

[1] See *The Philosophy of Religion*, by George Galloway ; *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, by W. K. Wright ; *Philosophy and Religion*, by H. Rashdall.

and imperfections cleave to that aspiration and endeavour of man by which he seeks and strives to rise above himself.

(3) Can this conclusion be maintained in regard to Christianity? There are still those who seek to defend the verbal inspiration of the Bible, treating it in all its parts as absolutely authoritative in morals and religion, nay even, entirely inerrant in history and science. Other religions make a similar claim for their sacred scriptures, as the Hindu for the Vedas, and the Moslem for the Koran. The Bible does not make any such claim for itself. Apostles and prophets do claim to speak the Word of the Lord: but nowhere is it claimed that the whole collection of writings has been divinely dictated. A candid and yet reverent study of the writings themselves compels the conclusion that, although the Bible is the literature of divine revelation, yet it is human literature, and must be studied as other literature is. The divine communication is affected by the limitations of the human channels. What the much-derided Higher Criticism [1] does is but to exercise a trained literary and historical judgment on these writings, to discover from their own evidence, and not to accept from any traditions about them, how questions about date, authorship, occasion, purpose, literary character, and historical value are to be answered. The method of the Higher Criticism is accepted in this volume, as simply an extension with the necessary modifications in a new sphere of inquiry, of these methods of accurate observation, searching scrutiny, and tested generalisation, to which modern science owes its triumphs. With the conclusions of the Higher Criticism, which are now generally accepted, it is not at all necessary to deal in detail here, as such conclusions as are assumed in the subsequent discussion will be dealt with in their relevant connection. All that

[1] *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, by W. Robertson Smith; *The Oracles of God*, by W. Sanday; *The Bible, Its Origin and Nature*, by Marcus Dods; *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, by G. A. Smith; *A Guide to Biblical Study*, by A. S. Peake.

need be stated in general terms now is this, that we cannot accept the Bible as a text-book of science, astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, or psychology, as in all these departments the writers were limited to the knowledge of their own age and surroundings. Any discussion of the views of the writers on the questions with which science alone is competent to deal belongs to *Biblical Theology*, and has historical interest, and not theological authority. Constructive Christian theology is not concerned with what any of the writers say upon any of these subjects; still less is it the task of Christian apologetics to recognise a conflict between the science of the Bible and modern science, and to attempt a reconciliation of them.

(*a*) In the historical narratives we must recognise that ancient methods differed from modern, and we are at liberty, and it is our duty, to test the trustworthiness of every document, as to the sources on which it is based, how near to the events recorded are these sources, and how far the historian is careful in his use of his sources. Thus most scholars would certainly prefer *Samuel* and *Kings* to *Chronicles* as a record of the past. Even in respect of the morals and the religion of the Old Testament we must recognise a progressive revelation of the nature and the purpose of God. The revelation of God is an education of man, for man's receptivity conditions God's communicativeness, and yet each human reception of a divine communication develops the receptivity. The light had to be tempered to the sight, but the sight grew with the giving of the light. Since God has not made man perfect, but only capable of growing into perfection in fellowship with Himself, there was no other way. The law of divorce was allowed for the hardness of men's hearts (Matt. xix. 8). Jesus could not utter all the truth because the disciples were not yet ready to receive it (John xvi. 12). We cannot claim finality for the doctrine or the practice recorded in the Old Testament.

(*b*) The succession of the prophets developed under the guidance and guardianship of God's Spirit that

ethical monotheism which Christianity has inherited. Jesus the Christ our Lord was the consummation of that progressive revelation: He fulfilled law and prophecy by correcting their defects and by completing what had remained incomplete (see Matt. v. 17-48). As the revelation of the Son by the Father was under temporal and local conditions, else He would have been unintelligible and unpractical to His hearers, we must in His words, by moral and spiritual discernment, which is the gift of God's Holy Spirit, distinguish the permanent and universal truth and the Jewish forms of thought and speech in which it was, and had to be expressed, although it must be added Jesus Himself in His moral conscience and religious consciousness transcended these limitations, and thus in Himself has significance and value for all lands in all ages. He has indeed the words of eternal life (John vi. 68) because He is the Truth of the eternal God 'embodied in a tale.'

(*c*) As regards the New Testament, its authority for us lies in the testimony it bears to, and the interpretation it offers of the person and work of Christ. Its testimony is not due to any theoretical interest, biographical or historical, but to a practical need that men should so know Him as to find in Him the Saviour and the Lord. Its interpretation is not that of abstract philosophy or theology, but of a concrete experience of what He was and did as Saviour and Lord. The literary methods of the age were employed and the religious ideas of the surroundings had an influence; but there was such a guidance and guardianship by God's Spirit that testimony and interpretation were then, are now, and still will be adequate to bring sinful men to the forgiving God by the true and living Way in the spirit of adoption. To some of these questions it will be necessary to return hereafter, but meanwhile enough has been said to indicate the standpoint of the writer in regard to the authority of the Holy Scriptures. The late Dr. Marcus Dods in answering a question at a conference said: 'If you will follow the teaching of this book, it will infallibly lead you to God.' It is with the Bible as

the record of God's approach and appeal to man in grace and man's response in faith, in Jesus Christ, the Mediator between God and man, that this volume is solely concerned, and the writer finds nothing in the method of the Higher Criticism or its conclusions, generally accepted among scholars, to lower its value, or lessen its significance for that purpose.

(4) In recent years there has been a further development in the method of study of the Bible. To the *criticism* of the sources of the Higher Criticism, the *religious-historical* method has added two principles, *correlation* and *comparison*.[1] Science seeks to correlate phenomena by the principle of causality, and by comparing them to illustrate the principle of uniformity; its task is to seek *causes* and *laws*. That these two principles are applicable in the sphere of human history must be fully conceded. Its course becomes much more intelligible as we can trace connections and resemblances in human activities. But there must be a limitation in the application to human history of these principles which does not obtain in regard to nature. Human personality is an incalculable and inexplicable factor: individuality, liberty, responsibility must be allowed for: the behaviour of men is not as uniform as the behaviour of atoms; and event cannot be linked to event as effect to cause, as rigidly as in natural processes. In human religion especially there enters a factor that baffles scientific manipulation. Man in fellowship and as fellow-worker with God cannot be included in the causalities and uniformities of nature. Even if we admitted that God's activity in nature was rigidly fixed in the order of nature as science knows it, but it is by no means a necessity of rational thought that we should, yet in human history no such invariability can be asserted. God's action by His Spirit in His grace is selective of individuals and nations for different functions, so that we cannot affirm uniformity, especially of the great moral and religious personalities. God's action in man,

[1] See the writer's *The Christian Certainty*, chap. iii.

supremely in those who are charged with a mission and message for Him, so increases the free capacity for action in fulfilment of His purpose, that we cannot assert that the causality of heredity, environment, and circumstance is the measure of their possible achievement. It is assuredly both interesting and rewarding to examine carefully how far Jesus was in His teaching dependent on Jewish apocalyptic, or Paul was in his doctrine of the sacraments affected by the mystery-religions, or John in his interpretation of Christ reproduced the speculations of Philo; but in this study we must not start with the assumption that dependence is to be made as complete as possible, and originality has, as far as can be, to be denied. Again, it is both interesting and rewarding to compare Jesus with Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, and to discover the resemblances, the evidence that it is one human nature that is approaching the one divine reality; but this comparison should not begin with, but, if it can, go on to the assertion that Jesus is only one of the world's great teachers, so comparable with them, that the Church's claims for Him are unjustified. Criticism, correlation, and comparison there must be, and it is the timidity of unbelief, and not the courage of faith, that would escape from the application of these tests to Christianity. But what we may insist on is that the tests shall be applied without prejudice or partiality, without any assumptions as to the credibility of the witnesses, the explicability of the events, or the originality of the persons before all the relevant data have been subjected to searching scrutiny; and the assumptions of unbelief have no less to be excluded than those of a faith that has not been fully tested. It is in this spirit of candour and sincerity that the writer desires to approach the treatment of his subject, confident as his Christian experience has made him that Christianity need not shun, but may seek the most searching scrutiny.[1]

[1] See *The Originality of the Christian Message*, by H. R. Mackintosh, and *Living Religions of the East*, by Sidney Cave.

(5) The judgments which can be reached in regard to historical questions are at best probable and not certain, and from these judgments we cannot exclude the personal equation.[1] They are not only judgments of *fact*, but also of *value*. While there are common grounds of judgment among scholars adequately equipped and properly trained, yet among these there will be differences of judgment regarding the trustworthiness of a literary source, and consequently its historical value. These differences may be due to unconscious bias, to untested assumptions. The philosophy of one scholar may involve a denial of the supernatural, of the possibility of a miracle in any sense; the philosophy of another may make him prepared to consider the evidence without any prejudice; a third may even hold a philosophy that makes him ready to admit a miracle without much scrutiny. What seems to the writer to be the proper attitude is this: on the one hand, to admit the reality of the supernatural, the immanent relation of God to nature, and the possibility of miracle as an activity of God in nature which, as yet at least, appears inexplicable by physical forces and natural laws as we know them; and on the other hand, to assume that God will not in His activity depart from His usual mode and His usual means without adequate reason, and, accordingly, to examine very closely if the evidence for the manifestation of the supernatural in miracle is sufficient to convince. We must try to steer our course between the Scylla of a credulity which accepts any evidence, and the Charybdis of a scepticism which rejects all. Whether the nature of the miracle itself is such as we might expect God as our moral conscience and religious consciousness apprehends Him as being to perform, and whether the occasion for and the purpose of the miracle are such as to be congruous with that conception of God, are questions which only a judgment of value can answer. That an ass should rebuke a prophet (Num. xxii. 28), that an iron axe-head should swim

[1] See *The Christian Certainty*, chap. vi.

(2 Kings vi. 6), and that a fish should keep alive a prophet in its belly for three days (Jonah i. 17), are assuredly incredible miracles for an intelligent faith, and the context offers no justification for them. But that He who as Son came to reveal the Father, and as Saviour to redeem men, should not only preach grace in the forgiveness of sins, but act that grace in healing the sick, and even restoring the dead, is an activity so congruous with the nature and the purpose of God that a faith which seeks to be reasonable may scrutinise the evidence without any bias against its trustworthiness, if such it appear.

(6) This distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value is one that deserves further consideration.[1] (*a*) In the first place, a judgment of value is not a judgment about the unreal, the imagined, the invented. It is a judgment about reality; it assumes that the object exists, but what is affirmed in the judgment of value is affirmed, not on the ground of sensible evidence, or logical demonstration, or rational consistency, but on the ground of personal valuation—what the object means for the person who makes the judgment of value. (*b*) This ground cannot be in contradiction of these other grounds; it may be but their complement, giving just that personal confirmation which may raise probability to certainty. While we may not be able to offer any sensible evidence of God's existence, yet just as from the speech, and the looks, and the deeds of our fellowmen we infer that they exist as minds that think, hearts that feel, and wills that strive and achieve, so may we infer from the existence, order, and progress of the process of nature that wisdom, love, and power are in that process manifested. It may be possible to interpret the evidence otherwise, and to decline to draw the inference; and yet for most thinkers some form of theism has appeared a highly probable interpretation of and inference from the world as

[1] See *The Ritschlian Theology*, chap. vi.; *Faith and Fact*, by Edghill, chaps. v. and vi.; *Ritschlianism*, by Mozley, chap. v.; *Facts and Values*, by Halliday, chap. viii.

sense presents it and the understanding explains it. (*c*) A philosophy may show that such a theism gives a rational consistency to all the data of human knowledge such as no other conception can. The moral conscience, which by its very nature asserts the supremacy of the moral law, or the absoluteness of the moral ideal, confirms this conclusion. And the religious consciousness brings its testimony to what faith in God has done in enriching experience, forming character, and solving the problems of the world and life. (*d*) Man has ideals of beauty, truth, holiness, and love, the complementary aspects of perfection, and is persuaded that in their realisation alone can be his blessedness.[1] What faith does is to affirm in belief, trust, and submission, in the committal of the whole personality, that there is reality corresponding to these ideals in God; and that because God is, these ideals will be realised in man. 'Now faith is the giving substance to (ὑπόστασις) of things hoped for, the proving or test (ἔλεγχος) of things not seen' (Heb. xi. 1). Because faith proves or tests the reality of God, it supports, underpins man's hope of personal perfection, the realisation of his ideals. It is the judgment of value regarding these ideals, and the God who is their reality and assures man of his realisation of them, that gives faith a confirmation which in such matters sensible evidence, logical demonstration, and rational consistency cannot give. He who does not, or will not, appreciate these values cannot apprehend this assurance. 'The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him' (Ps. xxv. 14). 'The pure in heart shall see God' (Matt. v. 8). The judgment of value does not produce although it confirms the faith.

(*e*) We must affirm on the ground of religious history and experience that there is an immediate contact and an intimate communion of man with God. Many would call this *mysticism*,[2] and under cover of such a

[1] See *Faith and its Psychology*, by W. R. Inge.

[2] See *Christian Mysticism*, by W. R. Inge; *Studies in Mystical Religion*, by Rufus Jones; *The Mystical Element in Religion*, by Baron von Hügel.

meaning for the term justify many vagaries of thought and life which have been characteristic of men and women claiming to be in an exceptional measure at home, or even one, with God. But surely it is spiritual religion, and need not be described by a term that has misleading associations. A distinction made by Eucken may here be usefully mentioned.[1] There is what he calls universal religion, and there is characteristic religion. In universal religion the ideals lead men to assert spiritual reality ; it is characteristic religion which apprehends that reality as personal, as God. His general philosophical standpoint has a close likeness to the position here maintained. A man must develop the spiritual life in himself before he can be assured of not only the subjective spiritual reality in himself, but of such an objective spiritual reality as may in the language of religion be called God.

(7) As the majority of men rely with greater confidence on sensible evidence and logical demonstration, as it requires some philosophical culture to apprehend the rational consistency of a system of thought, as the spiritual life needs nurture and exercise, which most men are not prepared to give, common thinking is largely determined by the first two modes of knowing, and neglects the second two. With philosophical culture, and its value, if not to the Christian believer, yet to the Christian theologian, we are not meanwhile concerned, but only with religious faith. At first it must seem a bold venture ; but the judgment of value and the sense of the reality of God make it not a rash adventure. Its verification can come only in the course of time : the satisfaction which the religious experience gives, and the power that comes out of it into the moral character and conduct, afford this verification. As the satisfaction is known only to him who has it, although it may be partially shown in his disposition, his joy in the Lord, for others the

[1] *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, p. 269 ; see *Rudolf Eucken, his Philosophy and Influence*, by Meyrick Booth ; *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy*, by W. Tudor Jones.

verification is most convincingly shown in what the man is made by his faith. Faith energises in love (Gal. v. 6), and is known by its fruits. This is the pragmatic test; the truth about God in Christ works in giving religious satisfaction and moral excellence. But it *works* because it is believed as *truth*, as the mind's apprehension of ultimate reality. It can continue to work only as it is still regarded as truth. Let the suspicion enter that there is no God, or that God is not as He is for Christian faith in Christ, then the joy will be quenched and the power be lost.[1] An illusion, once discovered, only mocks the heart and weakens the will. The venture of faith, confirmed in the judgment of values, and verified in experience and character, may be enough for some minds, or even for one mind at some times. But even although faith be further supported by the theistic interpretation of the world, doubts, fears, and questions may arise. There is much in the world and life to challenge faith, even so confirmed, verified, and supported.

II

(1) Over against the ideals of truth, holiness, and love, and the blessedness which their realisation would bring, there is falsehood, wickedness, hate, and consequent misery; over against the theistic interpretation of nature there is pain, disease, death. Can ideas so obscurely expressed in the world, and ideals so partially realised in man, maintain and assert themselves in face of these facts of man's experience? Men to-day clamour for facts, and will not accept ideas or ideals unsupported by facts.[2] Neither an idealism which asserts that the real is the rational, nor an optimism which declares that this is the best of all possible worlds, will by reasoning, however consistent and cogent logically it may appear, convince, if so many facts of experience challenge the

[1] See Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 355-8.
[2] See *The Fact of Christ*, by P. Carnegie Simpson.

argument, and may even in certain moods make materialism or pessimism appear just as plausible interpretations of things as they are. Faith for certainty, confidence, constancy needs facts that sustain the argument and confute the challenge.

(2) What facts can convince that ideals can be realised because God is reality? As these ideals must be realised in human history under the conditions of search, struggle, and suffering with the hindrance of falsehood, wretchedness, and hate ever to be overcome, God must be apprehended as present and active in history. The *static* deity of the philosopher who eternally contemplates his own perfection must give place to the *dynamic* deity who is temporally fulfilling His purpose in and for men. It is not about the eternal nature of God that sinning, struggling, and suffering men are concerned; it is the temporal purpose of God, and His activity in time to fulfil it, that alone matter to them. Is He a fellow-sufferer with them? are they fellow-workers with Him? Mr. Wells, in his book *God the Invisible King*, popularised a tendency in theology which is not recent, but may be said to be characteristic of the progressive thought of the nineteenth century, even as the conception of a God who holds aloof from men was characteristic of the eighteenth. While we must be on our guard against sweeping generalisations, and must admit that the thought of an age cannot be described in a phrase or term, yet it may be said with enough justification to make it worth saying that the tendency of the eighteenth century was deistic with an emphasis on God's transcendence, and the tendency of the nineteenth century pantheistic with the stress on the immanence. The God of Mr. Wells' thought is immanent in the world process, but not transcendent of it; above and beyond there is an inscrutable power, and God is saving Himself as well as men, and men may help Him in His struggle. Roman Catholic Modernism was based on a philosophy of immanence, and the far less significant and much more restricted New Theology undertook a restate-

ment of the Gospel on the basis of the principle of the divine immanence.[1]

This tendency in theology is an illustration of what has already been insisted on, that religion cannot be severed from the whole of life. The hypothesis of evolution was the guiding principle of physical science last century; and a cosmic evolution, if it is to be interpreted theistically, demands not *a transcendent static* but *an immanent dynamic* God, a God who is present and active in His world. As nature and history are parts of the one process of evolution, creation is historical and history is creative. If the physical universe has reached a stage of relative permanence in respect of its recurring processes, mankind is still in the progressive stage, and God is making man in and through history. Culture, Art, Civilisation, Morals, Religion are all developing, and the individual man is within that development of the race, being himself developed towards personality. For man's making or marring the temporal process is all-important, and God's creative, educative, redemptive activity must be in and by that process. History is no less if even not more important, therefore, for theology than philosophy; for it is now concerned not with conceiving God's eternal nature, but with perceiving His temporal purpose. Religion is not the flight of the alone to the Alone—that spiritual indulgence and luxury only a few may claim; it is the discovery in the full stream of history of those divine currents that show the direction of the flow.

(3) Religion, however, would deny its very nature, if it were to be 'cribb'd, cabin'd, and confined' to the immanent deity. The divine purpose can give meaning and worth to the temporal process only as it expresses the nature and commands the resources of eternal reality. If God were immersed in history, He could not direct nor control its course. He must

[1] See Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*; Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, and *Through Scylla and Charybdis; The Programme of Modernism*, translated from Italian by A. Leslie Lilley; and *The New Theology*, by the Rev. R. J. Campbell.

be above as well as in and through all to give to the soul of man the assurance that the purpose in the process will be fulfilled. A God bounded and hindered by an inscrutable power could not give the certainty that trial will end in triumph, and labour not be in vain. Unless God be ultimate reality, eternal, infinite, absolute, the reality of the ideals in Him would not guarantee their final realisation in men. Men need and want a Fellow-sufferer, whose compassion and consolation belong to the very core of all reality, and a Fellow-worker, whose co-operation commands all the resources that will make all labour finally effective.

(4) While it has been necessary to add this caution, as the present exaggeration of God's immanence has its perils for thought and life, in the present context what it is crucial to the discussion to show is that for men, being made in history, God must there also be present and active. This thesis has been developed with much conviction by Herrmann in his pamphlet *Warum bedurf unser Glaube geschichtlicher Thatsachen?* (What need has our faith of historical facts?) What is there emphasised is this aspect of the subject. If men are in history to fulfil the eternal law of righteousness, they need events which will assure them that He who gives the law also so guides history that those who seek to fulfil that law will not perish but be preserved.[1] This moral emphasis must be primary, but need not be exclusive, as man needs for his whole personal development in time such an assurance of protection and prevision for his good in the eternal God. What is needed is a fact or facts in human history that will make men sure of God as willing their good, as strengthening them in their struggles, as sustaining them under their burdens, as securing that aspirations shall be fulfilled and ideals realised; and especially, as men know the greatest hindrance to be in themselves, in their moral failure and weakness, they crave a God who forgives, renews, and saves. It is not speculative curiosity as to the ultimate cause, essential nature, and final purpose that is the dominant motive;

[1] See *The Ritschlian Theology*, pp. 218-19.

it is practical necessity that man should be his best and make the best of his world, that drives faith to seek a strength and stay in fact.

Christian faith affirms that this need is met in the fact of Christ. Some objections to this contention must be considered before we discuss the significance of the fact.

(i) In the dominant philosophy of the eighteenth century, idea or ideal was exalted, and fact was depreciated. 'Historical truth, which is accidental in its character, can never become the proof of the truths of reason, which are necessary.' (Lessing.) Without committing ourselves to either all the conclusions of physical science or all the speculations of idealist philosophy, we may appeal to both against this dogmatic assertion. Nature for science is not a fixed system, it is an evolving process, and the history of that process is significant for the interpretation of nature. The Universe is for idealism the realisation of an Idea or Spirit, and it is in the real that the rational is sought and found. The reason of man which discovers reason in reality is itself not *static* but *dynamic*. It develops with and by means of the reality it understands. Man grows in intelligence as his world becomes to him more intelligible. This development may be illustrated by the difference between deductive and inductive Logic; in the one the category of substance and accident, in the other that of causality is dominant. For Plato the world of sense obscured rather than revealed the world of ideas; Hegel finds in the world not only the otherness of the Idea, but the return of the Idea to itself, enriched by that negation of itself, a synthesis which takes up into its fulness both the thesis and antithesis. It is not necessary here further to develop this line of argument, as what has been stated should suffice to show that for the thought of to-day that old objection has lost force.

(ii) The objection, however, may be modified and stated in this form. How can infinitude be expressed in finite existence, or eternity in a temporal process?

It may be admitted that God in His absoluteness cannot be manifested in human history, that a human personality could not, consistently with the conditions of humanity, display omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence. But what man needs and longs for is not to discover God unto perfection, to fathom the abysmal depths of the divine, to resolve the mystery of God into a formula: man craves to be assured of God as present and active in the process of history for the common human good, God as not separated from man but as related to man, God so proved in the life of man as sharing man's lot and caring for man's welfare and succour that the God who is above and beyond shall be not an inscrutable mystery, or ineluctable fate, but One to be trusted, although He cannot be fully known. It is in the realm which is, so to speak, common to God and man as reasonable, moral, and spiritual, that man's faith craves this confirmation of ideas and ideals by facts. God's Fatherhood and man's sonship means (in a theistic, not to anticipate now the Christian, interpretation) such affinity of God and man, making relation possible, and yet such difference as the terms themselves convey, within the relationship, that God is the perfect communicative personality and man the imperfect receptive personality.

(iii) That the divine manifestation and communication in fact to meet the human need and craving must be within the limits and under the conditions of human personality is a conclusion that this summary discussion seems to justify. This conclusion does not, however, involve that the human personality must be in all respects what we know in common experience as the average manhood of our fellows. It is not unreasonable to expect that the human development should be crowned by the realisation of the ideal manhood, the presence and activity in human history of the typical man, man as God meant him to be in the final fulfilment of His purpose, not as man by his sin has marred himself and become. A perfect man, perfectly receptive for God, would

necessarily stand in another relation to the order of nature even than ordinary sinful men can stand. His insight into God's purpose would give Him a control over nature's forces in His dependence on, and obedience to God, such as we must ascribe to God, if we put any real meaning into our belief in God's immanence, not passive, but active, in nature.

(iv) The possibility of such a relation cannot on grounds of reason, then, be denied. It might seem rash to affirm the necessity that the facts which confirm faith should be supernatural or miraculous. That the miracles were Christ's credentials, giving Him a claim to be believed, trusted, and obeyed, is a view now superseded. But that the miracles were constituents of His manifestation of God as forgiving grace and saving love may still be reasonably maintained.[1] Whether His teaching by itself, unaccompanied by any of His healing acts, would have conveyed to men the assurance concerning the Heavenly Father that they needed is at least doubtful. That these acts were to men evidences not only of God's presence with Him, but even of the redemptive character of God's purpose, seems to be not at all doubtful. We may approach the record of the facts without any antecedent prejudice against supernatural activity or miraculous events. In view of our modern knowledge and thought we may be led in the fuller discussion of the subject to modify the current terminology, and define the supernatural and miracle otherwise than has hitherto been done. All that at this present stage needs affirming is that while the facts must be within human history, we are not warranted in demanding that they shall all be explicable by ordinary human agency. The human personality receptive and communicative of God's activity in history need not be an average man.

(v) Ideal and typical as may be the human personality in whom God manifests Himself, yet such manifestation does, and must, involve self-limitation

[1] See *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*, by A. B. Bruce, chaps. vii. and viii.

on the part of God. But in this respect incarnation is the supreme instance of an activity of God which is illustrated by all creation; it is only by self-limitation that the Infinite can create within time and space a finite and changing world. Man's personal liberty and responsibility still more involves God's reserve and restraint in regard to the creatures whom He has made. The principle of *kenosis*, as theology calls it, is necessary for the interpretation of nature and history no less than of the fact of Christ.

(5) Christ as Son realises manhood perfectly in relation to God, and in this realised Sonship as man He reveals the reality of God's Fatherhood in relation to men. Not by words and deeds alone, but by all He was in relation to God, did He give the assurance of God's Fatherhood, and man's sonship towards God. And as He realised His Sonship and revealed God's Fatherhood under those very conditions of struggle, sorrow, and suffering which challenge faith, and make facts necessary for the support and succour of faith, the challenge has in Him been fully met. Sinless through all temptation, trustful in all trial, He is not only Himself conqueror of the world, but He can and does, by drawing men unto Himself, bring them unto God in the same relationship as He Himself holds. As must afterwards be fully shown, it is in His Cross and His Resurrection especially that He gives men the confidence that sin is forgiven, death robbed of its terror, and that the victory over every challenge of fact is with faith in God. And not to His earthly life alone is this personal relation to Him confined, for in Christian experience throughout the centuries He ever liveth to save to the uttermost all who come unto God through Him (Heb. vii. 25).

(6) The knowledge of God as Father which is mediated by Christ is neither *intuitional*, as a native endowment of the mind of man, nor *inferential*, as the conclusion of a process of reasoning, nor yet *mystical* as an immediate contact with God without any historical mediation, but *experimental and practical*. Salvation is *experienced*, not only in the religious

consciousness, but also in the moral character; the man who through faith in the grace of Christ has found forgiveness is renewed unto holiness. This experience can be *practically* tested in what the man becomes and does as well as the joy, peace, and hope which come to him. This witness is not in solitary individuals, but in a continuous and expansive society. Whenever and wherever men have put the fact of Christ to the test, He has not been found wanting. Such evidence can be confidently set against all the contradictions of the fact of Christ which modern knowledge and thought may offer. Except it be on the question of miracle, science, when it minds its own business and does not try to play the part of a philosophy of all reality, can have no quarrel with this fact, as has already been indicated in dealing with the Bible. And we shall afterwards show that even on the question of miracle, faith need not fear science. Philosophy as an interpretation of all reality is necessarily speculative in character, and cannot assert its conjectures against the testimony of faith for him who has known what faith has been to him, and done for him. If it ignores faith's testimony, then it has wilfully neglected data of which it should take full account to justify a claim to completeness. If criticism could so discredit the literary sources of our knowledge of the fact of Christ, as to bring into doubt His historical reality, it would assuredly offer faith its most serious challenge. While there are tendencies in modern criticism of a negative character, they discredit themselves by their mutual contradictions. The total denial of the very existence of Jesus finds its opponents even among critics of negative tendency. The attempt to resolve the object of Christian faith into a myth has been rejected by the great majority of the critics. Although it may not be possible to say with Dr. Dale [1] that the evidence from experience would be adequate to support faith, even were all other historical evidence to fail, yet the existence of the Christian Church with its innumerable

[1] *The Living Christ and the Four Gospels*, Lecture I.

witnesses to this Christian experience is a historical fact of such magnitude that faith need not fear literary or historical criticism.

III

(1) If Christian faith be based on the fact of Christ, then Christian theology will be an exposition, commendation, and appreciation of the significance and value of that fact for faith. This will involve a considerable change both in the content of theology, and the order of the presentation of that content.

(i) Much that has hitherto been included in theology when its content was derived both from the Bible and the Church will now be left to Biblical and Historical Theology, and Constructive Theology will confine itself to what constitutes the object of Christian faith. As has already been indicated, there is much in the science, the history, and even the religion and morals of the Old Testament which for the Christian believer has now historical interest, but not religious or moral authority. That historical interest is real, and he who wants to be an instructed and intelligent Christian will not be indifferent to any part of the literature of the progressive revelation of God which is completed in Jesus Christ. This consideration applies to the New Testament in so far as it reproduces the current knowledge and thought; but it is to a far greater extent dominated by the fact of Christ with which Christian faith is vitally concerned. There is in the Old Testament a preparation for Christ, and in the New Testament a testimony to the history of Christ, and an interpretation of that history through the experience of Christ—all of which belong, and must belong, to Christian theology. The fact of Christ has a twofold aspect, the revelation of God and the redemption of man, and this redemption of man and this revelation of God are mutually inclusive, for God is revealed as redeeming man, and man is redeemed by the revealing God. Thus in accordance with its name, theology should be only a doctrine of God;

with all other doctrines which systematic theology has added to the doctrine of God, and given imposing names (anthropology, ponerology or hamartiology, Christology, soteriology, pneumatology, ecclesiology, and eschatology), it is concerned only as dealing with the content of God's redemptive revelation in Christ. To give an instance, theology is concerned with man as God's creature, subject, and child, and with sin as so affecting man's relation to God that redemption is necessary. The writer will at least make the attempt to justify his growing conviction that this, and this only, is the proper business of Constructive Christian Theology. This simplification will, in his judgment, be a great gain, as it will confine theology to ' the things most surely believed,' to what a believer must hold if the fact of Christ is to have full meaning and worth for him.

(ii) Text-books of Christian dogmatics have usually followed what appeared to be the logical order; and Dr. Orr in his book, *The Progress of Dogma*, has sought to prove the necessity of that order by showing its correspondence with the providentially guided development of dogma in the Church. A detailed criticism of this book cannot be offered ; all that the writer can now urge is that the correspondence is not so close as Dr. Orr, by a rather arbitary handling of historical data, makes it appear, and that historical conditions so fully explain why certain questions emerged for discussion at a particular time, that it does not seem necessary, and appears even a little audacious to assume a special providential guidance of the order. Further, as the emphasis of the treatment in the present volume falls on facts, a historical order is more appropriate than a logical. There are presuppositions of the fact of Christ, as He came in the fulness of the times, and fulfilled law and prophecy, and these presuppositions will emerge in the discussion of the content of the fact. There are interpretations of the fact of Christ which as experimental and practical may be included in the fact, the total historical reality which we seek to understand.

There are inferences which may legitimately be drawn from the fact of Christ, both theoretical and practical, and for them also a place may be found. The fact includes a revelation of God, and accordingly there is a doctrine of God which is attached to the exposition of what the historical personality was. The fact also includes a redemption of man, and, therefore, there is a doctrine of the new life for man which comes through Christ, the life in the Spirit of God. Thus there is indicated for us not only what must be the content of our Constructive Theology, but also the order in which that content should be developed.

(2) For this view of the content and order of Christian theology, two facts in the New Testament are significant. Christian baptism was in the earliest days of the Church in the name of Jesus Christ (Acts ii. 38) or the Lord Jesus (xix. 5); but later it was 'into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost' (Matt. xxviii. 19). The eternal reality antecedent to, and the personal and corporate experience consequent on the fact of Christ are now associated with that fact. In the closing benediction in 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Galatians, and 1 Corinthians, Paul mentions only 'the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ,' but in 2 Corinthians there is added 'the love of God . . . and the communion of the Holy Ghost,' the reason for and the result of the fact. Later creeds follow this precedent in having three parts, but depart from it in placing the section dealing with God the Father before that dealing with the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the section dealing with the Holy Spirit are included a number of clauses not formally linked with the Holy Spirit as the source of the Church, the communion of saints, and the life everlasting, although that may be implied. In accordance with the general principle enunciated in the previous discussion, the order of the apostolic benediction will be followed, and the three divisions will be entitled by the phrases of the apostolic benediction.[1] First of all the his-

[1] An interesting justification of the order here adopted is afforded by M'Giffert's book, *The God of the Early Christians*, in which he seeks to

torical personality of the Lord Jesus Christ will be discussed under the title which will indicate the dominating conception, 'the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.' Next the doctrine of God as revealed in Christ will be expounded with the title which indicates its distinctiveness, 'the love of God.' Creation, Providence, Sovereignty will all be dealt with from this standpoint. What has to be said about man and sin, judgment and forgiveness, will also be here included. Then the life into which mankind is redeemed by the love of God in the grace of Christ will be exhibited under the like significant title, 'the communion of the Holy Spirit.' This will include the individual Christian life and the corporate Christian fellowship (the Church), and the consummation of both in the blessed and glorious immortality on the one hand and the coming of the Kingdom of God on the other. Then the organic unity of the triple manifestation of God in human history will, so far as with our present knowledge is possible, be demonstrated in a doctrine of the Trinity under the title, 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one God.'

(3) The Apostolic Benediction not only supplies the distinctive titles of the sections of this volume, but it also indicates the directive principle of the theology to be here expounded. All that is inconsistent with the conception of God as here presented will be excluded; only that will be included which is in accord. The *formal* principle of the Reformation—the Holy Scriptures—is too wide, for, as has already been recognised, there are stages of moral and religious development in the Old Testament which Christ has corrected and superseded, and, therefore, no doctrine can be claimed as distinctively Christian because it can be supported by an array of texts. Neither, it must be added, need a deduction from this directive principle be denied because a text cannot be quoted in proof of it. The guidance of God's Holy Spirit

show that the Gentile converts did not begin with the God of the Jews as the object of their faith, but with the Lord Jesus Christ, and that only later theologians sought to relate the personal Saviour to the Divine Power.

is not withheld from the Christian thinker who seeks to discover and display the unsearchable riches of Christ. Care must of course be exercised lest the individual judgment err in either exclusion of what is expressly taught in any portion of the Scriptures, or inclusion of what can be only regarded as implicit in distinctively Christian truth. The material principle of the Reformation—justification by faith alone—is too narrow; for we must include all that is involved in the revelation of God and the redemption of man in Jesus Christ the Lord. To put the directive principle in a simple, short phrase, *God as Saviour* seems to be adequate; or, using the apostolic benediction, but arranging the clauses so as to bring out the mutual relations, we may affirm that Christian theology is concerned with the love of God in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ unto the communion of the Holy Spirit. This will afford a demonstration of what the fact of Christ means and is worth to faith.

(4) There is a movement towards Christian reunion with which the writer is in entire accord, and to which it would be a deep satisfaction if his volume could be accepted as a helpful contribution. What creed shall be the basis of such reunion? The writer would be wholly satisfied himself if such a creed were found in the apostolic benediction, interpreted in accordance with the teaching of the New Testament, and with grateful regard for what the collective experience of the Christian Church can teach. Many a creed has come to man as a burden to the mind. Would not this creed, which this volume will attempt to expound in a spirit in accord with its content, come as indeed a benediction to the thought and life of men?

SECTION I

'THE GRACE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST'

INTRODUCTORY

As this volume is not concerned with either Biblical Theology or Church History, but with Constructive Theology, the statement of the Christian Doctrine of the Godhead, which in the writer's judgment covers the whole ground of Theology, for the thought and in the terms of to-day, no attempt will be made to deal exhaustively with the whole contents of the New Testament relating to this theme; but an endeavour will be made to present the object of Christian faith—the fact of Christ—as that has been simplified, clarified, and vitalised for the writer by many years of study, meditation, and experience. This essay does not profess to be more than the writer's own confession of faith, which, as it has been shaped in the fellowship and ministry of the Christian Church, it is to be hoped will have meaning and worth for others.

CHAPTER I

THE EVANGELICAL TESTIMONY: *A.* THE PERSON OF CHRIST

CRITICAL questions are not to be discussed in any detail, but it is necessary to state what is here assumed regarding the literary sources.[1]

(i) The distinction between the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth Gospel, and the interrelation of the Synoptic Gospels, is recognised. The Gospel according to Mark is accepted as the earliest Gospel, the content of which is almost entirely reproduced in Matthew and Luke. A second source of the common material in Matthew and Luke, not derived from Mark, is also accepted. This is usually referred to as Q, the initial letter of the German word *Quelle*, source. The probability that Luke had a third source, the 'Travel document,' is also admitted. The interest in Mark is the development of the faith of the disciples in the Messiahship of Jesus, and their failure to respond, after the Messiahship had been confessed, to their Master's teaching regarding the need of His Passion. The interest of Matthew is in Christianity as a new law superseding the Jewish, and of Luke in Christianity as a Gospel of grace, the Pauline standpoint without the details of the Pauline theology. The difference of interest determines the use of the common material by Matthew and Luke. In regard to Q, consisting mainly of sayings of Jesus, Matthew collects sayings on different occasions into discourses, while Luke gives them separately, generally in their proper historical context. Mark was a companion of

[1] See *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, by Moffatt; *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, by Burkitt; *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, by Sanday; *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, by Stanton.

Peter, and reproduces his witness to the ministry of Jesus. Luke, 'the beloved physician,' was the companion of Paul, and wrote the Book of Acts also. Matthew the disciple probably collected the sayings now forming the second source Q; hence his name has been transferred to the First Gospel because it so fully uses this material. After giving due consideration to the views of Protestant Liberalism as represented by Harnack, and Roman Catholic Modernism as displayed in the writings of Loisy, and the more recent representations of Kirsopp Lake and Foakes-Jackson, the writer remains convinced, with Headlam, of the substantial historical accuracy of the Synoptic Gospels without in any way committing himself to any doctrine of inerrancy.[1] This conclusion of previous critical studies is the assumption of this constructive effort, and the writer does not regard it as incumbent on him to interrupt the course of his exposition by any discussion in detail of these critical views. It is not necessary for the present purpose to deal with the probable dates of the Gospels; all that need be said is that they are not so removed from the events recorded as to be untrustworthy.

(ii) The Fourth Gospel stands between evangelical testimony and apostolic interpretation. The recollections of a personal disciple of Jesus have been modified by subsequent meditation on them, and even in the final presentation by philosophical and theological influences of the end of the first century; and it is a delicate and difficult task to disentangle these three strands in what at first sight appears to be a living unity.[2] The writer holds on grounds of historic probability that there was a Judaean ministry at successive feasts, and that in this respect the Fourth Gospel corrects and supplements the one-sided representation of Mark, dependent on Peter, which has determined that of Matthew and Luke. He feels

[1] See *What is Christianity?* by Harnack; *The Gospel and the Church*, by Loisy; *The Beginnings of Christianity*, by Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, Part I. vol. i.; *Life and Teaching of Christ*, by Headlam.

[2] See the books of Sanday and Stanton already mentioned in a previous note; and *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*, by Burney.

justified in asserting this position, only if the beloved disciple, whose recollections and meditations may be traced, can be regarded as a Judaean disciple whose interest was confined to Judaea, as was Peter's to Galilee. How John the son of Zebedee, a Galilaean disciple, could so ignore the ministry in Galilee, and know so well the ministry in Judaea, appears an insoluble problem. The writer is convinced that to maintain his authorship is greatly to increase the difficulty of maintaining the historical value of the Gospel. While in dealing with this Gospel the writer is always mindful that interpretation blends with testimony, yet he holds that it may legitimately be used to supplement the Synoptic representation, which a study of the Gospels for many years has convinced him is itself one-sided owing to the limitations of understanding and sympathy of those from whom their contents are derived. Details may need critical examination in the course of the discussion, but this brief critical introduction is in the writer's judgment adequate for his purpose.

I

(i) It has been usual to distinguish the person from the work of Christ in the treatment of these subjects in systematic theology, and even to confine the work of Christ to His salvation of men by His sacrifice. No such limitation on the work of Christ will here be imposed, but the whole of His manifold activity among and for men will be taken into account. Although a man shows what he is in all he does, and all a man does proves what he is, and in proportion to the sincerity, transparency, and reality is this unity of personality and activity, yet the distinction between person and work is convenient for a clear and full treatment of the subject.

(ii) Christian theology has often begun with the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, and then come down from that speculative height to the levels of history, and has failed to see clearly what was there,

a real humanity. The manhood has not been conceived in accordance with the historical evidence, but to secure consistency with an abstract idea of God which had no relevance to the facts. There was a descent of Godhead to manhood, as we shall afterwards recognise, but that is an inference from the known facts, and not itself a fact known, and we must follow in this exposition not the speculative but the historical path, the ascent of faith from the knowledge of the manhood to the belief in the Godhead. There was a time when the preacher or writer who laid stress on the humanity ran the risk of being charged with a denial of the divinity, and being called an Unitarian. But, although there are still some reactionary theological circles for whom the word divinity is not definite enough, but who will speak about the deity of Christ, intending thereby to ascribe to Christ, even in His earthly life, the possession and exercise of divine attributes inconceivable in combination with a real humanity, there has been a decided change, and many are attracted to the human personality, and find in that the divine reality, who would at first be repelled by a doctrine of divinity. And not only so: it is the recognition of the real humanity, in which the true divinity is manifest and communicative, which gives the fullest content to the word *grace* as the alone adequate descriptive epithet for what Jesus was and did. Grace is love stooping, suffering, seeking that it may save; and the love of God were not shown and proved as grace, had not God in Him stooped to share man's life and bear man's lot. But to assert the real humanity is not to affirm that Jesus was an ordinary man, and that we cannot believe of Him what we cannot believe of men generally, or that we must deny as facts whatever in the Gospels goes beyond what might be said of an ordinary man. We must allow the facts to modify our conception of real humanity.

(1) What men most prize in the Gospel record is the evidence it gives of a real moral experience of

Jesus (it is appropriate that we should use this human name in dealing with the real humanity). That 'He was tempted in all points even as we are' (Heb. iv. 15) gives Him such a value to men struggling against temptation as no other fact could, for even His Saviourhood from sin would mean less had He never shared such an experience. To assume that somehow His divinity removed all moral risk and moral strain and stress would, more than any other consideration, turn the Incarnation into a sham and mockery for men. Here, if anywhere, God coming to man as man must meet him, and stand with him on the same ground. We must so conceive the divinity that it will allow reality to this liability to temptation.

(i) Temptation is not itself sin, although it may be an occasion for and even a provocation of sin. Temptation may have its source in previous indulgence in evil. The drunkard is so severely tempted because he has voluntarily acquired the habit of drinking, with the consequent crave for more drink. But animal appetites and physical impulses, innocent in themselves, and wrong only as they come into conflict with the dictates of conscience, may be the sources of temptation. The social environment may offer suggestions and inducements to evil to one in these particular respects hitherto innocent. When we closely examine the temptations of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels, in the Wilderness, at Caesarea Philippi, and in Gethsemane, we find that none springs out of previous sin. Probably the story of the Temptation in the Wilderness, as it appears in Matthew and Luke—not in Mark, who mentions only the fact of temptation without the details—was told by Jesus to His disciples at Caesarea Philippi subsequently to His rebuke of Peter as Satan (Matt. xvi. 23) and in explanation of that rebuke, and even (may we add ?) in justification of its severity. In symbolic form He presented the inward conflict in which He rejected the popular expectations, based on prophetic predictions and apocalyptic speculations, of the Messiahship, and chose the path of dependence on and

submission to His heavenly Father, even although that was a path of suffering. In the self-pleasing, self-display, and self-advancement that such a Messiahship involved He had first the moral insight to discover a temptation, and then the moral strength to reject it. At Caesarea Philippi the disciple whom He had just commended tempted Him to self-sparing in shunning suffering, and because it came from loved lips the trial was the more severe. In Gethsemane He was tempted to shrink from the cup (xxvi. 39) not merely of bodily agony but of darkness and desolation of spirit which He experienced on Calvary (xxvii. 46), and there was no sin in the Son's shrinking from any separation from the Father, although there would have been sin had the cup been refused, when it was clearly known to be the Father's will. 'He learned obedience through the things that He suffered' (Heb. v. 8)—not to obey, but how far the demand to obedience might go, even that He who had always rejoiced in the Father's presence as His sacrifice for man's redemption must consent to forego that blessing. His temptations thus came to Him because of His vocation, and were worthy of His personality. For 'that He was tempted in all points' (iv. 15) does not mean that He had just the same temptations as all men have, but that temptation was as real a factor in His experience as it is in that of all men.

(ii) That there was a possibility of the wrong choice we must maintain; had He been certain that He could not fall, temptation would not have been a real moral experience for Him, and so far the Incarnation would have been a semblance. But living as He did in immediate contact and intimate communion with God as Father, there was no moral probability that He would fall; and we need not concern ourselves with the speculative question of how God would have redeemed man apart from Him. Reverence and adoration forbid our contemplating that possibility, but we cannot deny it without sacrificing the reality of the Incarnation.

(iii) That He was tempted, and yet 'without sin,' does not lessen the value of His temptation to us. For, *firstly*, His sympathy is no less perfect because He remained sinless under temptation. It is entirely an error to suppose that those who have fallen will be most sympathetic to others who share their temptation. The work of rescue among fallen women is best done by pure women, and it is not necessary to be a converted drunkard to stand by those for whom danger lies in taking liquor. The better a man is, if his saintliness be that of holy love, the more pitiful and helpful can he be to sinners. For not only does sin blunt the sensibilities and weaken the affections, but he who has carried the fight to a finish and has overcome knows the severity of the struggle as he who has yielded cannot know it. And, *secondly*, Jesus is not merely an example whom we are to imitate only with such resources as are at our command. He gives the power as well as shows the pattern of the good life. It was from His religious experience as Son, knowing, trusting, and serving the Father in holy love, that He drew the moral resources for His victory over temptation. In His grace He mediates for us the love of God, which comes to us in the presence and power of God's Holy Spirit, making us, too, more than conquerors.

(2) His moral experience is thus explicable only by His religious experience, of which we may quite reverently speak. The eighteenth century was not so altogether wrong when it recognised a religion of Jesus as well as a Christian religion, although it did err in thinking that the one could replace the other. Jesus Himself was the subject of faith, as well as the object of faith for others; and surely His is both the typical and creative faith (Heb. xii. 2). We believe in God through Him, because He believed and as He believed in God. We look unto Jesus as the pioneer and the consummator of faith, as showing all that faith can do and dare. He Himself endured and achieved through faith in God all that we may be called to endure and achieve through faith in Him.

He is the object of our faith as Himself the subject of faith. It is very significant that in the *Epistle to the Hebrews* two of the proofs that He is not ashamed to call men brethren are these: 'In the midst of the congregation will I sing Thy praise'; and 'I will put My trust in Him' (ii. 12, 13).

The knowledge that He claimed of God was not, as has sometimes been asserted, a claim to share God's omniscience. He knew God as Father in the dependence, confidence, and submission of a Son—that is, by the exercise of faith. It will be necessary to discuss the religious consciousness of Jesus as Son very much more fully at a later stage, but its characteristic faith is here insisted on for this reason. Omniscience can neither exercise faith nor be tempted. Temptation, to be real, involves that the issue of the conflict is unknown; and he who knew all the relevant facts of a moral situation would not be exposed to such a conflict. Such faith as belief is less than knowledge because less certain; while as a psychic act it is more, as by trust and surrender giving to the belief, if not the certainty of knowledge, yet so high a degree of probability as to justify action. The religious experience no less than the moral compels us, to preserve its reality, to admit the limitation of knowledge as well as the liability to temptation.

(i) While there are in the Gospels instances of Jesus' asking questions, not as feigning ignorance, as some of the Fathers maintained, but because He desired information, two crucial proofs will suffice. He confessed that 'of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father' (Mark xiii. 32). There is surely an intentional climax. That men should not know is not surprising; that angels should not know is surprising; most surprising it seemed to Him that He as Son should not know, and that it had not been delivered to Him as part of His knowledge of the Father. Here He seems to be referring to His own Second Coming. It is to the fall of Jerusalem as God's judgment on the nation and the city which had

rejected Him that He refers when He declares: 'This generation shall not pass away until all these things be accomplished' (*v.* 30). Why that confession of ignorance, and this confident prediction? The explanation surely is this, that He did not know all the conditions which must be fulfilled for His Second Coming, but He did know with a historical foresight due to His moral and religious insight that nation and city were ripe for God's judgment. Such a prediction shows a prophetic consciousness, but not a divine omniscience. Still more surprising is the confession of ignorance implicit in the prayer in Gethsemane: 'O My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt' (Matt. xxvi. 39). If we recall the frequency and certainty with which Jesus foretold His Passion, it is altogether improbable that death itself was the cup. Is it not probable that as death approached He became more fully aware of all that death would involve for Him, the darkness and desolation which He experienced on Calvary?

(ii) If in two matters so closely concerning Himself He confessed ignorance, then surely we are forced to recognise that as regards facts and dates of history regarding which information must be acquired, and which no moral or religious insight can discover, He shared the ignorance of His own age and surroundings. On two questions especially must that ignorance be recognised. (*a*) While He had a moral and spiritual insight as regards the meaning of the Holy Scriptures such as no other had, and His treatment of the Old Testament shows a freedom from the defects of Rabbinism, of which even St. Paul is not altogether free, yet as to questions of authorship, etc., which scholarship alone can answer after searching inquiry, He shared the traditions of His time. For Him as for His contemporaries the law was from Moses, and the Psalms from David. He makes no claim to speak with special authority on any of these matters. His reference to Jonah has been used as authenticating the historical character of that story; but it may be

pointed out that a comparison of Matt. xii. 39-41 and Luke xi. 29-30 shows that v. 40 in the first passage, which deals with the experience of the prophet in the whale's belly and treats it as an analogue of Christ's burial and resurrection, has no parallel in the second passage, and may be regarded as a later gloss. Jesus was not three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. Such a blunder would not have been made when there was still a vivid recollection that it was on the third day that Jesus rose from the dead. It is a confusion of things great and small to assume, as the defenders of traditional views do, that it makes any difference to the true enduring value of the Bible to abandon these views for the critical. Jesus at least cannot be cited as a witness in favour of tradition, speaking with the same authority as that with which He revealed the Father.

(*b*) A second question on which we are justified in assuming that He had only such knowledge as His time and people had is that of 'demonic possession.' Whether there are or are not evil spirits is a question on which it would be rash to dogmatise. We should remember that the belief may be regarded as a survival into a higher stage of religious thought of an almost primitive *animism*, explicable both by the stage of human development and by the conditions affecting it, and that Zoroastrian influences had greatly strengthened that belief in contemporary Judaism. Whether Jesus shared that belief Himself, or only used the current language in regard to it, it cannot surely be claimed that either the correction or the confirmation of the belief fell within His distinctive function of Revealer of the Father. Unless where it is felt that His authority imposes the belief, Christian experience offers no convincing evidence for it. But even if it were held that as regards the existence of good and bad spirits Jesus' speech must be final, yet surely the same claim cannot be made for the belief in 'demon possession.' The causation of disease is a question of scientific inquiry and not of religious conviction. It is only where belief in the manifold activity of demons

prevails that such an explanation is offered. All the evidence the Gospels supply justifies the conclusion that the symptoms of demon possession coincide with the symptoms of insanity. Even the belief of the victims that they were so possessed is a symptom of insanity, for the insane reproduce in distorted, extravagant form current thought. When preachers were in the habit of dealing with the subject of the unpardonable sin, religious melancholia assumed the form of believing that that sin had been committed. The writer has himself had to deal with two such cases. That missionaries report that they have met with such cases of demon possession in the foreign field is but a confirmation of this conclusion. The dominance of the belief in demons is an adequate explanation of the delusions of the insane. That some of the insane, or demon-possessed, confessed Jesus as Messiah is no proof that the demons possessed a secret knowledge of what He was which good men had not yet all reached; but that, without reserve and restraint such as the sane practised, the insane gave voice to surmises and questions that were being repeated in their hearing. The belief in demonic possession need not be an article of Christian faith.[1] What has been said of demonic possession applies also to the whole realm of physical science. On all these questions Jesus knew only what others knew. Whether as regards facts of history or causes and laws in nature, there was limitation of knowledge.

(iii) There are two directions in which His knowledge seemed to reach beyond that of His contemporaries. He had on the one hand an insight into the moral and spiritual condition of others, and on the other a foresight regarding the course of events, which may at first sight appear altogether supernatural. (*a*) The perfection of His moral character, the absoluteness of His religious consciousness, the finality of His mediatorial function, to all of which we shall return in the next section of this chapter, do make it probable that He did possess an insight and a foresight of the

[1] See Alexander's *Demonic Possession*.

highest degree compatible with a real humanity. But we should rashly cut the Gordian knot of the problem of His personality if we simply regarded both as evidence of divine omniscience, for there are human analogues of both. A sensitive, sympathetic nature can transcend the limits of separate personality, and can receive and respond to the inner life of others. That Jesus knew how many husbands the woman of Samaria had had is altogether improbable; and we can explain the evangelist's statement only by assuming that, as no disciple was present at the interview, the woman in subsequently repeating it transferred to the lips of Jesus the accusation of her own conscience, stirred to activity by His presence, in her quite honest belief that 'He told me all things that ever I did' (John iv. 18, 29). That He was aware that He was in the presence of one with an uneasy conscience is altogether probable. As the Physician of souls He knew all which it was necessary He should know to diagnose the disease. He might detect at once when Judas began to be discontented and disloyal (as John vi. 64 at least suggests); but when He chose Judas He did not choose him to be traitor, and His references to betrayal were surely appeals to Judas to turn him from the way of perdition. When He commended Peter, He did not know how soon He was to be the Tempter (Matt. xvi. 18, 23). This insight was not a complete knowledge such as divine omniscience might be. It is love which gives insight, and it was the perfection of the love of Jesus which enabled Him to enter into the life of others and to make it so fully His own.

(*b*) As regards His foresight, it must be related to His insight. Because He so understood men, He could foresee the tendency of events and foretell them. This prediction was, like that of the prophets, *conditional.* Had His appeals to Judas moved him from his purpose, he at least would not have been the betrayer. Had His appeals to Jerusalem found a response of repentance and faith, its doom might have been deferred, if not averted, for it was Jewish

fanaticism which hastened the end. As man is free, and is in partnership with God in the making of history, the future is not fixed by any divine decree, and there is not, and cannot be, any unconditional prediction. The prophet succeeds with this warning of judgment, as his prediction fails. Only one prophet —the peevish Jonah—is represented as displeased because his warnings had been heeded, and so his reputation for accurate prediction had been lost. Jesus spoke with such confidence of Judas' betrayal and of the doom of Jerusalem, because He knew what was in man by His moral and religious insight.

(iv) But it may be urged, in view of this limitation of knowledge, how can we accept Jesus as the authoritative Teacher? There is a distinction which we are warranted in making which removes the difficulty. We may distinguish knowledge of facts, and insight into moral and religious truth, between learning and wisdom. James I. has been described as 'the most learned fool in Christendom.' A man may have much knowledge and little understanding. The seer's vision of God and the saint's submission to God are in no way affected by the extent of knowledge which the one or the other may possess. A scholar may be very fallible in moral judgment, and a great man of science may lack any sense of the reality of God. The insight of Jesus into moral and religious truth was in no way affected by His limitation of knowledge as regards nature and history. Such knowledge may be acquired by learning from others; but such insight is rooted in the personality. What Jesus was concerned with was the revelation of God and the redemption of man, and His efficacy in that function did not in any way depend on the extent of His knowledge, but on the unerring insight He had because of His immediate contact and intimate communion with God as Father. He had an unclouded vision of the reality of God as Father, and of all that that reality involved for man's relation as child to God, the duty that relation imposed, and the destiny that relation promised. He did not claim omniscience or infallibility in any

sphere except this, and yet this is the sphere to which man's knowledge could never reach, and which all man's learning could never disclose. What is knowledge of nature and history such as man by his own endeavours can acquire, compared with the knowledge of God as Father which the Son alone possessed, and alone could impart to men? To acknowledge limitation of knowledge is not to deny or diminish the revelation of God in Him as final and perfect.

(3) In view of the affirmation by many of the Christian Fathers, borrowed from Greek philosophy, of the impassibility of God, it is necessary to lay very special emphasis on the quick sensibility, the emotional intensity of Jesus.

(i) He was subject to quick and keen feeling. He was moved to compassion for human need, sorrow, and sin (Mark i. 41); to indignation against unbelief and wrong (iii. 5). He was grieved as well as surprised at the dulness and slowness of understanding of His disciples (viii. 21). He wept over impenitent Jerusalem, and at the grave of Lazarus (Luke xix. 41; John xi. 35). In Gethsemane He was exceeding sorrowful, even unto death (Matt. xxvi. 38). Was there ever sorrow like unto His sorrow on the Cross, where He tasted death for every man, that is, entered fully into the experience of dying? He was 'the man of sorrows, acquainted with grief' (Is. liii. 3). Common as has been this representation, true as it is, it is yet one-sided. He could and did rejoice as well as mourn. 'He rejoiced in the Holy Spirit' (Luke x. 21). His knowledge of His own Sonship, and God's Fatherhood, and His calling to share that knowledge with others, made Him blessed, a blessedness His disciples could share with Him (*v.* 23). Finding here His own rest from labour and burden, He could offer rest to others (Matt. xi. 28-30). His meekness and lowliness of heart, His dependence on and submission to His Father, made for Him the yoke easy and the burden light. He could leave to His disciples a legacy of peace (John xiv. 27). It was for the joy that was set before Him that He endured the Cross (Heb. xii. 2).

He surely both fathomed the depths of agony, and scaled the heights of ecstasy.

(ii) As this emotion was not self-centred or self-enclosed, but was made by His universal love expansive, He shared with men their joys and their sorrows as a selfish heart never can. The greatness of the sacrifice which He endured and achieved for man's salvation was determined by this capacity to feel with and for others. Gethsemane and Calvary bear witness how He could bear upon His own heart the crushing load of the shame, and sorrow, and suffering imposed by human sin. He could not have shared with and for man the consequences of human sin as He did had there not been this expansive emotion, this loving heart that could draw into its own inmost shrine the woes and griefs of others. He felt as man the sorrow of universal humanity. And as He was one with His Father, so God felt in Him with and for man. In His liability to temptation, in His limitation of knowledge, in His subjection to emotion He identified Himself with man, and so also God did in Him.

II

Having noted these features of a real humanity, we may now ask ourselves what are the proofs of a true divinity. We must not rely to-day on proofs such as were advanced in former days:—the pre-existence, the virgin-birth, the fulfilment of prophecy, or the performance of miracles; for this kind of argument is ineffective for our age. About each of these, however, a few words may be said.

(i) The references to pre-existence are so few, and are all found in the Fourth Gospel. They cannot, therefore, be the basis of a proof. As will afterwards be shown, we may find a place for these references in the exposition of Jesus' religious consciousness as Son, and need not now further discuss them.

(ii) The virgin-birth, disputed as the fact is, cannot be relied on in any convincing argument for the divinity of Jesus, and is indeed irrelevant, as it

concerns the humanity and not the divinity, for God is not born, but man. The writer himself does not feel justified in a confident denial or affirmation of the fact, although he leans to the latter. If it be a fact, its significance can be exhibited in discussing the moral character of Jesus.

(iii) Jesus Himself claimed to fulfil law and prophecy; He came as the completion of the progressive revelation of God in the Old Testament (Matt. v. 17). He corrected what was defective in its religion or morals. He filled up that which was lacking in its truth and grace. The ethical monotheism of the prophets He crowned by making God known as Father, and man as the child of God, called to be perfect even as the Father is perfect (*v.* 48). He abolished the sacrificial system of Judaism by giving mankind the good things, of which these ordinances were but the shadow, for He fully met the needs of the soul which these had been discovered unfit to meet.[1] He instituted the new covenant, prophesied by Jeremiah (xxxi. 31-34), in His blood; by His sacrifice men were brought into a new relation to God (Matt. xxvi. 28; 1 Cor. xi. 25). The hope of deliverance and blessing that had sustained God's saints in times of affliction He brought to fruition by a salvation more excellent than they had conceived or desired. He transformed the apocalyptic expectations of the Resurrection in the manner of His own Risen Life: the hope of immortality was confirmed in the eternal life men can find in Him. It is probable that in His triumphal entry into Jerusalem (Matt. xxi. 1-9) He had the prediction of Zechariah (ix. 9) in view; but what He did was done as a last argument and appeal to the Jewish people to accept the kind of Messiahship that prediction foreshadowed, and not merely to fulfil a prediction literally. It is not probable that on the Cross He said, 'I thirst,' to fulfil prophecy, but because He really thirsted (John xix. 28): and it was the evangelist who found in the cry such a reference to prophecy. After the manner of their own time the evangelists, Matthew especially,

[1] This is the thesis of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

did use the argument from prophecy in emphasising a correspondence between the events of the life of Jesus and prophetic utterances, even such as were not intended as predictions. Their procedure is, however, so artificial and even arbitrary from the standpoint of a historical interpretation of the Holy Scriptures as to have no apologetic value for us. The reference in Matt. i. 23 to Is. vii. 14 rests on a mistranslation of a Hebrew word in the Greek version. In the prophet's utterance no virgin-birth is predicted. The words quoted in ii. 15 from Hos. xi. 1 are not a prediction of the flight into Egypt, but a reminder of the people by the prophet of God's goodness to the nation in the Exodus. There is a vital connection between the Old Testament and the New, the revelation of God to the Hebrew nation and in Christ and His Church, and the modern study of the Holy Scriptures makes that connection clearer and surer; but the argument from prophecy as it is presented in the Gospels does not carry conviction to-day.

(iv) That Jesus performed miracles does not itself prove His divinity, as a man with a message from God might have been entrusted with that power. It is because we believe in Him on other grounds as Saviour and Lord that the miracles become at all intelligible and credible to us. We may relate them vitally to His person and His work, as will afterwards be attempted, but we cannot advance them as evidence of His claims, but must rest our argument on more convincing grounds. These grounds are His moral character, His religious consciousness, and His mediatorial efficacy.

(1) Just as it is the liability to temptation as evidence of a real moral experience that many men prize most in the real humanity of Jesus, so it is the perfection of His moral character, the result of such an experience that commands not only admiration, but adoration, which for many men will prove the most persuasive argument for the true divinity. The more theology makes progress in conceiving God as moral perfection, the more convincing will the moral

character of Jesus be as a proof that He comes from God, and makes God known.

(i) That, though tempted, He did not sin, does not lessen, as has been shown, the reality of His humanity, but it does point beyond humanity for an explanation. In this sinful race heredity and environment do not account for sinlessness. Even if we deny the doctrine of inherited corruption and total depravity, and take the more modern view that the individual moral development begins with a handicap, in that animal appetites and the natural impulse to self-assertion gain a start of the control of the will by conscience,[1] Jesus is the only instance of sinlessness, and this exception to common human experience needs in some way to be accounted for.

Unless we take the extreme ascetic view that the relation of the sexes is itself sinful, and that propagation by such a relation is itself a channel of moral corruption—a libel on human love, and a blasphemy on God who appointed this way for the continuance of the race,—virgin-birth itself does not offer any explanation. If the tendency to sin be inherited, there is no reason, if we set aside the above assumption, for supposing that the one parent is more likely to transmit that inheritance than the other. If the virgin-birth be accepted as fact, it can be brought into relation to the sinlessness of Jesus as at least a partial explanation in this way, that as His life as a human personality began in an exercise of faith by His mother in response to the communication of the divine purpose concerning her motherhood (Luke i. 38), so from the very beginning of His moral development that divine grace, which his mother received, was alike by heredity and environment a factor potent enough to restrain those other factors of human nature that impose the moral handicap already mentioned. It was the faith of the human race, as represented by His mother's submission to the will of God, that opened the door for the entrance into human history of this new divine factor, an immediate contact of a

[1] See *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, by Tennant.

developing human personality with the eternal reality of God. Even before the consciousness of Sonship emerged the relation to God subsisted, and sub-consciously influenced the development. If we deny the fact of the virgin-birth, such an explanation remains probable; what the story of the virgin-birth would add would be this, that it would disclose certain moral and religious conditions in the mother which would afford the points of contact within humanity for this new relation of God to human personality. Just as Jesus is represented as requiring faith for His miraculous activity, so would the supernatural act of God in the beginning of the Incarnation, the manifestation of God as man, be conditioned by human faith. Without any confident dogmatism in regard to the matter, if the virgin-birth be fact, so interpreted it does make incarnation more intelligible and credible. In dealing with this question it has been necessary to anticipate the conclusions of this discussion of the true divinity, and we may, therefore, sum up the immediate argument in a hypothetical proposition. If it be proved that Jesus was sinless and perfect, and that He was conscious of a unique relation to God as Son to Father, then the fact of the virgin-birth becomes more probable, and can be interpreted in such a way as at least partially to explain that sinlessness.[1]

(ii) Can any evidence for the sinlessness of Jesus[2] be offered which will stand a close scrutiny? (*a*) We need not be much disturbed by some specific charges against His character and conduct which have been suggested, as a candid and discriminating examination proves that the vocation of Jesus, and the circumstances, offer an adequate explanation. That in His absorption in the pursuit of the Father's will He remained in the Temple, forgetful of the anxiety of His parents (Luke ii. 49), does not justify

[1] See *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, by James Orr, with Appendix, giving opinions of living scholars.

[2] A monograph on this subject, published more than half a century ago, which is still of interest is *The Sinlessness of Jesus*, by Carl Ullmann, translated by Sophia Taylor.

a charge of inconsiderateness. That He repelled with emphasis His mother's appeal at the marriage in Cana shows that the same dominance of God's will in His consciousness compelled Him to set aside her authority in the exercise of those powers of which, for the fulfilment of His mission, He had become conscious at His Baptism, and the method of using which had been determined in His Temptation (John ii. 4). That He at first refused the petition of the Syro-phoenician mother in language which rebuked the Jewish exclusiveness of His disciples, and yet by the accompanying look or tone encouraged the mother to press her request, is an incident which carries its own justification (Mark vii. 27-29). That He called Peter Satan at Caesarea Philippi shows, not bad temper, only the strain He felt in resisting a temptation pressed on Him by so highly favoured a disciple (viii. 33). If we are to take the story of the withered fig-tree literally as a miracle, and not as a misunderstood parable, it can best be understood as a parable in act, and not in words only, regarding the doom of unfruitfulness—a compassionate warning to the Jewish nation (xi. 14). The cleansing of the Temple was a legitimate challenge of an ecclesiastical authority, an act of righteous zeal against impiety and also inhumanity, as it was the Court of the Gentiles which was being put to so base uses from the motive of greed (*vv.* 15-17). The severity of His denunciation of scribes and Pharisees was but the counterpart of His solicitude for the salvation of the people; it was love's judgment on a lovelessness which was hindering the grace of God to men (Matt. xxiii.). Even could we not explain each of these instances to our full satisfaction, yet in view of all the evidence regarding the moral character of Jesus, it would be more fitting for us to distrust our own moral judgment than to impute error or wrong to Him.

(*b*) The total impression of the historical personality as presented to us in the Gospels is of One 'holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners' (Heb. vii. 26), as regards any share in their guilt, but not as

regards His seeking that He might save the lost. If it be said that the evangelists, or their sources, concealed defects, and invented excellences, we can answer that we must then ascribe an infallible moral insight to them as the only possible explanation of their success in their purpose. But it is not in imperfect men to conceive such a perfection as Jesus presents to us. If it be further urged that there may have been secret sins, to them unknown, we may insist that no hypocrite is ever so consummate that his inward defects do not sometimes betray themselves in word and deed. But the most convincing evidence of sinlessness is Jesus' attitude to sin and sinners. The saints have been marked by the intensity of their penitence for their sins, and the urgency of their prayers for forgiveness. This mark of saintliness Jesus lacked. He never showed penitence, nor craved pardon. Unless He suffered from a moral insensibility, a deadness of conscience, which His character and conduct as disclosed to us make it quite impossible for us to ascribe to Him, the only explanation possible is this: that He not only was not conscious of any sin, but that there was not in Him any sin, of which He could repent, and for which He must seek pardon. His words to the rich young ruler: 'Why callest thou Me good? none is good, save one, even God' (Mark x. 18), are not a solitary confession of sinfulness, but are a humble acknowledgment that so long as He was still liable to temptation, so long as He was learning obedience through the things that He suffered, so long as He had not been baptized with the appointed baptism, and had not drunk the proffered cup of sacrifice, He did not claim the divine perfection. While He identified Himself with the sorrows and sufferings of men, sharing even the consequences of sin, which do fall most heavily on vicarious love, He did not reckon Himself, although in the world's scorn He might be reckoned, with transgressors. 'Not ashamed to call men brethren' (Heb. ii. 11) in relation to the one Father-God, in respect of this one thing—sin—He placed

Himself not on the side of sinful men but of holy God. He claimed authority on earth to forgive sins (Mark ii. 10); He declared that He was appointed Judge, so that the destiny of men would be determined by their relation to Him (John v. 22); He deemed Himself capable of offering His life as a ransom for many (Matt. xx. 28), and as the sacrifice of the new covenant of grace between God and man (xxvi. 28). It is inconceivable that One, conscious of sharing in man's sinfulness, could have taken this attitude towards sin and sinners. While He suffered Himself to be treated as a sinner that sinners might be made the righteousness of God in Him, yet He knew no sin (2 Cor. v. 21). If He was not altogether sinless, He either so deceived Himself, or others, that we cannot admire moral excellence in Him, not to speak of the adoration of moral perfection. To surrender His sinlessness is to surrender entirely the only possible object of a faith, reverence, and devotion such as the Christian Church has believed itself justified in offering to Him.

(iii) Although sinlessness may appear only as a negative conception, yet the actuality of it would demand in a world with so many inducements and provocations to sin an exceptional moral energy from which we should expect abundant positive results of goodness and grace. As human personality cannot be a moral vacuum, the entire absence of sin is conceivable only as due to the abounding presence of holiness and love. To attempt to describe the perfection of the holy love which we contemplate in Jesus seems an impossibility. Only a few features of His character can be mentioned which affect more directly our conception of His person. (*a*) First must be mentioned His humility, because we shall never truly conceive the Incarnation unless we regard it as the supreme instance of God's humbling of Himself. As an encouragement to the labouring and heavy-laden, as a disclosure of the secret of rest, the light burden and the easy yoke, Jesus described Himself as 'meek and lowly in heart,' and what He meant by that the immediate context shows. He

did not resent His rejection by 'the wise and prudent,' and His acceptance only by the babes, the ignorant and morally and religiously immature disciples, although He was disappointed that He had not found disciples among the labouring and heavy-laden, the men who morally and religiously needed Him most, and whom He could most fully help (men like Paul, whom in His earthly ministry He did not reach). Nay, He even submitted to the will of God. 'Yea, Father, for so it is well-pleasing in Thy sight' (Matt. xi. 25-30). Luke even reports that 'in that same hour He rejoiced in the Holy Spirit' (Luke x. 21). While the Fourth Gospel is mainly concerned, as the Synoptics are not, with the relation of Jesus to God, His Sonship, yet that Sonship is represented throughout as an entire dependence on, and a complete submission to God, as well as an intimate communion and absolute confidence in God as Father. It is an interesting and even arresting fact, that that Gospel introduces that beautiful instance of humility, the washing of the disciples' feet, by a statement emphasising Jesus' consciousness of His relation to God (John xiii. 1-3). Not only in His relations with men, in choosing for His companions working men and women, in going to the outcasts of Jewish society as objects of His loving care, did He show His humility, but it is in His relation to God—as Son to Father—that that grace is made most manifest. Theologians have often misrepresented Him in writing so much about His claims, as though ambition and arrogance were characteristic of Him. The Sonship He claimed was such a relation to God as could be adorned by meekness and lowliness of heart; and His Saviourhood was a humbling of Himself to be obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross (Phil. ii. 6-8).

(*b*) Closely related to His humility was His sympathy or compassion, taking both words in the fulness of their meaning as *feeling with* others. His love was vicarious love; it put Him in the place of those He loved, to share their lot with them. While He could and did rejoice with those that rejoiced, and at one

stage of His ministry could say that it would be unmeet for His disciples to fast while He, their Bridegroom, was still with them (Mark ii. 19), yet as Saviour of a sinful race, His self-identification with men was for the most part a sorrowing with them. He was found among the suffering and sorrowing, the sinners and outcasts of Jewish society. He cared no less for women and children than for men, contrary to the estimates of value of His age and people. The despised Samaritan and the hated Gentile He embraced in His interest and affection, even although He had to limit His brief earthly ministry to the people to whom in fulfilment of God's promises He had come. The agony of Gethsemane and the desolation of the Cross witness how completely He could make Himself one with sinful mankind so as to endure as His own pain and grief the consequences of man's sin, even tasting death for every man (Heb. ii. 9).

(*c*) While He thus identified Himself with men, He was Himself solitary in His moral vision and purpose. He told His disciples that if their righteousness did not exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees they could not enter into the kingdom of heaven (Matt. v. 20), and that, unless they turned, and became as little children, they, who were disputing about the first place there, would no wise enter therein (xviii. 3). He told Nicodemus, and through him the Pharisees whom he was representing, that without the birth from above they could not even see that kingdom, or enter into it (John iii. 3-5). His opponents were not the indifferent in morals and religion, but the exponents and examples of the godliness and goodness of contemporary Judaism.

In His holy love, forgiving sin, and suffering to save from sin, He was original among men. In some respects Gautama the Buddha approaches His perfection more than any other of the great teachers and leaders of men, and yet at what a distance! Heredity and environment cannot explain that moral transcendence; and not even genius in the ordinary acceptation of the term. As His character in this

particular corresponds so closely with what He taught of God as Father, we must regard it as not only human excellence, but as a revelation of the perfection of God.

(*d*) This holy love in sympathy for man, and in humility before God, had to be exercised and maintained under conditions of severest testing. Tempted, opposed, persecuted, rejected, betrayed, reviled, and scorned, He endured, constant in His purpose, and sealed His fidelity to God and man in His blood. Only a holy love of inexhaustible resource could in a sinful world have maintained its consistency as He did. His life was surely a seamless garment of perfection, woven by holy love throughout. Such figurative language must be used to suggest what plain words could not express.

(2) In dealing with the moral character of Jesus it has been impossible not to anticipate in some statements the discussion of His religious consciousness, for His morality was a religious morality; His character was rooted in, grew out of, and drew its nourishment from His relation to God.

(i) As His was a real, if ideal and typical humanity, we ought to speak of a religious consciousness of relation to God. Whatever metaphysical explanation we may be led by the facts to offer, we are bound first to set forth those facts under that category of our thought. He as Son knew Himself as distinct, and yet as related to the Father; immediate as might be the contact, it was not identity; intimate as might be the communion, it was not absorption. That He exercised faith, and used prayer towards God, warrants our speaking of the religion of Jesus, and we should lose much if we hid that fact under a metaphysical explanation. While, as has already been shown, Jesus' attitude to sinful mankind places Him on the side of God in dealing with sinners, and He made claims in that relation which it would have been arrogance and audacity for one who knew Himself to be only man to make, yet His distinctive religious consciousness of relation to God finds expression in

only one passage in the Synoptics, to which already in another connection reference has been made. This passage (Matt. xi. 27=Luke x. 22) undoubtedly belongs to the collection of sayings which supplies much of the common material of these two Gospels. There was a secret of His own nature which He as Son knew that God as Father alone knew, and He as Son alone knew and could reveal God as Father. But this relation of Father and Son is on His part as Son one of dependence and submission, for the words 'All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father' are no claim of universal dominion, but a confession of entire dependence, even as the words, 'Yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in Thy sight,' are an utterance of complete submission. Jesus thus not only gave God the name Father, and taught the care and bounty, the mercy, pity, and grace of the divine Fatherhood, but He revealed the Fatherhood most fully and surely by living as Son. The kind of Son He was shows the kind of Father God is. While He did teach the universal Fatherhood of God, yet there can be no doubt that He was in Himself conscious of an immediate relation to God, which for others could only be mediated by Him.

(ii) While we must always remember that in the Fourth Gospel recollection comes to us coloured by meditation, that history is interpreted by theology, yet we are justified in using that Gospel to supplement what the Synoptics disclose regarding the Sonship of Jesus. Dependence and submission are no less asserted there. Only a few crucial sayings need be taken. The defence of the Sabbath cure, 'My Father worketh even until now, and I work' (John v. 17), is no claim to equality with God, as His opponents represented it to be, but simply an appeal to the divine example. How absolute a dependence is expressed in the words: 'I can of Myself do nothing' (*v.* 30)! In freely laying down His life He is fulfilling a commandment received of the Father (x. 18). If we follow Moffatt's rearrangement of passages in chapter x. *v.* 30, 'I and the Father are one' would at once

follow *v.* 18, and what would be asserted would be a unity of purpose, and not, as a dogmatic interpretation would claim, of *substance*, importing categories of thought unknown to the Gospel. What more striking confession of dependence and subordination could there be than the saying, 'If ye loved Me, ye would have rejoiced, because I go unto the Father: for the Father is greater than I' (xiv. 28)? His earthly life was relatively a separation from God, in which He could not possess from His Father all that His return would restore to Him. Sayings that seem to contradict this representation of the relation, though found in the Fourth Gospel, must be regarded as interpretation rather than testimony.[1]

(iii) There are a few sayings in the Fourth Gospel which carry the relation to God out of the temporal process into the eternal reality. Again we confine ourselves to what may be with good reason regarded as words of Jesus Himself. 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am' (viii. 58). He was justifying His claim to bestow eternal life against the challenge of His opponents, who affirmed the universal mortality even of the greatest men, such as Abraham. At this challenge His thought soared above the temporal process, to which their minds were confined, to the eternal reality of His relation to God, and He thought of the Father of those who believe as anticipating with gladness His present manifestation of that reality. When His opponents again dragged Him back into that temporal process, He asserted the more emphatically His timelessness, but as He was speaking to those whose thoughts could move only in time, He represented that timelessness as priority in time. Under very different conditions did His mind again revert to His relation to the eternal reality. 'Now, O Father, glorify Thou Me, with Thine own self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was' (xvii. 5). Harnack's comment on *v.* 24 is worth quoting. 'The confidence with which

[1] Whatever use may be made in this volume of the Fourth Gospel is based on a thorough critical study, if not always in agreement with critics.

John lets Him speak to the Father, "Thou lovedst Me before the foundation of the world," is surely overheard from Jesus' own certainty.'[1] Pre-existence is an inappropriate term, as it represents an eternal relation as priority in the temporal process. To affirm, as is done by Tholuck,[2] that these sayings mean 'a continuity of the consciousness of the historical Christ with the Logos' is both unnecessary and unreasonable. In a developing human consciousness such a continuity is inconceivable. Did the babe in the mother's womb already possess it, or if not, when did it emerge? Seeing that the first distinct utterance of that consciousness is found only towards the end of the earthly ministry, when His controversy with His opponents was being pressed to its final issue, a much more probable explanation is that to meet the challenge of His opponents, there came to Him, or (should we not rather say) the Father gave to Him the certain assurance that, as His work for men was not to be confined to the temporal process of His earthly ministry, so the relation to the Father of which He was conscious, and which sustained Him in the fulfilment of His vocation against all opposition, had not begun in that temporal process, but was eternal as God Himself. He knew Himself to be the object of the eternal love of God, He knew that that involved eternal blessedness in communion with God. He believed that the man distinguished for his faith could not but have had some anticipation of His present manifestation of that eternal love and blessedness. It is in some such way alone that we can make these sayings intelligible.

(3) Not only were Jesus' moral character and religious consciousness so unique that we cannot exhaust their significance by describing them as human, and must ascribe the quality of divinity, but both were *creative*, an added proof of His claim to be related to God as Father as no other man has ever been. The divine Fatherhood does not mean only care and bounty in providence; it means primarily a creative fellowship

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 81.

[2] Quoted by Dods in *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, i. p. 841.

with man, in which the likeness of the divine perfection is reproduced. Jesus was the perfect Son in that in an unbroken fellowship with God He reflected undimmed the glory of God. It is by the perfect Son that the divine Fatherhood towards all men is mediated. As mankind is sinful, this revelation of God not only to, but in man, must needs be redemptive. What were the means by which Jesus fulfilled His calling in His revelation of God redemptive of man the next section will discuss; but what is here to be noted as completing the proof of the divinity of Jesus as presented in the evangelical testimony is this, that He has done for mankind what God alone could do. Through Him there has been realised a fellowship with God and a likeness to God in mankind, so that both the Fatherhood of God and the sonship of man which He revealed are real. By the forgiveness of sin He restored the interrupted fellowship with God; by His Spirit in men He produces in them a holiness in which likeness to God is shown. It is in His Cross that His revelation of God in the redemption of man is consummated; and yet in His earthly ministry He began His creative work of making sinners into children of God and saints. There have been great teachers and leaders of the souls of men, but none of them claimed to do or did what Jesus has done. Through Moses came a law to be obeyed; Mohammed was the prophet of a truth about God; Gautama offered man the secret of a salvation which must be secured by their own efforts. Christ brings men to God and God to men in an immediacy of relation, in an intimacy of communion, in a sufficiency and an efficacy of divine grace through human faith which is a new creation of man in his inmost, highest life. It is because of the sufficiency and efficacy both of His revelation of God, and His redemption of man, the transcendence of what He has done for man over all that other teachers and leaders of the soul have accomplished, the absolute quality of the relation of man to God through Him, that we must confess that this work is not of man, even at his very best; but

this God and God alone can have wrought. This cannot, of course, be demonstrated by merely intellectual arguments to those who have not had the experience of what Christ has done; but for those who have that experience, there need be no other evidence. They have the witness in themselves that He is God.

CHAPTER II

THE EVANGELICAL TESTIMONY: *B.* THE WORK OF CHRIST

As the personality expresses itself in the activity, so the work discloses the person of Christ. His person in its blended loftiness and lowliness, God as man, is, shows, and proves grace; so, as we shall see, does His work, which we do not confine, as has often been done, to His atoning death. There is a unity of motive, purpose, and character in the whole of His activity, so that the parts can be understood only in the whole.

(1) Jesus began as a teacher, and it is this aspect of His work which first claims attention. It is not priority in time, however, that is the whole reason for our considering the teaching first of all. Many false theories of the atonement have been due to ignoring the truth He taught about God and man, and their mutual relation. We can understand His sacrifice for our salvation only if His mind be in us, if we think as He did.

(i) What was distinctive of that teaching is suggested by the records of the impression made on those who heard. (*a*) Mark records that 'they were astonished at His teaching; for He taught them as having authority, and not as the scribes' (i. 22). The scribes were interpreters of the Holy Scriptures, and even in their interpretation they were prone to quote what others had said before them, rather than to state what they themselves thought. Conscious of the deficiency of their personal authority, they had to rely on authorities. Jesus came not as a commentator, but as a revealer. His forerunner had revived the prophetic succession, and He came in that suc-

cession as an agent of divine revelation and with a freshness, fullness, and freedom so much the greater as He was Himself greater. He did not need to quote what men had said about God, for He Himself knew God with the intimacy of the Son knowing the Father. It was His moral and spiritual discernment which enabled Him so to speak, that even those who knew not the secret of His personality were brought under His spell, recognising that He had a right to command the assent of the mind, the constraint of the heart, and the submission of the will. What His first hearers felt, that the generations since have felt. His authority cannot be ignored, it must be accepted or rejected. That is an issue from which for those who move at all in the moral and religious realm there can be no escape. He is, and must be, either a stone of stumbling, or the rock for building.

(*b*) The contrast between the teaching of Jesus and that of the scribes indicates another difference; and that also is noted in Mark's Gospel: 'What is this? A new teaching' (i. 27). Efforts have been made to discredit the originality of Jesus by showing that many of His characteristic sayings can be paralleled elsewhere. For instance, it is said that the Golden Rule is found in a negative form in Confucius, but in a positive in Lao-tsze. There is a likeness between the kind of life enjoined by Gautama the Buddha and that presented in the moral teaching of Jesus. In the Jewish fathers there are sayings about forgiveness which very closely resemble what He taught. It is assumed that in His teaching about the last things He reproduced the apocalyptic ideas of His own age. Regarding this argument three things may be said. *Firstly*, it would be very strange if Jesus had never said what had been said before Him. God had not been without witness in other lands and former times, speaking not through the succession of Hebrew prophets alone 'by divers portions and in divers manners.' To be saying what nobody else has ever thought of saying is proof of folly and vanity rather than of wisdom and virtue. Jesus came, not to

startle the world with unheard-of novelties, but to carry the moral and religious development of mankind to a new stage, transcending and yet fulfilling the previous stages, continuous with them as well as contrasted to them.

Secondly, a comparison of the Sermon on the Mount alone with the law of Moses and its scribal interpretations, and still more with the current practices and motives of the Pharisees, who claimed that they made morality and religion their chief concern, throws into bold relief the indescribable difference. Jesus was Himself conscious of that contrast. While He claimed to fulfil the law and the prophets,yet the Sermon shows that by fulfilment He meant ' filling full,' completing what was lacking, correcting what was defective. He told His disciples, ' except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven ' (Matt. v. 20). This contrast meant opposition and conflict. The undressed cloth will rend the old garment ; and the new wine burst the old wine-skins (Mark ii. 21-22). To give only a few instances : in respect of Sabbath observance, the distinction of clean and unclean, the relative importance of ceremonial and moral requirements, the association of the righteous with sinners, Jesus came into conflict with the custodians of the morality and religion of His age and nation. It is true that He justified Himself often by reverting to the older and better teaching of the Scriptures ; but so to detach oneself from present standards and practices and to attach oneself to what is discerned as truer and worthier in the past to the degree Jesus did, proves originality.

Thirdly, if we take the teaching as a whole, the association of morality with religion, of human duty with the relation to God, the dominating principle of love in both spheres, the maximum application of that principle in unwearied forgiveness of others, and unmeasured sacrifice for others, the harmony of motive, purpose, and character, giving to all a unity such as no other system has possessed, pervaded

throughout by a finality and sufficiency which all religious and moral thought have not superseded nor exhausted, who can doubt that this was indeed 'a new teaching'?

(*c*) Its general character is described in what Luke writes of the impression made in the synagogue at Nazareth. 'All bore Him witness, and wondered at the words of grace which proceeded out of His mouth' (iv. 22). It may be impossible for us now to be certain of the reference of the word *grace*: probably it is to the matter, and the passage read supports this view; for to Luke, the companion of Paul, what was important was the revelation of grace in Christ. But the evangelical records justify us, and the words allow us to include *manner* and *method*. The *manner* of the teaching was gracious in keeping with the message. The teacher did not repel, but attracted the ignorant and even the sinful. We may be sure that a look, a smile, a tone, a gesture made what appeared severe seem kind, and what in itself was unloving very rich in its tenderness. The sinful woman would never have dared to come so near to Him had not His manner invited approach (Luke vii. 37, 38); and the Syrophoenician mother would never have repeated her request had not His manner interpreted the word which sounded as a denial as an invitation to perseverance (Mark vii. 27, 28). The *method* too was gracious, for it always aimed at meeting the need, and fitting the capacity of those to whom the speech was addressed. 'By this method,' says Wendt,[1] 'of meeting the want of the occasion, Jesus has been able to impart two weighty qualities to His utterances and His instruction, viz.: *popular intelligibility and impressive pregnancy*. The importance lies in the union of these two qualities. A mode of teaching which aims at popular intelligibility is exposed to the risk of degenerating into platitude and triviality; and one which aims at pregnant brevity easily becomes stilted and obscure. But Jesus perfectly combined the two qualities, and by this very means attained

[1] *The Teaching of Jesus*, Eng. tr., i. p. 109.

a peculiar and classic beauty of style.' There was *grace* in the aesthetic sense as well as the religious.

It lies beyond the scope of this volume to discuss the method of Jesus in detail; and the writer just quoted may with advantage be studied for this purpose. But two observations must be added. *Firstly*, the reason given by Jesus for speaking in parables only in appearance and not in reality contradicts the statement, 'Unto you is given the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest haply they should turn again, and it should be forgiven them' (Mark iv. 11, 12). The words in *v.* 12 are a quotation from Isaiah vi. 9. In accordance with Hebraic modes of thought the human result of insensibility and unresponsiveness to divine truth is there represented as the divine intention. What was meant was that the attention of those who could not or even would not receive His message in plain words must be held by a story; a time might come when the meaning of the story would unfold itself to them. In the form of a parable Jesus lodged a truth in the memory, when the understanding was not yet ready to receive it. How suggestive the parables have proved, revealing and not concealing truth! *Secondly*, if the method of teaching in the Synoptics aims at this *popular intelligibility*, it is not a conclusive objection to the authenticity of the teaching presented in the Fourth Gospel that it is not the same in form, if most of it was addressed, on the one hand, to opponents who challenged its truth, and on the other to a disciple, or group of disciples, who could receive and respond to the teaching as the multitudes, and even for the most part the Twelve, could not. But even the Fourth Gospel emphasises the reserve and restraint of Jesus in that more intimate teaching. 'I yet have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now' (John xvi. 12). There was grace in the withholding as well as the imparting. It must, however, be

added that the *impressive pregnancy* of Jesus' method does make it highly improbable that He ever spoke with that diffuseness and even repetition which marks so many of the discourses in the Fourth Gospel. In meditation on pregnant utterances which he remembered, the evangelist expanded them to display their meaning.

If it be remembered that very little, if any, of Jesus' teaching took the form of formal discourse, and that much of it was casual conversation, wayside and table talk, this combination will appear all the more an evidence of the intellectual keenness and quickness of Jesus, as well as of His moral and spiritual insight. He was so much at home in the realm of God and goodness that He could at once, without any laboured preparation, make the best response in speech, for which any occasion called. He was also so much at home in the works and ways of men, the common human heart, that He could always command the language that would best correspond to the condition of His hearers. That He was so much at home in both realms is surely also an evidence that His were words of grace.

(ii) Manner and method agreed with matter. His message to men was grace. (*a*) The passage from Isaiah (lxi. 1) which He read in the synagogue at Nazareth, and which He declared was now fulfilled (Luke iv. 18-21), set forth grace, and grace alone, for He did not read the words 'and the day of vengeance of our God.' In His message to the Baptist He gives as one of the proofs of His Messiahship, 'the poor have good tidings preached to them' (Matt. xi. 5). The invitation in verses 28-30 shows whom that grace sought to reach, and what it offered. Such parables as the lost sheep, the lost coin, the prodigal son (Luke xv.), and such incidents as the acceptance of the act of devotion of the woman who was known as a sinner (vii. 36-50), and the call to Zaccheus (xix. 1-10), make that mark of His teaching clear and certain. When Jesus spoke with severity it was only against those who themselves rejected grace, or made acceptance

of it by others more difficult. His denunciations of scribes and Pharisees, and His doom on Jerusalem confirm and do not contradict that general impression (Matt. xxiii.). The Fourth Gospel states this fact in its own distinctive terms: 'Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life' (John vi. 68).

(*b*) Harnack has indicated the content of the teaching in the three groups of sayings, to which he gives the titles: *the Kingdom of God and its coming, God the Father and the infinite worth of the human soul, the better righteousness and the command of love.*[1] It is evident that these groups are inter-related. The sovereign and the subjects, and the supreme law of the kingdom determine the character of the kingdom, and the method of its establishment. While Harnack does not adequately deal with the question with which the eschatological school is mainly concerned, he does give a much more accurate presentation of the teaching of Jesus than does that school. As this volume is not intended to give a detailed account of the teaching of Jesus, his exposition in details need not be discussed; but two defects of his account of the Gospel must be noted. He tries so to explain the miracles as to deprive them of any supernatural character (a question to which we must return), and he avoids the problem of Christology. Admitting the knowledge which Jesus as Son claimed to possess of God as Father, he is content with affirming that our psychology cannot fathom the secret of this consciousness.[2]

(*c*) The eschatological school, of which Loisy is the most noted representative, and which was brought into notice in Great Britain by the translation of Schweitzer's book, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, uses what may be justly described as critical violence on the Gospels. It deprives Jesus of every utterance that cannot be forced into the narrow framework of its view that He was but the herald of an imminent, transcendent, catastrophic kingdom of God, and

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 33.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

assigns to the Christian community of a later age all those sayings about God and man, duty and destiny, which the Christian Church hitherto has regarded as most distinctive of His Gospel. The community is represented as greater in its moral and religious insight than the Founder, and less dependent than He was on the contemporary apocalyptic thought. Harnack, in refusing to share this view, rightly states the position. 'Surely it is a mistake in similar cases to judge pre-eminent, truly epoch-making personalities first of all in this respect, what they have shared with their contemporaries, and on the contrary to push into the background what was distinctive and great in them. The inclination as much as possible to level down, and to eliminate what is special, may in some persons spring from a sense of truth, deserving recognition, but it is misguided. More frequently there prevails here, conscious or unconscious, the endeavour not to acknowledge the great, and to throw down the lofty.'[1] We are justified in affirming that for Jesus the kingdom was not merely future, but in His presence and activity among men already present and active. He was not merely the herald of that coming kingdom; but the kingdom was being already established in His revelation of God, and the truth and grace which He Himself was already imparting to men. His moral teaching was no *interim ethics*, and His function no merely transitional and preparatory one. For even Harnack does not do full justice to the place Jesus gave Himself in His Gospel.[2] Even if it be true that He did not preach Himself, but the Father, yet He alone knew and could reveal the Father. He did require a more intimate personal relation to and dependence on Himself than just obedience to His commandments; and as has been shown, while He was not ashamed to call men brethren, yet as regards His consciousness of God's Fatherhood and His revelation of it to man He did distinguish Himself from all others, and especially in regard to

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 35.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

sin He stood on the side of God and not of man. He was not merely the messenger, but in His relation alike to God and man He was included in the content of His message. When we come to discuss how He conceived His distinctive vocation, all that this statement means will be made more plain.

(*d*) The eschatological school has, however, called attention to a feature of Jesus' teaching which Christian theologians have often ignored. The Apostolic Church lived, laboured, and suffered with a vivid, eager expectation of a speedy Advent of Christ in power and glory. Could it have cherished that hope had there been no ground for it in the teaching of Jesus? That is extremely improbable. Further, we should need to do critical violence to the Gospels as great as that of the eschatological school were we to deny that Jesus gave any eschatological teaching. There is no doubt that He foretold the doom of Jerusalem, and placed the fulfilment of His prophecy within that generation. There seems to be no doubt that He also, as did other prophets, placed the consummation of all things in close association with the immediate judgment of God: but, as we have already seen, He confessed ignorance of the day and the hour of that event. It is probable that the thought of the Apostolic Age has left its colour and tone in the transmission of the teaching of Jesus on the Last Things, and that probably a greater definiteness was given to some of His sayings than these at first displayed. He believed that God could bring the fulfilment of His purpose speedily, but He also recognised that the unbelief of man might hinder and delay this final consummation. He never affirmed that the divine power would bring about God's purpose apart from the human process in history, which He presented figuratively in such parables as the mustard seed and the leaven (Matt. xiii. 31-33). Surely as man He was subject to changing moods. When His faith in God exalted Him above the conditions of the hour, His manifestation in power and glory seemed not only certain, but imminent; when His contact with men

brought despondency, He was less confident that the time was near. What is significant is that for the future no less than the present, He was at the centre of His message.

(2) Jesus lived what He taught alike in His religious experience and His moral character, as well as the grace of His dealings with men.

(i) His teaching was enforced by His *example*. Those whom He enjoined to learn of Him were also called to take His yoke upon them, that is, to serve not Him, but as He served, to be His yoke-fellows (Matt. xi. 29-30). What He said and did was not to set an example, but because it was just what it was most fit should then and there be said and done. Jesus never assumed the moral pose which some men do in trying to set an example; in fulfilling His calling in word and deed He showed what moral perfection is. On one occasion He is represented as doing something for the sake of example. When He had washed the disciples' feet, He enforced the meaning of His deed in the words: 'I have given you an example, that ye also should do as I have done to you' (John xiii. 15). As the deed, however, was one of humble service, there was in it no moral pose, which is often so offensive in those who offer themselves as patterns to their fellows. As the words to Peter show: 'If I wash thee not thou hast no part with Me'; the example was not one merely to be imitated; it was in itself one may even say sacramental, the channel of the grace that cleansed the disciples from the rivalry and ambition which so endangered their personal relation to Himself. As it was necessary for them, so it was a duty for Him as charged with their training for His work. By its moral quality it was morally efficacious. This is essentially what the moral example of Jesus means. His holy love gains such influence over His disciples, that without conscious imitation they are gradually conformed to His likeness. Literal reproduction of what He said and did is not to follow His example; but vital participation in His motive, disposition, purpose is. His

vocation on the one hand, and His circumstances on the other, were so unlike ours, that such artificial imitation would be a moral absurdity. His perfection, while it humbles, also encourages us, for it is the perfection of the grace that enables us to do what it enjoins; it is a pattern which does not make us despair, because it is also a power that is sufficient according to our faith for every demand. We may truly use of His example the words of Augustine, *Jube quod vis, Da quod jubes.*

(ii) It is in connection both with the teaching and the example of Jesus that the miracles may be with most advantage considered. (*a*) They must not be regarded as external credentials of supernatural power to enforce the authority of Jesus as teacher. That teaching appeals to reason, conscience, affection, and aspiration, and needs no such enforcement. The miracles are necessary constituents of His message and mission of grace, in which He revealed the love of the Father to men, and showed the characteristics of His own religious experience, moral character, and mediatorial function. We shall not accordingly give the miracles their due place in this work if we lay stress on the supernatural power which may have been displayed and not on their witness to His confidence in God and compassion for man. At the Temptation Jesus rejected the use of His supernatural power on His own behalf or for the advancement of His cause as a suggestion of evil. He not only refused, but condemned the request for a sign from heaven in proof of His claims. The statement in Matt. xvii. 27 about finding a shekel in the mouth of a fish does not afford an instance of any use of supernatural power for any personal end; for there is no record that a miracle took place, and the words themselves bear the construction of a playful command of Jesus to Peter to go and earn by his fishing the money which was wanted. If the record of the withering of the barren fig-tree is to be regarded as the report of a miracle, and not as due to a misunderstanding of a parable (a possible explanation, compare Mark xi.

13-21 with Luke xiii. 6-9), it would at first sight appear an exception to the general rule that the miracles were beneficent, healing disease, relieving need, warding off danger. But it may be understood, although it must be admitted the context does not suggest that interpretation, as a symbolic miracle, a prophecy in act of the doom to fall on the Jewish nation, which had not yielded to the Messiah the fruits of penitence and faith. A critical study of the story of the Gadarene demoniac shows that Jesus used His power to heal the man believing himself possessed, but not to destroy the swine, the panic which resulted in their destruction being probably due to the violent gestures and loud cries of the demoniac, for the word Matthew reports as spoken by Jesus, 'Go' (ὑπάγετε), being addressed to the consciousness of the possessed man, does not at all necessarily carry the interpretation that Mark puts upon it, 'And He gave them leave' (Matt. viii. 32, Mark v. 13). While the beneficent character is evident in the miracles of healing, it is not so obvious in some of the nature-miracles. A supply of wine towards the end of a feast does not at first sight appear a necessary service of love; nor can we at once see the imperative need of the stilling of the storm, or the walking on the sea, unless indeed the lives of the disciples were imperilled; but we may find the motive of even such miracles in the compassion of Jesus, His readiness to respond to any human appeal. This we can say confidently, that He never worked a miracle for show, to display His power, or prove His claim. As the nature-miracles present the greatest difficulty for our thought, we may postpone their discussion until we have dealt with the healing ministry of Jesus.

(*b*) Matthew Arnold suggested that the miracles of healing were instances of what he called *moral therapeutics*, because of the close connection between moral fault and disease.[1] Harnack has advanced a similar view: 'We see that a firm will and a convinced faith act even on the bodily life and cause

[1] *Literature and Dogma*, pp. 143-4.

appearances which appeal to us as miracles. Who has here hitherto with certainty measured the realm of the possible and real? Nobody. Who can say how far the influences of one soul on another soul and of the soul on the body reach? Nobody. Who can still affirm that all which in this realm appears as striking rests only on deception and error? Certainly no miracles occur, but there is enough of the wonderful and inexplicable.'[1] So far as assured medical knowledge goes, not all diseases can be treated by such suggestion or influence, but only those due to nervous disorder. Dr. Ryle[2] after a careful examination of the records of the healing miracles asserted the conclusion that such an explanation was inadequate. 'If the dropsy which was cured was real dropsy, and the withered arm a real withered arm; if the blind old men were not the subjects of hysteria, and the sick folk who were laid in the streets were not all neurotics, then we can no longer accept the works of healing as historical, and reject the so-called cosmical miracles. One who could rejuvenate at a word a strand of atrophied nerve might bring about the wasting of a fig-tree in a moment, and it would be rash to say that He might not command the winds and the waves, and raise the dead to life.' The experience gained during the War in hospitals in dealing with shell-shock and other nervous disorders has, however, led some medical men to modify their position, and to widen the range of the possible physical consequences of nervous disorders. One medical man has declared that he has seen cures effected similar to those of Jesus with only the one exception of the raising of the dead. As regards cure by auto-suggestion, or hetero-suggestion,[3] it has been contended that the distinction between functional disorders and organic diseases cannot be insisted on. Medical science generally has not yet reached the conclusion that all

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 18.

[2] 'The Neurotic Theory of the Miracles of Healing,' *Hibbert Journal*, v. p. 585.

[3] See Baudouin's *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion.*

diseases are curable by such methods. It would be very unwise, however, for the Christian apologist to take up a position on such a question which even a slight advance in medical knowledge and skill might soon prove to be untenable, and we are forced to ask ourselves the question: if the miracles of healing are explicable on the lines of this modern method of treating disease, to what representation of the healing ministry of Jesus must we resort?

(*c*) It must be admitted that the Gospel records themselves lend some support to this explanation. Jesus required faith in the recipient of the benefit, or those who interceded for him. He could not do many mighty works in Nazareth because of the unbelief of the people (Mark vi. 5). He told the father of the epileptic boy that 'all things are possible to him that believeth' (Mark ix. 23), and He explained the failure of the disciples to effect a cure in the words, 'This kind can come out by nothing, save by prayer' (*v.* 29). At the grave of Lazarus He is reported as lifting up His eyes and saying, 'Father, I thank Thee that Thou heardest me. And I knew that Thou hearest me always' (John xi. 41-42). The requirement of faith made His healing miracles a part of His ministry of grace to man, a means of bringing man into closer relation to God. That Jesus Himself exercised faith, and even expressed His faith in prayer in connection with His healing ministry, shows that that ministry for Him also had its roots, not only in His moral character—His compassion for man, but also in His religious experience—His confidence in God. It is the psychic energy, the will to cure, due to this compassion for man, and this confidence in God, which offers some analogy to this modern method of cure. Jesus was ignorant of this discovery of modern medical science, and so did not consciously use a method of natural cure. He Himself, as well as the witnesses of the cures, ascribed them to the supernatural power of God. But the possibility must at least be admitted that His perfect compassion for man evoked such a psychic energy of faith in others, and His perfect

confidence in God such a psychic energy of grace in Himself, that auto- and hetero-suggestion were combined in these cures. Even on this assumption, however, the activity of God must not be excluded. As in prayer the believer is conscious of benefit, religious, moral, and even physical, which he could not have secured for himself by his own aspiration or endeavour, so both the faith of the recipients and the faith of the agent in healing provided the conditions for the divine working, to which the miracles of Jesus were ascribed. There are persons who have in a high degree a curative influence over the sick, and probably Jesus did possess that pre-eminently. But that He had an inherent power to work miracles is on the whole, in view of all that has been said about the nature of His relation as Son to God as Father, less probable than that His miracles were instances of the divine activity through Him. While maintaining this view, the writer is not prepared to admit, however, that this modern method of cure fully explains the healing ministry. It is not proved that all the diseases He cured could be so treated, and the most wonderful events, the raising of the dead and the nature miracles, are unexplained.

(*d*) Regarding the raising of the dead we cannot dogmatise. If we could explain the narratives by a confusion of recovery from trance with restoration of life the difficulty would certainly be removed. We know too little of the relation of body and soul to affirm that such a restoration of life after death is impossible, however improbable our general experience makes it appear. What does seem in the highest degree improbable is that a body already decaying should have been restored to life; and we must assume that there is some mistake in the narrative in John xi. 39. Two of the nature-miracles (if such they are) have already been dealt with—the coin in the fish's mouth, and the withering of the fig-tree. It is not imperative to assume a miracle from the narratives of the draught of fishes, for a surprisingly abundant catch is not an unknown occurrence for

fishermen. If Jesus' command was not the result of careful observation, it may be explained by a supernatural intuition on His part that there was a shoal of fish. But as the same kind of occurrence is told in Luke v. 1-11, and John xxi. 1-8, in the one Gospel in connection with Peter's first call, and in the other with his restoration, and there is nothing corresponding in the record of Peter's call in Matthew and even Mark, who transmitted what Peter had reported about the ministry of Jesus, we may have here a vagrant tradition of uncertain origin. The stilling of the storm may be explained either as a supernatural intuition of Jesus that the storm was abating, or as an instant answer of God to the prayer of Jesus implicit in the words 'Peace, be still,' which could not have been addressed to inanimate, senseless winds and waves, but expressed His triumphant certainty. The walking of Jesus on the water offers more serious difficulty. Mark, Peter's reporter, says nothing about Peter's attempt to join his master (Matt. xiv. 28-32), and the Fourth Gospel does not reproduce that part of the story. Only if we assume that the 'beloved disciple' was John the son of Zebedee, can we claim that that Gospel offers us an independent testimony regarding the occurrence. The narrative itself shows the state of terror in which the disciples were, so that they mistook Jesus for an apparition (Mark vi. 49, Matt. xiv. 26). As Mark reports that 'Jesus would have passed by them' (*v.* 48), the motive of the action is obscured. If they were in such danger and terror, that He must at once be in their midst, what was the reason for such action? It must be conceded that the condition of the disciples did not qualify them to give a coherent account of what actually did take place. We cannot pronounce the miracle impossible, but the account is not convincing, and no adequate reason is offered for Jesus' thus raising Himself above those human limitations which give reality to the Incarnation. The story of the feeding of the four thousand (Mark viii. 1-9, Matt. xv. 32-39) may be regarded as a doublet of the story of the feeding of

the five thousand (Mark vi. 32-44, Matt. xiv. 13-21, Luke ix. 10-17, John vi. 1-13). 'It is,' says Dr. Headlam,[1] 'another account of the same event. There is a remarkable similarity between the two stories, but that of the five thousand has all the vividness which characterises a Marcan narrative, while that of the four thousand is singularly bald. Apart from this the two stories (except for the numbers) are almost identical. Then we notice that the second story is narrated as if there had been no similar event previous to it, and that while the first story takes its proper place in the narrative, the second story seems quite unconnected with what precedes it.' The difficulty of this narrative lies for us in conceiving what did take place. The report seems circumstantial, but it fails us just where we would like information most. When did the multiplication take place—in the hands of Jesus as He blessed, of His disciples as they distributed, or of the multitude as they received? When was an increase of the quantity observed? If there was indeed such, how does the witness fail to describe it? It is not surprising that various solutions of the problem have been offered, as that the people were so sustained and satisfied with the teaching of Jesus that they forgot their hunger, and felt that they had been fed, or that Jesus and His disciples set so good an example of generosity by sharing with others what they had that other stores of food were produced and divided, so that all got enough. The writer's own standpoint in this matter has been well expressed by Dr. Headlam.[2] 'A miracle and a wonderful event may have taken place in many ways, and we need not disbelieve it because our imagination cannot picture to ourselves the way in which it could have happened. I would venture to suggest, therefore, that, exercising a certain amount of suspense of judgment, we should refuse to rule out the story on *a priori* grounds, as necessarily unnatural or impossible, and should recognise that

[1] *The Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ*, p. 13.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 278.

something occurred, so wonderful as to stir up the people in a remarkable way.' He adds with reference to two narratives already considered: 'I would suggest also that we should not be too anxious to adopt a rationalistic explanation of the walking on the waves and the stilling of the storm, and should there also exercise a certain suspense of judgment. It is quite easy to devise rationalistic explanations, but they are really never convincing.' One miracle remains for consideration, the turning of the water into wine at Cana (John ii. 1-11). That it is told only in the Fourth Gospel need not itself excite suspicion. That it lends itself to an allegorical interpretation as a symbol of the transforming of human life by the Gospel of Jesus Christ does not prove that the author invented the story with that intention, as no such meaning is in any way suggested. As there was no multiplication of substance, but only transformation, the same difficulty for our imagination does not exist as in respect to the miracle just discussed. The difficulty is rather here, that no adequate reason for the performance of such a miracle is given in the narrative.

(*e*) While the writer is not prepared to abandon belief in the exercise of supernatural power by Jesus, either inherent in His Person or derived from God through prayer, in view of the difficulty which many Christian believers now experience in accepting the miracles as actual, valuable as the records are as illustrating the character of Jesus, he is convinced that it would be a mistake to treat belief in the miracles as a test of Christian faith. If Jesus' miracles were answers of God to His prayers, they afford evidence of the efficacy of His prayers in their perfect accord with the Divine Will. What is involved in such answers to prayer as regards the relation of God to nature is a question which must be left unanswered until the doctrine of God in the next section of this volume is discussed, but the evidence in the Gospels that such answers were given is a datum which must not be overlooked in such a discussion. We may now

pass from the subject of the miracles as illustrative of the teaching and example of Jesus to consider another aspect of His work which the miracles also illustrate—His Saviourhood.

(3) In dealing with Jesus' Saviourhood we do not exclude His teaching, example, or miracles. He saved from error by His truth, from sin by His example, from pain and grief and fear by His miracles. But what we are now to concentrate our attention upon is what He Himself conceived to be His distinctive vocation. That He knew Himself as Son of God has already been shown—that relation is primary in His consciousness; but how did He think of the mission from God to man, which was committed to Him as Son, and for which His Sonship qualified Him?

(i) At first He presented His universal vocation in a local, national, historical form. He accepted from Peter the confession of Messiahship (Matt. xvi. 17); He offered Himself to the Jewish nation as Messiah or Christ, the Anointed, in the significant act of the entry into Jerusalem (xxi. 1-11); and He recognised that He must die as Jewish Messiah, rejected by His people, if He were to become the world's Saviour (John xii. 24). As He did not think of the Messiahship as an earthly kingship, a victorious, prosperous, and righteous reign on the throne of David as a scion of the house of David, we need not deal at all with the Messianic hope in the strict sense of the term. In His Temptation, and throughout His ministry, He rejected the popular expectations, even though based on prophetic predictions of Messiahship. Owing to these false views He did not proclaim His Messiahship even to His disciples; and when Peter confessed that he at least had found this hope fulfilled, Jesus still enjoined silence, and at once began to present an ideal of His vocation no way corresponding to the expectations of even the disciples (Matt. xvi. 21-28). Only at the very end, when the disclosure of Messiahship would not involve the result He did not desire, did He in His triumphal entry claim Messiahship, but of a kind that disappointed all popular hopes. He

came to Jerusalem, not as conqueror delivering by His power, but in all lowliness to save by sacrifice (xxi. 1-11).

(ii) A more universal, permanent, and human conception of His vocation is indicated by the title which He chose for Himself, the Son of man. Much has been written as to the source and the significance of this title; but the writer can here only give his own conclusion after careful consideration of what has been written. The term Son of man is not merely a synonym for man; by it Jesus meant to express something distinctive. It is in most of its applications to be explained by the eighth psalm. After a discussion of the relevant passages the writer has stated elsewhere[1] that, just as in the psalm, 'Humiliation is as prominent as exaltation, humility as dignity.' 'Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Jesus meant by the use of this title so to assert His similarity to other men as to deny His superiority. It was because there was no natural identity that it was necessary for Him thus to intimate His voluntary identification with the race. A sense of difference of moral character, of religious consciousness, of historical position and function, is expressed, as well as the desire for union with the race, so that He might become to it the channel of divine grace.' While we recognise that the terms are inadequate, we may say that in the use of this title Jesus claimed *typical* and *vicarious* manhood. Realising in Himself *manhood* as it ought to be, He identified Himself with *mankind* as it is. There can be no doubt that in His answer to the High Priest's challenge whether He were the Christ or not (Mark xiv. 62), He had in view the statement of Daniel (vii. 13, 14): 'I saw in the night visions, and, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven one like unto a son of man, and He came even to the Ancient of Days, and they brought Him near before Him. And there was given Him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages should serve Him: His dominion is an

[1] *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus*, pp. 305-7.

everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and His kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.' Son of man is not here an individual title, but a description of a symbolic figure, standing for a collective conception, the saints of God, whose human reign is to succeed the brute reign of the oppressors of the saints, symbolised by beasts. Even if Jesus was familiar with the *Similitudes* of the *Book of Enoch*, we are not warranted in determining the significance of the term on His lips by that apocalyptic representation. It may be it was that book which led Him to individualise that collective conception of Daniel; but to assume that Jesus took over into His own consciousness of His vocation what that writing contains is altogether unjustified. We should rather discover this secret from His own words and deeds.

(iii) The writer is convinced that Jesus' view of His calling was determined by the ideal figure of the servant of Yahveh, especially as depicted in Isaiah liii. When we read that passage the conclusion seems inevitable that in Him alone that ideal was realised. But what we must try to prove is that Jesus Himself set this purpose before Him to be fulfilled from the beginning of His ministry. (*a*) It is sometimes assumed that He began His ministry with the hope by His preaching to bring Israel to repentance and faith, and that it was only afterwards, when His popularity failed, that His thought turned towards suffering as the means of salvation. It is true that it was only after the confession of His Messiahship by Peter that He began to disclose His purpose to His disciples; but that fact is not a proof that it was only then that the purpose was formed. As the drama developed, it may well be that the tragedy was more clearly discerned in all its details: but that He looked for success, and was only led by failure to try the way of sorrow, is incredible. We need not assume divine omniscience to explain His anticipations. As the lad's reply in the Temple shows, He was intent on the things of His Father (Luke ii. 49, ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Πατρός μου). In those quiet years of study

and meditation in Nazareth till He began His work, He must have pursued the same quest, to know His Father's will; and the Scriptures were available, if not in His home, yet in the synagogue. It was His insight that led Him to those passages which deal with the servant of Yahveh; and when He began his work, this was how He thought of it. Possible it is that He expected a larger number in the nation to believe, or even cherished the possibility of a national movement towards God; but that expectation, even if He had it, does not exclude the modified anticipation that He thought of the nation as with Himself a martyr nation for the salvation of other peoples, as the prophet of the Exile had thought of it. Had the nation repented and believed, and then striven to realise this ideal in its whole life, in the world as it then was, could it have escaped martyrdom? What may have deepened the tragedy for Him in the course of His ministry was the discovery that He would be alone in His martyrdom, forsaken even by the few disciples He had gathered around Him (Mark xiv. 27, John xvi. 32). Whether in this or some other form it does seem certain that His aim was to be the servant of Yahveh, although His filial consciousness rejected the term servant, and preferred to convey His sense of His oneness with the race He came to redeem by the title Son of man.

(*b*) We must now prove this conclusion in detail. At His baptism He dedicated Himself to His vocation; and in the record of it there are two indications of how He thought of it. He met the Baptist's objection: 'I have need to be baptized of Thee, and comest Thou to me?' with the words: 'Suffer it now; for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness' (Matt. iii. 14-15). The Servant who makes many righteous is Himself righteous; and He shows His righteousness in bearing their iniquities (Is. liii. 11). This was the righteousness He was fulfilling: He was, in vicarious love, being numbered with transgressors in sharing the baptism of repentance, though Himself sinless. As the Baptist's remonstrance shows,

he had some knowledge of the character and purpose of Jesus, derived probably from previous conversations. Only if Jesus had disclosed to Him His secret can we understand the declaration ascribed to the Baptist in the Fourth Gospel: 'Behold, the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world!' (John i. 29), so unlike all else that he spoke about Jesus. The Servant is described as 'a lamb that is led to the slaughter,' and the words that follow reproduce the thought of the following verses (Is. liii. 7-8). The voice from heaven that confirmed this dedication, 'Thou art My beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased' (Mark i. 11), recalls Isaiah xlii. 1: 'Behold My servant, whom I uphold; My chosen, in whom My soul delighteth.' When Jesus began His ministry in Nazareth, it was a passage in Isaiah lxi. 1-2 which He read, and which He claimed to fulfil (Luke iv. 18-21). When He gave the first indication of coming separation from His disciples due to the inherent antagonism between His mission and Judaism (Mark ii. 18-22), He used the figure of the Bridegroom which is also used in Isaiah lxii. 5. It is surely more than a chance that He described Himself as the Good Shepherd (John x. 14), even as the prophet described God in His leading of His people (Is. xl. 11): 'He shall feed His flock like a shepherd, He shall gather the lambs in His arm, and carry them in His bosom, and shall gently lead those that give suck.' When the Baptist's disciples came to ask Jesus if He were the Messiah or not, He referred their master to Isaiah xxxv. 6 and lxi. 1. In the healing ministry the First Gospel (Matt. viii. 17) finds a fulfilment of Isaiah's words, 'Himself took our infirmities and bare our diseases' (liii. 4), and in Jesus' enjoining of silence on the healed a fulfilment of Isaiah xlii. 1-4 (Matt. xii. 18-21). The Fourth Gospel quotes Isaiah liii. 1 as a prophecy of the unbelief of the people (John xii. 38). Each Synoptist finds a prediction of some detail of the Passion in the same portion of the Scriptures, the entry into Jerusalem (Matt. xxi. 5, Is. lxii. 11), the crucifixion between two thieves

(Mark xv. 28, Is. liii. 12), so also Luke xxii. 37, Is. liii. 12. The saying of Jesus in Matthew xx. 28, 'Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many,' gains fuller content from what is said about the servant in Isaiah liii. 4-6. Owing to the unbelief of the disciples even after the confession, Jesus could not freely disclose what was in His heart to them, and what He said was not accurately remembered in its details, as the very summary form of the three specific announcements of the Passion show (Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 32-34). Had there been fuller reports, we should probably find more numerous connections than we have now indicated. What has been proved, however, warrants us in using Isaiah liii. as filling out the content of Jesus' consciousness of His vocation.

(*c*) How soon His mind was turned towards the sacrifice which lay before Him has been shown in the preceding paragraph. After the crisis at Caesarea Philippi His mind was more constantly absorbed. The Transfiguration, which may be regarded as an objective vision, was a confirmation of Jesus' purpose, and a challenge to the unwilling disciples to submit themselves to that purpose. The appearances of the representatives of law and prophecy in converse with Him in regard to His '*exodus* which He was about to accomplish at Jerusalem' (Luke ix. 31), stamped the divine seal on His announcement of His Passion, and no less of the Resurrection which was to follow it. In the voice from heaven the divine approval confirmed the divine authority of Jesus (*v.* 35). Another prophetic association for the death, although entirely consistent with all the references to the Servant of Yahveh, is found in the words of Jesus at the Last Supper, 'This is My blood of the covenant, which is shed for many unto remission of sins' (Matt. xxvi. 28). As the Covenant at Sinai was not a covenant of grace, but of law, this must be another covenant; and, whether the word *new* was used or not (as in 1 Cor. xi. 25), the reference was undoubtedly to Jeremiah's

prophecy (xxxi. 32-34). The death is represented as a covenant-sacrifice. In Isaiah liii. 10 the death of the servant is represented as a sin offering. We must not commit the error, however, which the older typology committed of attempting to interpret the death of Christ by means of the Old Testament sacrificial system. The Epistle to the Hebrews ought to have warned us against the mistake of trying to explain the substance by the shadow. There are three other points of view from which Jesus presents His death to us: as a martyrdom, a following of the path of duty whithersoever it might lead (Matt. xvi. 24), as an offering of love—for Jesus surely saw more than an external connection between Mary's gift of love and the Gospel of His death (xxvi. 13)—and as a crime (xxi. 39-41).

All these allusions of Jesus to His death do help us in some measure to understand how He thought of it. The crime of the Jewish people in His death weighed heavily upon His heart, for He knew that it meant its doom. How revealing are the words which He puts on the lips of the owner of the vineyard when sending his son to the husbandmen, 'They will reverence my son' (*v.* 37)! It was a surprise and wonder to Him that man's sin could thus refuse and resist God's goodness and grace in Him. In obedience to God, as the Cross appointed to Him to bear, and in love to man, prodigal as was Mary's offering, He suffered Himself to be the victim of the crime, nay, even He forced the issue upon the Jewish people, while He grieved for the judgment that His act was inflicting because He recognised a necessity not to be avoided or escaped. Only by the crowning act of ministry in His death as a *ransom* (Matt. xx. 28) could men be delivered from their bondage to evil; only in His death as a sacrifice could the new relation of God and man, full forgiveness and free fellowship, be established. But the words *ransom* and *sacrifice* (blood means that and can mean nothing else here) do not themselves indicate to us what His death meant to Him, and how to it

were related man's forgiveness, freedom, fellowship with God, and we must turn to the records of Gethsemane and Calvary to discover if they disclose the secret to us.

(*d*) If we accept, as we may, as authentic history the difference which in Matthew's record is reported in regard to the first and the second prayer, a doubt was removed from the mind of Jesus, and a certainty gained. What was the cup which His first prayer assumes can be removed, and His second recognises can not (Matt. xxvi. 39 and 42)? All He had said before excludes the conjecture that it was death itself that He shrank from and wanted to escape. The conviction that He must die was too deeply rooted to be shaken even by fierce gusts of emotion. It would have been unworthy of Him to fear death as a natural occurrence; for He by His grace has enabled men and women to face death in no less horrible forms in fidelity to Him. It was because now He realised what death might be to Him as a spiritual experience that He shrank from it. In His agony in Gethsemane He anticipated the darkness and desolation of soul which fell on Him on Calvary. It was worthy of Him as Son that He should shrink from and even seek to avoid that interruption of His filial communion with God which death now seemed to Him to threaten. It is He who by His Resurrection has taken from those who believe in Him the terror of death as a spiritual experience; but He in the days of His flesh, in the realisation of human sin, and the judgment of God on sin which came upon Him in those last hours, thought of death as involving so great a loss. He seems to have realised that to make the sacrifice of His obedience to God and His compassion for man complete, He must experience death at the worst which man had ever feared—the loss of God's presence. Only thus could He 'taste death for every man' (Heb. ii. 9). No other writing in the New Testament shows such insight into the content of the sacrifice of Christ as the Epistle to the Hebrews. What Jesus dreaded in Gethsemane and endured on

Calvary is truly interpreted in these words, 'Who in the days of His flesh, having offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him out of death (ἐκ θανάτου), and having been heard for His godly fear, though He was a Son, yet learned obedience by the things which He suffered; and having been made perfect, He became unto all them that obey Him the author of eternal salvation' (v. 7-9). It was indeed a godly fear (ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας) that He should dread this interruption of His filial communion, and yet His obedience as Son was tested to the uttermost, the greatest sacrifice for Him being accepted. He was indeed heard and saved out of death, for the dread experience had ended before death came, and He passed into the unseen in self-committal to His Father (Luke xxiii. 46). Himself sinless, He yet experienced death as God's judgment on sin, and in so enduring it He conveyed to 'mankind sinners' God's forgiveness of sin. The love which assures forgiveness of sin no less endures judgment on sin, and so approves itself holy love. This to the writer seems to be the meaning of the agony of the Garden and the desolation of the Cross. Any less and lower interpretation is not great enough for the moral and spiritual greatness of Jesus Christ. To say that it was common human emotion in the prospect and the endurance of death which so overwhelmed Him, or, because He used the words of a psalmist in His cry of dereliction, to measure His experience by the psalmists, is to trifle with reality. As Son of God and Son of man such an experience was not individual, but must be interpreted in relation both to God and to man, and His relationship to both.

(*e*) To discuss what doctrine of the Atonement may be based on this experience of Jesus, in which His fulfilment of His vocation was completed, belongs to a later chapter; here we are concerned only with such psychological interpretation of the experience as will make it appear more intelligible. In this experience there culminates His twofold relation to 'mankind

sinners,' which can be traced throughout the whole of His ministry. On the one hand He was the friend of outcasts and sinners, and in His sympathy and compassion identified Himself with them. Unlike the righteous men of His own people, He made their lot His own in love. Because He was not ashamed to call the sinners His brethren, He was despised and rejected of men who thought themselves good and godly. On the other hand, however, He was Himself 'holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners,' as Himself knowing no sin. He never, identifying Himself with sinful mankind, shared signs of repentance, made confession of sin, or prayed for forgiveness. In respect of the fact of sin as personal act He stood not on the side of man, but on the side of God, judging and forgiving sin. In the tenderness of His forgiveness of the penitent we must not lose sight of the severity of His condemnation of the self-righteous. In forgiveness of and judgment on sin He identified Himself with God, as in compassion and sympathy He identified Himself with 'mankind sinners.' Because love is by its very nature vicarious, *i.e.* puts itself in the place of the beloved, He both judged and forgave sin as God does, and He endured the consequences of sin, suffering, sorrow, shame, struggle, as man does. In the Cross this self-identification with God and man was brought to its highest intensity. The occasion, on which man's sin was exposed in its worst antagonism to God's holy love, made not only possible, but even inevitable, that as the Son of God He should approve God's judgment on sin in death, and as Son of man should Himself endure that judgment, not by any artificial substitution, but by love's self-identification with God and with man. He so loved God that He condemned sin with God; He so loved man that He endured its doom with man; and His experience with man was deeper than man can share, because He saw in that experience what God sees. In penitence man identifies himself with Christ in His judgment of sin, both as approved and endured by Him, and in faith He identifies Himself with Christ also in

accepting the forgiveness He conveys. We must beware of saying that Jesus felt guilty, or was held guilty, or was punished instead of us, for these terms are inapplicable to the sinless and holy, and they belong to the law-court, which by its analogies can only mislead: all we dare say is that His vicarious love endured all the consequences of sin, regarding them not only as man may, but as God does. We must not say that God's wrath rested upon Him, or that God forsook Him. He was the Son beloved and approved, even when His intense, overwhelming realisation of death as God's judgment on sin excluded from His immediate consciousness the sense of God's presence and favour: for, as human, His consciousness was subject to the limitation that an absorbing emotion excluded other contents. As soon as that emotion was relieved, the sense of God's relation to Him was at once restored. As a historical occurrence the death of Christ must first of all be psychologically interpreted before we can attempt any theological interpretation, and this is all the writer, acutely conscious of the imperfection of his endeavour, has here attempted to do. In closing the treatment of this subject he must express his conviction, a conviction that has been deepened by the meditation of many years, that the fact of Christ is mutilated, and the grace of Christ is obscured by any interpretation of the Cross that does not recognise, as the writer's study of the Gospels has forced him to recognise, that not in the teaching, example, or companionship, but mainly in His sacrifice He fulfilled His vocation.

(4) This chapter would not be complete without a brief statement regarding the Resurrection, and its significance for the work of Jesus.

(i) When Jesus foretold His death, He also spoke of His Resurrection. He did not contemplate His death as an end of His relation to God or to man, but as a condition of a wider activity for God among men. This conviction He expressed in an analogy: 'Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit'

(John xii. 24). Even if reflection blend with reminiscence in the report of the Discourse in the Upper Room (John xiii.-xvii.) we are warranted in assuming that the experience of the disciples was the fulfilment of the promise of the Master. The Transfiguration, in confirming His purpose to die, also gave Him a prevision of the glory that should follow. Again the Epistle to the Hebrews displays a truly inspired insight, when it declares that He 'for the joy that was set before Him endured the Cross, despising shame' (xii. 2). It was not so clear and full a knowledge as would lessen the trial, but it was a sure and strong enough faith to make the trial endurable. For the disciples the Resurrection brought a renewal of faith, and a recovery of hope: it alone made the death tolerable; and it was only in the light of the Risen Lord that they began to discover its meaning. The Cross would have remained an unrelieved tragedy had not the Crucified risen and 'showed Himself alive after His passion by many proofs' (Acts i. 3). Even those who deny the fact of the Resurrection admit that the belief in the Resurrection was the foundation of the Christian Church, and try by various theories to explain the belief without accepting the fact. To Paul the thought of the Messiah as having died the accursed death of the Cross was a blasphemy so intolerable that with utmost violence he sought to stamp it out; and it was only the certainty of the Resurrection that forcibly turned him from unbelief to faith (1 Cor. xv. 8, 'an abortive birth,' ὡσπερεὶ τῷ ἐκτρώματι). As the purpose of this volume is not critical or historical, but theological, the writer must simply ask his readers to accept the assurance, that after a candid and careful study of the relevant literature he has reached the conviction that the evidence for the fact is adequate, and that the theories which seek to explain away the fact are untenable. The statement in 1 Cor. xv. 1-11 itself would suffice for this conviction. How completely the reality of the Christian faith and hope depended on the fact is shown by Paul in *vv.* 12-34.

(ii) What must be here discussed, however, is the nature of the Resurrection, for there is a common tendency to-day to deny the complete resurrection of Jesus, and to substitute for it what is miscalled a spiritual resurrection, for it seems to amount to no more than a survival of the soul, while the body was left to perish. To insist on the completeness of the victory over death is to expose oneself to a charge of materialism. Regarding this charge the writer will content himself with saying that to him it seems *materialism* to assume that God had not the power to transform a *natural* body into a *spiritual* (to use Paul's distinction), especially in the case of Him who is typical ideal man, the first-fruits from the grave, the first-born among many brethren, the beginning of the new creation of God, and not *materialism* to believe that matter is the creation, and so remains under the control of spirit. The more recent theories of physics should make us hesitate about setting rigid bounds to the possible transformation of matter as our senses apprehend it. To substitute the Greek idea of the immortality of the soul for the Hebrew idea of the complete restoration of the human personality, and yet to continue using the word *resurrection*, is to palter with words. On this view the appearances of Jesus were deceptive, for they were corporeal appearances, and by appeal to the senses of sight, hearing, and touch were seemingly intended to give assurance of corporeal reality. On this view, too, the appearances must be regarded as subjective hallucinations, or as manifestations similar to those that the spiritualists claim to be able to secure from the dead. Such evidence as we possess in the Gospels forbids the assumption of an identity of physical attributes. It was the same person with a changed body. Mary mistook Him for the gardener, and only recognised Him by the tone of His voice (John xx. 15, 16). The two on the way to Emmaus knew Him not until a familiar gesture recalled Him (Luke xxiv. 31). He appeared in the midst of the disciples when the doors were closed (John xx. 19). To overcome unbelief and to

ensure faith there seem to have been occasional manifestations to sense which might be regarded as not permanent characteristics. We move here in a region of conjecture; and yet the conclusion seems justified that the natural body had been transformed into the spiritual body. Whether the transition was gradual and completed at the Ascension, as the records in the Gospels would at least suggest, or sudden, as Paul anticipates for those who may be alive at the final resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 51-53), we need not attempt to decide. We must admit that we are here seeking a way amid apocalyptic thought, which Christianity inherited from Judaism, and in which our minds cannot be thoroughly at home: but of this the writer himself is quite convinced, that to the completeness of the Christian faith in Jesus the Christ our Lord there does belong the belief, which the historical evidence does not challenge, but to which it gives some support, that the victory of Jesus was a complete victory, that the whole personality lives as the promise and pledge of the believer's complete deliverance from death.

(iii) What the Resurrection means is that the work of Jesus the Christ our Lord was not ended at death, and is not merely continued by a posthumous tradition and influence, but that He Himself, and no other, in the fulness of His real divine-human personality works on. As it is not an activity of which there are any sensible tokens, but only spiritual evidence, we may say that it is by His Spirit or the Spirit of God that He still teaches, succours, comforts, saves, and blesses men. The record of His earthly ministry is invaluable as indicating so clearly the content and character of His person and work, that it can serve as a test of every historical movement which claims to be inspired by Him. While His activity is freed from the conditions and limitations of the earthly life, its purpose is the same as was that of His ministry among men in the days of His flesh. It is through His Church that the sensible manifestation of His Presence and Power is now made; hence it is His

body, His necessary complement, as He is Himself in and by it completing His vocation (Eph. i. 23). But it can serve as His body only as it is realising that He, the Head, is diffusing His own life through all the members of that body. There are various stages in apprehending the meaning of Christ, varying degrees in appreciating His worth, but it can be said confidently that the distinctive, typical, crucial Christian conviction is that of personal experience of a personally present and active Saviour and Lord. Thus Jesus rises above, and reaches beyond the realm of temporary history, and becomes a permanent and universal reality, so immediately and intimately related to the infinite and eternal God, that by Christian faith God is not apprehended apart from Him, but in Him. The justification to reason of this faith must be reserved to the constructive section of this volume, but what must now be affirmed as an essential part of the *fact of Christ*, which is the enduring and world-wide object of faith in Him, is just this, that in His person and work He is exalted above the limitations of time and space. This is the meaning of the symbolic phrases of His ascension, His exaltation, His session at the right hand of God, His title as *Lord*, ' the name above every other name,' the title which pious Jews substituted in the reading of the Scriptures for the covenant name, Yahveh, and which believing Christians found no difficulty in bestowing on Jesus the Christ, after His Resurrection. It is in this world-wide and age-long Saviourhood and Lordship that the work of Jesus is consummated.

CHAPTER III

THE APOSTOLIC EXPERIENCE AND INTERPRETATION

The work of Christ was completed in His continued presence and power in His community. The Resurrection was followed by Pentecost. When in meditation and prayer the company of believers reached the certainty that Jesus the Christ lived and reigned as Lord, a holy enthusiasm and energy possessed it. There were abnormal as well as normal manifestations of this fulness of life in the Spirit of God, phenomena similar to those which have been witnessed at religious revivals. This enthusiasm and energy were accompanied by a very intense and confident expectation of the Second Advent of Christ, His sensible manifestation on the clouds of heaven with hosts of angels in glory and power as Judge of the world and Saviour of His Church. These two features—the being filled with the Spirit, and the looking for God's Son from heaven—were characteristic of the Apostolic Age, and were even within that age being gradually transformed. Paul without depreciating the spiritual gifts finds 'the more excellent way' of Christian life in love (1 Cor. xii. 31, xiii. 1), and for the hope of surviving till the Second Advent (1 Cor. xv. 51) he finds compensation when the fulfilment seemed less certain to him, in the conviction that to be absent from the body is to be at home with the Lord (2 Cor. v. 8). In the Johannine writings this transformation of primitive Christianity, as it was in the first generation of believers, into its more permanent and universal form is completed. As this volume is neither a History of the Apostolic Church, nor a Theology of the New Testament, but an attempt at a constructive state-

ment of the Christian faith for the thought and the life of to-day, it is not at all necessary to deal any further with these passing phases of Christian belief and life; but as the Pauline and Johannine writings do enshrine what has permanent and universal significance and value for Christian faith, this chapter must be restricted to an exposition and estimate of the contribution of these two great Christians to our understanding and our prizing of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ; and in regard to both of them, what is to be insisted on is this, that we are dealing with a real personal experience of Christ's activity as Saviour and Lord, and not merely with a speculative interpretation of the common Christian tradition. From whatever source the terms used in setting forth their thoughts may have been borrowed, both used the terms to express what was real to them, the reality of Christ as they knew Him in their own personal experience; and accordingly the interpretation can appear intelligible only as the experience is regarded as credible.

I

Two errors in regard to Paul must be carefully avoided. We must not, with orthodox dogmatics, altogether ignore the temporal and local elements in his theology, and seek to impose all he wrote as authoritative at all times and places for Christian thought and life; and we must not, with modernist scholarship, treat him as merely a product of his own age and surroundings, and resolve his theology into a mixture of Jewish dogmatism and Greek speculation. He did not cease to be a Jewish rabbi when he became a Christian apostle, and his Gentile environment was not without effect on his ideas and ideals; we must not reject these influences on his theology as necessarily valueless, but must test their value. What makes him authoritative for the Christian Church to-day is his real, original, typical experience of Christ as Saviour and Lord; for what Christ was to him

Christ has been to other great Christian personalities who stand in the Pauline succession of faith (Augustine, Luther, Wesley); and even if the majority of Christian believers cannot rise to the same height, the realisation of the possibility in even a few must be accepted as evidence of what Christ really is and does to those whose faith responds adequately to His grace.

(1) What was distinctive of Paul's experience was his personal communion with the Risen Lord.

(i) It was as Risen that Christ manifested Himself to him on the way to Damascus, and it was in the light of that vision that he walked and worked. For him the reality of his apostleship, his authority to found and direct churches, depended on his having seen Christ no less than the other apostles. On his ecstatic visions we need not lay stress, as he himself does not (2 Cor. xii. 1); but what was typical was his vivid sense of the presence of Christ, and his confidence of direct communion. His threefold prayer for deliverance from the stake in his flesh was answered in what he claimed as an immediate communication from the Lord (*vv.* 8-9). We must return to his exposition of the Cross of Christ as propitiation, redemption, and reconciliation. That doctrine did remove his own difficulties and perplexities, for he too needed for not only the satisfaction of his mind, but also the repose of his heart, the conviction that God is righteous in reckoning righteous all who have faith in Jesus (Rom. iii. 26); and we should altogether misunderstand him if we supposed that doctrine to be only an accommodation to Jewish ideas he did not himself share. Nevertheless, what was distinctive of him is expressed rather in his declaration: 'I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me: and that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself up for me' (Gal. ii. 20).

(ii) The two facts which were essential to his theology were the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. By the Resurrection Christ was 'instituted Son of God with

power' (Rom. i. 4), and received the name above every other name, the title of Lord (Phil. ii. 9-11). It was the living Son of God in power who was the object of Paul's faith, a faith which was an intimate personal union. The Resurrection also made the Crucifixion tolerable for him; otherwise the death on the Cross would have remained for him accursed, and the assertion of the Messiahship of the Crucified a blasphemy. Because it was the Risen Lord who had so died, Paul had to find in the death a meaning and a worth congruous with what, for his faith, the living Christ was. These two facts also were the moulds into which his own life was cast; its negative aspect of repentance for, and renunciation of sin was crucifixion with Christ, and its positive of aspiration and achievement of holiness was resurrection with Christ. It was his experience of union with Christ that had its inevitable result in his character of conformity to Christ.

(iii) This characteristic of his Christian personality has been often described as his *faith - mysticism.* Mysticism it is, if all immediate contact and intimate communion of the soul with God is to be so described; but if mysticism is what Neo-Platonism or Indian piety thinks it to be, a relation of the soul in ecstasy or trance with the essence of deity in the realm of the super-conscious, Paul is not a mystic. It was in the conscious exercise of faith that he found God in the no less real, because invisible, personality of Jesus Christ, and this relation of dependence and submission issued in such an activity of Christ by His Spirit as conformed him in character to that personality. Paul had what have often been claimed as the distinctively mystical experiences of visions and voices; but for him these were not primary, but altogether subordinate to the personal relation of the sinner saved by faith in the Lord and Saviour, who ever mediated the love of God to him, and whose presence was manifest in him in the enlightening and renewing Spirit. That Paul had an exceptional receptivity for, and responsiveness to the divine reality cannot be

questioned. There has been none in the record of Christian faith who excelled him in the certainty and the confidence of his communion with Christ, and in the effectiveness of that communion in the transformation of his personality. But it must not be, therefore, assumed that in this respect he should be regarded as solitary. If in less degree, yet still in reality such a relation to Christ is the typical relation, an aspiration for, if not an achievement of, all believers, possible by God's grace according to the measure of faith.

(2) Paul's theology is the interpretation of his experience with such ideas and terms as his Jewish inheritance and education and his Gentile environment provided. If it be remembered that in his Epistles he is combating error, it will be conceded that that theology is not determined solely by his experience seeking self-expression, but is influenced not only as regards the language used, but also as regards the conceptions so expressed, by the occasion. In Galatians and Romans he is defending his Gospel against Judaism, and in Colossians and Ephesians against an incipient gnosticism; accordingly we cannot regard all in his theology as simply an intellectual exposition of his own distinctive experience; in form at least his statement of truth was affected by the error he was seeking to refute. His discussion about the relation of the Law and the Gospel, while of personal interest to him, does not express what was vital in his experience. How far he shared the angelology of Colossians and Ephesians we cannot determine, but what was alone vital to him was the absolute supremacy of Christ in the realm of the spirit. The writer is convinced that, although Paul could not altogether escape the influence of the Gentile environment amid which he was educated as a boy and youth, and afterwards moved as a preacher of the Gospel, yet he was almost exclusively a Jew; and, therefore, when an explanation of any feature of his thought can be offered from the standpoint of his Jewish inheritance and education, it seems to be

altogether a mistake to prefer recourse to his Gentile environment. Able and scholarly as is the book of Dr. W. Morgan on *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, it fails in two respects: (i) it does not adequately recognise the originality of Paul's religion in the distinctiveness of his personal experience; and (ii) it is too ready to resort to current pagan ideas of religion to explain what the experience adequately accounts for, or what can be traced to the Jewish influences. Paul's sense of union and communion with Christ is not derived from the pagan mystery religions. His use of the title Lord (κύριος) is most easily and probably explained from the use of that title in the Jewish synagogue instead of the covenant name Yahveh, when the Scriptures were being read. Having made this general statement regarding his attitude, justified by an adequate study of the relevant literature, the writer will not interrupt the exposition of Paul's Christology and soteriology by any discussion of the sources from which any idea or term may have been derived.

(3) The starting-point of Paul's Christology was his vision of the Risen Lord in His corporeality (Col. ii. 9, σωματικῶς), the natural body having been transformed into the spiritual (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 44), the body of His glory (Phil. iii. 21).

(i) The Risen Lord was to him in his inner life, life-giving spirit (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, 1 Cor. xv. 45), a cleansing, enlightening, and strengthening power. While Paul does distinguish the Lord from the Spirit (2 Cor. xiii. 14), yet the Lord also does what the Spirit effects, and so inseparable is the relation of the Lord and the Spirit that in one passage he seems to identify the one with the other (2 Cor. iii. 17-18); but generally he preserves the distinction.[1] This glory and power became Christ's at His Resurrection. He was then invested as Son of God with power (Rom. i. 3-4), and this investiture was the reward of His self-humbling or emptying (Phil. ii. 9-11). Then also he

[1] This subject will be more fully discussed in the later chapter dealing with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

received ' the name which is above every other name,' the name of Lord (cf. 2 Cor. iv. 5). It is significant that Paul, as in contrast with idolatry and polytheism, expresses his confession of monotheism in these terms : ' To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto Him ; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him ' (1 Cor. viii. 6). The Lord Jesus Christ is here subordinated as the mediating agency of creation and redemption to the Father as the ultimate source and the final purpose. (Note the prepositions δι' in one case, and ἐξ and εἰς in the other.) Other passages in which this same subordination is taught are Col. i. 19, Phil. ii. 9, 1 Cor. vi. 14, iii. 23, xv. 28. An utterance of passionate emotion such as Romans ix. 5, even if the phrase ' who is over all, God blessed for ever,' is to be ascribed to Christ, cannot set aside this clearly expressed doctrine. While so distinctly distinguishing Christ from the Father, Paul could preserve his monotheism only by thus insisting on the subordination of Christ to the Father. This subordination is entirely in accord with the testimony regarding the self-consciousness of Jesus, even as presented to us in the Fourth Gospel, as has already been shown. It also accords with what we to-day must think ; the Incarnate Son, or God as man, God under the conditions and limitations of manhood, must be subordinate to God as infinite and absolute reality. Even if we assume the divine Sonship as real in the Godhead antecedent to incarnation, and even creation, the term Sonship itself connotes subordination. In a later chapter we must return to a full discussion of the doctrine of the Godhead, but all that need be affirmed here is that the doctrine of subordination, which Paul felt to be necessary to his own thought, is no less necessary to ours.

(ii) Paul, however, is not content with this confession of the Lordship of Christ in subordination to God the Father ; drawing inferences from his own experience, he seeks to define more closely the relation of Christ to God, and also to the world. In Colossians

i. 13-17 he describes Christ as (1) ' the Son of His love,' (2) ' the image of the invisible God,' and (3) ' the firstborn of all creation.' God by His very nature is love, and Christ is the object of that love, the eternal object, and consequently the appropriate historical medium of that same love to man. He is the manifestation to men of God Himself, and as such manifestation is the final purpose of the universe, creation itself being a method of God's self-revelation, He is both prior to, and supreme in the universe, for that seems to be the meaning of the phrase ' firstborn of all creation.' It corresponds to the phrase in Hebrews, ' heir of all things,' as does the phrase ' the image of the invisible God ' correspond to ' the very image of His substance,' ' the effulgence of His glory ' (Heb. i. 2-3). As the manifestation of God, the visibility of the invisible, He is the agent of creation itself as a revelation of God. Translating this thought into terms which may make it more intelligible to us, we may say that Paul conceives Christ as Son of God as the reality of self-expression and self-communication in God, in which lies the possibility and even actualisation of the creation as well as redemption of man. If man be the summit of the evolution of the universe, if he be in his nature akin to, and capable of fellowship with God, if the revelation of God to man and the redemption of man unto God in Christ Jesus be indeed the final purpose of the creation of the world and man, then it is credible that He who so reveals God and redeems man should have this *cosmic* significance. It is not a merely speculative interest that is the motive of this process of thought ; it is the practical interest of asserting the absolute value of Christ as Saviour and Lord, as Paul had proved this in his own experience.

(iii) A still more daring adventure of thought to fathom the mystery of the person of Christ is the passage in Phil. ii. 6-8. If we do not allow ourselves to forget that here also Paul's aim is practical, to commend humility and mutual service by the example of Christ, we shall avoid the error of many theologians

who seek here authoritative doctrine expressed with scholastic minuteness; we shall not attempt to read into the words the developed conceptions of a later age. Let us rather try to retrace the path of Paul's thought. It was the risen Christ, not the Jesus of history, who was the object of his faith, and so dominated all his thinking. As divine, he believed Christ as necessarily pre-existent, and into this pre-existent state he projects his vision of the risen Lord, with only this difference, that the name above every other name—the Lordship—is not yet His. Although He might have claimed it, He chose to win it as the reward of His humiliation. The earthly life, between that pre-existent state in 'the form of God,' and the post-resurrection Lordship, culminating as it did in the death on the Cross, is so great a contrast to both, that it cannot but be regarded as due to a voluntary self-emptying and self-humbling. This *kenosis* (*v.* 7, ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν) Paul probably did not conceive as a surrender of the divine essence, but only of such functions and privileges as must be given up to make the human humiliation and sacrifice possible. The metaphysical process which Paul here describes presents insuperable difficulties to our thought to-day. The historical personality of Christ is assigned to the eternal Son of God, and thus the unity of the Godhead is imperilled for our thought, as we cannot think of Father and Son as separate individuals. A temporal act, such as might be ascribed to the incarnate Son in time, is ascribed to the eternal Son beyond and above time. But it is only the form of Paul's thought that we cannot make intelligible to ourselves; we can preserve its substance by the conception of an eternal activity in the Godhead of self-limitation for self-communication as Word and Son, which is the necessary condition, not only of the Incarnation, but of the whole process of creation as the manifestation of the Infinite in the finite, the Eternal in the temporal. For us the moral glory of the Incarnation, culminating in the Cross, as the self-sacrifice of God, shines no less brightly than it did

for Paul. It is the same thought which is expressed in 2 Cor. viii. 9. Ours is a different philosophy, but the same faith that Jesus the Christ in His earthly life does express the very nature of God as the holy love which in His grace stoops to, and shares, the life of man to lift man to partnership with God.

(iv) It has often been affirmed that the earthly life of Jesus had no significance for Paul. That he did not concern himself with the details in word and deed as of primary importance may be conceded; but that he was interested in and attached importance to the reality of this self-humiliation and self-sacrifice cannot be questioned. It is as grace that he regards the whole of the earthly life. He mentions the Davidic descent (Rom. i. 3) 'according to the flesh' to disparage that hope of political Messiahship which the Jewish people desired, and Jesus refused. In his phrase 'born of a woman' (Gal. iv. 4) Paul may be referring to the virgin-birth, as the word γενόμενον is a neutral word, and does not call for a reference to the mother, rather than the father, and this birth ἐκ γυναικός is contrasted with the divine paternity (ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ). The phrase which follows, 'under the law,' suggests another association of ideas. As by a woman sin came into the world (cf. 1 Tim. ii. 14, 15), so by a woman also came the Saviour from sin. As the law 'came in beside' (Rom. v. 20), so the Saviour from sin was Himself 'under the law': this was necessary for the completeness of the identification of the Saviour with sinners; He must become all that man is, that man might become all He is; this is an instance of His poverty by which alone mankind can be made rich. Jesus did submit Himself to the code of laws of His people, and did experience this submission as a contradiction of His spirit of Sonship (cf. Matt. xvii. 26, 27). That even His filial obedience to God involved some strain on His will, a struggle and a victory, another statement (Rom. viii. 3) implies. 'For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of flesh of sin and for sin (as

an offering for sin), condemned sin in the flesh.' Leaving for later consideration the phrase 'for sin' as referring to the atoning death, we may examine the phrase 'in the likeness of flesh of sin.' Paul does not deny a similarity of the flesh (the material organism) of Christ to that of other men; but he does seem to deny that the flesh in Him was the seat and vehicle of sin, as it is in other men, while regarding it as the occasion of temptation without sin. He has not the interest which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews has in the trials and temptations of Jesus (ii. 18, iv. 15); but here he must be regarded as dealing with the moral experience of Jesus, as a condemnation of man's failure, and yet a promise of his victory. The sinlessness achieved 'in the likeness of the flesh of sin' is referred to again in the phrase (2 Cor. v. 21) 'Him who knew no sin.' Nevertheless Him, though sinless, he goes on to affirm, 'He (God) made to be sin on our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him.' What does the phrase 'made to be sin' mean? What the context seems to demand is a paraphrase such as this: 'He was treated as a sinner,' or 'the consequences of sin fell on Him.' The abstract phrase was surely chosen by Paul because of the difficulty he felt in stating the truth without falling into error. We must carefully avoid saying that 'He was held guilty,' or 'He was punished' by God, for these terms are applicable to sinners only. God did not regard Jesus, nor did Jesus regard Himself, as a sinner; such moral confusion would be impossible to the Father knowing the Son, and the Son knowing the Father. It was the Father's will, accepted by the Son, that He, the sinless, should experience the consequences of sin. How was this possible? and why was this necessary?—these are questions which must meanwhile be held over. That this experience of the consequences of sin was complete, going as far as is conceivable, Paul affirms in the startling saying (Gal. iii. 13), 'Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.' Jesus

not only died, so sharing the human lot, but He endured a death which was regarded among the Jews as accursed (see Deut. xxi. 23 and xxvii. 26). As in the previous passage Paul does not say 'was made a sinner,' but 'was made sin,' so here he does not say 'became accursed,' but 'became a curse,' seeking evidently to maintain the distinction between personal guilt and punishment and vicarious endurance of the consequences of the sin of mankind. Doubtless Paul was acquainted with the record of Gethsemane and Calvary, and on the ground of the facts there given, and not only as an inference from the texts quoted by him, he regarded the death of Christ as invested with unique horror and distress. Through all these passages there runs the dominating thought of the *kenosis*, the self-emptying and the self-humbling of the Son of God in His identification of Himself with all that constitutes the struggle, the sorrow, the burden, and the desolation of the lot of 'mankind sinners.' While this full sharing of the life of man culminated in the Cross, the risen Christ was for Paul still a partner with man. As faith for him was so close a union that he had been crucified and had risen, nay, rather, was being crucified and raised with Christ, so Christ's grace did mean such a union with himself that his sorrows were the sufferings of Christ, and thus were not uncomforted (2 Cor. i. 5). 'As the sufferings of Christ abound unto us, even so also our comfort aboundeth through Christ.' The scars upon his body left by stonings and scourgings were 'the marks of Jesus' (Gal. vi. 17). He rejoiced in filling up the measure of his sufferings for the sake of Christ's body, because Christ so shared them that he could speak of them as 'the afflictions of Christ' (Col. i. 24). For Paul there is thus a continuity in disposition, purpose, activity between the Son of God and the humiliation in time, and again between that humiliation and the exaltation of the risen Lord: and because of that humiliation voluntarily endured, that exaltation is something more than was the glory of the pre-existent state of the Son of God, and not merely a return to

it unchanged. The *kenosis* resulted in a *plerosis*, the self-emptying in a self-fulfilment. Paul's Christology is, the writer is convinced, one that Christian thought to-day cannot afford to ignore or neglect. Even should we need to use other terms, yet the substance of his thought has a permanent and universal value, for it is the interpretation, necessary and appropriate, of an inspired experience.

(4) It has been an incalculable loss to Christian theology that Paul's soteriology, or doctrine of the work of Christ, has been separated from his Christology, or doctrine of the person of Christ; for in such separation it can very easily be subjected to a legalistic explanation which does it grave injury. If for him the love of God as shown and imparted in the grace of Christ was real, no less real was the righteousness of God; and his doctrine of atonement is his endeavour to show how the love of God through the grace of Christ does not annul, but sustains the righteousness of God.

(i) God's righteousness is the reaction, and necessary reaction, of God's moral perfection—His holy love—against sin, not exclusively in condemning and punishing sin (that Paul describes as *the wrath of God*, Rom. i. 18), but rather predominantly in securing for man deliverance from that judgment on sin, for God is righteous, not in spite of His reckoning righteous those who have faith in Christ, but because He so reckons them (iii. 26). It shows a lack of moral insight to assume that righteousness must be punitive and repressive, and cannot be also reformatory and redemptive. Righteousness must be expansive and reproductive; and its fullest vindication is not in making the bad suffer, but in making the bad good. This, there can be no doubt, was how Paul thought. It is this conception—the righteousness of God as both a quality of God and a gift to man—which is his guiding principle in dealing with the work of Christ. It is not necessary for the present purpose to offer an exegetical study of Paul's use of this term, for enough has been said above to indicate how we are to under-

stand its meaning. In the righteousness of God there meet God's judgment on sin and His forgiveness of sinners, for God's forgiveness comes in such a way and by such means as show His judgment; and the judgment on sin comes in such a way and by such means as will ensure that forgiveness—the recovery of the filial relation to God interrupted by sin—will issue in holiness. God so *reckons* sinners righteous in Christ as to *make* them righteous, for grace is such a divine activity in man, and faith is such a human receptivity towards God, that this recovered fellowship of God and man in Christ becomes creative of, not only a new relation to God, but a new character in man.

(ii) The antecedent of this righteousness of God is for Paul *the propitiation of Christ's blood*, and its consequent *reconciliation with God* and *redemption* from *sin*, *law*, *death*, and *doom*. For him the revelation of the righteousness of God is in the Cross of Christ. What is the necessity of this connection? In the past God's judgment on sin had been tempered with mercy, there had been a 'passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God' (Rom. iii. 25). God's righteousness as judging sin had thus been obscured. Now that God offered forgiveness of sins, which is more than showing mercy even, without any judgment on sinners, it was the more necessary that that judgment should be displayed in some other way, even a more unmistakable way. On the Cross the judgment was borne by Christ and did not fall on men. Paul does not say that the sacrifice of Christ *propitiated* God in changing God's disposition towards men, His displeasure into favour, His wrath into grace. With the same care as in the passages already noted (that Christ was made sin, and became a curse) he states that Christ was set forth *propitiatory* (ἱλαστήριον) 'through faith, by His blood' (Rom. iii. 25). It is best to take the word ἱλαστήριον as a neuter adjective, conveying the idea in the most general way. Although God is eternally holy love, and need not be changed in disposition towards man, yet we do not do full justice to Paul's thought, whether

we can share it or not, unless we admit that for him, at least, Christ's death not only *revealed* God as *propitious* towards men, but even *rendered* God propitious, as showing both God's wrath against sin, and the appeasement of that wrath—wrath not as a passion inconsistent with His holy love, but as a necessary reaction of His heart against the sin which thwarts and hinders the purpose of that holy love.

(iii) This line of thought may be described as *legal*; but the use of the phrase 'by His blood,' suggesting *sacrifice*, introduces another circle of ideas which we may describe as ritual. Many modern scholars deny that the sacrifices of the Old Testament involved the idea of penal substitution or satisfaction; while we may concede this as regards sacrifice generally, yet the *trespass* offering had a reference to breaches of God's law, and was regarded as appointed by God as a means of recovering His favour. In Isaiah liii. 10 the Servant of Yahveh is made 'a guilt-offering,' and, as the rest of the chapter shows, that is understood to mean vicarious suffering, even penal substitution and satisfaction. But that picture itself forbids our regarding that substitution from the standpoint of law, and not of love. Love is by its very nature vicarious, and takes the place of the loved. Christ in His grace completely identified Himself with the lot of man, sharing with man the consequences of his sin. How far Paul consciously distinguished the legal and the ritual associations, and combined them, we cannot conjecture; what is certain is that, as his language shows, he did think of Christ's death both as a sacrifice and as a vicarious endurance of the consequences of sin.

(iv) We must not attempt to weaken his thought by introducing an idea which the Epistle to the Hebrews makes prominent. It is urged by some who cannot find themselves at home in this circle of ideas, that what was important was not the *blood-shedding* or death of the victim, but the *blood-sprinkling*, or the presentation of the life to God; but we cannot separate the two ideas, for it was the blood-

shedding that made the blood-sprinkling possible.[1] Christ did offer His life unto God in holy obedience, but He learned obedience, proved what obedience may require to the uttermost, in enduring death. There is in Christ's death a representative submission, but there is also a vicarious suffering. A misunderstanding that the clause 'through faith' (Rom. iii. 25) might suggest must also be removed. Paul does not mean that the death of Christ is by faith invested with a meaning as *propitiatory*, which it does not in fact possess; but what he does mean is that the fact is not disclosed to unbelief, but only to faith, and only faith can claim God as in Christ propitiatory.

(v) The consequent of the righteousness of God which judges in forgiving sin is *reconciliation with God.* Doubt, distrust, disobedience are banished from the heart of the sinner who becomes a child of God. This is a consequent, however, which man must realise by his own response of gratitude, confidence, submission to God; hence Paul exhorts believers to have peace with God (Rom. v. 1). This reconciliation involves the appropriation of all the blessings which belong to the children of God. But a serious question must be faced: is this reconciliation mutual? It is true that the exhortation to be reconciled to God is addressed to men; but the basis of the appeal is 'the word of reconciliation,' namely, that God is 'not reckoning to men their trespasses' (2 Cor. v. 19), and that surely means that God in Christ is reconciled. God's disposition and purpose towards men are not changed, but His attitude to them is: the pain of His judgment is changed to the joy of His favour. Four reasons for this conclusion can be suggested:— (1) In Romans xi. 28 'enemies' are so contrasted with 'beloved' that we must regard them as exposed to God's antagonism. (2) If 'while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of His Son' (Rom. v. 10), the process of reconciliation must have begun on God's side before it began on man's. (3) If we may speak of God's wrath, we may surely

[1] See Westcott's *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, Additional Note on ix. 12.

speak of His reconciliation. (4) If God may be spoken of as in Christ propitiatory, why may we not speak of Him as reconciled? The two words, *propitiatory* and *reconciled*, must both be used with caution; it must never be suggested that the death of Christ wrought a change in God's character, that from being wrathful He was made merciful; it must always be made plain that God's holy love is the motive of His reconciliation with man.

(vi) Redemption is the most comprehensive term to express the consequences of Christ's work for man in revealing God as propitiatory, and in reconciling God and man. In one of the few sayings of Jesus about His death, He speaks of it as a *ransom* for many (Matt. xx. 28); but the word redemption may mean simply deliverance without any reference to a ransom by which it is effected. It is not at all necessary for us to ask the question, to whom was the ransom paid; still less should we answer it, as one of the earliest theories of the Atonement did, that it was paid to the devil, under whose dominion man had voluntarily placed himself by sin.[1] Passing with a bare mention one aspect of redemption, very important for Paul, but without significance for us—the victory of Christ on His Cross over 'the principalities and powers,' angels or demons (Col. ii. 15)—the redemption as Paul conceives it is fourfold. (*a*) Man is redeemed from *the wrath of God*, God's doom on sin, because it has been taken up into *the righteousness of God*; its necessity has been removed, because such purpose as it sought in the moral order has been fulfilled in a more excellent way by the manifestation of God's judgment in the Cross of Christ. (*b*) Man is redeemed from *death as the penalty of sin* by the hope of resurrection rooted in the believer's relation to Christ as the living Lord, or the belief that absent from the body he is at home with the Lord (2 Cor. v. 8). This belief replaced the hope of the resurrection, when Paul became less confident of

[1] See *A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, Franks, vol. i. References in Index under 'Redemption from the devil.'

his survival to the Second Coming of the Lord. (*c*) Man is redeemed from *the bondage to the flesh*, so vividly described by Paul in the autobiographical passage (Rom. vii. 7-25), by his personal union in faith to Christ, in whom he died unto sin, and lived unto God. 'The expulsive power of the new affection' frees him from the appetites and passions which hitherto had held him in thrall. (*d*) Man is *redeemed from the law*—a matter of great importance to Paul as a Jew and a Pharisee, because his life is brought under grace and not law; the new commandment of love to God and man is the fulfilling of the whole law; and this commandment the saved man finds his freedom and joy in keeping because of his new motive, the constraining love of Christ (2 Cor. v. 14). Thus reconciled to God, redeemed from the flesh and the law, death and doom, the believer enjoys God's favour, has freedom of access to Him in prayer, rejoices in hope, not only endures trials cheerfully, but finds in that endurance a discipline of character (Rom. v. 1-4). He possesses the Spirit of God not only as the source of manifold gifts, but as the power within that sanctifies him, and so prepares him for the inheritance of the saints in light. Amid all the sorrows, temptations, and trials of this earthly life he knows that all things are working together for his good (Rom. viii. 28), and that there is nothing real or conceivable that can separate him from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord (*vv.* 38-39).

(vii) The reconciliation and redemption thus described Paul himself *experienced* through his faith in Christ as Saviour and Lord; and his experience belongs to the fact of Christ, the historical reality of the grace of Christ, which is the basis of the constructive theology being offered in these pages. When he is expounding the righteousness of God as revealed and realised in Christ propitiatory on His Cross, he is going beyond religious and moral experience to theological explanation; and we must ask ourselves how far we can take up what he here offers into the constructive theology which we can to-day defend and

commend to the thought of our own time. The full discussion of the doctrine of the atonement for our own age must be reserved for a later chapter; but here the writer may very briefly indicate how far he is able to take up into his own convictions regarding the work of Christ what Paul held. He believes that there is a wrath of God, a displeasure of God against sin, a necessary reaction of His perfection against the contradiction and challenge thereof; that the divine order of the world in the consequences—physical, moral, social—of sin now inadequately manifests that reaction, but anticipates a more adequate manifestation either in the future life of the individual or a future age of the race; that death in its totality, not as a physical event merely, but as a personal experience, may be regarded as the penalty of sin; that to awaken man's penitence as well as faith it was necessary for God to show convincingly His judgment on as well as forgiveness of sin, as He has indeed done in the sacrifice of the Cross; that it was necessary for God as eternally perfect in consistency with His character, and in order to carry out His purpose to make men sharers of His perfection, to assert His own righteousness, His reaction against sin, in a judgment on sin more authoritative for the human conscience than could be the punishment of 'mankind sinners'; that for the moral community of God with man, man's penitence must respond to, correspond with God's condemnation of sin; that the death of Christ does *somehow* express God's condemnation, and evoke man's penitence. Just how Christ's Cross does this Paul does not make altogether clear; what is certain is that Christ did endure the consequences of sin *on our behalf*, and, as He thus delivers us from them, it may be added, *instead of us*. What Christ did endure, how He could so endure, why He must so endure, Paul does not fully disclose, and these questions we must try to answer when offering the constructive doctrine. Of one thing the writer is quite certain, and has become more certain with years of experience, study, and meditation, and,

he may even dare to add, of some illumination by the Spirit: that to omit what Paul teaches regarding the work of Christ from Christian doctrine, whatever intellectual difficulties it may present, would be to impoverish the religious experience and to enfeeble the moral character of Christian believers.

II

It is generally recognised that there is a marked difference between the Fourth and the other Gospels. Into critical theories it is not necessary here to enter. Sufficient for the present purpose is the statement that in the Fourth Gospel there is not only evangelical testimony, but also apostolic experience and interpretation. There are the recollections of an eye-witness, which supplement the testimony of the other Gospels in respect to the number of visits paid to Jerusalem at the great feasts, and the character of the teaching there given—controversy with the teachers and rulers of the nation in regard to the claims of the Son. What is but mentioned in the other Gospels—the consciousness of Sonship towards God—is often and clearly asserted. Meditation on what was remembered was added to these recollections, either by this eye-witness or a disciple of his, and these meditations were affected by a personal experience of the presence of Christ and communion with Him, and also of the guiding and the enlightening of the Spirit, giving a fuller meaning to words which had been recalled. Further, there are passages which are combined with, and yet can be distinguished from, these recollections and meditations, in which a more developed metaphysics of the person of Christ is expounded than would be appropriate in the historical situation on the lips of Christ Himself. In the interpretation of these passages throughout the Gospel care must be taken not to read into them the philosophy of the Prologue—the doctrine of the Logos or the Word of God; as they are an expansion of the conception of the Sonship, which is the dominant influence in the

Gospel. In dealing with the representation in this Gospel of the person and work of Christ we cannot with any certainty separate recollections and meditations; in the mind of the disciple sayings of Jesus expanded into statements of his own faith which he could not himself distinguish from the facts which he recalled. These metaphysical explanations and the doctrine of the Logos we can, however, deal with separately.

(1) Only the leading characteristics of Jesus as presented in the Fourth Gospel need be indicated.

(i) First of all to be noted is His certainty of His relation as Son to God as Father—His communion with, dependence on, and submission to God, and His consequent confidence in the sufficiency of His resources from God for the fulfilment of His vocation. This is a development of, but not in contradiction with, the self-testimony of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels.

(ii) Next must be mentioned His assurance that as He can satisfy all the needs of men as the Bread from Heaven (John vi. 32-58), the Living Water (iv. 13, 14, vii. 37-38), the Light of the World (viii. 12, ix. 5), so in Him men by acceptance of what He offers gain full salvation, the possession of the eternal life, but by rejection in sin and unbelief bring on themselves condemnation. He is thus the Judge of mankind (v. 22).

(iii) In this Gospel there is exhibited as in no other the intimacy of the personal relation between the disciples and the Master as the Door (x. 7), the Good Shepherd (*v.* 11), and the Vine (xv. 1-6). As He as Son is related to the Father, so are they to be to Him, trusting, loving, obeying, holding fellowship. Death will not destroy this relationship, as He will still be present to them, and they will be able to hold communion with Him. That presence and communion will be mediated by the other Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, who will not supersede Him, but complete His revelation in unfolding its meaning. This teaching in the last discourse (xiv.-xvii.) is distinctive of this Gospel; but it so closely corresponds with what is

most typical of the deepest Christian experience that, even if we have not before us a *verbatim* report, the conviction is irresistible that this is the record of an experience, in which the promises of the Master Himself were fulfilled, that the Jesus of history intended to be to His disciples what the Christ of his faith proved Himself to be to this disciple. Without attempting to distinguish recollections and meditations, we can accept this contribution to our Christian thought, not as theological speculation, but as personal experience, which may be added, even as Paul's, to the historical reality of Jesus as the Christ and the Lord.

(iv) While there is not a developed doctrine of the Atonement, this Gospel no less definitely asserts the necessity of the death of Christ not only as voluntarily endured as a sign of the Shepherd's devotion to His sheep, and as a proof of the Son's obedience to the Father, but as the necessary condition of His universal saving efficacy for man (iii. 14-15, xii. 24, 32). In the First Epistle more prominence is given to the atoning death, and the forgiving and cleansing grace of Christ. 'The blood of Jesus His Son cleanseth us from all sin' (i. 7). 'We have a Paraclete with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous: and He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world' (ii. 1-2). 'If we confess our sins, God is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness' (i. 9). It may be said confidently that there is substantial agreement with the Pauline doctrine.

(v) This Gospel is very much more explicit than are the Synoptics regarding the Resurrection (xiv.-xvii.). It is a return to the Father, a recovery of the glory which the Son had with the Father before the world was; and yet after a temporary separation there will be reunion with His disciples, and His presence and power will again be experienced in the inward working of the other Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth. Here we have the beginnings of the doctrine of the Trinity; the Father immanent in the Son, and the Son in the Holy Spirit.

(vi) What has been implicit hitherto must be now made explicit. There is an advance of thought in this Gospel beyond the common Christian tradition. While the older eschatology, inherited by the Christian Church from Judaism, is not absent, yet it is being superseded. Even in His earthly life Jesus is Judge (ix. 39), for by their attitude of faith or unbelief men secure salvation or incur condemnation (iii. 18-21). Apart from Him, men are already perishing under death (*v.* 16, cf. 1 John iii. 14); in Him *they now possess eternal life*, and cannot die; *there has been a spiritual resurrection.* His is a universal and permanent presence with His Church, in His Spirit, and thus *He is ever coming into the world.* If we trust the record of the teaching of Jesus this development had the authority of words of His, remembered but only afterwards understood. As we have observed the same tendency in Paul, we may for our constructive theology now discard the older eschatology, and be guided by this teaching instead.

(vii) We come to teaching which is altogether peculiar to the Fourth Gospel, the utterances about pre-existence. We can deal with these apart from the metaphysical explanations and the doctrine of the Logos. Some of them we must regard as comments of the evangelist (i. 30, iii. 13, vi. 33, 38, 50, 58-62). What remains is the response to the challenge of His enemies in viii. 58: 'Before Abraham was, I am.' The contrast here between γενέσθαι and εἰμί indicates a timeless existence. The term pre-existence is contradictory, as expressing such timeless existence, since it suggests priority in time, and to speak of a continuity of consciousness between that timeless existence and the whole of the life in time is to make a development under human conditions and limitations altogether inconceivable. The only intelligible explanation of such a saying, accepting its authenticity, is this, that the more Jesus' claim was challenged the more certain He became of His relation to God as Son to Father, and that this certainty included a distinct intuition that this relation had not

and could not have begun in time, but was eternal as God Himself. In the seventeenth chapter Jesus is represented as regarding His Resurrection as a return to the Father, and a recovery of the glory He had with the Father before the world was (*v.* 5), and of His Father's love as 'before the foundation of the world' (*v.* 24). Such meditation on His relation to God seems altogether appropriate to the occasion, and the mood of Jesus in the Upper Room, and we may accept this testimony that the consciousness of Sonship did include the intuition of timeless relation to God.

(2) The representation of the person and work thus sketched we may regard as historical testimony (including therein that of Christian experience). There are, however, in the Fourth Gospel, theological explanations which can easily be distinguished from what we can reckon as testimony; and the value of these as a contribution to a constructive theology must be tested with care, as even an apostle's inferences cannot be as authoritative for us as his witness to history or experience.

(i) The disclosures of the Messiahship by Jesus Himself and the confession of it by others are antedated (i. 41, etc.). There is a tendency to exaggerate the supernaturalness of the knowledge of Jesus (i. 48, ii. 24-25, iv. 17, 18, vi. 6). The apologetic interest of the evangelist ascribes to Jesus what cannot be described otherwise than as an artificial pose (vi. 5-6, xi. 42, xii. 30, xiv. 29), and results in a disproportion in the presentation of the teaching as more polemical than it really was. Either the witness or his disciple in several passages develops his own doctrine. The first passage (v. 19-29, except *v.* 24), on the relation of Father and Son, emphasises the absolute dependence, complete knowledge, and entire resemblance of the Son, and insists on equal honour. The functions of quickening the dead and judgment—to be understood either spiritually or eschatologically—are entrusted by, and exercised in dependence on the Father. In the second passage (vi. 51, 52-57) there seems to be

an expansion of the words used at the Supper to affirm the believer's absolute dependence by faith on Jesus, and most of all on His sacrifice, for the maintenance of his life and its satisfaction. In the third passage a still more experimental note is struck (John iii. 16-21). Eternal life depends on faith in the Son as the gift of the Father's love; while the divine intention in that gift is salvation, man's unbelief can turn it into condemnation. While we thus distinguish the reminiscences and the reflections, the sayings in the Gospel about the Holy Spirit (xiv. 16-20, 26, xv. 26-27, xvi. 7-15) show that for the author that distinction would have been meaningless. It was the Spirit in whom Christ continued His presence who unfolded the meaning of His works and words. The Johannine and the Pauline theology are thus in substantial agreement as regards both the relation of Christ as Son to God as Father, and the relation of the believer to Christ as Saviour and Lord, sometimes represented as immediate, at others as mediated by the Holy Spirit.. If we follow the rendering of the R.V. in John iii. 34, then it is Christ who is represented as giving to believers the Spirit, *not by measure*; but elsewhere (xiv. 16) the Spirit is represented as the Father's gift in response to the prayer of the Son: and this seems to accord more closely with the Johannine doctrine on the relation of the Father and the Son. If we follow the A.V. rendering, however, which represents Christ Himself as the recipient of the Spirit without measure from God, then the Spirit would be conceived as mediating not only the relation of the believer to Christ, but even that of the Son to the Father. There would be here the germ of a doctrine of the Trinity. But His bestowal of the Spirit might refer only to the Son incarnate as a condition of the Incarnation, but not the 'inner life' of the Godhead.

(ii) The most distinctive contribution of the Fourth Gospel to Christology is the Logos doctrine of the Prologue. The writer does not believe that the Prologue was written by the disciple who was the

witness of the works and words of Jesus in the flesh, but by a disciple of his who reported his teaching. He holds with Harnack [1] as against Scott [2] that the doctrine of the Logos does not dominate the whole representation of Jesus in the Gospel. It is the truth of the divine Sonship which runs through the rest of the Gospel, and affects, so far as it does affect, the record of the facts. Whether the doctrine of the Prologue be derived from the system of Philo, or has a Palestinian origin, or can be directly traced to the 'Wisdom' literature, is a question which for the present purpose it is not necessary to decide, although the writer, after weighing the arguments *pro* and *con* each view, inclines to believe that the Philonic influence cannot be excluded, whether it was direct or not. A brief comparison between the Philonic and the Johannine doctrine will serve the end in view, the estimate of the value of the Logos conception for Christian constructive theology.

(*a*) While for Philo the Logos is not a person distinct from God, the Fourth Gospel identifies the Logos with the historical personality of Jesus; and thus, as also does Paul in Phil. ii. 1-11, mentally projects the historical personality into the eternal reality of the Godhead. To identify the concrete individuality of Jesus with the Logos within the Godhead is to be involved in metaphysical difficulties from which Christology in later developments has been making vain attempts to escape.

(*b*) This identification, instead of being a solution, was rather a problem for speculative thought in the Church. If the Logos be regarded as not only personal, but a person, as was the historical Jesus, the divine unity is sacrificed to tritheism. Only if we so far modify the identification as to conceive the Logos as by Incarnation acquiring the concrete individuality of the historical Jesus, and not as eternally a person distinct from God the Father, can we preserve the divine unity. Where the unity of the Godhead

[1] *The History of Dogma*, vol. i. p. 329.
[2] *The Fourth Gospel*, pp. 163-75.

and the equality of Father and Son were emphasised in subsequent theological thought, the doctrine of a distinct personal Logos fell into the background. Where that doctrine was emphasised, the subordination of the Logos to God was insisted on. In the Athanasian teaching the Logos doctrine is modified in the interests of the divine unity; the logical development of that doctrine results in the Arian heresy.

(*c*) The Logos doctrine in Philo was the solution of a *cosmic* problem, not a moral or a religious—the relation of the infinite, eternal, perfect God to an imperfect world in space and time. While the Prologue passes quickly from a reference to the making of the world by the Word (*v.* 3) to the moral and religious interest of the Gospel, yet the tendency in later developments of the doctrine was to emphasise the metaphysical instead of the ethical and theological. The taking over of this philosophical idea has not been by any means an unmixed blessing to the Christian Church.

(*d*) A difference between the Philonic and the Johannine conception must, however, be noted. It was because Philo conceived God as so transcendent of the world as to be unrelated to and unrevealed in the world, that he had to conceive the Logos as mediating the relation of God to, and the revelation of God in, the world. It is because for him God and the world are so apart that he needs to think of the Logos to come between them, and bring them together. In the Fourth Gospel it is immanence which is the ruling idea. The Father so dwells in the Son and the Son in believers as the children of God, that in and by the Logos God Himself is brought to men, and men to God. It is only when so modified by Christian experience that the doctrine of the Logos can have any value for Christian theology. What use can be made of it will afterwards be shown. This may now be said, however, that it is in the representation of the immediate and intimate relation of Father and Son, and then of the Son with believers, that the distinctive

value of the Fourth Gospel lies, not as a contribution to speculative thought, but as a stimulus to spiritual experience.

(iii) While the Fourth Gospel does not deny the manhood, and does give indications that the Word did become *flesh*, yet the Epistle to the Hebrews may be regarded as complementary to it in the way in which it brings out the significance of the *human experience*, and not merely the *human nature*, as the creeds assert. In discussing the evangelical testimony reference has been frequently made to that Epistle as affording what can truly be regarded as an inspired commentary on such facts as the Temptation in the Wilderness, the Agony in Gethsemane, and the Desolation of Calvary. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with that Epistle as part of the Apostolic testimony in a separate discussion. If the Apostolic interpretation in some of its more speculative aspects exposes our thought to the peril of losing our firm hold of the historical reality, this Epistle always brings us back to it; and this is an invaluable service, for Christian faith must always strike deep its roots into, and draw freely its nourishment from, the soil of fact both in the history of the earthly life and the experience by believers of the heavenly power of Jesus the Christ our Lord.

CHAPTER IV

THE DOGMATIC FORMULATION REGARDING THE PERSON OF CHRIST

This chapter and the next will not attempt to give the history of the doctrines of the Person and the Work of Christ, for these have unfortunately been separated in Christian theology, and in the Christian Church. That is not necessary to, and would not serve the purpose of, this volume. Only those subjects will be discussed that can further the object of a constructive theology.

(i) A remarkable difference in the lot of the two doctrines must first of all be noted. The doctrine of the person of Christ has found a dogmatic formulation in a series of œcumenical creeds; and the Christian Church may be said to have expressed its mind authoritatively upon it. The doctrine of the work of Christ, on the other hand, has not had that good or ill fortune. There have been various theories of the Atonement expounded, and generally accepted at different times; but it cannot be said that the Church has come to any accord on this subject as it has on the other. Accordingly, it will be necessary to deal with the two doctrines differently: it will suffice in this chapter to consider how far the dogmatic formulation of the doctrine of the person of Christ in the œcumenical creeds can be regarded as adequate to meet the demands of modern thinking; it will be necessary to discuss a number of theories of the Atonement in the next chapter to discover what truth they may contain for our thought to-day. It is true that the separation of the two doctrines cannot be absolute, as it was a definite conception of the work of Christ which affected the conception which was

formed of the person of Christ; and a definite theory of the Atonement must assume some view of the nature of Him who effects that Atonement. Nevertheless, a relative separation there has been, greatly to the injury of both the doctrines.

(ii) While there is danger in historical generalisations, there are some which are not only justified, but even necessary. The course of Christian theology has been affected in a very remarkable manner by the difference of the Greek and the Latin mind. The first was speculative and consequently metaphysical; the second was practical and as a result ethical or legal. The doctrine of the person of Christ as dogmatically formulated is the product of the Greek genius. The Roman ethos restored to prominence in the thought of the Church, and gave its character to what was thought about the work of Christ. There is a Greek and a Latin type of theology clearly distinguishable, since these differences between the Greek and the Latin mind do correspond to diverging tendencies of human interest and activity. There will always be those to whom the Incarnation makes more of an appeal than does the Atonement, and *vice versa*. But Christian constructive theology must aim at wholeness, and shun one-sidedness. To lay emphasis, as did the Greek theology, on Christ's human *nature* is to move from the region of practice to that of theory; to lay stress on His human *experience* as giving the meaning of the Incarnation, is to pass from the realm of speculation into that of morality and religion, is to find the point of contact between the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Accordingly, the writer entirely disagrees with those who advocate a return from the Latin to the Greek type of theology. We must advance beyond both to such a conception of the Incarnation as will make Atonement its characteristic activity, and such a conception of the Atonement as will make the Incarnation the necessary source of it. In dealing with the two doctrines separately, as their history compels us to do, we must never allow ourselves to forget that

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while they are distinguishable, yet they are not separable, for the content of the work depends on the character of the person of Christ, and the meaning of the work shows the worth of the person.

(iii) To these two theological types correspond the two dominant tendencies in the Christian Church to-day, the Catholic and the Protestant, or the sacramental and the evangelical. The close connection between the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation and the sacramental tendency is not always adequately emphasised. Where stress is laid on a union of natures rather than on a personal activity, and especially where great importance is attached to the assumption of a body as part of human nature, the belief in material channels of spiritual gifts follows with logical consistency. To anticipate the subsequent discussion by way of illustrating this we may note that monophysitism and transubstantiation theories have a close mental kinship. Protestantism has always concerned itself more with theories of the Atonement than has Catholicism; for while at the Reformation the orthodox Christology was taken over, although developed in different directions in the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches, yet apart from the kenotic theories Protestantism has not concerned itself greatly with the doctrine of the Incarnation. And the kenotic theories, inasmuch as they aimed at so conceiving the Incarnation as to allow for a human *experience*, are true to the Protestant tendency with its stress not so much on what Christ *was* as on what Christ *did*. If there is to be a reunion of the Christian Churches—even of the Catholic and the Protestant—it will be necessary to harmonise these two theological tendencies, for unity in thought regarding the person and work of Christ is a necessary condition of union of spirit in Him.

I

We are not at all concerned here with the ancient creeds as standards of orthodoxy, or as weapons

against heresy, nor with the question whether the truth of the Gospel needs to be so defended, or ought to be so commended. As the keynote of this volume is 'through fact to faith,' our primary questions are: Does the dogmatic formulation express personal faith in Jesus Christ the Lord as we to-day conceive it? Does it correspond with historical fact as modern scholarship establishes it? A subordinate question, important for constructive theology, which must use the philosophy of the age in interpreting the history and giving intellectual form to the faith, is this: Can the metaphysical formulae employed meet the demands of the philosophical thought of our own time? Before these questions can be answered, a summary of the history must be given.

(1) The Apostles' Creed does not come from the Apostolic Age; but its beginnings can be traced back to Irenaeus, A.D. 185, as an expansion of the Roman Baptismal Creed, and in its present form it is first found in 750 A.D. Its clauses were inserted at different times to assert the belief of the Church against various heresies. For our present purpose it need not be more closely examined.

(i) Much more important for constructive theology is the creed adopted by the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325 in condemnation of the heresy of Arius. This was an expansion of the creed of Caesarea presented to the Council by its bishop, Eusebius. The most important changes made are these: the clause *πρωτότοκον πασῆς κτίσεως* was left out as an Arian sense could be put upon it, and there were added the explanatory clauses *τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί*. Christ was raised above the category of the creature, and declared to be begotten, not made, and *consubstantial* with the Father. It was the word *ὁμοούσιον* which was the bone of contention in the subsequent controversies. The full and real divinity of Christ was asserted as the universal belief of the Church.

(ii) What is now known as the Nicene Creed is,

however, of later date. It is not certain that this can claim even to be the creed of the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), although the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) did accept it as the creed of that Council. The difference between this and the former creed lies in the expansion of the eighth article, καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, to condemn the heresy of Macedonius and his followers, nicknamed 'Pneuaumatomachians,' who repeated the heresy of Arius in regard to the Spirit, regarding Him as a creature subordinate to the Son. The following clauses were added: τὸ Κύριον καὶ τὸ ζωοποιὸν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν. There were also added clauses on the Church, baptism, the resurrection, and eternal life. The statement in this creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, was afterwards at an uncertain date modified in the West by the addition of the *Filioque* clause, placing the Son on an equality with the Father. This was the most serious theological difference between the East and the West, as the East in accordance with its Logos Christology tended always to the subordination of the Son to the Father. It may be added that alike in the Macedonian heresy as in this, the orthodox condemnation of it, there was no independent experimental interest in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit; both were but a logical consequence of the Christological differences.[1]

(iii) The Christological development was completed in the Creed of Chalcedon (A.D. 451). The perfect divinity of Christ is reasserted against Arianism, which was condemned at Nicaea in 325. The perfect humanity is maintained against Apollinaris, whose doctrine was condemned without mention of his name at the Synod of Alexandria in 362, the Synod of Rome in 377, and the Council of Constantinople in 381. Desiring to safeguard the unity of the person of Christ,

[1] The subject is dealt with in *The Humiliation of Christ*, by Bruce, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, by Ottley, *The Person of Christ*, by Mackintosh, and Dorner's monumental work, *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*.

and the immutability of His will, Apollinaris denied that Christ had the human spirit or rational soul, the third constituent of human nature according to the current psychology: its place was taken by the divine Logos Himself. This, however, was condemned as a heresy in the following clauses of the Chalcedonian formulae: *τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι . . . ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος . . . ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας.* The parallelism of the clauses referring to the humanity and the divinity shows that the Council was resolved to assert the reality of the humanity. But granted complete manhood and complete Godhood, how can these be combined and function in one person? Nestorius had attempted to deal with that problem, but his attempt had been condemned as a division of the person of Christ. Against him is directed the clause in the creed,[1] *ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, Υἱὸν τὸν Κύριον*, and the two adverbs, *ἀδιαιρέτως* (without division) and *ἀχωρίστως* (never to be separated). While the historical evidence and theological consistency demanded the maintenance of the completeness of the two natures (human and divine) in the unity of the person, the tendency of piety was to let the humanity be absorbed in the divinity. This tendency found expression in Eutyches, who taught that Christ, while *of* two natures, is not *in* two, as after the Incarnation there is but one nature, the human being so absorbed into the divine that even His body was not consubstantial with ours. This *monophysitism*, as it was called, was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon; but there is some doubt about the text of the clause directed again Eutyches. The Greek text in the record of the Councils runs *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, a phrase Eutyches would have accepted readily. The text generally adopted is *ἐν δύο φύσεσιν*, which asserts the permanence of the two natures. It has been conjectured that probably both clauses were

[1] The text of these creeds will be found in a very handy form in the volume entitled *De Fide et Symbole*, edited by Heurtley.

used. Against Eutyches also are directed the two adverbs, ἀσυγχύτως (without confusion) and ἀτρέπτως (without conversion). For our present purpose it is not at all necessary to follow the later developments of doctrine in the East in detail, except to call attention very briefly to two questions of interest. The first was this: Does the will belong to the nature or to the person? If to the former, then it logically follows that Christ had two wills (Dyothelitism); if the latter, then there was only one will (Monothelitism). But an intermediate position was possible; the will of each nature might be regarded as only a possibility, becoming actuality only in the activity of the one person, and concurring therein. The second was this: Must the human nature to be complete be personal, or can it become personal only in its union with the personal Logos? John of Damascus, whose name is usually associated with the solution of this problem, was anticipated by Leontius of Byzantium, who 'was the first who definitely maintained that the human nature of Christ is not ἀνυπόστατος (impersonal), nor on the other hand an independent ὑπόστασις (person), but that it has its ὑποστῆναι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.'[1] This view John developed, and he drew the consequences from this position, that there is an interchange of attributes, a circumincession (περιχώρησις), so that the human nature is deified (θέωσις τῆς σαρκός). It must be observed, however, that the interchange is one-sided: the human nature is deified, the divine remains unchanged. These are suggestive efforts to escape the dualism of natures which, despite the assertion of the unity of person, remained unresolved by the Creed of Chalcedon.

(iv) One other creed, although it contributes nothing new, deserves notice. The Athanasian Creed elaborates the doctrine of the Trinity. No certainty can be reached as to its date and origin. It was probably composed in Gaul by one single author as a sermon. It makes the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Trinity appear as unintelligible as it can be made,

[1] Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Eng. tr., iv. p. 233 note 3.

and nevertheless it represents salvation as depending on the acceptance of its complicated and elaborate doctrine. It is scholastic theology, and not living religion. It has no connection with Athanasius, but shows the influence of the teaching of Augustine. Its details do not need to be discussed.

(2) From the standpoint of Christian faith the creeds are profoundly disappointing as regards both what is included and what is excluded.

(i) The Apostles' Creed is expressly an individual confession; and the Athanasian Creed declares that 'Whosoever would be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith. Which Faith, except any one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.' The Catholic Faith is not the personal relation to Christ of the believer; it is an ordinance of the Church which must be obeyed without any use of the individual intelligence, solely on the Church's authority. In the Apostles' Creed, a recital of facts past, present, and future about Jesus Christ, there are included articles which are difficulties for Christian faith to-day. The virgin-birth, the descent to Hades, and the Second Advent, even if accepted, do not influence Christian thought and life to-day as when the creeds were framed. Each does indicate an essential element in Christian truth, the absolute sinlessness of Jesus, the complete efficacy of His sacrifice for the salvation of all the generations of men, whatever be the way in which the divine grace is brought within the reach of all, and the final triumph of Christ as the consummation of the present order of human history; but we do not express the truth in the same way as this creed. The Nicene and Chalcedonian Creeds are bishops' and not laymen's creeds, custodians of theology rather than guardians of faith. The doctrines of the unity-in-difference of the Godhead (the tri-unity), and of the unity of the real divinity and the real humanity in the person of Christ, are truths for Christian faith; but the metaphysical formulae of the Athanasian Creed cannot be enforced as a condition of

salvation, if salvation depends on intelligent personal faith.

(ii) The Nicene symbol does assert theologically what is an essential interest of faith. If the Christian salvation is real, God's own act to save men, then Christ must be so immediately and intimately related to God that what He does God does in Him; and it is this assurance to faith that the formula about the oneness in substance of the Father and the Son seeks to give. Later the fitness of the metaphysical terms will be discussed; but it must be here affirmed that the dispute was not merely about a diphthong, a verbal nicety, or a mental subtlety, as critics of the Christian Church have sometimes misrepresented it as being, but the issue was whether Christian theology was to become one of the mythologies, or the adequate interpretation of the final revelation of God and redemption of man.

(iii) No less of interest for Christian faith are the reality and completeness of the manhood of Jesus Christ and the unity of His person. We must sympathise with Apollinaris in his attempt to make more real the unity of the person of Christ, even although his inadequate psychology led him in so doing to sacrifice the completeness of the manhood. With Nestorius too, we must sympathise in his endeavour to maintain the completeness of the manhood, even although the ambiguity of the terms he used exposed him, it would now seem wrongly, to the charge of denying the unity of the person. His inadequate conception of personality, however, prevented his stating that unity in such a way as would satisfy our thought to-day. But the creed which condemned him was no more successful in solving the problem. Eutychianism was really a greater danger to Christian faith than either Apollinarianism or Nestorianism, for it would have severed the metaphysical creed from the historical basis in the actual life of Christ on earth, or faith from fact. Nevertheless, he was carrying to its logical conclusion the dominant tendency of the Christian piety of his age. Cyril's defence against

Nestorius of the term θεοτόκος as applied to the mother of Jesus shows how completely the humanity was being absorbed in the divinity—the historical in the metaphysical. Eutychianism endangered a vital interest of Christian thought and life that God was manifest as man, even as Arius brought into peril no less a concern for Christianity, that it was God Himself who was so manifest for the salvation of man. The failure of the creeds to present concretely the personal unity of God and man in Christ was due on the one hand to their ignoring the facts of the earthly life of Jesus, His moral character and religious consciousness—which give content to the abstract conceptions of divinity and humanity, and in that content also indicate the actuality of the personal unity—and on the other hand to the inadequate conception of personality. Historically and philosophically alike we are in a better position to-day in our Christology to meet the demands of faith for an intelligible and credible presentation of the person of Christ.

(3) The creeds include what is doubtful from the historical standpoint, and omit what is certain. The writer has already expressed his view in dealing with the fact of Christ regarding the virgin-birth and the resurrection. As regards the descent into Hades and the Second Advent, while it is impossible to take either conception with prosaic literalness, yet each, as has been indicated, expresses a truth for Christian faith. A problem which this recital of historical facts in the Apostles' Creed raises has already been fully dealt with. In the Introduction of this volume it has been shown that Christian faith is not concerned solely with religious ideas and moral ideals, divorced from historical facts; but that the redemptive revelation of God is by the historical personality of Jesus Christ. It is not the defect, but the merit of the Apostles' Creed, therefore, that it deals with historical facts. It asserts those facts which were being challenged or denied; but the omissions show that there was one aspect of the historical reality of Jesus Christ for which

the age from which the creed has come had little appreciation, and yet it is that aspect which most potently appeals to-day—the earthly ministry of Jesus, and the grace and truth therein manifested. While the completeness of the human *nature* was asserted in metaphysical terms, the living image of Jesus was not present to faith, for His personal experience as man was not being explored by Christian thought, because the soteriology of the time required only a human nature, and did not need to discover the meaning of the Wilderness, Gethsemane, and Calvary.

(4) As the purpose of this volume is to offer a Christology and a soteriology acceptable to modern thinking, reason must be shown why the metaphysical formulae of the creeds cannot satisfy us to-day. We must closely examine the terms used, which were borrowed from ancient philosophy, but had also their meaning modified in being so used. What follows will, however, not be a merely verbal discussion, as words stand for thoughts, and the scrutiny of language will make clearer the thought to which it gives expression.

(i) The most crucial of all the terms is ὁμοούσιον, which is explained in the phrase ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός. (*a*) The term ὁμοούσιον means *of the same ousia*. The term οὐσία is itself ambiguous. It may mean either an *entity*, the subject of attributes, or a class, species, or genus. As applied to man, for instance, it may mean this or that man, or man (including all men). Athanasius did not mean that Christ was an individual divine being, belonging to the same class of divine beings as the Father. That would have been polytheism, and he was combating polytheism in resisting Arianism. Neither did he mean that Christ and God the Father were one individual subject, for that would have been a relapse into the modalism which had been condemned as a heresy, and which by conservative theologians was thought to lurk in the term ὁμοούσιον. He meant neither separation from nor identity with the Father; but a relation of difference in unity. His meaning

was intermediate between a qualitative similarity and a quantitative identity, between belonging to the same class and being the one subject. Accordingly, neither of the meanings of the word *οὐσία* is carried over unchanged in his use of the word *ὁμοούσιον*. The rival word, *ὁμοιούσιον*, would serve no better, as it would not affirm even that Christ belonged to the divine class.

(*b*) Without intention the Creed of Chalcedon takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term in using it for Christ's relation to man as well as to God. Here it cannot mean identity of subject, it can mean only inclusion in one class, as the subsequent phrase *κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας* clearly indicates. Christ is not one with us as He is with the Father, but like us as belonging to the same species. That the term in both cases means exactly the same can be maintained only on the basis of a highly speculative theory of the relation of mankind to Christ, namely that He as Son of God, the image of God, the firstborn of the Creation, is the transition from God to man, and as such the root out of which, as it were, mankind grows. It is to be noted, however, that the New Testament does not teach a metaphysical unity, but a moral and religious union of the Vine and the branches.

(*c*) Does the phrase *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρός* in any way remove the ambiguity? The Chalcedon Creed offers this further explanation: *πρὸ αἰώνων ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα*, and *ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς Παρθένου τῆς Θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα*. The statement of the Athanasian Creed runs: 'Deus est ex substantia Patris ante saecula genitus: Homo ex substantia Matris in saeculo natus.' While there is here again the same endeavour to preserve a parallelism between the relation to the Father and to man, the same term is used in two senses. Generation out of the substance of the Father expresses, in the intention of the creed, distinction, but not separation: generation out of the substance of the mother involves separation. The language itself does not guard the unity of the Father

and the Son. Again, the term generation, even when qualified by eternal, does suggest separation of one individual from another. The term *substance* in the Athanasian Creed, when applied to the mother, means something more distinctly physical than its proper meaning as applied to God can bear. If we may use physical analogies, the relation of Christ to God is like that of a branch to a plant rather than of an offspring to a parent, for the branches abide in the plant as the offspring does not in the parent. If the relation of Christ to His mother was only according to the manhood, the phrase τῆς Θεοτόκου is manifestly inconsistent, as she bore man, not God. Even if the explanation be offered that she bore man so closely united to God that He could be called God, nevertheless the term is a concession to the monophysite tendency not in accord with the general intention of the creeds, which is to distinguish Godhood and manhood in Christ, while maintaining a parallelism of relation to the one and the other by a use of terms which a closer scrutiny proves to be ambiguous.

(ii) Another ambiguous term used in the creeds is φύσις. In the phrase ἐν δύο φύσεσιν, or ἐκ δύο φύσεων, it seems to mean the same as οὐσία. In popular speech *nature* and *substance* are not clearly distinguished, but there is a difference, as between manhood and mankind or the man, to use an illustration. The substance is that which exists; the nature is the sum of the qualities of the person or the thing. It was easy to substitute the *what* for the *that*, to use a distinction Greek thought made. Owing to this ambiguity we may deceive ourselves into thinking that we are in closer agreement with the creeds than we really are. When we speak of 'two natures in one person,' we think of one subject combining the qualities of God and man; they meant, until later refinements sought to meet the difficulty, two substances or subjects in one person, as the dispute about one or two wills showed. We so identify substance or subject and person that we cannot, therefore, think of two subjects—God and man functioning in one

person, although we can think of one person functioning both as God and as man, owing to the affinity of nature and community of purpose between God and man. This interpretation of the Chalcedonian Creed is confirmed by the Athanasian, 'Unus omnino, non confusione substantiae, sed Unitate Personae.' It is two substances or subjects, and not two natures, that the Creed of Chalcedon intends to describe as united, unmixed, unchanged, undivided, not to be separated.

(iii) Each of these adverbs deserves study. (*a*) By the first, ἀσυγχύτως, we are forbidden to think of any blending of the qualities of the two natures, Godhood and manhood, for the two subjects, God and man, stand apart. The contrary view would involve a heresy, 'by this confusion teaching the monstrous doctrine that the divine nature of the only-begotten is passible.' While the man in Christ suffered, it is regarded by these fathers as monstrous to believe that the God in Him suffered with the man. This is a survival of Greek philosophy which hindered an understanding of the Gospel story.

(*b*) The second adverb, ἀτρέπτως, forbids our thinking that the Incarnation made any difference in God or man, involved any humiliation of the one, any exaltation of the other. Paul's words in Phil. ii. 7, ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, 'He emptied Himself,' would be rank error. This is the *static* view of Greek philosophy, while the Scriptural and the modern view is *dynamic*. We can and must think of God, not as fixed substance, but as living Spirit.

(*c*) The third and fourth adverbs, ἀδιαιρέτως and ἀχωρίστως, may be taken together as emphasising one idea—the unity of Christ's person against Nestorius, or at least what Nestorius was supposed to teach. The framers of the creed, in thus asserting the two unchanged, unmixed natures against Eutyches and Apollinaris, make it very difficult for us to understand how they can have conceived concretely the unity of the person, on which against Nestorius they also insist. We can think of Christ as one only as we recognise the resemblance and communion between

God and man, the communicativeness of divine grace and the receptiveness of human faith. The inconsistencies of the creed show that abstract philosophical formulae cannot do justice to concrete historical reality.

(iii) We can learn still more the inadequacy of this dogmatic formulation if we study the two words used for person, πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις. Ancient philosophy, which was objective, asking *what do we know*, and not, as modern is subjective, inquiring *how we know*, had not formed any proper conception of personality. It was Christianity which so developed the moral conscience and the religious consciousness as to make the new conception necessary; and in the creeds we find the attempt to get the fit words for the new thought. (*a*) The term πρόσωπον means face, countenance, or expression of the face, appearance as regards condition or circumstance; it may mean also the actor's mask or rôle, a function or an office discharged. Sabellianism applied the term to the three *modes* of the revelation of the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Nestorius was prepared to confess that Christ in His Godhood and His manhood was one *prosopon*. Bethune-Baker accordingly maintains that he was not guilty of the heresy for which he was condemned; but Loofs has properly pointed out that when he used the term he did not mean what a modern thinker would mean when using the term person, nor what his orthodox opponents meant, for they were putting a new content into the term.[1] This term, when applied in the doctrine of the Godhead to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, has not advanced so far in its change of meaning as when used of Christ. (*b*) To avoid the old associations of the term πρόσωπον, and to assert the new meaning which was being put into it, the opponents of Nestorius insisted on the use of the term ὑπόστασις as its equivalent, and this Nestorius refused to do, and in so doing was undoubtedly justified by the older usage of the term.

[1] See *Nestorius and his Teaching*, by Bethune-Baker, and *Nestorius and his Place in the history of Christian Doctrine*, by Loofs.

He used it as equivalent to *οὐσία* for substance. It is so used in the anathemas attached to the Nicene Creed in the phrase *ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας*, and Athanasius asserted the identity of the meaning of the two terms. Some of the Greek theologians had come to use the term as equivalent to *πρόσωπον* in the doctrine of the Godhead, and this use had found general, if not universal, acceptance. Nestorius himself recognises it. It had not, however, been previously used of the person of Christ, and Nestorius, therefore, was not an innovator, but a conservative, in his refusal to use it in this new sense. Cyril, Nestorius' opponent, was not himself above reproach in respect of his use; and it may be he served his own purpose in using a term of ambiguous meaning to cover his own monophysite tendency, as *φύσις* and *ὑπόστασις* very nearly coalesced in meaning. It was this covert monophysitism which Nestorius believed himself to be combating in refusing to use the term. For this he is not to be blamed. He had not, however, reached a conception of the person of Christ which would include the full recognition of the unity which the creed, however imperfectly, aimed at affirming.

(v) It is interesting to observe that the same terms came to have different meanings as they were used in the doctrine of the Trinity or of the person of Christ. Identical as the terms *hypostasis* and *ousia* (Latin *subsistentia* and *substantia*) were in meaning to begin with, *ousia* came to be used to express the unity of the Godhead, and *hypostasis* the unity of the person of Christ. *Hypostasis* expresses the trinity in the Godhead, and *ousia* the duality in the person of Christ. In the one case we have three *hypostases* in the one *ousia*: in the other two *ousiai* in one *hypostasis*. Or, using the equivalent of *hypostasis*, person, we are asked, nay, even required, by the Athanasian Creed, on pain of damnation if we don't, to confess three persons in one substance in the Godhead, and two substances (modified usually to natures) in one person in Christ. If we use the word

person in the same sense as regards the Godhead as we do as regards Christ, we deny the divine unity and fall into tritheism. If we use the word substance in the same sense as regards Christ as we do as regards the Godhead, we deny the unity of His person, and fall into dualism. The creeds maintain an unstable equilibrium between the differences and the unity alike in the Godhead and in Christ.

II

Without following the history of the doctrine of Christ in the subsequent centuries, it will serve the purpose of this volume to prepare for the constructive statement which the writer intends to attempt by a consideration of the modifications of these creeds in the Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, and also the attempts so to modify this dogmatic formulation as to bring it into closer harmony with modern historical scholarship in the *kenotic* theories.

(1) While Socianism challenged the teaching of the creeds regarding the nature of God and the person of Christ, the Reformers accepted the œcumenical creeds. Their religious standpoint did not require any change ; they could fit their fresh apprehension of the Christian salvation into this old framework. Their historical position also made it politic that they should claim to be ' orthodox ' according to the definition of these œcumenical Councils, while rejecting the accretions of Roman Catholicism. It was impossible, however, to avoid all modification in the restatement of the old dogmas, for that restatement must needs be affected by the new thought and life. The difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed type of Protestantism, both as regards the dominant religious interest, and especially as regards the view taken of the Lord's Supper, affected the Christology, so that we can distinguish the Lutheran and the Reformed.[1]

(i) While there is danger in generalisations, the

[1] A very valuable account of the Lutheran and Reformed Christologies is given in Lecture III. in Dr. A. B. Bruce's *The Humiliation of Christ.*

contrast may be described as follows: For Lutheranism the question was, How can I be saved? for Calvinism, the dominant force in the Reformed Churches, it was rather, How is God's will fulfilled? Although both assigned absolute authority to the Bible, for Luther it was the tutor unto Christ, for Calvin it was the legislator, revealing the purpose of God. Luther kept from Roman Catholicism all that did not conflict with his original experience of the grace of Christ; Calvin gave up all that could not be justified from the Holy Scriptures. The one laid stress on the Gospel, and subordinated the Law to the Gospel; the other tended to conceive the Gospel even as Law. The one was conservative, moving only under the compulsion of personal conviction; the other was radical, following whithersoever the word of the Lord might lead. The one met individual needs; the other claimed social authority. Consequently Calvinism has been a much more potent factor in modern history than Lutheranism.

(ii) It is one of the tragedies of the Christian Church that when unity was most necessary to Protestantism it was sacrificed to a dispute about the doctrine of the Eucharist. It was the scholastic dogmatist, surviving in Luther despite his conversion, that made him take the words of institution with a prosaic literalness, and insist on the real presence of the body and blood of Christ *in*, *with*, and *under* the bread and the wine. His doctrine is called that of *consubstantiation*: the elements are not changed, the body and blood of Christ are not included in the bread and the wine, nor are the bread and wine mixed with the body and blood; but during the administration there is such a union that the whole Christ is received by the communicant. Zwingli admitted a presence of Christ 'in the contemplation of faith.' The Eucharist is not merely a memorial, it is also a pledge of the grace of Christ, even as a ring is in marriage. Calvin tried to get nearer the Lutheran position. He rejected the doctrine of consubstantiation, the objective presence of the body and blood of Christ *in*, *with*, and *under*

the elements, as he held that the glorified body was in heaven. But he maintained that Christ is received spiritually by the believer as he partakes of the elements; Christ presents His body and blood to the believer, and by the energy of His Spirit communicates power, a power which is the mysterious source of a spiritual body which will appear at the Resurrection. Without attempting to discuss these theological subtleties, the difference of the two doctrines may be thus stated. Luther had to affirm the ubiquity of the body of Christ so as to secure that objective presence in the sacraments. Calvin, although in his desire to conciliate the Lutherans he does not maintain his position consistently, could not admit such a presence, as he thought of the body of Christ as subject to the conditions of space, as localised in heaven. Luther's position involved a deification of even the body of Christ, a transference to it of the divine quality of omnipresence; and his Christology was a reversion to Eutychianism or Monophysitism. Calvin's position, with its insistence on the continuance of the human qualities, even after the glorification, was a movement rather towards Nestorianism. However extravagant may seem some of the assertions of the Lutheran Christology, it can be understood only as we always recognise that it was an attempt to find a metaphysic which would justify the view of the Lord's Supper, a view which Luther honestly and passionately believed he must maintain to preserve his own assurance of the forgiveness of sin.

(2) The presence of the body and blood of Christ in, with, and under the elements involved its ubiquity. This Luther explained by the theory of the communication of the attributes of one nature to another. Christ is at the right hand of God, which means everywhere; and wherever He is present, His whole humanity is. Luther introduced in stating this view the scholastic distinction of the threefold mode of presence: the local or circumspective, a presence in one place and not elsewhere, the definitive, or a presence wherever willed, and the repletive, equi-

valent to ubiquity or omnipresence. Lutheran Christology advanced from this starting point.

(i) The first problem discussed was the consequences of the union of the two natures in one person. Brentz and Chemnitz both started from the assumption of the communication to the human nature of divine attributes, but Brentz carried out this principle with logical consistency, regardless of consequences, whereas Chemnitz, having some regard to the historical reality, carried it out only partially, and so with less consistency.

(*a*) Brentz asserted the mutual communication of attributes without any such qualification 'as far as he is capable,' for Christ was made capable of receiving all divine properties without any exception whatever. He developed only one side of this mutual communication, the deifying of the humanity. It is true that he conceded that the humanity possessed only a communicated divinity, and was made equal to God, not in being (οὐσίᾳ), but only in authority (ἐξουσίᾳ). As regards the body of Jesus he maintained that a body can exist *locally*, but also *illocally*, and that to be *in loco* is not essential, but accidental to body. During the earthly life His body existed both *in loco*, here and there, and *in Logo*, that is, everywhere. The humanity of Christ was invested with divinity from the moment of incarnation, which was itself an invisible ascension. The earthly Christ combined two humanities, a humbled one and an exalted one; but the omnipresence was invisible, and the omniscience and omnipotence were dissimulated. 'Majestatem humanitas, tempore exinanitionis, suo modo dissimulavit.'

(*b*) Chemnitz maintained that the communication of the divine attributes to the human nature was limited by the principle that each nature must preserve its essential properties, that *finitum non est capax infiniti*. Not only the earthly but even the heavenly body must be *in loco*, and Christ is not usually present in His Church bodily. The human nature was not endowed with divine properties, but

rather *pervaded* by the divine, which used it as its organ, and exerted energy in, with, and through it. 'Divina virtus et potentia majestatis et omnipotentiae suae opera in assumpta natura *cum* illa, et *per* illam exerceat et perficiat.' His watchword is that of John of Damascus, περιχώρησις, and his image the mass of heated iron. How scholastic this Lutheran development became is shown by the way in which he works out in detail the modes of communication. In the *genus idiomaticum* the subject is the whole person, *in concreto*, and the predicate the property of either nature, *e.g.* Christ knew and revealed the Father, or Christ died. In the *genus apotelismaticum*, the subject is either nature and the predicate an activity pertaining to the work of redemption in which both natures concur, *e.g.* the Son of God endured the Cross. In the *genus majestaticum* or *auchematicum* the divine perfection is ascribed *realiter* to the human nature, *e.g.* the Son of man sits at God's right hand. It has been noted that one mode is lacking, what might be called the *genus tapeinoticum*, the acceptance by the divine of human properties, such as suffering and death as stated in Phil. ii. 6-8. It was about the third genus that there was difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed theologians. Chemnitz does not affirm ubiquity in the unqualified way of Brentz. He holds that Christ is *able* to be present *when*, *where*, and *how* He pleases, even in invisible form. He teaches, not a necessary omnipresence, but a hypothetical or optional multipresence. He grounds this teaching not only on the words, 'This is My body,' but also on a legitimate deduction from the union of natures, *Logos non extra carnem et caro non extra logon*; this for the Lutherans was essential to the reality of incarnation. The doctrine of Chemnitz may be distinguished from that of Brentz as follows. For Brentz the state of exinanition consisted in possession, with habitual furtive use, of majesty; for Chemnitz in possession with occasional use and prevailing non-use. The latter even inclines to adopt Ambrose's idea of the retraction of the Logos, that is, a defective possession.

(*c*) The *Formula of Concord* (A.D. 1580) tried to settle the controversy by a compromise. The exaltation of the human nature to divine majesty from the very conception is asserted (the birth being *inviolata ipsius virginitate*). Possession without use (kenosis) and possession with furtive use (krypsis), and also a hypothetical and a necessary omnipresence, are taught. No notice is taken of the distinction between the presence of the human nature to the Logos, and to the world. Such a compromise settled nothing, and so the quarrel went on till the Tübingen-Giessen controversy broke out.

(ii) The watchwords of this controversy were *kenosis* and *krypsis*, and the combatants were concerned about the nature of the humiliation in an endeavour to harmonise Christology with historical fact. While possession of the divine majesty even in the state of humiliation was admitted, the difference lay in the question of use or non-use of divine properties; the Giessen theologians held the kenotic, the Tübingen the kryptic position. The Giessen theologians contended for the distinction between the two kinds of presence of the body, to the Logos and to the world, and maintained that the second depended on the first. The Tübingen school held that the distinction was imaginary, and that potential omnipresence was an absurdity. The Giessen school tried to meet this objection by distinguishing the operative and the inoperative attributes, and applied this distinction to the ubiquity. God is free in His action, and is, therefore, free to be present in the world or not as He pleases. The use of presence is a matter of free will, 'usurpatio praesentiae est liberrimae voluntatis.' The Tübingen school following Brentz were dominated by theory; the Giessen following Chemnitz had more regard to fact, and tried by such assumptions to bring theory nearer fact. The assumption of voluntary absence or presence involves the principle of God's free self-limitation, a principle of primary importance for modern theology.

(iii) A few comments on this Lutheran Christology

may be offered. *First of all*, the principle of the communication of properties (*idiomata*) is arbitrarily applied: the divine majesty is communicated to the humanity, but not the human limitations to the divinity. *Secondly*, although this was not the intention the logical consequence of the theory is the extinction of the reality of the humanity. The communication should have been limited to the gifts and graces which human nature is capable of receiving. *Thirdly*, while the humiliation is admitted as necessary from the standpoint of soteriology, it being needful that the Saviour of men should become like unto His brethren, the Christology makes it virtually impossible, as the distinction between the possession and the use of the divine attributes does not safeguard the reality of the humiliation. *Fourthly*, while the fact of exinanition is in theory admitted, it remains an effect without a cause, for from the beginning the Logos is united to a humanity endowed with the divine attributes. The only way in which a cause for this effect could be found would be in the theory of a pre-existent divine humanity voluntarily humbling itself to a state of exinanition. *Fifthly*, while this doctrine aims at the deification of the humanity, it really denies the Incarnation, for it makes the humanity unreal. *Sixthly*, the attempts made by Chemnitz and his followers to modify the dominant conceptions in order to get nearer historical reality were ineffective, because the starting-point is not from history, as it should be, but from a theory, and a very arbitrary and artificial theory, as to the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. *Lastly*, the Lutheran Christology has an interest and importance for the constructive theology inasmuch as it works out in detail with logical consistency the dogmatic formulation of the doctrine of the Incarnation. In its extreme form it may be taken even as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principles of the creeds, and so a call to a reconsideration of these.

(3) The Reformed Christology is not so speculative as the Lutheran, and keeps nearer to the facts of history.

(i) Calvin did not insist on terms, if only the essential elements of doctrine were retained. He would gladly have given up the terms *person* and *trinity* so long as the truth was affirmed that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, yet each distinguished by some peculiar property. Since the original cause—*principium et origo*—is in the Father, the name God is specially appropriate to the Father; and this preserves the order of persons without taking anything from the deity of the Son and the Spirit. He was anxious to steer a straight course between Arianism and Sabellianism. That he gave the attention to the doctrine of the Trinity which he did shows the greater theological thoroughness of Calvinism.

(ii) For the Reformed Christology incarnation was itself humiliation, while it was admitted that there might have been an incarnation in exaltation. The theory is well stated in the *Admonitio Christiana* (1581), which was an answer to the *Formula of Concord*. (*a*) For man's salvation the eternal Son of God assumed into the unity of His person a nature truly human, consisting of a rational soul and a human body. (*b*) While thus closely related these natures are not changed, or mixed, or confused, but remain distinct while united, and retain their respective essential properties. (*c*) The union endows the human mind and will with gifts surpassing those of all men and angels, yet it ever remains finite in the divine view, and can never be equal to the essential power, wisdom, and virtue of God. (*d*) Because of this union, whatever is said of Christ is said truly and really of the whole undivided person, sometimes in respect of both natures, sometimes in respect of the one or the other. The former holds when the predicate has reference to Christ's office, as He is Mediator, Redeemer, Intercessor, King, Priest, Prophet, in respect both of the Deity and the Humanity, and each nature performs its proper part in all official acts. The latter holds when the predicate has reference to a peculiar property or operation of one of the natures. Thus it can be said that God was born, died, etc., only in respect of

the human nature, and again that the man Christ Jesus is omnipotent, omnipresent, in virtue, not of His humanity, but of His divinity. The predication, however, is real and not verbal in consequence of the union. (*e*) The distinction between the two states is, as regards the divinity, that of partial concealment and of open manifestation, but as regards the humanity the state of exaltation involves the loss of some accidental properties possessed in the state of humiliation, the perfect development of others, and the retention of the essential properties, *e.g.* the glorified body as a body is localised in heaven.

(iii) This statement calls for some comment. (*a*) The natures appear to be placed in juxtaposition without any real union (*gemina substantia, mens, robur et virtus*). The act of union by the Logos is described as a secret and inscrutable *vinculum*. It is the divine person of the Logos who unites Himself to the human nature. (*b*) The effort was indeed made to make the communication between the natures a reality by two media. *First*, there was the ascription to the Son of God on the one hand, in virtue of the personal union, of participation in the sufferings of the humanity; and on the other hand there was the doctrine adopted from Aquinas, of the communication of charisms to the human nature, fitting it to be the companion and the organ of deity. The latter was, however, limited by the axiom *finitum non capax infiniti*. While valuable religiously as supporting the truth of the *homoousia* of Christ with His brethren. it has its theoretical difficulties. Why should the operation of the Spirit be necessary to effect what from the Lutheran point of view seemed a necessary effect of the union? An attempt to meet the objection is found in the phrase, 'by the Logos through the Spirit,' which seeks to express a moral influence rather than a physical result. 'The influence was not physical,' says Schneckenburger,[1] 'but moral, depending on the will, but the will of the Logos was to give room for a purely human development and

[1] *Vergleichende Darstellung*, ii. 239-40, quoted by Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

activity.' (*c*) The exinanition applied to the divine nature; the Son of God emptied Himself in becoming man; but this kenosis was an emptying as to use and manifestation, not as to possession: it was an *occultatio*. Whether the occultation was to the world only, or to the consciousness of Jesus also, is not made clear. If the latter, a double life of the Logos would be involved. Some retraction of divine power is recognised. (*d*) The likeness of Christ's humanity to that of man in all respects, sin excepted, is affirmed distinctly. Some of the earlier theologians were not quite consistent here. Zanchius, for instance, ascribed to Jesus' soul the perfect vision of all things in God. Hulsius, however, thought that on earth Jesus was *viator*, not *comprehensor*. This is the characteristic Reformed doctrine. (*e*) Had the Reformed Christology not been committed to certain categories of thought by the dogmatic formulation, its greater historic sense and its soteriological interest would have led it towards a much more satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation than the Lutheran, with its distinctive presuppositions, could have reached. As it is, to use its own terms, it remained *viator*, and did not attain as *comprehensor* of the Truth.

III

The Lutheran and the Reformed Christologies developed the ecclesiastical dogma of the person of Christ in dealing with the problem of the relation of the two natures or substances in the one person. The Creed of Chalcedon had affirmed the reality, completeness, and differences of the two natures, and the unity of the persons, but had not attempted to show how natures *ex hypothesi* so different could remain real and complete within such a unity. The Eutychian and the Nestorian tendencies were inevitable with these presuppositions. John of Damascus, following Leontius of Byzantium, did endeavour to make the unity intelligible in a monophysite direction, for an impersonal humanity assumed by the

divine person of the Logos is God rather than man. This same tendency Lutheranism followed under the influence of its view of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Calvinism, on the other hand, with its emphasis on the difference of God and man, moved in the Nestorian direction, but was also affected by its greater regard for historical reality.

(1) This too was one of the motives of the movement to modify the orthodox Christology by the theory of the *kenosis*, for which Scriptural authority was found in Phil. ii. 6-8.[1] A more immediate motive was found in the desire to harmonise the Lutheran and Reformed Christologies to facilitate efforts at ecclesiastical reunion. Regarding this movement two considerations must be kept in view. *Firstly*, the orthodox Christology was assumed, and the modifications attempted used its categories. *Secondly*, these kenotic theories differed from the earlier kenotic views in asserting not only a non-use in the state of humiliation of the divine prerogatives, etc., as did the Giessen theologians, but even a partial or complete non-possession. An examination of these theories is important for our present purpose, as the unsatisfactory solution of the problem in these theories will force on us the question whether a constructive theology must not frankly and fully abandon the metaphysical conceptions and terms of the orthodox Christology. The motive and the method of this movement have been well stated by Faut.[2] 'Essentially under the influence of the Biblical witness to Jesus, the real man, there resulted the new forms of the Christological dogma in the doctrine of the kenosis of the God-man. This, rejected as a heresy by the confessions, was generally recognised as churchly because Biblical. It was not a systematic interest to add the *genus tapeinoticum* to the *genus majestaticum* in the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* that led to this modification, but the desire to do justice to the historical person of Jesus. Not rationalism only but

[1] See Lecture IV. in Bruce's *The Humiliation of Christ*.
[2] *Die Christologie seit Schleiermacher*, p. 7.

Christian piety fixed attention on history. The question put was, How can the God-man be real man? The answer was the doctrine of the kenosis of the Logos. The doctrine of the God-man as the second person of the Godhead was assumed as a changeless truth of faith. There seemed to be no other possibility of understanding the earthly human life of Jesus than the assumption of a self-emptying of the God-man for the end of the Incarnation. The Formula of Concord had rejected this thought as a blasphemy with regard to the changelessness of God. It was a serious step which churchly theologians took, and it is to be understood only as a proof of the helpless condition in which the assumption of the ecclesiastical dogma places us.'

(2) What were the problems for thought involved could not be better stated than they have been by Dr. Bruce.[1] 'When this general idea has been announced, three questions may be asked regarding it. *First*, is the depotentiation *relative* or *absolute*? That is to say, does it take place simply as far as the Incarnation is concerned, leaving the Logos *per se* still in possession of His divine attributes; or does it take place without restriction or qualification, so that *pro tempore* at least, from the moment of birth till the moment of exaltation, the second person of the Trinity is denuded of everything pertaining to deity but its bare, naked, indestructible essence? *Second*, in what relation does the depotentiated Logos stand to the man Jesus? Is He the soul of the man, or is there a human soul in the man over and above? Is the Logos metamorphosed into a human soul, or is He simply self-reduced to the dimensions of a human soul in order that, when placed side by side with a human soul, He may not by His majesty consume the latter and render all its functions impossible? *Third*, how far does the depotentiation or metamorphosis, as the case may be, go within the person of the Incarnate One? Is it partial, or is it complete? Does it make Christ to all intents and purposes a mere man, or

[1] *The Humiliation of Christ*, p. 137.

does it leave Him half man, half God, in some respects human, in other respects superhuman? All these questions have been variously answered by different writers.'

(3) Into the details of the varying theories it is not at all necessary to enter, as all of them must be rejected on the following grounds :—

(*a*) The use of the word κενόω by Paul in Phil. ii. 7 is far too slender a basis for such a structure of speculation. In the discussion of that passage in a previous chapter the intellectual difficulties which Paul's own presentation involves have already been indicated. It affords a very shaky foundation for any theological theory which may be built upon it.

(*b*) The theory of the depotentiation of the Logos by His own temporal act is a speculation which is too high for us; we cannot attain it. It is one thing to start from the historical facts, which demand that we should lay stress on the human limitations of the person of Christ, and justify us in inferring that in the Incarnation there must be involved a self-limitation on the part of God; and quite another to begin with the orthodox dogma of the Trinity, and, using the term *person* in a much more individual sense than any just interpretation of the intentions of the creeds allows, to ascribe speculatively to one person of the Godhead a surrender, total or partial, of the divine prerogatives belonging to Him. Rightly does Ritschl[1] say, 'It is nothing else than mythology, what is taught under the name of the kenosis of the divine Logos,' and this mythology exposes its own futility. 'It confesses openly,' says Ritschl, 'that we cannot express the humanity and the divinity in the same relation and in the same time regarding the person of Christ; that is, that both predicates mutually exclude each other.' God in this school is so thought of that He must cease to be God in so far as He becomes man. We need to revise the conception of God assumed so that the self-limitation necessarily involved in incarnation shall not be a depotentiation,

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. pp. 386-88.

but a self-fulfilment. The conception of *kenosis* we shall use in our constructive theology, and shall conceive the nature and purpose of God with reference to it: it is the use of the conception in the kenotic theories alone which is here condemned.

(*c*) The theories do prove that, starting from the ecclesiastical dogma, it is impossible to reach and to hold the historical reality of Jesus without speculations which can appear intelligible and credible only to their authors. They serve to expose the dogma in all its contradictions, and so challenge and justify an attempt to safeguard the interests of Christian faith in regard to the person of Christ by means of other categories of thought, and other methods of presentation.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT REGARDING THE WORK OF CHRIST

Closely related as the person and work of Christ are, the treatment of the two subjects in the Christian Church involves their separation.

(i) That a soteriological interest was involved in the Christological development must be recognised. The apprehension of salvation affected the conception of the Saviour. If what man needed was deliverance from corruption, or mortality, consequent on sin, a deification of his nature, then the Incarnation must be regarded as a deification of human nature typical and creative for the race; the leaven of divinity must be introduced into the lump of humanity so that the whole might be leavened. The Atonement here is a mysterious transformation of human nature in the race consequent on such transformation by the presence of God Himself in the representative person of the race. What was done in Adam for man's destruction was undone in Christ for man's salvation. God became man, that man might become God, incorruptible, immortal. It is this conception of salvation which is the doctrinal basis of sacramentarianism. The sacrament of the Eucharist is the physical channel by which this transformation is communicated. This whole mode of thought and life is so alien to the spirit of the writer, that this conception of salvation need not for the present purpose be pursued any further.

(ii) In the doctrinal development to be traced in these pages it is the death of Christ which is the central interest. What is the significance and value of His sacrifice for the salvation of men? Here there is a restriction of the scope of the work of Christ.

Although He was fulfilling His calling in His earthly ministry, that for the most part falls out of account. His life, His teaching, His example, His companionship, His dealing with sinful, sorrowing, and dying men to impart God's grace, are ignored, and great is the loss; for the Cross becomes an abstraction about which there can be a great deal of speculation divorced from reality, unless the concrete context of this earthly ministry is carried forward into the conception of the Crucified. No theory of the Atonement can be true and right which is not consistent with the spirit and purpose of Him who atones, as revealed to us in the earthly life. Let this be accepted at the outset as a criticism applicable to this doctrinal development as a whole.

(iii) The doctrine of the Atonement thus restricted has had many vicissitudes in the course of its development. Often it has been allowed to fall into the background of the life and thought of the Church. Often has a religious revival brought it again to the central position. (*a*) It does not owe so much to the collective judgment of the Church, as to individual experience and interpretation. Its history is not associated with universal councils, but with great personalities. All doctrine does and must reflect the life and thought of the time and the place; but no doctrine has been more sensitive to this influence, and in this doctrine we can see as in a mirror what beliefs and habits were dominant. Instances of this tendency will recur again and again in the course of the following discussion. (*b*) If the doctrinal development has been thus affected by temporal and local conditions, may we not be compelled to acknowledge a like influence on the presentation of the data for the doctrine in the New Testament? We cannot think and feel about sacrifice as the godly in Israel did. We cannot put ourselves again into Paul's attitude as a Pharisee to the Law, an attitude which the Christian apostle had not altogether abandoned. On the other hand, we should fall into serious error if we supposed that there was nothing permanent nor universal in

the doctrine. The persistency with which men have returned to the interpretation of it because of the constancy of its challenge to the religious consciousness and moral conscience proves that it does correspond with something that endures in the inner life of man, that it does answer a question man must ask, and meet a need he cannot set aside. That among those who have wrestled with this truth have been some of the greatest personalities in the Christian Church shows that it has a hold on what is worthiest in the soul of man. (*c*) In no other doctrine is there so intimate a relation, and so direct an influence, of the religious consciousness and the moral conscience, and, what till we consider it closely seems most inexplicable, nowhere does the religious consciousness come into more acute conflict with the moral conscience than with regard to this doctrine. Religion seems to demand what morality is not prepared to concede. Two considerations can be offered in explanation of this contradiction. Religion as dealing with eternal reality is more conservative than morality which deals with the temporal relations of men in human society. Not only must morality be more immediately responsive to change of the total conditions of life than religion is forced to be, but man has a sense of liberty in this moral conscience, whereas in his religious consciousness he has rather the sense of dependence. It seems much less reasonable and righteous that man's thoughts about God should change than that he should modify his view as to what is his duty to his fellow-men.

(iv) These considerations show the spirit in which, and the purpose for which, we must address ourselves to a study of the history of the doctrine.[1] However uncongenial and even repugnant to us some of the theories may appear to be, we must not forget that they met a present need, that through them as

[1] The following books among others may be specially mentioned: Franks' *A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, 2 vols.; Mozley's *The Doctrine of the Atonement*; Bruce's *The Humiliation of Christ*; Denney's *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*.

adapted to the thought and life of the time the grace of God did bring comfort and succour to the hearts of men. We must try to understand them, and even recognise their worth for their immediate purpose. This, however, does not involve that we are to make the attempt to take up these theories into our constructive theology, forcing our minds to assimilate what must remain for us alien, and even, it may be, offensive. We must try to discover what fact about man, or what truth about God, they may contain, however imperfectly expressed, so that we may take due account of the one or the other in making a statement as comprehensive as possible.

(1) We may begin with that theory which is most remote from our thinking to-day, viz. that the death of Christ was a ransom paid by God to the devil.

(i) We have the conception of redemption in the New Testament as deliverance from sin and law, death and doom; but the metaphor of the *ransom* is not there developed into a theory. This theory has, however, its points of contact with the New Testament in regard to the place of angelology and demonology in the primitive Christian beliefs. In dealing with Paul's teaching in a previous chapter, mention was merely made of Paul's reference to the relation of the death of Christ to the rule of angels, good and bad. The passage may here be recalled. 'Having put off from Himself the principalities and the powers, He made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it' (Col. ii. 15). 'Till recently,' says Peake,[1] 'the principalities and powers have been explained as hostile demoniacal spirits, and this view is held by Meyer, Ellicott, Lightfoot, Oltramare, and Weiss.' As the preceding verse refers, however, to the abolition of the law for Christian believers, Peake considers that the context requires us to think here of the angels by whose mediation, according to Jewish belief, the law was given. 'This law that has been abolished was given by angels, its abolition implies their degradation.' This interpretation seems forced, and is justi-

[1] *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, iii. pp. 528-30.

fied only on the ground of the continuity of Paul's argument. But Paul was not always a strictly logical thinker, and having shown what the death of Christ meant to the Jew he may have turned abruptly to show what it meant to the Gentile. Be the interpretation what it may, it is certain that Gentile readers would regard the passage as teaching Christ's triumph over demons.

(ii) This vivid and intense belief in demons, their power to inflict physical as well as moral and religious injury on man, was a survival in the Church of paganism, of the *animism* which is a very early form of religious belief. It introduced a very real dread of untold mischief which might befall any man. This belief was modified by the Christian faith in two respects. Just as polytheism yielded to monotheism, so the multitude of demons, while their existence was not denied, were concentrated as regards malevolent purpose and power in one, their ruler, Satan, the devil, who, where monotheism did not assert itself, was almost a counter-god. So also it was not by natural necessity that men were subject to this dominion of the devil; as a result of Adam's fall mankind had subjected itself to that dominion voluntarily, but was not able by its own efforts to cast off that yoke. It is not so surprising as it at first appears to us that an attempt should be made to include in the Christian salvation deliverance from the devil's dominion, and the use of the word *ransom* suggested the way in which the connection was made.

(iii) This theory is anticipated in Marcion's statement that the death of Christ was 'the price by which the God of love purchased men from the creator of the world,' for his demiurge shows a marked likeness to the devil of orthodox theology. It is not probable that Irenaeus had the devil in view when he speaks of God as redeeming men, not by force, but by persuasion. Origen was the first Christian theologian who affirmed distinctly that the death of Christ was a ransom paid to the devil for the souls of men brought under his dominion by sin, that the devil could not

keep the price he had received because of Christ's perfect purity, and that Christ both for Himself and all who follow Him won the victory over the devil. He does not, however, suggest any deliberate deception on the part of God. It was Gregory of Nyssa (who died about A.D. 394) who fully developed this doctrine. As man had freely surrendered himself to Satan, God could not deliver by force, but must pay a price. Satan coveted the miraculous power of Christ and wanted to get possession of it. That the power was divine had to be concealed by the flesh. 'Goodness is displayed in God's will to save, justice in the giving of a *quid pro quo*, wisdom in devising that Satan might take what he could not retain.' 'Satan was taken as a greedy fish by the hook concealed in the bait.' 'Was not guile used in the Incarnation? Yes, but this is a mark of wisdom, justice, and goodness—justice in that the devil is rewarded after his desert; wisdom in that by this retribution a better thing is brought about; goodness in that the guile ends in human salvation.' [1] Gregory of Nazianzum does regard the death of Christ as a victory over Satan and death, in which Satan was deceived, yet he will not admit that a ransom was paid to Satan, since Satan had no claim for compensation, as his power was usurped. Ambrose held the theory of a ransom paid to the devil, including a fraud practised upon him; but he also represents Christ's death as the payment of a debt due to the devil, and acknowledged by God. Augustine recognised the devil's rights, but did not teach any 'pious fraud' on him. Anselm decisively rejected this theory. But Bernard maintained that although the right of Satan over mankind is not based on any obligation to him, yet this bondage, however irregularly secured, is righteously permitted by God as a just retribution for sin. He is the executor of the divine justice, and Christ makes deliverance from his control harmonise with the justice of God. Peter the Lombard states the theory in a most offensive form. 'What did the Redeemer to our captor? He

[1] Franks, *op. cit.*, i. p. 76.

extended to him His cross as a mouse-trap: He set there as a bait His blood.' [1]

(iv) However offensive such a theory may appear to us, we should not be content with condemning it, we should ask ourselves rather: How did men find any satisfaction in it? It must be conceded that the moral ideas involved are to us repugnant; that God should be under obligation to make a bargain with the devil for the recovery of man from his dominion, and that nevertheless He was wise, righteous, and good in cheating the devil of his due, is a combination of ideas which our conscience must condemn as immoral. What gave the theory its hold was that the fear of the devil's dominion was a real fear, and that in this theory there seemed to be assured to men a real deliverance. This has marked all theories of the Atonement, that they have represented the death of Christ as saving from what was there and then deemed one of man's greatest evils. If we attempt to find some counterpart for this theory in the constructive theology at which we aim, it would seem to be this, that in Christ we are brought into such a relation to God that for us in the love of God there is an assurance that nothing works for our hurt, and all works together for our good.

(2) Having dealt with the patristic view of salvation in which the emphasis was put on the Incarnation rather than the Atonement of the Cross, and having passed judgment on the theory of the death as a ransom paid to the devil, we need not dwell on the varied views of the Fathers, in which many different tendencies appear but there is no systematic treatment of the subject. We may pass at once to a clear-cut theory in Anselm's answer to the question *Cur Deus Homo?* the title of his treatise.

(i) He feels it incumbent to answer that question in vindication both of the wisdom and the power of God. He aims at showing that this was the only way in which mankind could be saved from the doom of sin. He sets aside the 'ransom to Satan' theory on

[1] Franks, *op. cit.*, i. p. 220.

the ground that Satan has no legal claim on God, as he is God's creature even as man is. (*a*) The Atonement was necessary because of sin. Sin is nothing else than failing to render to God what is His due, for every creature owes to Him absolute obedience, and even the slightest disobedience would not be justified, were it to rescue the Universe from total destruction. Sin can therefore be atoned for only by something more valuable than the whole universe. (*b*) Though God cannot lose His honour, yet sin is a personal insult to God, and God's honour must be vindicated, not simply by the future obedience of the transgressor, but by an adequate compensation for the injury done to God's honour. (*c*) Man cannot render this compensation, and yet he cannot be excused on account of his inability, for that is due to his own fault, It is impossible that God should let His honour be affronted without vindicating it, since that would be permitting an incongruity in the government of the universe. This necessity is not imposed on God, but rises out of His own nature, since by a single sin a debt is incurred which the whole universe would be insufficient to meet. (*d*) God alone can make the satisfaction, but it must be made by man, since it was he who incurred the debt. Therefore the case can be met only by a God-man. Thus the Word became flesh. (*e*) He is impeccable, and death is only properly due to sin as its consequence. He being sinless was not compelled to die. His death was due to His unswerving fidelity to God. It was thus a supreme act of honour to God, which outweighed the whole sin of the race. (*f*) But it would be unjust of God to let this act go unrewarded. He could give nothing to Christ, since He as God possessed everything. So Christ transferred His merit to us, and thus we receive salvation. Christ pays our debt in satisfying God's honour by dying, and transfers to us the merit which falls to Him for dying voluntarily.

(ii) This theory has such importance in the history of the doctrine, that it claims closer examination.

(*a*) Although there is in Anselm a deep sense of the enormity of sin—Denney insists that this is the final merit of his theory—yet his view of it is unsatisfactory. It is the dishonouring of the Creator by the disobedience of the creature. It is not related either to an eternal law of righteousness or to the eternally perfect character and purpose of God. It is as a moral agent in a moral community with God that man should be regarded to estimate his sin adequately, and not merely as a creature related to the Creator. It is true that the other view is not altogether absent. God must vindicate His honour, since *Deum non decet aliquid in suo regno inordinatum demittere.* Had this subordinate thought been made primary there would have resulted a more satisfactory theory.

(*b*) While making sin a robbery of God's honour, Anselm spoils his argument by admitting that God cannot be robbed of His honour. Sin is an affront to God, who cannot thus be affronted. It might be argued that men had the intention to affront, although that intention could not take effect. To this the reply might be given that their sin should be measured by the finitude of man, and not the infinitude of God. Anselm's admission does lessen the reality of the sin, and makes less real the need of expiation, although he does not himself recognise this consequence.

(*c*) If sin is only a personal affront to God it is difficult to see why God might not remit the penalty of His choice, as a matter that concerned only His own honour. God demands an atonement to vindicate His personal honour, which after all has suffered no affront. Denney[1] is not altogether successful in his defence of Anselm in regard to this matter. 'It may be that it carries with it some flavour of ideas of personal rank and dignity, such as lay at the root of the feudal system. But this is certainly not the main thing, and it is absurd to say that Anselm, or those to whom his thoughts appealed, conceived of God as a feudal baron, and not as the Father of our Lord

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 67.

Jesus Christ.' But what is there in Anselm's argument turning our minds from the feudal baron to the Father ?

(*d*) If this view is replaced by Anselm's assertion that the vindication of God's honour is a necessity of His nature, then atonement is represented as made for God's sake rather than man's, and does not appear as an act of free grace or love.

(*e*) Anselm's view of the consequence of sin as an affront to God's honour made satisfaction or punishment necessary. The difference between these is thus expressed by Denney : ' In the case of satisfaction the offender makes good his offence, in the case of punishment it is made good upon him by the act of the offended.' ' According to Anselm it is inconceivable that God's purpose in creating man should be finally frustrated in this fashion ; and as this is an assumption of reason, it is rationally necessary that not the easy way of punishment, but the hard way of satisfaction, should be followed in dealing with human sin.' [1] Man could offer no satisfaction, but Christ as the God-man could. The next step in the argument should surely be that Christ owed it to God and man to offer the satisfaction He alone could offer. But Anselm does not so reason. ' The God-man must do something for the honour of God to which He is not obliged upon other grounds.' [2] ' He is not obliged to die—for death is the wages of sin, and He has not sinned—and hence His death, the surrender of His infinitely precious life, may be offered to God by way of satisfaction.' [3] This gift is entitled to a reward. As a work of supererogation it had a merit which ought to be recognised. The flaw in this argument is the denial that God could claim Christ's death, and Christ owed His death to God, since the claim of God on man and the debt of man to God are absolute. What God's glory might require, it was Christ's duty to render.

(*f*) Consequently, the next step in the argument is invalid. As justice does not require that any reward

[1] *Op. cit.*, p, 69. [2] P. 71. P. 72.

be given to Christ for being more obedient to God than was necessary, Christ cannot claim our salvation as a reward due to Him.

(*g*) Suppose, however, the reward was earned, in transferring His merits to us He makes over to us a boon of which He has no need, for which He has no other use. The relation is thus altogether external. Anselm knows nothing of Paul's experience of that mystical union with Christ, in which Christ's death and resurrection are reproduced in the believer's death unto sin, and becoming alive unto God. Christ does not by the self-identification of His love assume our sins, and His merits are quite arbitrarily and externally transferred to us. We are moving here among the contemporary ideas of honour, insult, satisfaction, works of supererogation, merit, and not amid moral and religious experiences.

(iii) Denney shows a very high appreciation of Anselm in three respects: (*a*) the serious view he takes of sin, (*b*) his recognition that the death of Christ meets a divine demand and not merely a human need, and (*c*) the connection he insists on between forgiveness and the redemptive work of Christ: and these merits may be admitted. Denney, however, recognises four defects. (*a*) 'Anselm gives no prominence to the love of God as the source of the satisfaction for sin, or to the appeal which that love makes to the heart of sinful men.' (*b*) 'The death of Christ is treated merely as a thing, a *quantum* of some kind.' '*Ex hypothesi* (as a work of supererogation, above God's claim and man's duty) it is outside of the world of moral obligation, and is therefore not susceptible of moral construction.' (*c*) 'No real connection is established by Anselm between the death of Christ and the sin of the world, which sin, nevertheless, can only be remitted on the ground of that death. This is due to the entire arbitrariness of the idea of satisfaction. It seems fairly certain that the word *satisfactio*—though commonly enough applied, in connection with the penitential system of the Church, to the acts or sacrifices by which the Christian who had

fallen into sin made good his fault, and was reconciled to God and His people—was never before Anselm expressly applied to the work of Christ.' 'Anselm, by defining Christ's death merely as an *alternative* to the punishment of sin (*necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur*), and by refusing to define it in relation to His life, as something which He owed to God, and which therefore entered into His vocation and could be morally understood, has practically made it meaningless.' (*d*) 'Anselm gives no real account of the way in which the work of Christ comes to benefit men. Christ is left standing, so to speak, with the merit of His death in His hand, and looking round to see what He can do with it. What is more suitable and becoming (*convenientius*) than that He should give it to those who in virtue of the Incarnation are His kindred? Nothing could be less like than this to all we know about how the work of Christ takes effect in human lives.'[1] Notwithstanding all these defects Anselm's essay has a very great historical significance as the first attempt at a systematic statement of the reason for and the meaning of the death of Christ as an atonement for sin, in which incarnation is subordinated to atonement.

(3) Anselm's is an *objective* doctrine of the Atonement; it is concerned with the death of Christ in relation to God as meeting the divine demand for satisfaction for His honour affronted by man's sin. Abälard's is a *subjective* doctrine; it exhibits the death of Christ as it affects man, in the influence it exerts over man. This is commonly spoken of as the *moral* view, a description that does injustice to other views which are no less concerned with morality, and does not bring out what distinguishes this view from others. A more accurate phrase would be the *moral influence* view.

(i) Abälard very decisively rejects the ransom to Satan theory, but also the view that God is appeased by the death of His Son. (*a*) For him the work of Christ, including the suffering and death, is a manifestation of the divine love to the unworthy which is

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 75-7.

adapted to kindle gratitude in their hearts, and to win them back to obedience to God. It is this aspect or interpretation of the office of Christ which most impresses him. Of this redeeming work of Christ only the elect are the objects, only in regard to them God's disposition need not be changed, there is no wrath to be assuaged, but it is their disposition to God which needs to be changed : and Christ by giving the highest proof of love wins their trust in and surrender to God. (*b*) This statement, however, leaves the question unanswered: Why was the love shown in just this way ? A sacrifice can be justified only if its necessity can be proved. 'The death of Christ,' says Denney, 'can only be regarded as a demonstration of love to sinners, if it can be defined or interpreted as having some necessary relation to their sins.' Abälard in some of his utterances shows that he had a sense of the insufficiency of his view. 'Hence it is not astonishing to find Abälard saying that ours was the guilt for which He had to die, and that we committed the sin whose penalty He endured : though these are manifestly forms of speech which belong to another order of thought than that which is conscious and predominant in him. So also, while he gives predominance to the love of Christ, as the stimulus of love in man, he admits that it never does everything in sinners that they need to have done ; their justification or righteousness is always imperfect, and what is wanting in this respect has to be supplemented by the righteousness of Christ, and especially by His intercession for them.' [1] By the introduction of this new point of view, the theory loses its consistency. (*c*) God forgives us in Christ's deed of dying for us in so far as He reckons to us the merit of Christ, because Christ stands before God as the head of humanity. God is satisfied by the obedience of Christ and lets the merit of the perfect righteousness of Christ fall to our advantage. Christ keeps on working on our behalf, for His constant intercession for us is reckoned to us as merit. This merit lies not in a

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 79-81.

number of acts, but in the fullness of love dwelling in Christ. The love of Christ calls forth our love, and in loving Christ a man has forgiveness of sin granted to him—nay, the forgiveness is in the interchange of love. This theory has a wavering outline, as Abälard was forced to recognise aspects of truth beyond his dominant idea.

(ii) The defect of the view is that Abälard fails to show the necessity of the death of Christ; and if this is not shown, the death ceases to be an evidence of love to the uttermost, as love shows itself not in superfluous but in inevitable sacrifice. There is something spectacular and not real in an exhibition of love in sacrifice for which no moral necessity can be shown. To have full moral effect the sacrifice must be shown to have full moral content, to be an absolute moral necessity. The most worthy and mighty love morally for the sinful is the love which so suffers for the sin as to show the greatness of the sin forgiven as well as the greatness of the love forgiving. A sinner cannot be saved from guilt until he has fully discovered his guilt, as he does in the sacrifice of Christ only when in it is seen sin's judgment as well as love's gift. The merit of Abälard's view, however, is that he recovered the New Testament conception of the living fellowship of the believer with Christ, and so recalled the forgotten apostolic thought of Christ's perpetual intercession; and this sense of the love of Christ led him to seek for that love not only in the death, but also in the earthly life. Inadequate as the theory is, the spirit in Him is evangelical as Anselm's is not. Had Anselm sought the ultimate motive of the death of Christ in the love of God, and had Abälard sought the final purpose of the death of Christ in God's judgment on, while forgiving, the sin of man, the defects of each would have been corrected, and a more adequate theory of the Atonement might have emerged.

(4) Into the elaborate combination of almost all former points of view which we find in Thomas Aquinas we need not for our purpose enter; but

mention may be made of an idea asserted by Duns Scotus. The value of the death of Christ does not lie in anything in its nature, but only in the *divine acceptance*. The divine will can estimate whatever is done or suffered just as it pleases. A thing is good because God loves it. Had God pleased, man might have been redeemed by acts of love done by Adam or an angel. Since Christ merits as Man and not as God, His merits are finite and cannot be reckoned as infinite, or taking the place of the infinite. For the extrinsic reason of the dignity of Christ, God accepts His merits as infinite. It is a merit of *congruity*, and not of *condignity*. God decides to consider the merits of Christ as full atonement, to accept them for more than their inherent value apart from this acceptance. This theory has been called the theory of *acceptilation*,[1] and has evidently no meaning, but is the bankruptcy of thought on the subject.

(5) Anselm regarded punishment and satisfaction as alternatives: Christ did not endure punishment instead of us, but He rendered satisfaction on our behalf. The idea of punishment endured was not absent from Mediaeval thought, and we find it in Abälard, however inconsistently with his dominant conception. In the theology of the Reformation the conception of substitutionary penalty assumes a prominence it had not had before. The relation between Christ and the believer becomes more intimate and immediate. Instead of Christ rendering a satisfaction to God and transferring His merits to us, there is a personal exchange. Christ takes our sins, and suffers their penalty; we take His righteousness, and are reckoned righteous.

(i) 'Luther, introducing into the traditional structure his new doctrine of justification by faith, introduces it not as another block to be built in with the rest, but rather as a solvent, before which some elements of the older theology disappear as alien philosophical accretions not belonging to Christian-

[1] 'Acceptilation signifies in Roman law the dissolution of an obligation by mere words.' Franks, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 25.

ity, while those that remain begin to be transmuted each into the other, and all into the doctrine of justification by faith.' [1] (*a*) Whatever difficulty the statement of the doctrine of the Atonement by the Reformers may now present to us, we should not ignore the fact that all the changes of doctrine resulted from a fresh apprehension of the personal relation of the believer to Christ, a relation of mutual identification. ' The believer is so cemented to Christ,' says Luther, ' that he can say, " I am Christ—that is, His righteousness, victory, life are mine " ; and in turn Christ can say, " I am that sinner because he cleaves to me, and I to him," for we are joined by faith as members of His body, of His flesh and bones ' (*Ad Eph.*, v. 30). The foundation of all the blessings the believer receives through faith is the atoning work of Christ, and not any merit of his own works. In virtue of his union with the Righteous One, his faith is imputed unto him for righteousness. This is the earlier and simpler statement; it was afterwards modified as follows: the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him, and God deals with him as if he had gained this righteousness for himself. Still later Lutheran theology made a further distinction between Christ's *passive righteousness* in enduring the penalty of sin, and His *active righteousness* in fulfilling the requirements of the law; and both are imputed to the believer.

(*b*) In dealing with the Atonement, Luther often represents Christ as conquering sin, and death, and Satan. He strongly asserts Christ's vicarious endurance of the curse of the law. ' In His innocent, tender heart He was obliged to taste for us eternal death and damnation, and, in short, to suffer everything that a condemned sinner has merited and must suffer for ever. " Sensit poenam infernalem." Christ took all my sins upon Him, and for them died upon the Cross; therefore it behoved that He should become a transgressor, and, as Isaiah the prophet saith, " be reckoned and accursed among transgressors and tres-

[1] Franks, *History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, i. p. 387-88.

passers."' [1] 'Christ is innocent as concerning His own person, and, therefore, He ought not to have been hanged on a tree. . . . But Christ sustained the person of a sinner and a thief, not of one but of all sinners and thieves' (*Ad Gal.*, iii. 13). He bears our penalty, and in bearing it He secures a righteousness which accords with the divine righteousness.

(*c*) 'Luther,' says Denney, 'had no enthusiasm for the term' *satisfaction.* 'The idea of satisfaction was bound up with the penitential system of the Mediaeval Church, which more than anything else roused the indignation of Luther as concealing, disguising, and corrupting the Gospel.' [2] In later Protestant theology 'the satisfaction is not the Anselmic one, which has no relation to punishment, nor that of the penitential system, which is only quasi-penal, but that of Roman law, which is identical with punishment. . . . Melanchthon is as explicit as words can be: "Deus justitiae suae puniendo satisfecit; justitia servatur in recipienda poena."' [3] The righteousness of God takes the place of His honour, and sin is conceived not as an affront to that honour, but as disobedience to the law of God, which expresses that righteousness. The defect of this view of satisfaction is that, as Denney points out, 'it left no significance for salvation to anything in Jesus except His death.' As has already been indicated, the later theology found a significance and value for His active as well as His passive obedience.

(*d*) This Christ who thus suffers for us and offers Himself to us as our righteousness is given us by God, who is well pleased with all Christ says and does for us. 'Grace,' says Denney, 'ceased to be a thing or *quantum* which could be "infused" in man, or administered in appropriate quantities or qualities through the sacraments; it became the attitude of God to sinners as exhibited in Christ.' [4] Luther puts this truth with his usual vehemence. 'God's

[1] Quoted by Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
[2] *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, pp. 92-3.
[3] P. 94.
[4] P. 91.

good pleasure and His whole heart thou seest in Christ, in all His words and works. . . . Thinkest thou not that, if a human heart truly felt that good pleasure which God has in Christ when He thus saves us, it would for very joy burst into a hundred thousand pieces? For then it would see into the abyss of the fatherly heart, yea into the fathomless and eternal goodness and love of God, which He feels towards us and has felt from eternity.'[1] It is clear from these words that for Luther Christ expresses and does not procure the love of God for sinful men.

(*e*) Luther's doctrine affirms so complete an identification by Christ of Himself with sinful mankind, that He sorrows and suffers for sin as if He Himself had been a sinner; and so complete an identification of the sinner by faith with Christ, that he has Christ's righteousness as accepted by God in Him, and is changed to the likeness of the Son. He does distinguish, as does Paul, between the absolute religious assurance and the relative moral progress. The believer 'has begun to be justified and healed,' so that what is left of sin 'by reason of Christ' is not imputed to him (*Ad Gal.*, ii. 17).[2] If there is not an external, arbitrary substitution of Christ for us, Christ substitutes Himself for us in the endurance of the penalty of sin because in His love He has identified Himself with us as sinners. His salvation avails for us not by our merely believing that He is our substitute, but by our identifying ourselves so with Him that He becomes in us the motive and the power of a new life. Luther must not be held responsible for the later Lutheran scholasticism. Recklessly as he sometimes expressed himself, laying himself open to misunderstanding, he did recover the Pauline experience of the grace of God in Christ.

(ii) Calvin is in substantial agreement with Luther. (*a*) We are saved by the imputation to us of Christ's righteousness, not on the ground of anything, not

[1] Festpostill, *Von der Taufe Christi*, quoted by Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*.

[2] Quoted by Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

even of faith in ourselves. While faith includes in it the *certitudo salutis*, Calvin allows for the imperfection of faith, for the struggle with remaining sin, and the consequent occasional or partial dulling of the believer's confidence. While justification as the forgiveness of sin is distinguished, it is never separated from sanctification or the process of becoming holy. Christ has satisfied for our sins in sustaining the punishment. He has appeased God by His obedience, not only in His death, but also in His life. What gives value to His death is His voluntary submission. 'He makes much,' says Denney, 'of the *Descensus ad inferos*, "that invisible and incomprehensible judgment which He underwent at the bar if God; that we might know that not only was the body of Christ given up as the price of our redemption, but that there was another greater and more excellent price—namely, that He endured in His soul the dreadful torments of a condemned and lost man" (Calvin, *Institutes*, II. xvi. 10).'[1] This statement must, however, be qualified by this other: 'We do not indeed insinuate that God was either ever opposed to or angry with Him. For how could He be angry with His beloved Son, in whom His mind rested? or how could Christ, by His intercession, propitiate for others a Father whom He had as an enemy to Himself? This we say, that He sustained the gravity of divine severity; since, being stricken and afflicted by the hand of God, He experienced all the signs of an angry and punishing God.'[2]

(*b*) There are two peculiar opinions worth mentioning. First, while he regards the main purpose of the Incarnation to be redemptive, yet he does not regard this as the only possible reason. God so far transcends and excels man that even if he had remained sinless he would have needed a Mediator in order to attain to union with God. Secondly, in one place he seems to accept Duns Scotus' view: 'The merit of

[1] Denney, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[2] Calvin, *Inst.*, II. xvi. 11. Quoted in Bruce's *The Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 334-35.

Christ by which we are saved depends merely on the good pleasure of God which appointed the method of salvation for us' (*In.*, II. xviii. 1). The theory of *acceptilatio* would, however, be inconsistent with what he says about the death of Christ, and what he means here to assert is probably the freedom of God's grace in redemption. God was under no necessity to provide salvation: but this salvation He provided had an intrinsic value. 'In a certain ineffable manner, at the same time as He loved us He was nevertheless angry with us until He was reconciled in Christ' (II. xvi. 2).

(iii) We need not consider the vulgarisation of this doctrine in later evangelical theology—such as the attempt to prove a qualitative and a quantitative equivalence of the sufferings of Christ and those which sinners would have had to endure—that they were the same in amount as well as in kind, and that the temporal agony of an infinite person is equal to the eternal torments of finite persons. The position of the Reformers was an advance on the Mediaeval one. The conceptions of righteousness, moral law, and order are more adequate than those of satisfaction and merit. But the conception of God has not been entirely transformed by the revelation of His love and grace in Jesus Christ. A dualism remains between His righteousness and His love and grace which the theory of the Atonement does not resolve. The conception of a transference of guilt and penalty is neither sound law nor good morality. The sinless cannot be held guilty, or punished instead of the sinful, although love in self-sacrifice may share the sufferings which are the results of sin. The categories of the law courts, and human government generally, are quite inadequate to express the moral and religious relation of man to God. The Reformers did apprehend moral and religious reality, but inadequately expressed what they apprehended; and we must now try to find a more adequate expression of that same reality. The subsequent developments both in the Lutheran and in the Reformed Churches show

that, great as Luther and Calvin were, they had not given a final expression to Protestant theology. Many of the controversies have only a historical interest, and no direct bearing on the problems of the constructive theology of the day, and we may at once pass to Arminianism and the theory of the Atonement it offers us in the treatise of Grotius.

(6) Arminianism was a revolt against Calvinism. (i) Its creed was set forth in the Remonstrance of 1610 in five articles.[1] 'The first asserts conditional election, or election dependent on the foreknowledge of faith. The second asserts universal atonement, in the sense that it is intended, although it is not actually efficient for all. The third affirms the inability of man to exercise saving faith or to accomplish anything really good without regeneration through the Holy Spirit. The fourth declares that although grace at every step of the spiritual life is indispensable, it is yet not irresistible. The fifth pronounces the perseverance of all believers doubtful. Later, the Arminians went farther on this last point, maintaining that believers may fall from grace finally.' Grotius, in defending the orthodox doctrine against Faustus Socinus in his treatise *Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ against Faustus Socinus of Siena*, 1617, formulated a new theory which is generally known as the *governmental* or *rectoral* theory.

(ii) For the assumption of Anselm that man is related to God as debtor to creditor he substitutes the conception of the relation of the subject to the Ruler (Rector). As the end of punishment in the State is the preservation of order and deterrence from future transgressions, a penalty may be remitted if some other means of gaining the same end can be found. The death of Christ serves this end as being a 'penal example.' It shows impressively what sin deserves; what its punishment, if inflicted, would be; for it reveals the Lawgiver's hatred of sin. It is not the reality, but the symbol of punishment. Accordingly God may fix what other conditions are necessary for

[1] Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

pardon. While the Scottist conception of the liberty of the divine will as regards inflicting or remitting the penalty of sin is affirmed, the term *acceptilation* is rejected on the ground that it cannot be said that God receives the endurance of suffering by Christ. The Calvinists considered that Grotius had surrendered the doctrine, as he had failed to represent the divine wrath against sin as a necessity of the divine nature, and had reduced God's treatment of sin as due to His goodness, regulated by His wisdom, with a view to the happiness of His creatures.

(iii) The analogy of the relation of Ruler and subject is an inadequate basis for any doctrine dealing with the relation of God to man, even if less inadequate than that of creditor and debtor. We are not shown by Grotius what it was that Christ suffered as the equivalent of man's punishment, nor wherein lay the virtue of His suffering. The theory is arbitrary and artificial, unrelated to the experience of Christ or of the believer. Nevertheless, it did mark an advance, as it 'helped to remove the ban of individualism, and to revive the idea of the Kingdom of God by its emphasis on the idea of a common good.' [1]

(7) Jonathan Edwards opposed to Arminianism the modified Calvinism known as the New England Theology.

(i) He wrote a profound treatise on *Satisfaction.* His argument is as follows: There must be compensation for sin—punishment or repentance, humiliation and sorrow proportionate to the guilt incurred. As man's guilt is infinite, no repentance adequate is possible to man. But Christ does for man what he cannot do for himself. As Intercessor for man He must have perfect sympathy: He must identify Himself entirely with God and man. His sympathy was perfected by His death, for there He understood fully what guilt involves. He appreciated both God's holy resentment and man's criminality and misery. The substitution was in His heart, but this led to, and was completed in, the final act of self-sacrifice.

[1] Denney, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

By His voluntary submission to death Christ showed His absolute approval of the righteousness of the law as penal as well as preceptive. He gave the strongest possible proof of the justice of the divine administration in assigning death to the sinner, by Himself, though sinless, sharing in that experience.

(ii) The value of this essay lies in the endeavour to set forth those elements of Christ's own experience, moral and religious, which give value to His sacrifice and make it significant as atoning. While Edwards still insists that Jesus endured the penalty of sin, he is careful to set aside the thought that Jesus was in fact, or in His own consciousness, the object of God's wrath. When this is conceded, the term penalty ceases to be appropriate. Edwards was thus preparing the way for an abandonment of the conception of the death of Christ as penal satisfaction. His importance in the doctrinal development has been well summed up by Franks:[1] 'Edwards' discourse is no mere reproduction of the traditional Protestant theology. It contains the following germinal thoughts, all of which have resulted in important developments in modern theology:—(1) A perfect repentance on man's part might have sufficed to satisfy for sin: of such a repentance sinful man was, however, incapable. (2) Christ's sufferings in bearing the divine wrath and the burden of human sin are to be understood *psychologically* through His sympathy with and pity for men. It was not, however, possible for Him, as an infinitely holy person, to bear the very pains of hell to be endured by the damned. (3) Christ Himself was perfected by His sufferings, "the exercise of His obedience or holiness tending to increase the root of it in His nature."'

(8) No theologian wielded a greater influence on theology in the nineteenth century than Schleiermacher.

(i) For him redemption consists in the deliverance of the consciousness of God in man from his lower consciousness, and its enthronement in the soul. Not

[1] *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 189.

only was there the supremacy of the consciousness of God in Christ from the beginning, but through His personal influence in the historical channel of His Church He produces this redemption in others. Schleiermacher distinguishes this redemption from reconciliation thus: 'The Redeemer receives believers into the power of His consciousness of God, and this is His redemptive activity.' 'The Redeemer receives believers into the fellowship of His undisturbed beatitude, and this is His reconciling activity.' [1] Ritschl criticises Schleiermacher on the ground that it is contrary to the principles of the Reformation to make redemption primary and reconciliation secondary. But we cannot so rigidly determine the order in which the sense of power and the feeling of blessedness shall come in the Christian experience. Schleiermacher calls his view the mystical as contrasted with the orthodox, which he described as 'magical,' and the Socinian, which he spoke of as 'empirical.'

(ii) Bruce includes Schleiermacher's view in what he calls 'the theory of *redemption by sample*,' and thus describes the tendency generally:—'Common to all forms of this so-called mystical theory is the position, that what Christ did for men He did also for Himself, and that He did it for us by doing it for Himself, acting as the Head and representative of humanity before God.' As modern instances of this tendency he mentions Menken and Irving, whose theory he regards as the same in principle with that taught by the Fathers. 'The Sanctifier makes the lump of humanity holy, by taking a portion of the corrupt mass tainted with the vice of original sin and subject to sinful bias, and by a desperate lifelong struggle sanctifying it, subduing all temptations to sin arising out of its evil proclivities, and at last consuming the body of death as a sin-offering on the Cross.' [2] While the Fathers recognised the superiority of Christ's human nature, Menken and Irving insisted on the similarity of Christ's nature to man's.

[1] *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 233. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 308-10.

As we cannot to-day assume the doctrine of original sin and total depravity, we cannot accept the theory as it is stated. The reality of Christ's moral and religious experience we must affirm, no less than the fulfilment of His own vocation, the perfecting of His own personality in life and death. But our sense of the difference between ourselves as imperfect and Him as perfect forbids the assertion that He did and needed to do for us, only what He did and needed to do for Himself. Himself He sanctified; us He must not only sanctify, but also justify. While this theory emphasises an aspect of the work of Christ which should be recognised, and is recognised by Edwards, it does not give a complete account of Christ's work.

(9) To another element in Edwards' statement the exposition of the doctrine of the Atonement by M'Leod Campbell attached itself. His treatise on *The Nature of the Atonement, and its Relation to the Remission of Sins and Eternal Life*, Denney reckons with Schleiermacher's and Ritschl's works as one of the three original contributions to the subject made in recent times.

(i) Of the alternatives insisted on by Jonathan Edwards as the necessary consequence of sin—punishment or adequate repentance—Campbell rejects the former, and considers that Atonement was effected by an adequate repentance in the consciousness of Christ. The ingredient of personal remorse was absent, but present were all the spiritual elements which Edwards finds in the experience of Christ. In this experience Christ made an expiatory confession of our sins, which was 'a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man.' [1] Faith is our Amen to this condemnation in the soul of Christ. Christ enters fully into the mind of God respecting sin, into His condemnation of it, and into His love to the sinner. This was the equivalent repentance which Edwards makes the alternative of punishment. With this sanction of His judgment

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 136.

on sin, reproduced in its essential elements in the believer through His connection with Christ, God is satisfied. Campbell regards the death of Christ as necessary to the realisation by Him of God's feeling and man's need. Without 'the perfect experience of the enmity of the carnal mind to God,' an adequate confession of man's sin 'could not have been offered to God in expiation of man's sin, nor intercession have been made according to the extent of man's need of forgiveness.' [1] He endured, and it was necessary that He should endure, death in the sense of the wages of sin. 'As our Lord alone truly tasted death, so to Him alone had death its perfect meaning as the wages of sin, for Him alone was there full entrance into the mind of God towards sin and perfect unity with that mind.' [2] As man is both capable of and liable to death, not only sin had to be dealt with, but 'an existing law with its penalty of death, and that death as already incurred.' Hence a response was necessary to 'that expression of the divine mind which was contained in God's making death the penalty of sin.' Thus the death of Christ was necessary that He might in this respect also enter into the mind of God, and complete the expiatory confession which is the moral essence of the Atonement.

(ii) The development of the theory shows how inevitable is the transition from the new presentation to what was essential to the older doctrines. What must be included in Christ's expiatory confession to make it complete is His actual experience of death as the penalty of sin. An analysis of the conception of penitence which goes deep enough into moral and religious reality leads inevitably to the idea of penalty. Abälard, as we have seen, starting from a different assumption, is led to recognise, if inconsistently, this element in Christ's death. An objection to Campbell's theory which must be reserved for fuller discussion in the next chapter is whether such terms as repentance and confession can be used any more appropriately than the term penalty in regard to the

[1] P. 289. [2] P. 302.

experience and consciousness of the Sinless and Holy, or should be used only of the sinful. Apart from the question of terms, this theory contributes an essential element to the doctrine.

(10) Albrecht Ritschl in his monumental work *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (Justification and Reconciliation) [1] strikes out a new path.

(i) He starts with the traditional doctrine of the work of Christ as fulfilling the offices of prophet, priest, and king, and insists on the need of modifying it in four respects:—(*a*) For the idea of office must be substituted the more ethical conception of vocation, in which the personality realises itself in discharging its tasks. (*b*) The similarity of Christ and believers must be more fully recognised. Ritschl does not intend to deny the originality or uniqueness of Christ; only to affirm very strongly that Christ reproduces in the community which He has founded His own relation to God. (*c*) In His prophetic function Christ represents God to man, and in His priestly man to God; but both of these functions are subordinate to His kingly as founder of the Kingdom of God on earth, as establishing for Himself and His Church dominion over the world, a transcendence and independence of personal life in communion with God above all the threats and hindrances the world may offer, or, as Paul puts it, the assurance that 'all things work together for good to those who love God,' that nothing can separate the believer from the love of God (Rom. viii. 28, 38, 39). (*d*) As the kingly function was exercised in the humiliation, so are the priestly and prophetic functions still exercised in the exaltation; the change of state does not affect the continuity of the vocation. All these are undoubtedly theological refinements to be approved.

(ii) Ritschl denies that there is any hindrance in God or man to forgiveness which needs to be removed. On the one hand, man's sin is regarded by God as due to ignorance, and so forgivable; on the other, God's

[1] English translation of vol. iii. by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay, 1900. See *The Ritschlian Theology*, by the writer, pp. 271-77, 285-86, 316-33.

wrath is an eschatological conception, and is directed only against those who finally resist His purpose, who refuse forgiveness. The positive motive of God in forgiving men is His intention to establish the Kingdom of God among men, as the religious good of fellowship with God and the moral task of the life of love among men. The realisation of this forgiveness depends on Christ as the founder of the Kingdom, who maintains unbroken His religious unity with God in His trust and surrender even unto death. This He does as the representative of His community before God, since He can and does reproduce in it that same attitude towards God. The believer who is both historically and logically dependent on the community appropriates by faith what Christ has done for him and will do in him.

(iii) A valuable thought is that the work of Christ must be related to the fulfilment of God's purpose, the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth, as both a religious good and a moral task; to His own personal development in carrying out His vocation; and to the believer's own experience and character. As will afterwards be more fully urged, he sets aside far too easily the punitive aspect of God's dealings with man. He takes out of the experience of Christ what has been most precious to the believer, when he denies the vicarious character of the sufferings of Christ. He contradicts the teaching of Jesus in its stress on the worth of every soul to God, when he so entirely subordinates the individual to the community. It may be added that some of his school stand nearer to the common evangelical position than he does.

(11) Dr. Denney's *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation* (1917) may be regarded as the latest contribution of primary importance on the subject.

(i) His comparison of the three works which have just been discussed deserves quotation. ' One characteristic of all these books is that, to a far greater degree than those which preceded them, they rest

on the basis of history and experience. They are all conscious of Jesus as well as of Christ, and conscious that, whatever the work of Christ may be, it must arise naturally out of the life of Jesus. He is not conceived as here to carry out any plan of salvation, but He is the Saviour by being what He is, doing what He does, and suffering what He suffers, as the relations in which He finds Himself require. There is nothing artificial in the work of the Saviour; it is ethical in its inspiration and achievement from beginning to end. It is ethical also in the mode of its appropriation. The two German writers, to avoid risks in different directions, lay stress here on the idea of the Church. Perhaps what Schleiermacher is most afraid of is magic, the kind of appropriation of Christ and His grace which is taught in the sacramental doctrines of the Church of Rome. . . . Mysticism, on the other hand, in the sense of a direct and immediate contact between Christ and the believing soul, is Ritschl's bugbear; and the Church, in the ethical life of which the Christianity of the individual is kept within sound moral limits, is part of His defence against it.' 'M'Leod Campbell distinguishes more emphatically than either Schleiermacher or Ritschl Christ's dealing with men on the part of God and His dealing with God on the part of men.' He, following Jonathan Edwards, restores the connection of Christ's work as substitute or representative of man with love. 'Vicariousness is seen to be only another name for love: under the influence of love men make the case of others their own; and even if we speak of Christ as our substitute, it is because love has impelled Him to make our situation His. Side by side with the altered emphasis at this point comes a new sense that what Christ does for us must be more definitely related to what He produces in us. His identification of Himself with us must have as its aim and issue an identification on our part of ourselves with Him. The vocabulary of imputation, if not displaced by that of identification, is interpreted through it. . . . It will not be denied that in such thoughts as these

personality gets the place, or something like the place, which is its due.' [1]

(ii) Dr. Denney's own exposition of the subject may now be briefly summarised:—(*a*) His experimental basis is shown in his choosing the conception of reconciliation as his governing idea. While reconciliation in some form is indispensable for every religion, Christian reconciliation is inseparable from Christ, both in His historical actuality and as He is now present by His Spirit. The initiative in reconciliation is with God, but the reconciliation is mutual. It is a reconciled God to whom man is reconciled. Forgiveness is no less a real experience for God than for man, for to forgive makes a difference as well as to be forgiven. (*b*) Denney fully recognises that Christ was already doing His reconciling work in His treatment of sinners in His earthly life; yet he concentrates his thought on the Cross. Accepting in substance the view of M'Leod Campbell, he rejects the use of the term repentance for the experience of Christ, as he rightly recognises that it is morally confusing to speak of the repentance or the punishment of the sinless. But, insisting that there is a real relation between death and sin, as the consummation of the divine reaction against sin in the moral order of the world, and that the Scriptures insist on something dreadful and mysterious in the death of Christ, he puts his conclusion in the form of a question: 'Can we say anything else than this: That while the Agony and the Passion were not penal in the sense of coming upon Jesus through a bad conscience, or making Him the personal object of divine wrath, they were penal in the sense that in that dark hour He had to realise to the full the divine reaction against sin in the race in which He was incorporated, and that without doing so to the uttermost He could not have been the Redeemer of that race from sin, or the Reconciler of sinful men to God?' [2] The crux of the problem lies just here: Is the inexorable reaction of God against sin in death a necessity of the very perfection

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 115-19. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 273.

of God ? Is it so inexorable that in bringing to men the forgiveness of God, the Son of Man could not, and would not even if He could, escape the reaction ? Was it a necessity for love itself to share with as well as for man that reaction to its very consummation in death, and death apprehended as divine judgment ? It is impossible to offer any logical demonstration ; all that we can do is to confess an ultimate moral intuition which it would be as perilous to challenge as the authority of conscience itself. The writer must confess his entire concurrence with the statement by Denney just quoted. ' The concrete view of Christ's death and the conception of it as in some sense substitutionary cover the truth that there is something from which the death of Christ saves the sinner,' namely, ' from dying in our sins.' ' But for His death we should have died in our sins : we should have passed into the blackness of darkness with the condemnation of God abiding upon us.' [2] It is this conviction which explains the ' deep and ever present sense of debt to Christ,' and ' the *initial* assurance of a completed salvation which pervades the New Testament.' (*c*) The new theological standpoint is shown in the fact that Dr. Denney gives almost as much space to showing *reconciliation as realised in human life* as in proving *reconciliation as achieved by Christ*, to Christ's work by His Spirit in us as to His work on His Cross for us. It is faith, and faith alone, which he recognises as the condition of salvation. While the writer agrees with him in his estimate of the efficacy and sufficiency of faith, he cannot but regret that Dr. Denney is not more sympathetic in his treatment of those who do not understand faith as comprehensively as he does. For it must be admitted that the doctrine of justification by faith alone has often been so stated as to justify the contention that faith must be supplemented by union with Christ, good works, the fellowship of the Church, and the grace of the sacraments. A more adequate conception of grace as Christ Himself acting savingly,

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 282-83.

and of faith as man's full personal response to Christ's action, such as Dr. Denney insists on, would correct all such errors, and would assign to all such means their proper function in the life of faith in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER VI

CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT ON THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST

THE two chapters preceding have shown that however adequate or appropriate to the time the ecclesiastical dogma of the person of Christ or the theological theory of His work may have been, we cannot be satisfied with the ideas or the terms which have been used; but, having learned from the past on the one hand what is essential to Christian faith, and on the other what defects there have been in the presentation of the truth about Christ, we must express our own thoughts in our own words so as to commend and defend to our own age the fact on which faith rests.

(i) The modern method of the study of the Bible enables us to interpret the significance and estimate the value of Christ as no previous generation could. Giving Him the place which rightfully belongs to Him as the consummation of the divine revelation, assigning to Him the supreme authority as the Son knowing and making the Father known and correcting or completing all other divine oracles by His truth, we are to-day reaching a conception of God more fully, purely, and surely Christian than the Christian Church has ever possessed before. And it is this conception of God which Christ Himself gives to us which makes possible for us a constructive statement about His Person and Work such as could not be given before, just because the conception of God had hitherto been mixed up with elements of Jewish and Gentile thought that were not only not Christian, but even inconsistent with what we have learned about the Father from the Son. First we see God in the light of the revelation in Jesus Christ, and then we seek to see

Christ Himself in the light of the God so revealed to us.

(ii) Modern philosophy and modern psychology, influenced as their development has been more or less directly by the Christian reason and the Christian conscience, afford us categories of thought and corresponding terms which are much more adequate and appropriate, not only to our own time but for all time, to the essence of the Christian Faith. The framers of the creeds used the conceptions and the terminology of a philosophy which was not only not Christian, but was alien to what is most distinctive of Christianity. It is Christianity which has discovered personality by making possible a realisation of its promise and potency, undiscovered and untested before; and that makes the difference between Ancient and Modern thought.

(iii) Although it is in the next division of the present volume that the conception of God which Christ has given us will be expounded, and applied to the solution of many problems of thought and life, it will be necessary here to anticipate in some measure that discussion by dealing with such modifications of the idea of God as this modern way of looking at the world and life forces upon us—modifications which we shall find accord with the revelation which Christ has given us. Whether apart from Him the mind of man would have reached such conclusions or not we need not now decide. For our purpose this suffices, that philosophical theism is being led to a conception of God which is not only more in accord with His teaching than any other has been, but also enables us to reach a conception of His person and work that is more intelligible and credible than any hitherto offered to us.

(iv) In dealing with the history in the two previous chapters, the separation there made between the person and the work of Christ was for convenience of treatment accepted, with the caution, however, that such a separation could not be regarded as satisfactory. In this constructive statement it is

hoped to restore the unity, to interpret the person and the work by the one conception of God, the one conception of man, and the one conception of the relation of God and man, which illumines both the Incarnation and the Atonement. It is because of what God eternally is, man is historically becoming; and the relation between God and man should according to the will of God be, that not only did the Word become flesh, but the Captain of Salvation tasted death for every man. Any conception of the Incarnation which does not see its fulfilment in Atonement is a structure left incomplete; and any conception of Atonement which does not find its potency and promise in Incarnation is a structure without foundations. How far the writer will succeed in convincing others he knows not, but this is his intention and aspiration.

(v) The categories of thought to be used may be very briefly indicated. We must start with the idea of the divine immanence in the world, which in relation to man means the affinity and community of God and man. Next, we must use the idea of evolution as indicating that the method of that divine immanence is a progressive revelation of God, and a progressive realisation of a relation to God corresponding to that revelation. Lastly, it is only as we adequately explore the idea of personality in God and man that these two other ideas will gain their full moral and religious content.

(1) Ancient pagan thought was pervaded by dualism, matter and mind, image and idea, world and God. This dualism is not overcome in Plato or Aristotle, and the conception of God which Christian theology took over from Greek philosophy was deistic, separating the eternal and infinite perfect God from the imperfect world in time and space. Later Jewish thought felt the same influence, and, as has already been shown, the conception of the Logos in Philo assumed such a difference between God and the world that some such mediation appeared necessary. Mediation may assert separation as well as relation. As

used in the Fourth Gospel the conception of the Logos asserts a mediated immediacy of God in nature and history, as the mediating agency or activity is so entirely divine. The Word is not other than God, but God Himself in nature and history, and as man.

(i) The tendency of patristic thought was so to assert the difference between God and man that relation became an inscrutable mystery, an inexplicable miracle. The attributes of God which philosophy affirms were emphasised to the exclusion of those activities of God with which religion is concerned. God was incomprehensible, indefinable, to be reached only by the way of negation. One of the heresies most severely condemned was Patripassianism, which affirmed that the Father Himself suffered. The metaphysics of this theory was crude enough, but it did stand for a truth which was being ignored. The Council of Chalcedon denounced as heresies both Nestorianism and Monophysitism or Eutychianism. 'Some daring to pervert the mystery of the dispensation, which for our sakes the Lord undertook, and denying the propriety of the name Mother of God (Θεοτόκος), as applied to the Virgin, and others bringing in a confusion and blending of natures, and fondly feigning that there is but one nature of the flesh and Godhead, and by this confusion teaching the monstrous doctrine that the divine nature of the Only-begotten is passible.'[1] The Fathers do not recognise the inconsistency of their own position. If the divine nature had no part in the Passion, neither had it in the being born, and therefore the mother of the human nature should not be described as the Mother of God. What for our present argument concerns us is the assertion that the divine nature could have no share in the sufferings of the human. For their thought God is so exalted above the world and man that He cannot be thought of as a fellow-sufferer with man. The difference of nature excludes community of life.

(ii) With such presuppositions it was quite impossible

[1] *On Faith and the Creed*, p. 214.

to reach a satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation. The creeds may have served the purpose which is the utmost that some of their defenders now claim for them, of having fixed the boundaries within which Christian thought may roam, but beyond which it may not stray—what must be affirmed and what must not be denied; but they certainly in their denials and affirmations have not provided thought with the data for a concrete conception of the person of Christ, the content of which can be made intelligible. And from the nature of the case it was impossible that they should. If we start from the difference of the natures we can never reach the unity of their relation. If we start from the unity of their relation and then ask how the natures are to be conceived, if the unity of relation is to be intelligible, we may hope for a solution of the problem. We do not then begin with God as infinite and eternal, but with God as present and active in the world of time and space. How this immanence is consistent with that transcendence is a question to which we must return when we deal with the nature of God: but we are entitled so to begin; as we rise from facts to faith, our thought must pass from the immanent to the transcendent God. Not only is such an advance necessary for our understanding of the doctrine of the Incarnation: two reasons for it may be offered in the thought of to-day.

(*a*) We do not and cannot think of the world as a completed machine, so constructed that, having once been started, it goes on of itself; we have to think of it rather as a growing organism, inadequate as the analogy is, or, what is more nearly adequate, an unfolding purpose. There is not only continuity of movement, there is progress. The rigid atom has slipped out of the grasp of the man of science, and what he is now laying hold of by his hypothesis is force, ever active force. The deism of the eighteenth century is an impossible mode of thought in the twentieth. Were it not for other considerations which need not be discussed at this point, pantheism would

be a much more timely way of looking at the world. It is in the realm of morals and religion that the defects of pantheism are discovered; in the sphere of nature we must affirm an immanent God if we are to believe in God at all—a God constantly present and active in nature. If we think consistently we cannot put a long series of secondary causes between the present order of nature and the First or Ultimate Cause; a system of nature does not exclude God from the world. Physical forces are God's infinite power exercised in finite forms; natural laws are God's infinite wisdom expressed in finite forms. Because there is constancy and consistency in God's presence and activity—His fidelity to His purpose and His promise, on which men can rely and with which they can co-operate—the effects of these physical forces are in accord with the natural laws man has discovered. Natural laws are God's habits of action in the world, the order of nature His character as so disclosed to us. As we shall see, in considering the next category of thought, that order of nature is not a rigid uniformity, but a continuous progress. There is no break in the divine action, as God does relate the present activity to the past: in creating the new He preserves the old, and the creation of the new is conditioned by the preservation of the old; He is not for ever extemporising the strange and unrelated. Physical and chemical conditions are preserved in the vital process, and the development of mind is conditioned by the growth of the organism. Yet, as these illustrations at once suggest, there are marked stages in the cosmic evolution, or the divine creation. We may describe this process as progress, because life has values matter alone has not, and mind values which do not belong to life alone. In the personal development of man, who is the consummation of the evolution as we know it, values emerge—truth, holiness, blessedness, love—which in the reason and conscience of man claim to be absolute. In human religion the Universe becomes, as it were, self-conscious, for man, the creature, becomes conscious of

and seeks to relate Himself to the Creator—nay, even in religion a divine revelation is apprehended, in which God makes Himself known and relates Himself to man as Father to child. The progress of the Universe lies in its becoming always more and more expressive of God, who at last discloses His secret in the ideals of man and the relation which through revelation is in religion established between God and man. The divine immanence is expressed in the words of the apostle, 'in Him we live, and move, and have our being' (Acts xvii. 28), but still more adequately in the doctrine of God with us in the living Christ and within us by His own Spirit. The most mystical piety and the most speculative thought are of one accord as regards the immanence of God in nature and history, but more expressively in the inner life of the seer and the saint.

(*b*) Mr. Wells is moved by the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the age, in his search for a God who will meet the human need, because He is a fellow-sufferer with man, and man may be a fellow-worker with Him. Political conditions do affect religious thinking, and the God of the older theology, enthroned in heaven, reproduced the Eastern despot. The democratic spirit of this age demands a God who is one of us. There is, it must be granted, a great deal which is very crude in all this thinking; but democracy is nearer truth than despotism, as it recognises the inherent, inalienable value of human personality. That the God in and through all must also be over all, even in order that He may be all to man which man needs and craves of God, is the complementary truth which we neglect at peril to our thought, with loss to our life. The agony and desolation through which the world passed in what is generally called the Great War, but we may hope and pray will one day be known as the Last War, made urgent and insistent the demand for the God whom, as Mr. Wells has discovered, he himself needs—God who suffers and struggles with and for man. The impassible God would be the monstrous heresy for the religious thought and life of to-day.

God's immanence finds its highest expression in His participation in love in the whole life and lot of man; and that is realised and revealed, not in Incarnation apart from the Cross, but in Incarnation as completed in the Cross. For these two reasons we may approach the problem of Christology from the standpoint of this demand for the divine immanence as a guiding principle.

(2) As has already been indicated, the method of divine creation, as we know and understand it, is evolution.

(i) There are two conceptions of evolution which at once confront us. On the assumption that nothing can be in the effect that is not in the conditions, that the principle of causality demands an exact equivalence of antecedents and consequents, it is sometimes asserted that nothing can be evolved that is not already involved, that all nature and history were latent in the diffused matter with which the process began. Mr. Herbert Spencer was a past master in the verbal jugglery by which he reduced morality, religion, science, art, society to be nothing more nor other than matter-in-motion. Matter may have 'the promise and the potency of life and mind,' but is fulfilment no more nor other than promise, or actuality than potency? If the Universe be a closed system, then we are driven to the conclusion that the evolution must be explicable by the resident forces under inherent laws; but then the explanation must escape us altogether: how can the always-the-same be producing the ever-different? A machine repeats the same operation, however complicated that may be; it does not so alter its structure that it becomes capable of still more complicated operations. We are driven to the other conception of evolution, which Ward,[1] following Harvey, describes as *epigenesis*, and Bergson as *creative evolution*. The new is not simply educed from the old; it is produced, but is other and more than the old. The *élan vital* of Bergson is creative. Such a conception of a finite Universe

[1] *Realm of Ends*, p. 98.

self-enclosed is a self-contradiction. The only way we can make it intelligible to ourselves at all is to think of the finite Universe as so related to the Infinite God that His activity is not only preserving what already is, but is ever creating what is yet to be. For the ends of chemical and physical science it may be altogether legitimate to assume that the matter and the force in the Universe are a fixed *quantum*, although more recent speculations seem to be breaking down the rigid barriers of a closed system; for philosophy as an endeavour to make the total reality intelligible it is imperative to recognise that evolution as we know and understand it is creative, that the finite universe involves the constant activity of the infinite God.

(ii) We have now, 'greatly daring,' to try and conceive more distinctly that creative activity. That activity involves both self-limitation and self-fulfilment, or, to use words suggested by the New Testament, *kenosis* (Phil. ii. 7) and *plerosis* (Eph. i. 23).[1]

(*a*) God must limit infinite power in finite forces, infinite wisdom in finite laws. As the work expresses the worker, He limits Himself in the measure in which the work is inadequately expressive of Himself. Matter is less expressive of God than life, and life than mind, and mind as instinct than as reason and conscience. God limits Himself in so far as life has a spontaneity of its own, and mind a liberty, so that there may be a development of life—as seems to be the case for instance in parasites—and of mind, as in the sin of man, which is contrary to the divine intention. God may so limit Himself in the creature, in bestowing spontaneity of life or liberty of mind, that the creature may oppose itself to the Creator. God has accepted the limitation of an opposition in His Universe to Himself. The writer is convinced that human liberty can be harmonised with divine sovereignty only as a voluntary self-limitation by God is admitted in the making of man as he is. Further,

[1] See *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, by P. T. Forsyth, Lectures XI. and XII.

the self-limitation of power to let man be free seems to involve also a self-limitation of knowledge, so that God knows free acts before the choice is made only as possible and not as actual. That the Creation might culminate in 'self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control' in personality freely willing the reality of its ideals, God set bounds to His infinitude in His creative activity in a finite Universe, and most of all in man as free to oppose or to co-operate with God in the fulfilment of His purpose. Our thought must recognise a self-limitation (a *kenosis*, or self-emptying) in God.

(*b*) This self-emptying is, however, for a self-expression which is a self-fulfilling. God is manifesting more and more of Himself in the creative evolution. When in man a creature becomes capable of receiving the revelation of God in the ideals which are reality in God, and in a personal relation, conscious and voluntary, is realising these ideals, the self-expression is distinct and the self-fulfilment certain. When in Jesus the Christ our Lord the human development culminated in One who knew Himself Son of God, and God as Father, and who perfectly did the will of God as He abode in intimate communion with God, that self-expression within the Universe was adequate and the self-fulfilment complete. If we take the view of evolution which treats the Universe as a closed system, then we must not affirm that evolution accounts for Him. But if we accept the more adequate view that evolution is *epigenesis*, that it is *creative*, then we can regard Him as man as the highest stage of that progress of God's self-expression and self-fulfilment in His Universe. He is the promise and the potency of that family of God perfect as is the Father in Heaven, and possessing eternal life in Him, which is the goal of the long course of nature and of history. He came in 'the fullness of the times,' when the conditions were prepared for that consummating creative act of God.

(3) How God can express and fulfil Himself in man, and finally and perfectly in Christ, is a matter that

demands fuller inquiry. There must be a close affinity and community between God and man, if the perfect man could also be verily God.

(i) Modern philosophy as contrasted with ancient is subjective and not objective, and the development of psychology during the last century has given to the category of personality an importance it had not before. By personality we mean the conscious subject thinking, feeling, willing; the self-conscious subject aware of these activities, and seeking self-satisfaction, self-expression, self-realisation in them; the subject which can compare its own actuality with the ideals, truth, holiness, blessedness, love, for which it strives and in which it can find its fulfilment. In man personality is hampered and hindered in fulfilling itself by conditions imposed upon it which it cannot control. It is externally limited and internally incomplete. But it not only has the desire for and makes the effort after ' self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control,' but regards its ideals, not as illusions, but as promises of what yet will be. Even in man personality reaches beyond and rises above actuality with its limitations and imperfections. Hence it is an unjustified assumption that such finitude is a necessary condition of personality, and that we cannot therefore ascribe personality to God.

(ii) If self-consciousness in man emerges along with consciousness of not-self, that does not prove that God cannot be personal, since there is no not-self for Him, as He is total reality: for, in the first place, there must even in man be a sense of self, however vague, before the contrast with the not-self can emerge at all; and, in the second place, as man develops personality, it is his own inner life more than the outer world that gives content to his consciousness, and it is the aspiration of the developing self to be thus more and more self-sufficing, rich in its own inward treasures; thirdly, just because God is God, He can and does constitute Himself that inner life in which the contrast of self and not-self is possible without an external reality not dependent on Him.

If instead of taking the words infinite and absolute in their literal sense, unlimited and unrelated, a sense which would compel us to think of God only in negations, we define them as self-limited and self-related, and if man as personal aims so to determine himself, then these two attributes of God are not only consistent with personality, but we can give them meaning only as attributes of a personal subject. Once more, if man does hold the place in the process of creation which he seems to hold, as the consummation of its progress, and if the ideals which command his aspiration and effort claim absolute value, then his relative insignificance physically is no adequate ground for charging him with folly and audacity if he conceives God, not in his own likeness, limited and imperfect, but as infinitely and perfectly the reality of his ideals, the source of these absolute values.[1]

(iii) This conclusion becomes an assurance of faith in religion. Man can and does realise God's presence, holds communion with Him, and gains satisfaction in Him. Man's personality as imperfect is receptive of and responsive to God's perfect personality as communicative. Unless the whole religious thought and life of mankind be an illusion and a mockery, there is communion between God and man. Earthly goods are often sought in religion, and moral goodness is sometimes the dominant desire; but the core of religion is the hunger and the thirst of the soul for God, the living God, in whom alone man fully lives. Just as there has been evolution in nature and history, so has there been development in religion. The unique significance and value of the Hebrew religion is that there we can trace as in no other a development of religion which was the channel of a progressive divine revelation. There was a correspondence in a Godward movement of man, and a manward movement of God, faith receiving and responding to grace. Historically that double movement is completed in Jesus Christ. The immanent activity of God in the Universe was consummated in that perfect human

[1] See Lotze's *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., ch. iii.

receptivity for and responsiveness to God. But that was met by a transcendent act of God communicative of such fullness of light, life, and love from the very being of God Himself, that the secret of what God is was at last disclosed, the eternal reality of God was revealed. When we come in a later section to discuss the doctrine of the Trinity, it will be necessary to consider how we must conceive the eternal reality of God Himself. At the present stage it will suffice that the argument here developed enables us to conceive Christ as the perfect human personality, perfectly receptive of and responsive to the perfect communication of God.

(iv) For the *static* conception of natures we substitute the *dynamic* conception of personality. Instead of conjoining in one person the differences of these two natures, we show the concurrence of the divine activity manward and the human activity Godward—an affinity that fitly issues in community. Imperfect but receptive and responsive human personality becomes the channel of the manifestation and operation in history of the communicative perfect personal God. We must think of human personality as individual, a person, and so must give up the notion of an impersonal nature. We must think of the Logos or Son as personal, but we cannot think of Him as individual, a person in the modern sense of the word, which, it need not be added, is not the sense of the creeds. In the view here presented human personality is completed in this relation to the personal God, because it was for such community of life with God that man was made. But this is not the same as the doctrine of Leontius and John of Damascus, the enhypostasis of the impersonal human nature by the personal Logos. As the conception of personality is dynamic, and not static, we must conceive the Incarnation as itself progressive, a developing human receptivity and responsiveness, the condition of an increasing communicativeness on the part of God. Jesus became more certain of His Sonship as His claim was challenged by human unbelief. As has

been shown in a previous chapter, the intuition of His eternal relation to God (pre-existence) came to Him as He was exposed to the derision of His foes. His human experience of trial, temptation, sorrow, struggle, disappointment, and opposition disciplined and developed the faith of the Son to receive more abundantly the grace of the Father. These two terms both affirm a relation and a difference of each in the relation. The Father teaches, gives, approves; the Son learns, accepts, and submits. 'He learned obedience through the things that He suffered' (Heb. v. 8). Such an experience was necessary to perfect the relation of dependence and surrender of the Son to the Father. We are in the Gospels in the realm of morals and religion, of personal relationship, and not of abstract metaphysics, in which the creeds move and so fail to do justice either to historical reality or religious and moral interests. As the previous argument has shown, the conception here offered is not humanitarian nor Unitarian. The immanent divine activity in nature and history is completed in the human personality; there is the transcendent divine act which all that went before does not explain in the perfect divine content which is given to this personality.

(4) Calvin's view that even apart from the purpose of redemption there might have been a divine Incarnation has already been mentioned. The previous argument leads to that conclusion. The relation of God to the world and man would be incomplete without such a consummation. The Creation can be completed in the Creator, God as love must give His life to and find His life in man as perfectly as can be conceived. Without in any way making light of what sin means in the world, it is to the writer incredible that it should be the decisive factor in determining that God should become man. The fact with which we are concerned, however, is not Incarnation in a sinless race, but Incarnation not only for the revelation of God to man but for the redemption of man from sin. It is a very serious error to confine the work of Christ to the sacrifice of the Cross, or in that work to

separate the revelation of God and the redemption of man. If we do not narrow the meaning of revelation, as an intellectualist theology tends to do, to a communication of knowledge about God, and mean by it the manifestation of God in deed as in word, n passion as in action, we may affirm that the revelation of God in Christ is the redemption of man through Him. To know the Father is to be forgiven, and to become a child of God. Nor must we isolate the revelation of God and redemption of man in Christ from the permanent and universal activity of God. 'O Israel, hope in the Lord, for with the Lord there is mercy, and with Him is plenteous redemption. And He shall redeem Israel from all his iniquities' (Ps. cxxx. 7, 8). Rightly did Dr. Bruce, in his book on *The Chief End of Revelation*, insist that it was redemption. In controversy Paul opposes the Law and the Gospel, but law did not exhaust the content of the divine revelation in the Old Testament. The Holy One of Israel is the Saviour (Is. xliii. 3). Christ Himself was not Redeemer on the Cross alone. The truth He taught, the holiness He lived, the grace He showed to sinners, the love He bestowed on all, were redemptive, wherever faith was receptive of and responsive to Him. He forgave and He saved during His earthly ministry, and His Cross came not as a contradiction of that ministry but as its completion, having the same motive, purpose, and method of redemption.

(5) What we have to interpret is the Incarnation as redemptive, as affected by the fact of sin. We must, but only as far as is necessary for the immediate purpose, consider what sin is and how it affects the relation of God and man.

(i) We are not here concerned, as we shall be in a later section, with the origin of sin in the race, or its beginnings in the individual, but simply with its nature. Moral evil in man as the violation of the laws of his own nature is vice, as the violation of the laws of human society is crime, as the disturbance of the relation to God is sin. It has both its moral and

its religious aspect in this relation. As disobedience to God's law as written in the human conscience, it is an offence against God, a challenge of His authority, a resistance of His purpose. As distrust of God's love as that love makes its appeal to man both in His goodness and His grace, it is an injury to God, it is a withholding from Him of what He desires, of that for which God made man, for He made him for fellowship with as well as likeness to Himself.

(ii) What are the effects of sin? (*a*) First of all, there is guilt and the sense of guilt. By guilt we mean not only that man is liable to punishment, exposed to the consequences of his wrong-doing, physical, social, personal, but that God's judgment rests upon him: the holy love of God is not only distressed, but disapproves. God's relation to man is so intimate that He cannot be indifferent to man's sin: He is, and must be, affected by it in this twofold way. He is not only grieved by the injury and loss which man brings on himself by his sin. Against the sin itself there is a reaction, an inevitable reaction, of the perfection of God—not a mild displeasure, but a severe disapprobation. We shall be quite incapable of understanding the truth of the Atonement unless we have ourselves experienced this reaction against sin, this judgment on sin, and, having felt its necessity in ourselves, cannot but hold that it is inevitable for God. If a man believes that God as love forgives sin easily at no cost, because there is no such inevitable reaction against sin, he cannot be made to understand what the Cross means. This guilt is a fact for God in the relation between God and man, and not merely a feeling in man about that relation. In man there is the sense of guilt, the apprehension, more or less adequate, of the fact of guilt. Man becomes aware that his relation to God has been thus affected. This sense of guilt brings to the religious man an acute distress.

(*b*) Man is so constituted that for every action there is a reaction on himself. In acting he forms habits, and his habits fix his character. We can maintain

man's continued liberty and responsibility only as we recognise, as the facts of experience warrant us in doing, that the character does not exhaust the personality, but that there are reserves of psychic energy which can with an adequate stimulus be so evoked as to make a fresh start—reformation or conversion—actual, even where there is apparently a fixity of character in evil. Nevertheless, the common consequence of sin, and continuance in sin, is enslavement to sin. It is in regard to the vices of drunkenness and uncleanness that this bondage is most glaringly seen ; but a man may also be a slave of selfishness, temper, greed. Paul has most vividly described this tragedy in Romans vii. 7-25. The temptation grows stronger and the will becomes weaker, and the contest becomes so unequal that defeat seems inevitable, unless other forces can be brought into the field, such as the grace of God. The sense of guilt will intensify this feeling of bondage. Estranged from God, the man feels himself alone with his sin and cast on his own resources. An uneasy conscience will mean an enfeebled will. If forgiveness remove the sense of guilt it will also be a freeing and strengthening of the will. It is because of this bondage to sin that the law of God is a burden. The contrast between desire and duty does emerge in every moral consciousness, but it becomes a conflict only when desire has broken bounds, has become rebellious, and has established a tyranny over the will. Setting aside such commandments of men as are arbitrary and provoke disobedience, the law of God, the ideal of what man should be, will approve its worth to the conscience, and obedience will be not bondage but freedom. Given, however, on the one hand this estrangement from God, and on the other this enslavement to sin, then the claims of the law will appear grievous, and the inability to meet them and the self-reproach which failure will bring will make the law burdensome. The yoke of obedience can be made easy and the burden of submission light only as the love of Christ becomes the constraining motive, and the power of His Spirit brings the

deliverance of the will from its enslavement. When the guilt of sin is removed and the bondage is broken, then also there is emancipation from the law as itself a bondage.

(*c*) When Shakespeare put on the lips of Hamlet the confession, 'conscience doth make cowards of us all,' he uttered the common human experience. Unless a man has reasoned himself out of the belief, there is a dread of judgment to come. Death so bounds the human horizon, that it is at the gates of death that that dark shadow lingers. There are consequences of sin in this life, but they are not exhausted here. Many transgressors do seem to evade the penalty which they deserve. The belief in God as holy and righteous deepens this dread. God will hereafter deal with men more exactly according to their deeds than He does here. The writer cannot regard these ideas as superstitions which can be discarded. If for Christians this dread has been removed, it is not because it has been disproved as an illusion, but because in the new relation to God, into which Christ brings men, the old things have passed away and all things have become new. It is the love of God which has cast out the fear. The writer agrees with Dr. Denney[1] that Jesus Himself did regard death as the penalty of sin, and that the agony and desolation of Gethsemane and Calvary can be understood only as we recognise that for Him death was not merely natural occurrence, but really divine judgment. We may freely admit that as physical dissolution death is a natural occurrence, and that man as a living organism is necessarily subject to it. We need not assume that death as such was introduced into the world as a consequence of man's sin, for we know it was here long before man's coming. We need not indulge in any speculation as to whether sinless man would have escaped the common lot altogether, or what it might have been for him. For man the natural occurrence becomes a personal experience, the content of which must be determined by what

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 268.

he has made himself, how he stands related to God, and how it affects even human relationships. It is a goal which is believed to be the starting-point of a fresh course. It is not merely man's sense of guilt which subjectively invests death with darkness and terror; as the sense of guilt corresponds with the fact of guilt now, so it is only reasonable to think that in death or after death God does deal with man, if unredeemed, to bring home to him, as life has not yet brought home, the reality of the divine judgment on sin. That itself may be an act of grace and may prove to him who so receives and responds to it a means of grace, but even then the joy of salvation will come only through the pain of judgment.

(6) This is the disease: what is the remedy? This is the need: how can it be met? The writer himself is at home in the language of the New Testament and of Christian theology; but as he desires to reach those to whom some of that language is a difficulty, he will try to set out all that is essential in the language of common life.

(i) The word forgiveness is a familiar word, as in human relations there is occasion and demand for it. What do we mean by it? (*a*) It is not primarily the prevention of the consequences of sin, physical, social, and personal, nor the suspension of such further judgment as may be anticipated. A man who by his vice has injured his health does not recover it as soon as he turns from his evil ways and is forgiven. A man who by dishonesty has forfeited the confidence of his fellows does not at once recover his reputation when he returns to the ways of uprightness. A man when he becomes a Christian does not always at once break off all the habits which had hitherto enslaved him. But, nevertheless, forgiveness does affect even these consequences: not only would continuance in sin have aggravated these consequences, but the changed man changes the effect of these consequences upon himself. Even if the experience of God's grace does not by the peace of mind it brings promote health better than it would have been, he bears it in such a way as makes his experience other than it would

have been. His fellows may be slower in restoring him than they should be, but, the genuineness of the change having been proved, he may regain his position in society, and, even if he does not, he will bear what falls on him meekly, and it will be to him a means of grace. As we shall show, one of the effects of forgiveness is deliverance from sin's bondage, not at once complete, but progressive, so that the reaction on a man's nature of his former sin will be counteracted by the reaction of his nature by faith to God's grace. It is as untrue as it is cruel to say that forgiveness does not in any way affect the consequences of sin; for where it does not modify them, it changes the man so that they are not the same to him. As regards the judgment to come, that has been made far too prominent in a great deal of preaching about forgiveness. To escape hell and to get into heaven matters little in comparison with being right with God. If that relation be restored to what it should be, then the best that hope can look for is assured. Even to the Christian death and the Unseen World may bring home judgment, but that will be for the reconciled unto fuller salvation. 'There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus' (Rom. viii. 1).

(*b*) What forgiveness primarily is, is the restoration of the personal relation to God which sin has disturbed. As on God's part it is the removal of the guilt, so on man's part it is relief from the sense of guilt. The sin remains, and God's judgment of disapproval on the sin remains; and where there is no such judgment, there is a passing over of sin, but not a forgiveness of it (Rom. iii. 25). In forgiveness the sinner is so disassociated from his sin that the judgment of it does not fall on him as a continuance of that divine displeasure which hinders the loving communion with God which God wills for man. God's grace wills so to disassociate the sinner from His sin, and so seeks and strives with men that they will disassociate themselves from their sin; and when by repentance and faith this disassociation has taken place, then the forgiveness God intends and makes it His endeavour

to effect becomes actual. As the displeasure of God is removed, so the distrust of man passes away. God delights in instead of being grieved with the sinner, now the child; and man, instead of feeling estranged from God, has the joy of God's Fatherhood.

(*c*) It seems necessary at this point in the argument to remove a misconception which is very common in regard to forgiveness. To blunt the edge of the insistent teaching of the New Testament on the duty of men to forgive one another, it is often insisted that there must be repentance before there can be forgiveness; and no sign or offer of forgiveness is made to call forth the repentance. As forgiveness affects the mutual relation of persons, it cannot be one-sided. It is not actualised when only offered, but only when also accepted. But the person who has been wronged need not wait till forgiveness is sought; if he always did, there would be much less experience of forgiveness than there is. It is not only the privilege but the duty of the wronged to offer that forgiveness, and even to urge it with love's importunity, so that he who has done the wrong may be shamed out of the moral indifference or defiance that continues in sin unforgiven. It is the duty of the good man to lessen the evil that is in the world, and sin unrepented and unforgiven is an evil that even at a great cost should be removed. God does not wait for man's repentance: He takes the initiative in freely and fully offering forgiveness, in beseeching men to be forgiven. It is only thus that men are brought to the repentance and the faith that makes forgiveness a blessed experience. While there are passages in the Old Testament which give the impression that God will forgive if men repent, yet even the sacrifices which had to be offered in token of penitence and with prayer for pardon were regarded as gifts of grace, a way God Himself had appointed by which He might show His grace to men. It is true that their efficacy was limited to offences which were not a defiance of God's authority.[1] But the highest teaching in the Old

[1] See *Old Testament Theology*, by Schultz, ii. pp. 87-89.

Testament is this, that judgment is God's strange work (Is. xxviii. 21), and that in mercy is His delight (Mic. vii. 18). In Jesus, in His earthly ministry even as in the Cross, God takes the initiative, makes the approach and the appeal, proclaims forgiveness, calls for penitence and faith. Those 'righteous' men know not Christ who are unbending in judgment on sin until forgiveness is sought in penitence and faith, and who even do not welcome the beginnings of penitence with encouragement, and insist on a self-humiliation of the penitent which may leave behind seeds of bitterness. It must be confessed that the nations calling themselves Christian have not since the end of the War stood the test of forgiving as God forgives, spontaneously, magnanimously. Christ's death we shall not understand if we suppose that it procures forgiveness instead of recognising that it conveys forgiveness in such a way as evokes the penitence and faith in which it is received.

(ii) The first effect of forgiveness offered is the repentance and faith which are the conditions of its full actuality. Just as the action of the light on a sensitive part of the organism resulted in the development of the eye, so the conviction that forgiveness is possible produces that inward condition in which it becomes actual. God's judgment on sin which the forgiveness conveys is reproduced in the sinner's own judgment on his sin in his penitence. He severs himself from his sin even as God in forgiving wills to separate him. God's judgment passes away as the penitent makes that judgment his own. The offer of forgiveness inspires man's faith in the goodwill of God, not in forgiving only, but in imparting all other gifts which may be needed to restore the relation to Him. Faith in the sufficiency of God's grace relieves fear, fills with courage, and so the bondage of sin is broken. A new motive enters into the life to exclude all other conflicting motives. 'The love of Christ constraineth us' (2 Cor. v. 14). There is 'the expulsive power of the new affection.' A new power is experienced: 'I can do all things through Him

which strengtheneth me' (Phil. iv. 13). Now 'all things work together for good to those who love God,' because loved of God. Nothing can now separate from that love (Rom. viii. 28).

(7) While Jesus in His earthly ministry conveyed to men the forgiveness of God, He Himself looked forward to His death as the highest service He could render, the giving of His life as a ransom for many (Matt. xx. 28); and at the Supper He described His death as the sacrifice of the new covenant of forgiveness (Matt. xxvi. 28; cf. 1 Cor. xi. 25). Christian faith has linked together the forgiveness of sin and the sacrifice of the Cross. As has been shown in a previous chapter, the writer accepts Paul's interpretation not merely on his apostolic authority, but as personal convictions to which his religious experience and his moral conscience give a hearty assent. It is not necessary to repeat here what has already been said, but the conclusion of that discussion may be recalled. In Paul's teaching the Cross of Christ does somehow express God's condemnation of sin more impressively and effectively than man's endurance of its penalties could, and yet also convincingly conveys the assurance of God's forgiveness, and thus so evokes both penitence and faith that the sinner forgiven becomes a child of God, called to be a saint, an heir with Christ of the inheritance of the saints in light. Paul does not clearly answer three questions, and with these we must now try to deal. What did Christ endure? How could He so endure? Why must He so endure? Or, putting the matter another way, we must try to show the actuality, the possibility, and the necessity of the sacrifice of Christ. The first answer must be exegetical, the second psychological, and the third theological.

(i) As the record of Gethsemane and Calvary shows, the agony of the one was an anticipation of the desolation of the other. What He shrank and prayed to be delivered from, if it were possible, was that experience of being forsaken by God. He regarded death as the penalty of sin, as involving the possi-

bility of the loss of the unbroken fellowship with God which He as Son had enjoyed with the Father. He so identified Himself with sinful mankind as to feel all the consequences of sin, including this its ultimate consequence, for Him the worst that He could experience. We must not say that He felt Himself guilty, or that He was punished, or that He was exposed to God's wrath, for all such language involves an intolerable confusion of what is possible for the sinful and the Sinless. But in His own heart He felt the consequences as no sinner could do; for on the one hand He loved the sinful race as no other has done, and so felt with and for it as no other could do, and on the other He so loved God that He saw sin and all it involves as God sees it. Sinless, He could suffer for sin as much more as His love for God and for man excelled all other love. To this strain was His faith put, that He as Son of God should as Brother of man lose, if only for a moment of uttermost desolation, the comfort and joy of the love of the Father. In that experience He tasted death for every man; but before He gave up the ghost, faith was once more confident, and it was into His Father's hands that He committed His spirit. This to the writer seems the least we can dare to say of the actuality of the Sacrifice upon the Cross.

(ii) The actuality as thus described compels us to explore the possibility. How on the one hand could the Sinless so identify Himself with the sinful as to endure the consequences of sin to the uttermost? How on the other hand could the well-beloved Son, on whom God's approval ever rested, endure this utmost consequence, that He should feel Himself forsaken of God? Christ's experience was unique as He Himself was, and yet human experience offers analogies. (*a*) The innocent suffer with and for the guilty, not only in outward lot, but also in inward life. The mother of a drunken son suffers the shame of his sin, even if her outward circumstances may be in no way injuriously affected. There are Gethsemanes and Calvarys within the loving heart. The

more intense the affection, the more complete is the participation in another's life. Those who carp and cavil at substitution as a theological fiction show only their ignorance of or insensibility to what is noblest and most heroic in human life. Love by its very nature is vicarious; it freely takes another's place to share his struggle and bear his burden. It was because the love of Christ excelled all human love, that His self-identification with the sinful race exceeded what the common mind and heart can comprehend. It is only as we learn to love with Him that we reach the fellowship of His sufferings, being in our own experience conformed to His death (Phil. iii. 10).

(*b*) The religious consciousness does not apprehend the total reality of God even in His immediate individual relation to the subject. If Christ was subject to human limitations, His sense of Sonship did not always completely reproduce the total reality of God's Fatherhood toward Him. There were moments of depression as well as of exaltation. Without claiming that in the Last Discourse as given in the Fourth Gospel we have His *ipsissima verba*, yet that report justifies us in the conclusion that the earthly life was a separation from the Father relatively to the closer communion desired and anticipated when He returned to the Father. If the sense of Sonship did vary, if the communion was not always as confident and satisfying, we can understand that the depression might be so intensified that the certainty of nearness and dearness to God might waver, and even fail. And surely on the Cross there were the conditions for such an experience. There are limits to the content of human consciousness; the mind may be so absorbed in one impression, experience, effort, as to drive all competing interests into the subconsciousness. When Jesus was undergoing the strain of temptation He did not feel the pangs of hunger (Matt. iv. 2). He forgot His bodily needs in the joy of giving the Living Water to a soul athirst (John iv. 32). When He was feeling with and for man what sin means,

that apocalypse of iniquity obscured for Him the vision of God. On His Cross He was realising, not only because of the physical pain which man's hate and cruelty were inflicting upon Him, but still more because of the manifold forms of human weakness and wickedness exposed to His searching gaze, the enormity of sin and the awful consequences it involves. Is it not intelligible that He felt Himself alone with that sin, and apart from God as Father? It cannot be too strongly insisted, however, that God had not forsaken Him, although He felt forsaken, and that as soon as the overstrained emotion had found relief in words of Scripture (Matt. xxvii. 46) which were words of faith still, though out of the depths, He again realised that Presence, and in it found peace.

(iii) More difficult than either of these questions is the last. If in Gethsemane Jesus Himself at first prayed that if it were possible the cup might pass from Him, and only, bowed in prayer before God, discovered that it could not pass (Matt. xxvi. 39 and 42), it would be irreverent for us to assume that we can offer a logical demonstration which would satisfy those who bring only an inquiring intellect to the subject. It is only to the submissive spirit, depending on God's illumination, that there can come the certainty that thus it must be. This condition does not, however, forbid any further inquiry; for it may be that for Christ Himself the experience could be all that God meant it to be only if the cup was accepted in the obedience of love, and as a venture of faith and not merely an assent of the understanding, and that to the saved in communion with the living Lord may be disclosed a meaning in that sacrifice that the Saviour Himself, while enduring it, did not discover, and could not discover if the sacrifice were to be complete. (*a*) It is not necessary to estimate the value of the theories discussed in a previous chapter. In this constructive statement such reference will be made as is necessary for the development of the argument. We may begin with the discussion of the distinction made betweeen subjective theories, such

as that of Abälard, and objective theories, such as Anselm's—that is, theories in which the impression on man is the guiding thought, and theories in which the attempt is made to show how Christ's death affects God. The writer is convinced that this is a false antithesis. There is such moral affinity and community between God and man, that that Cross of Christ can impress man truly, rightly, worthily, only as it affects God. What the Cross means for God, or God means in the Cross, is the meaning and the sole meaning that man should find in it. As forgiveness is actualised as renewed fellowship between God and man only when there is repentance and faith, there must be a correspondence between the human conditions of receiving and the divine content which is received in forgiveness. In repentance man condemns his own sin, and in so condemning morally annuls it, or, if that seem too strong a phrase, at least severs himself from it, so that it is no longer his act. Must there not have been in the Cross which conveys forgiveness also judgment on the sin that is forgiven, and God's judgment? Must not God disclose His mind concerning the world's sin even as He unfolds His will concerning the sinner whom He forgives? There might be an emotional reaction against sin as a result of the contemplation of the suffering which man's wickedness imposed upon Christ; but the moral reaction which alone has value in repentance demands that it is God's estimate of sin which is discovered in and conveyed by the Cross.

(*b*) We may next assign the place which may be given in a constructive statement to the idea which M'Leod Campbell has expounded. As has already been said, we cannot in strict propriety use the words repentance and confession of the Sinless. But we can say this, that not only does the Cross impress repentance on the sinner, but that the Cross expresses repentance and confession of sin typically, representatively, inasmuch as Christ so identified Himself with sinful mankind that He felt the sorrow and shame and curse of sin as His very own. In Him was

the accusing and condemning conscience of the race concentrated. He bears the sins of the world upon His own heart. His agony and desolation show how great a burden the world's sin ought to be to mankind.

(*c*) But M'Leod Campbell had to recognise that this confession was an assent to and approval of the divine condemnation of sin. The passage in which he states this view is of such crucial importance that it must be quoted in full; it states better than the writer himself could the very core of the whole matter: 'That oneness of mind with the Father, which towards man took the form of condemnation of sin, would, in the Son's dealing with the Father in relation to our sins, take the form of a perfect confession of our sins. This confession, as to its own nature, must have been *a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man*. . . . Let us consider this Amen from the depths of the humanity of Christ to the divine condemnation of sin. What is it in relation to God's wrath against sin? What place has it in Christ's dealing with that wrath? I answer: He who so responds to the divine wrath against sin, saying, "Thou art righteous, O Lord, who judgest us," is necessarily receiving the full apprehension and realisation of that wrath, as well as of that sin against which it comes forth, into His soul and spirit, into the bosom of the divine humanity, and, so receiving it, He responds to it with a perfect response—a response from the depths of that divine humanity—and *in that perfect response He absorbs it.* For that response has all the elements of a perfect repentance in humanity for all the sin of man—a perfect sorrow—a perfect contrition—all the elements of such a repentance, and that in absolute perfection, all,—excepting the personal consciousness of sin;—and by that perfect response in Amen to the mind of God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met, and that is accorded to divine justice which is its due and could alone satisfy it.'[1] Again it must be

[1] *The Nature of the Atonement*, 5th ed., p. 116 ff., quoted in Denney's *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.

repeated, but the misrepresentation of the evangelical position is so common that repetition seems necessary wherever misconception might arise: Christ is not punished instead of man; there is no quantitative equivalence between what He suffered and what mankind would suffer if sin's full curse fell upon it.

(*d*) There is a moral order of the world which we believe expresses the holy love of God; which attaches consequences, physical, social, moral, and religious, to sin; which attaches death—so Jesus believed, and the common conscience confirms that belief—to sin as the crucial consequence. Jesus identified Himself with sinful mankind not only in sharing death with men, but, on behalf of mankind as its concentrated conscience, in approving, in submitting to it, as the judgment of sin. Even if, with Ritschl,[1] we reserve the term *wrath* for the final dealing of God with defiant and resistent sin despite all His grace can do, and do not use it as M'Leod Campbell does in relation to the present order, even if we regard that moral order as not merely penal, but as disciplinary, reformatory, even redemptive in the divine intention, nevertheless we can regard Jesus' submission to death as expressive of the divine condemnation of sin, and of the assent of the human conscience to this judgment as righteous. It expresses that judgment in and with the appeal of the holy love of God for man's repentance and faith, and the assurance of the divine forgiveness. The love of God, which in Christ so cleaves to sinful mankind as to share the consequences of man's sin, makes such an appeal and offers such an assurance as is fitted as no other means could be conceived to be to overcome man's distrust and disobedience, and so to bring him into that fellowship with God which grace offers fully and freely; but it is so fitted because it no less expresses God's judgment on the sin forgiven than assures that forgiveness.

(*e*) The Cross expresses the divine judgment as it assures the divine forgiveness, and for moral completeness the one is necessary to the other. God

[1] *Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. trans., p. 323.

does not merely pass over sin, treating 'mankind sinners' with moral indifference, as though their sin were of no consequence to Him. He forgives sin—that is, He condemns it, and in condemning it shows the necessary moral reaction of His perfect character and purpose against it; and His holy love in forgiveness separates the sinner from that condemnation, if he will by echoing the divine judgment separate himself from his sin. With God mercy does not merely temper justice, but grace so deals with sin that forgiveness absorbs (to use M'Leod Campbell's term) judgment. It is at this point of the argument that we may recognise what truth there is in the governmental theory. God as the Ruler of mankind, responsible for the maintenance and vindication of the moral order of the world, must command the respect of mankind for that moral order in the method of His forgiveness.

(*f*) Such a forgiveness conjoined with judgment the Cross *conveys* to men—it does not *procure* it. It cannot be stated too definitely or emphatically that the Cross does not change God's nature, disposition, purpose. God is eternally holy love. It is ever His purpose to redeem mankind from sin. The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world (Rev. xiii. 8). Righteousness and Mercy, Holiness and Love, Wrath and Grace, Judgment and Forgiveness, have often been represented as successive states or moods of God; but they are complementary, and necessarily complementary, aspects of the divine perfection. All this harmonising of conflicting attributes in God in which theology has often indulged is irreverent. What the Cross does is to present as harmonised what to imperfect human judgment appears conflicting. This is not to minimise the significance of the Cross, for it is in the Cross that the eternal reality of God in His estimate and treatment of sin is finally and perfectly disclosed. There is a change, a crisis in the moral and religious history of mankind in its relations to God. There is through the Cross revealed to and realised in man, as never before, what God eternally

wills in His holy love—redemption from sin, reconciliation unto Himself. Can any moment in human history compare with that in which God in Christ is finally and perfectly revealed as Saviour, except that in which the Saviourhood shall gain the Sovereignty ?

(*g*) Again, Christ does not propitiate God, but God sets forth Christ as propitiatory (Rom. iii. 25) : in Christ He reveals and realises His goodwill to men. What has been previously said about the Incarnation as about the relation of Christ to God is necessary to an understanding of the Atonement. It is the God immanent in the whole evolution of nature and history, in personal unity with mankind in Christ, as God-man, God as man, who is reconciling the world unto Himself. What Christ did, God did in Him; what Christ suffered, God suffered in Him. To identify the Father with righteousness and the Son with grace, and then to represent the Son's grace as prevailing over the Father's righteousness, is pagan mythology and not Christian theology. The whole historical reality of Jesus Christ from the cradle to the Cross is the divine deed of revelation to and redemption of ' mankind sinners.'

(*h*) If the question be pressed, Why was it necessary that God should save man by such a sacrifice ?—to justify the interpretation of the sacrifice here offered the reason for the necessity must, however diffidently, be stated. That it was necessary to impress man is generally admitted. Does it express God, and was such an expression necessary to God ? Conscious of the intellectual difficulties involved, the writer had searched his own conscience, and had reached the conviction which now many years of concern with the subject have confirmed, that it is a necessity of moral perfection to react on sin in condemnation, and to react in such a way as will adequately express what to this perfection sin is. Even a good man cannot be indifferent to sin : it must be repugnant to him. It may not be his duty to express that condemnation to others ; but if he has any responsibility for the character and conduct of others, that obligation also

follows. The moral order, purpose, and ideal centre in God: He cannot be acquiescent, silent, inactive, at sin's challenge. That challenge must be met. Could any response of holy love be more adequate not only to meet the challenge before men, but to satisfy that holy love itself, than God's own sacrifice in bearing in Christ's Cross His own judgment on the world's sin? All the divine judgments in human history pale before the splendour of that vision of the Judge and Ruler of mankind as Saviour. As one muses on this theme, the fire within burns; argument must sink into silence, and adoration and gratitude alone can have voice. 'Thanks be unto God for His unspeakable gift.'

(8) Much as one might desire to close the interpretation of the fact of Christ here, we must not see Him only on His Cross. It is because He lives that He saves to the uttermost all who come unto God through Him (Heb. vii. 25). What Christ has done for us has meaning and worth only from what He does in us. It is as with Him we die unto sin and live unto God that our repentance and faith as the conditions of our salvation grow to completeness. His atonement on the Cross can become a reality for us as by His Spirit we are being made a new creation, the old things having passed away and all things having become new. Belief in a plan of salvation or a theory of the Atonement becomes a moral and religious scandal apart from the life in the Spirit. God's forgiveness is not for man's safety, comfort, ease, and happiness here or hereafter, but for his becoming perfect as the child of God even as the Father in heaven is perfect. This task of sanctification will be a grievous yoke and a heavy burden if it be attempted as the fulfilment of a law; the yoke is easy and the burden light only in personal dependence on, communion with, and submission to the Living Lord; it is by the contemplation of His glory that there can be any transformation into that glory (2 Cor. iii. 18). If that sounds too mystical for the ordinary Christian experience, a human analogy may help. In human relations example and

influence are more potent morally than precept. Even if we do not vividly realise the presence and activity of Christ, yet to know by faith's assurance that He is with us, and works in us by His Spirit, that His grace is sufficient for us (2 Cor. xii. 9), is a deliverance from weakness and an enduement with power. We need not discriminate between Christ and the Spirit (this subject belongs to the last section of this volume). It is God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who completes the revelation and redemption in the fact of Christ. God is more intimately immanent by His Spirit than in nature or history. He is completing the evolution of the world and of mankind in the progressive manifestation of the sons of God. Every believer can to-day complete his own personality by receiving and responding to the communicativeness of God in His grace, even as the Son on earth knew, trusted, loved, and obeyed the Father in heaven.

SECTION II

THE LOVE OF GOD

(i) The Christian Church acknowledges Jesus as the Revealer of God as Father; through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ the love of God is mediated. It has nevertheless allowed its theology to be injuriously affected by two influences—the imperfect conceptions of the Old Testament on the one hand, and the inadequate apprehension of the revelation of Christ even in parts of the New Testament on the other hand. Jesus came to fulfil law and prophecy (Matt. v. 17); but His fulfilment was not simply confirmation, but correction and completion, for He was the perfect consummation of the progressive revelation of God to the Hebrew nation. The contrasts of the old law and the new life in the Sermon on the Mount illustrate a principle of much wider applicability. What He said about God was also in contrast to what had been said of old times. Dominant as was the influence of Christ in His apostles, great as was the change wrought in them, yet even in Paul the Jewish Rabbi survives in the Christian apostle, and in his arguments with Judaisers he often remains partially in the Jewish standpoint, and does not pass completely to the Christian point of view.

(ii) This has had very serious consequences, not for Christian theology and ethics alone, but even for religious experience and moral character. The attitude of many Christians has been that of the bondage of the law, and not that of the freedom of grace. An imperfect tribal morality has often determined the conduct of Christians rather than the perfect universal moral ideal of Christ. As men think, so they live; and as they live, so they think. God has often been conceived, not as the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, but as the covenant god of a nomad people. If

Christianity is to hold the thought and rule the life of to-day, it is only Christ's revelation of God, and what in prophet or apostle is consistent with it, which can be commended and defended by Christian theology. Whether this volume succeeds in the attempt or not, the intention is, not to include anything that any part of the Bible may assert about God unless it accords with the mind of Christ; and not to exclude inferences about the nature and purpose of God for which no statement of the Scriptures may be quoted, so long as they follow logically from a courageous and consistent development of the teaching of Jesus about the Father.

(iii) We must not, however, assume that Jesus believed about God as Father only what He explicitly stated. He stood in the prophetic succession, and the 'ethical monotheism' of the prophets is the background of His distinctive revelation of God as Father. That inestimable gain of the moral and religious development of His people He did not throw away; but in it He lived His own inner life with God. This at the present moment needs some emphasis, as there has been a tendency to isolate the teaching of Jesus from its presuppositions, and so to give what must be regarded as a one-sided representation. Like every great teacher, He emphasised what was being forgotten or neglected in the truth of the past as well as the truth which was His distinctive message. One may have a great deal of sympathy with the pacifist position, and hold that the Christian Church should take up a very different attitude to war from what it has generally held, and yet be forced to the conclusion that the pacifist teaching ignores much that is of permanent value in the prophetic teaching about the divine providence, and the judgment of sin by God in human history.

(iv) We must not further assume that the apostles are not interpreting the Christian revelation when they make statements about God's attitude to and dealing with sin for which no explicit warrant can be found in the teaching of Jesus. Much of the

apostolic teaching is interpretation of the Cross of Christ; and although there are, as we have seen, words of Jesus bearing on His death, yet the teaching could not be complete, for three reasons. *First of all*, had Jesus Himself understood all, the necessary experience of His sacrifice would not have been possible to Him, for here He had to walk by faith and not by sight, trusting and obeying the Father's will when He did not fully understand it. In Gethsemane He prayed that, if it were possible, the cup might pass from Him (Matt. xxvi. 39), and on Calvary He asked, ' Why hast Thou forsaken Me ? ' (xxvii. 46). *Secondly*, the disciples were so opposed even to the thought of His death, that they were neither willing nor able to receive all the teaching that their Master might have given them. Observe how summary are the reports of the announcements of the Passion. *Thirdly*, it was only after the sacrifice had been endured, and its effects experienced as saving grace, that the saved could understand from their own standpoint as well as that of the Saviour all that the sacrifice might mean. To dismiss the teaching of Paul, grounded in experience, on the atonement in Christ's blood, because there is no mention of atonement in the parable of the Prodigal Son, is entirely unreasonable. Assuredly no doctrine of the Atonement can claim to be Christian which offers a representation of God inconsistent with what that parable teaches about God's attitude to sinners. But, as the companion parables which Luke (xv. 1-10) has put in front of that parable show, it does not give the complete account of God's action for the salvation of men.

(v) It would certainly be easier to take one or other of two courses different from that here adopted. Either we might from the standpoint of Biblical literalism try to combine in our conception of God whatever statements on the subject may claim Scripture warrant. This is the dogmatic method of the past which, as has already been indicated, has had so disastrous an influence on Christian thought

and life, and which still promotes, happily in very restricted circles, an uncharitableness and censoriousness which are lamentable. These, despite all that modern knowledge has taught us, still hold by the old position, imagining that by so doing they are proving themselves the defenders of the faith, whereas in truth they are making faith to some almost impossible. Or we might follow the easy path of a theological modernism which confines itself almost entirely to the teaching of Jesus, and even in that teaching finds much uncongenial to the modern mind, as these exponents regard it. Reason has been shown why we should not confine ourselves to the teaching of Jesus; and in judging that teaching it is well for us to remember that our age too has its prejudices and limitations, and that it would be an irretrievable loss if we cut down the permanent and universal revelation of God in Christ to the restricted measure of rationality which much of this modernism alone would leave to us. Some of these modern tendencies need the correction of 'the truth as it is in Jesus,' and cannot be accepted as fixing the standard of judgment for His authoritative message for our day. To keep a straight and steady course between that Scylla of literalism and this Charybdis of modernism demands an insight into the mind of Christ which learning alone cannot give, but which comes in communion with the Living Lord in dependence on His Spirit. It is thus, and thus alone, that one can dare to approach this perilous enterprise.

CHAPTER I

THE REVELATION OF THE FATHER

We must first of all endeavour to set forth simply and clearly the conception of God given by Christ in deed as well as in word, and then consider some difficulties for our thought that the acceptance of that conception involves.

I

(1) Christian theology has from its beginnings been hampered as well as helped by philosophy; philosophical assumptions about the nature of God have sometimes stood in the way of an acceptance of the revelation of God in Christ and all that it involves; and we cannot go far in the exposition of Christ's conception without encountering some of these hindrances. It is the writer's intention in another volume to deal with the philosophical vindication of the religious belief in God, or the harmonising with the other products of the thought of man of the distinctive contribution of religion. Here these matters will be referred to only in so far as may be necessary for the immediate purpose. It is the assumption of the Old Testament that God is personal, thinking mind, feeling heart, and acting will. Jesus in knowing God as Father and Himself as Son assumed such affinity of nature and community of relation between God and man as can be described as personal; and consequently the God He knew and made known must be conceived as personal. Whatever other and more than man God may be, for such relation to man He must be thought of as personal. The terms Jesus used in regard to God and Himself, Father and Son,

while affirming both affinity of nature and community of relation, were a confession of a difference within this unity, the dependence of the Son upon the Father, the subordination of the Son to the Father. In the passage (Matt. xi. 25-27, Luke x. 21-22) in which the unique relation to God is claimed, entire dependence ('All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father') and complete submission (*v.* 26) are expressed. When He asked the young ruler, 'Why callest thou Me good? none is good save one, even God' (Mark x. 18), or assured the disciples, 'The Father is greater than I' (John xiv. 28), He recognised limitations in Himself that He did not assign to God. Entirely in accord with this teaching, then, is Lotze's position, already referred to in the previous section, that God alone is perfect personality, and that man is progressively personal. The Incarnate Son was truly man. That God is personal is an affirmation which we may make on the authority of Christ.

(2) To such an assertion the objection is offered that the divine attributes of infinitude and absoluteness are incompatible with the necessary limitations and relations of personality. This objection has already been dealt with in the discussion on personality in God and man. What here remains to be added is that, while Jesus thought of God as personal, He, without using philosophical terms, thought of God in a way which would involve both these ideas. God was for Him not merely the process in nature and history, but always the power over nature and history. While He was ever conscious that He dwelt in God and God in Him, His attitude, already noted, of dependence on, submission to, and confidence in God showed that for Him God was above and beyond as well as within. To use the language of philosophy, God for Him was no less transcendent than immanent. These abstract conceptions He clothed with concrete reality. For Him there was no long series of secondary causes removing to a distance God as First Cause. As He Himself lived in the immediate presence of God, so He saw God feeding the birds of the air and

clothing the flowers of the field (Matt. vi. 26-30), nay, even taking count of every sparrow and every hair of the head of man (x. 29-30). For Him there was no order of nature, apart from God, mediating and limiting the activity of God. He did not distinguish the natural and the supernatural, since for Him there was always and everywhere the one activity of God, as in the sunshine and the shower (v. 45); and He set no bounds to what God would do. For His faith with God all things are possible (xix. 26). It is only man's unbelief which hinders a more wonderful working of God in man and for man. In dealing with the miracles of Jesus in a previous chapter, this matter has been already more fully discussed. When we come to discuss the relation of God to nature the difference of natural and supernatural will be considered. Meanwhile, only two considerations need to be emphasised: (1) Jesus was expressing the religious consciousness in its simplicity and intensity, and not formulating any philosophical theory; and nevertheless (2) the testimony of His religious consciousness is a datum to which justice must be done in framing any philosophical theory. The immediacy of the divine presence and activity which the religious consciousness affirms must be fully taken account of in any conception offered of the relation of God to nature for which the authority of Christ can be claimed.

(3) To apply to the teaching of Jesus another distinction familiar to the thought of to-day, we may ascribe to Him a *dynamic* and not a *static* view of God. It was not the divine nature but the divine purpose with which He was concerned. 'My Father worketh even until now, and I work' (John v. 17). In His ministry He was an agent of that purpose. He assumed what all His countrymen assumed, that God had been active in the history of the nation; and with them He was expecting a still more manifest activity of God in the coming of the kingdom of God, or the kingdom of heaven. So extensive has been the discussion among scholars as to the meaning

of this term on the lips of Jesus, that it would be quite impossible to reproduce any part of it here. The conclusions which have resulted from a study of the relevant literature as well as of the evidence in the Gospels must be briefly stated. For Jesus the kingdom had a twofold aspect: it was already present in Himself and those who attached themselves to Him as an expansive, pervasive, illuminating, and preserving influence in the world; it was mustard-seed and leaven (Matt. xiii. 31-33), light and salt (v. 13-16). It was coming in the fullness of its power, glory, and blessing by an act of divine intervention in human history in connection with His return to the world from which He was soon withdrawing His visible and audible presence (Matt. xvi. 28, xxiv.). But divine omnipotence could not inaugurate the kingdom apart from human penitence and faith, and yet the kingdom would not be consummated by any merely human historical process. The mind of Jesus Himself seems to have wavered between confidence in the sufficiency of the Father's power, and despondency due to the hindrance offered by human sin and unbelief. The subject has already been more fully discussed in the previous section, but must be here as briefly as possible recalled.

(4) We do not and we cannot confess our hope to-day in exactly the same terms as did Jesus and His contemporaries. How far His language was an accommodation to the understanding of His age, and imperfectly expressed His own convictions, we cannot confidently assert. But inasmuch as in His revelation of the Father He rose so far above the thought of His time, may we not at least conjecture that the apocalyptic language of His contemporaries but imperfectly expressed His inmost meaning, and that that is to be found not in hopes which history has left unfulfilled, but rather in the ideals of which history is offering us the evidence of a realisation? We must judge what is obscure by what is distinct in His words. His conception of God as Father is our guide to the character of the purpose of God in history. Under

such guidance Christian thinkers have been led to the conclusion which may be briefly summarised in the words that the kingdom of God is both the good God offers and the duty He lays upon man, the sovereignty of His grace in all mankind and the obedience of the children of God to the law of love. In the last section of this volume the subject will be further considered in dealing with the Christian hope, and the writer projects another volume on 'The Kingdom of God as the Christian Ideal,' in which He will fully discuss the subject of Christian ethics, individual and social. Meanwhile, the conviction that this teaching of Jesus leaves with us is that God is working in history, not apart from but with and by man for the fulfilment of His purpose; that human progress is assured not by what man is and does, but only by what He will suffer God to do in and with Him; that so intimately and inseparably is Christ related to that purpose that the fulfilment of the purpose will be the vindication and triumph of Christ Himself; and that the rapidity with which the kingdom may come is not to be measured by the capacity of man to bring about its coming, but rather by the receptivity and responsiveness of the faith of man to the grace of God which will give Him the opportunity of Himself completing His own purpose.

(5) As has already been indicated, Jesus assumed the prophetic teaching about God, and we must accept that on His authority so far as it is consistent with His revelation of the Father. If we give due heed to the whole of His teaching, we shall find that more of the apostolic teaching is in accord with that revelation than a superficial view of the Fatherhood might lead us to suppose. God is true, wise, faithful, righteous, holy, good, merciful, and gracious. The teaching of Jesus is not without the terror of the Lord as well as the tenderness. Only a few instances need be given. For those who cause little ones to stumble there is Gehenna, the unquenchable fire (Mark ix. 42-43). The wicked husbandmen are to be destroyed (xii. 9). The unfaithful servant is to be cut asunder and have

his portion with the hypocrites (Matt. xxiv. 51). Those who did not do good to the least of His brethren are bidden depart into 'the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels' (xxv. 41). There is a sin which never has forgiveness, for it is 'an eternal sin' (Mark iii. 29). While much of the language is figurative, and we must not interpret eternal as necessarily meaning everlasting, there can be no doubt that Jesus does teach a righteous judgment of God in His providence in the present life as well as in His dealing with men in the hereafter. He does not so separate God from or exalt God above the moral order in the world as to justify our regarding the consequences of sin as natural and inevitable apart from His will: for Jesus the will of God was ultimate and supreme. If, however, we do admit that Jesus did regard these consequences of sin as willed by God, it does not follow that this teaching is inconsistent with the teaching of the Fatherhood. The holy love of God seeks to reproduce the character of God Himself in man, and uses many means, righteous judgment as well as forgiving mercy. As has already been shown in a previous chapter in dealing with the work of Christ, the Cross is a revelation of judgment as well as of mercy. The love of God in Christ suffers with and for man in the grace which conjoins the condemnation of sin and the forgiveness of the sinner. The discussion in that chapter must now be recalled; and the conclusions there reached must be included in the conception of God for which the authority of the Son in revealing the Father may be claimed. We may now, however, concentrate on what is distinctive in the teaching of Jesus—the Fatherhood of God.

II

(1) Jesus claimed that He as Son was known by the Father alone, and that He alone knew the Father and could make the Father known (Matt. xi. 27, Luke x. 22). He thus distinguishes His relation to God from that of other men. His is an immediate

relation, that of other men is mediated by Him. According to the Fourth Gospel, He gives to those who believe on His name the right to become children of God (John i. 12). He is Son by an eternal relation, men become sons by a temporal experience.[1] But apart from this difference, which has already been dealt with in the discussion of the person of Christ, He did offer to men the same privileges and blessings of the Divine Fatherhood as He used and enjoyed. There seems to be no doubt that Jesus taught a permanent and universal Fatherhood of God. God, whose nature and purpose do not change, is eternally and infinitely Father, and His Fatherhood is the motive of Creation and Providence as well as Redemption. God made man, and cares for him as the object of His eternal and infinite love. God does not become Father only to those who repent and believe, as some writers have asserted as a logical inference from the parallelism of the relation of God to man and of man to God. But such an exact parallelism cannot be insisted on when we are concerned with the eternal God and man made in time.[2] The Fatherhood of God does not involve the actual, only the potential sonship of all men at birth. Men are not sons of God by nature, but become sons by grace. The relation is not a physical one, but a spiritual, although it does rest on the relation of God as Creator to man as His creature, made with the promise of and the capacity for such a higher relation. As a moral and religious relation it has to be realised personally by each man. Even apart from sin, by the very character of this sonship each man needs to become a son, receiving and responding to the Fatherhood of God. It shows a lack of moral insight and spiritual discernment to affirm that because God is eternally and infinitely Father in His grace, all men are by nature sons of God. God loves and cares for all, and is ever willing —nay, eager—that all should so become sons as in

[1] Here difference of sex is irrelevant, and therefore the term ' son ' is used to maintain the analogy with ' the Son.'

[2] See *Our Growing Creed*, by W. D. M'Laren, pp. 379-80.

experience to realise all that His Fatherhood wills for their good. The prodigal in the far country was not morally and religiously any longer son; the physical fact remained, but the spiritual relation was for the time suspended, and could be restored only by his return home. If Jesus does not explicitly make this distinction, it is implicit in His conception of Fatherhood as a spiritual and not a physical relation, and as, therefore, a relation which, while perfect on God's side, must on man's be realised in the process of moral and religious development. Paul is not contradicting the teaching of Jesus in his doctrine of adoption (Rom. viii. 15), or John in what he writes about becoming the sons of God (John i. 12).

(2) God's Fatherhood is His relation with man as constituted by His love. While Jesus does not give us a definition of the love of God, He gives us the data for a description of its elements. It is a mistake in psychology to regard love as only emotion or sentiment, as belonging only to the affective aspect of human personality. It is this error which has led some theologians astray into contrasting God's love with His holiness or righteousness, into assuming that God's Fatherhood needs qualification by various epithets, and that, so unqualified, the truth is a dangerous doctrine. If we conceive love aright, we need not fear to declare that love alone. For in love it is the whole personality—thought, feeling, will—which is directed towards another, giving itself that it may find itself in another. It is self-communication for self-realisation in and with another. Love as thought is a judgment of value, as feeling a sense of interest, as will a purpose of good. That God in Christ reveals Himself as Father sets an estimate on man in correspondence with the value of God Himself. Great as is the difference between God and man, this relationship exalts man above mere creaturehood. Jesus' teaching on man as lost lays the stress not on what man loses by his sin, but on the loss God feels when man is estranged from Him; and every man has this value for God. The necessary inference from the

Fatherhood of God is the infinite value to God of every man as potential son. Because man has such value to God, God has an *interest* in man. The etymology of the word (Latin *interesse*, to be among) may help our thought. God is so much mixed up with men (if such a phrase may be forgiven as best conveying the meaning), so identified with man, that He has both pain and pleasure in and with man. He is grieved by man's sin, and made glad by his recovery. God is not impassible, and to affirm that He is passible is not the monstrous heresy that the Creed of Chalcedon represents it as being. God can and does feel with and for man. As God sets on man such a value, and has in man such an interest, He wills for man a corresponding good, that man shall become so worthy of his worth that God will have joy and not grief in Him. What that good is, the term Fatherhood itself indicates. This analysis of the love of God is based solidly on the exposition of the parables in Luke xv., and in no particular or degree goes beyond what is there taught.

(3) God's Fatherhood is His *communicative and reproductive perfection.* God as Father wills that men should live in fellowship with Himself, and grow in likeness to Himself. God made man in His image, not as actuality, but as promise and potency. Sonship consists of communion with and conformity to God—likeness which comes from loving. Communion is not the reward but the source of conformity. Man is perfected by faith, and not by works. It is as men love God as Father that they as sons become like God. Christian morality depends on Christian religion. We love God because He first loved us, and as we love God we come to love our fellow-men as also loved of God (1 John iv. 19-21), and love is the fulfilling of the law (Rom. xiii. 10). It is as God is known and loved as Father that His will is freely willed, not by the compulsion of law, but by the constraint of love. Even in the life of Jesus there were times of temptation and trial, when obedience was a struggle and a sorrow; but for the most part He gives the impression of a

spontaneous goodness, a likeness to His Father which freely came from His fellowship with the Father. As God's love is holy and imparts holiness, the antithesis of holiness and love is theological rhetoric, and not moral and religious reality.

(4) So far we have been describing God's Fatherhood towards men without taking account of man's sinfulness, although some reference has been unavoidable. In dealing with sinful man God's love shows itself as grace, for grace is love which will not be overcome by unworthiness, but seeks to recover and restore the worth of the unworthy. As God deals with man's sinfulness decisively in Jesus Christ, we may say, as is implied in the apostolic benediction, that God's love shows itself and works as the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. To what has already been said about that grace in the first section of this volume, something remains to be added here. (*a*) The simple but great word for God's dealing with sin is *forgiveness*. While for the object he had in view, and the opponents he had to meet, Paul truly and rightly used the phrases 'the righteousness of God,' or 'justification by faith,' and even we to-day cannot leave out of consideration the relation of love to law, mercy to judgment, yet it has been a loss that Christian theology has not confined itself more to the use of the word forgiveness, which goes right home to the heart. While God does not and cannot deceive Himself as to the condition of men, yet His holy love wills so to distinguish and separate the sin which He condemns from the sinners whom as lost sons He loves, as to offer to them the restoration of the personal relation to Himself which they have interrupted by their distrust and disobedience, if only they will in penitence and faith accept His judgment of condemnation on that sin and His judgment of favour on themselves. It does seem an inexact use of language to speak of the forgiveness of sin, for sin is ever under God's judgment. It is sinners who are forgiven, because their sin is no longer reckoned unto them, and they themselves have disowned it. It is not a theological subtlety to dis-

tinguish between hatred of an act and hatred of the actor. Were the actor so exhausted in, so identified with his act that no distinction and separation were possible, then assuredly he must be condemned with his sin. It is surely such a condition which Jesus calls the unpardonable sin (Mark iii. 29). As long as the man is not lost in the sin, and can disown the sin, he can be forgiven his sin—it need no longer be put to his account. The unworthiness which sin has brought on a man does not exhaust his worth. That worth God recognises, and in forgiveness He deals with man according to that worth, despite that unworthiness. In His dealing God does not wait till man confesses his unworthiness and seeks to recover his worth, He does not wait for penitence and faith, but by the offer and even pleading of His grace He evokes the penitence and faith without which forgiveness as the fully restored personal relationship cannot be actualised. God's forgiveness is a creative act of God, by which He makes in man the conditions of its full realisation.

(*b*) A forgiveness which followed on penitence and faith was expected by the Psalmist (li. 17). That falls within the Old Testament revelation. What is new in the revelation of God in Christ is that God Himself takes the initiative, and this is an initiative of such a kind as will so secure man's reception of it and response to it as fully to maintain the holy love of God in its condemnation of sin, and to satisfy the conscience of man that sin deserves condemnation. The forgiveness in Christ is no *passing over* of sins in divine forbearance (Rom. iii. 25), leaving in doubt His attitude to sin. It is forgiveness, which means the restoration of the personal relation to God in accordance with the personal perfection which God ever is, and which in that relation is again to be a possibility for man. There is no contrast and contradiction, as thinkers more shallow morally and religiously than intellectually often affirm, between the truth of the Fatherhood of God and the doctrine of the Atonement. The Fatherhood is revealed in

Christ's Cross as the holy love which imparts itself both as holy and as love to sinful man in a forgiveness which judges the sin which the man is forgiven. God shows Himself most and best as Father in the gift of His Son in sacrifice for man's salvation.

(*c*) As Father, God wills the salvation of all men. God does all His holy love can do in Christ to seek and to save the lost, whether in this life or another, for we have no right to affirm that death ends the dealings of His grace with any. We dare not, however, affirm that all will be saved. As has already been suggested, the sinner may so identify himself with his sin that forgiveness will be impossible. That God should remit penalties even for the impenitent is conceivable; but that God should forgive—that is, restore to full personal relationship to Himself—those who continue distrusting or disobeying Him is a moral and religious impossibility. To invoke God's omnipotence is an irrelevance, even an impertinence. That God may have resources of appeal and persuasion in reserve which at last will prevail we dare not affirm, for Christian faith must ask, What more can even God do than He has done in Jesus Christ? We dare to believe and hope, however, that men may in another life apprehend, appreciate, and accept the truth and the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ as they may not have been able to do in this life. But we must admit the possibility that some may remain impenitent and unbelieving despite all God has done, or will yet do. Whether many, or even any, shall commit the unpardonable sin of rejecting God's every appeal we know not; but even with those, if such there should be, we may be confident that God will deal according to His love. It may be that as human personality has been created for sonship, for fellowship with and likeness to God as Father, he who refuses to become that for which he was created shall by a process of moral, mental, and spiritual deterioration at last lose that personality the ideal of which he has refused to realise. As human personality has emerged out of animal consciousness and vital organism, so it is

conceivable that it may again relapse to a lower phase of reality, and at last even pass out of existence. This conjecture will need to be considered more fully in a subsequent chapter dealing with man's destiny. It is here mentioned only as bearing on the permanence of God's Fatherhood as holy love towards all men.

III

(1) To this conception of God as Father there are several objections which can be urged. The attractiveness of such a conception will be generally conceded; but to some thinkers it seems to be too good to be true. They would believe if they could; but the facts of the world and of life appear to some, as these facts are seen to and are understood by them, to make such a faith impossible. Others there are to whom even the teaching of Scripture presents an obstacle. How can this difficulty be removed?

(i) Jesus taught as one having authority, and not as the scribes (Mark i. 22); and many believers have so realised that authority in reason and conscience alike, that they have not felt anything else necessary to commend the truth to them. The writer of this volume must confess that Jesus Christ makes such an impression on him, not only of subjective confidence, but even of objective certainty, that where Christ affirms he cannot doubt. Were the difficulties of faith even greater than they are, he feels that Christ would Himself overcome them by the assurance that His personality inspires. And there are moments when the mind is so perplexed, that it is on Christ, and Christ alone, the soul must fall back as its only refuge.

(ii) While the venture of faith must be made when the resources of reason fail, yet the reason may reinforce faith. The mind has a right to have its questions answered, as the heart to have its needs met. We must, therefore, deal with the objections to the conception of God's Fatherhood, so far as our reason can. Two of these objections must be here mentioned—

the comparative insignificance of man in the Universe, and the reality of pain and sin, although the full treatment of those subjects must be reserved for a more appropriate context in subsequent chapters. (*a*) As to the first, all that need here be said is that the objection, if it is valid, must receive a general application as challenging equally the truth of science and philosophy, morals and religion. Man's insignificance must depreciate the value of all his activities, and not only this one conception. In dealing with man's place in the Universe an argument will be offered to show how significant man is, not only as the final product of the evolution of the Universe, but as the subject who knows and understands the Universe and his own place in it, and who in his ideals rises to a reality above the actuality of the Universe.

(*b*) As to the second objection, the proper place for dealing with the problem of evil is when the relation of God to nature and man is under discussion; but here an evasion of the difficulty must be considered. The Apostles' Creed affirms the belief in God the Father Almighty. Some thinkers, J. S. Mill for instance,[1] maintain that this assertion involves a dilemma. Either God is not altogether good, or He is not almighty. Either the Fatherhood must be sacrificed to the Almightiness, or *vice versa.* And the argument by which this conclusion is sustained is as follows: As good, God wills and cannot but will good only; were He also almighty, He would prevent all evil. As the evil is not being prevented, God cannot be almighty as well as good. If as almighty He could prevent evil and did not, He would not be good. Either the goodness or the almightiness of God must be surrendered. The almightiness is re-

[1] This is Mill's conclusion regarding the nature of God from the facts of the world as he estimates them: 'A Being of great but limited power, how or by what limited we cannot even conjecture; of great and perhaps unlimited intelligence, but perhaps also more narrowly limited than His power; who desires and pays some regard to the happiness of His creatures, but who seems to have other motives of action which He cares more for, and who can hardly be supposed to have created the universe for that purpose alone.' (*Three Essays on Religion*, p. 194.)

jected, and the goodness retained. We must resolve the problem into two questions: What do we mean by almightiness? What do we mean by all-goodness? For this argument involves an unproved assumption regarding each; and by correcting the error in each case we may get such a conception of these two attributes of God as to be able to show that the existence of evil does not involve their opposition.

(2) Many misunderstandings have arisen in theology because the loose popular use of terms has been accepted, instead of the endeavour being made to define the meaning exactly; and we may, therefore, be enabled to resolve a problem by means of more exact definitions.

(i) Almightiness does not mean that God can do anything or everything that we can imagine, conceive, or desire that He should do. God Himself is not an indefinite, undetermined potency of anything and everything. We may frankly accept Spinoza's principle—*Omnis determinatio est negatio*; but instead of avoiding determination to escape negation we must be ready to affirm what God is, even if that excludes a multitude of possibilities for speculative thought. God has a nature, a character, and a purpose, and He gives to the reality He creates a definite and determined actuality, and not an unlimited possibility. Even the potency of the evolution of the Universe and the promise of progress of man are within limits of possibility appointed by God, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with what He is and, therefore, wills. Our thought would be plunged in confusion if we could imagine that *A* could be both *A* and *not-A*, that two and two could be five, that hatred could be better than love by the mere fact of the divine omnipotence. There are necessities and limitations in the creative reality and the created actuality which we must fully recognise. God can do only what can be done. Further, He can act only in accordance with His own perfection. There are impossibilities for wisdom, holiness, and love which reason and conscience in interpreting the Universe must recognise. All that

we must insist on in opposition to the conception of a limited God, such as Mr. Wells offers us in *God the Invisible King*, are these two considerations which are involved in the attributes of God's infinitude and absoluteness. *First*, there is no fate or force external to or different from God Himself which determines what God can and God cannot do. God is self-limited, for it is by His will that any actuality other than Himself is created by which His action could in any way be conditioned. *Secondly*, God has in Himself all the resources by the use of which in accordance with His own perfection He can fulfil His own purpose, for the fact that He has willed to create is a guarantee that what He has begun He can bring to an end harmonious with His own perfection. Surely the Universe displays such power that it is unreasonable to assume that the power will not avail to finish what has once been begun, and reasonable to believe that the perfecting of His work is not beyond the resources of Him who has carried that work so far. Still more do God's wisdom and goodness give the assurance that what God has promised He can perform. These convictions are essential to the confidence and courage of faith, for a God who had to contend against a fate or force beyond His control, and who could not fulfil His purpose, would not give to man the certainty and the security that he needs and finds in faith that all will be well with the world because God is in His heaven. A God who needs our help cannot give us the help we need, although He wills to fulfil His purpose with us as His fellow-workers. With these explanations of what is meant by God's almightiness, the problem we are considering resolves itself into this: Is God's action, conditioned as it is, contrary to or consistent with goodness?

(ii) If God's goodness means the pleasure or even the happiness of all His creatures, that and that alone, then it must be conceded that the facts of life do challenge faith in God's Fatherhood. But if these same facts themselves point to a larger purpose, then we may conclude that the challenge can be met. We

must neither minimise nor exaggerate the amount or the intensity of the evil in the world. We cannot be either optimists, affirming that this *is* the best of all possible worlds, or pessimists, deploring that this *is* the worst of all possible worlds; we may be *meliorists*, admitting that the world is partly bad, but believing that it is becoming better, and hoping that at last it will become the best. A closer scrutiny of all the relevant facts leading to such a solution of the problem must meanwhile be reserved; but the Christian conception of God's Fatherhood as His communicative and reproductive perfection, His purpose to restore man to His own fellowship and likeness, answers the question as to what God's purpose is, and we must judge the world not as it meets our wishes, or furthers our ends, but as it is fitted to make men sons of God. If it can be shown, as will be shown in the fully-developed argument in a subsequent chapter, that the world can be so interpreted, then we may conclude that only on an inadequate conception both of God's almightiness and God's goodness are we confronted with the dilemma that God is either all good or almighty, but that He cannot be both, since there is evil (pain and sin) in the world.

(3) What may seem a very much more serious difficulty for many minds is the doctrine of God which has been dominant in the Christian Church, and which is specially associated with the names of Augustine and Calvin, but has also support in texts of the Holy Scriptures and the teaching of Paul especially. The writer of this volume must quite frankly confess that, trained though he was in the tenets of a strict Calvinism, not only the study and thought of many years, but still more his own experience of the love of God in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ by the dwelling and working in him of God's Holy Spirit, has led him to a theology radically opposed to Calvinism, but based on a broader and firmer foundation than the biblical scholarship of the day afforded to Arminianism. The contrast between the position here reached and Calvinism may be stated

in this way. Calvinism started from the divine nature and attributes, speculatively construed on often a very slender basis of Scripture proof, using such texts as gave support to its contentions, and ignoring such teaching as would have modified its conclusions, while maintaining the supreme authority and the sole sufficiency for doctrine of the whole Bible. What is here being attempted is an interpretation of the character and the purpose of God, as disclosed in the progressive revelation consummated in Christ, not for the ends of speculative completeness and consistency, but for the solution of the moral and religious problems of human experience and history.

(i) We must do justice to the older view. While it is a speculative contention that God must be absolute will, foreseeing all, foreordaining all, directing and controlling all, it must be admitted that there are texts of Scripture which can be quoted in its support; and we must add that it is a view that man by his reverence for God, his sense of insufficiency in himself and of his dependence on God's sufficiency, is naturally led to take. The very serious difficulties which this view presents could be set aside as mysteries which it would be presumption in man to claim that he could penetrate. (*a*) For the doctrine of election, which is the most conspicuous instance of this theological tendency, there is a truly religious motive. Man not only desires salvation, but the assurance of the reality of that salvation. Were that salvation based on the variable will of man, that assurance would be gone. Were it even based on a varying purpose of God, certainty would be beyond reach. For the full confidence of faith there must be the belief that the salvation is God's work and not man's, and that the purpose of God to save is not a temporary response to a human need and appeal, but has its roots in the very nature of God Himself—that it is an eternal purpose which is finding its fulfilment in time. This conviction is expressed, with all the power and charm which Spurgeon could command, in a sermon, 'Songs in the Night.' 'My beloved brethren,' he

says, 'you will find it a sweet subject for song at times, to begin to sing of electing love and covenanted mercies. When thou thyself art low, it is well to sing of the fountainhead of mercy, of that blest decree wherein thou wast ordained to eternal life, and of that glorious Man who undertook thy redemption; of that solemn covenant signed, and sealed, and ratified, in all things ordered well; of that everlasting love which, ere the hoary mountains were begotten, or ere the aged hills were children, chose thee, loved thee firmly, loved thee first, loved thee well, loved thee eternally.' (*b*) Where this legitimate demand of the soul is abandoned, and a precarious assumption takes its place, is where this purpose is not conceived as universal, embracing all mankind, but as particular, discriminating the one man from the other, electing the one, reprobating the other. In the same sermon Spurgeon speaks of 'electing love' and 'discriminating mercy.' But can a love which is partial be as full of comfort and assurance to the soul as a love that is universal? Can I be surer of my salvation if I believe that God only loves some, than if I am convinced that He loves all eternally? This doctrine, however, also suffers from a moral defect. A sentiment which is contrary to the spirit of Christ enters in when the man rejoices in the certainty of his own salvation, and acquiesces, even if he does not find some satisfaction, in the fact that others have not been so favoured as he has been. That He might save others Jesus would not save Himself (Mark xv. 31). Paul was willing to be anathema from Christ for his brethren's sake (Romans ix. 3). This is the Christian sentiment. If reprobation is the necessary counterpart of election, then to find joy in being elected out of a race the majority of which has been reprobated is a selfish feeling, and selfishness is not less but even more offensive when it invades the relation of man to God. If we have really seen God in the face of Jesus Christ, it should be impossible for us to believe, unless in deference to the Holy Scriptures we silence both conscience and reason within us, that God wills

the damnation of any creature of His hand and child of His heart.

(ii) A passage which is claimed as a sure foundation for the doctrine of election is that in which Paul is explaining the refusal of his own nation to accept the Gospel (Rom. ix. 1-29). He does undoubtedly, with almost brutal ruthlessness, declare God's right to do as He will with His creatures, to save some, to damn others; and he supports his contention by quotations from the Scriptures which it must be admitted do indicate facts of history, whether the explanation of them be adequate or not. (*a*) What has been ignored by Calvinism in its use of this passage is that it is what the logicians call an *argumentum ad hominem.* Paul is rebuking Jewish arrogance, which was claiming a privileged position towards God. If God had a right to choose Israel, He has no less a right to reject Israel. On the level of Jewish thought the argument was strictly valid. But Paul cannot himself remain on that level. He rises first to the merely moral and then to the Christian solution of the problem with which he is dealing. Israel has been rejected because it deserved to be rejected on account of its unbelief (ix. 30, x. 21). But the rejection is only temporary, and has the salvation of Jew and Gentile alike as its end (xi. 1-31). 'God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all' (*v.* 32). It would be well if the whole argument were always considered, and not one part of it only. In Paul there is, not a dogmatic universalism, but at least a hope for mankind, in which the doctrine of particular election passes out of sight altogether.

(*b*) It has often been contended that history proves that God's dealings with men are discriminative. That there are differences of natural endowment and historical circumstances among men may be frankly admitted. But it is too rash an inference that these are directly due to any arbitrary exercise of the divine will. Just as we come to understand nature do we recognise that God works in and through an order of nature, not setting it aside, not interfering

with its operations. So also as we study history do we find sequence, reason, purpose. We recognise more fully man's responsibility for the course of events. We do not exclude God; but He comes into the course of history not as absolute Will above and beyond, but as Holy Love within and through, the reason, the conscience, and the spirit of man. As psychology will disclose to us more fully the working of the mind of man, we shall have a fuller understanding of the differences among men. We shall then abandon the conception of a God whose will cannot be understood by the reason and approved by the conscience of man, but must be accepted as inscrutable mystery; but we shall find the Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who discloses Himself to us in His works and ways as holy love, to which our hearts respond. Paul's own illustration of the potter and the clay (Rom. ix. 21) forbids the assumption of an arbitrary action of God in history. The potter can do with the clay what he will only as he takes account of the quality of the clay. He will not use the better clay to make what could be made out of clay less good. He makes the best and the most of his material if he is a master of his craft and not a bungler in it. Shall we ascribe less wisdom and skill to God? Thus Paul's argument, closely scrutinised, does not support the doctrine of election, as has often been assumed.

(iii) The argument against Calvinism from the standpoint of God's revelation in Christ is conclusive. With this revelation the doctrine of foreknowledge and foreordination alike is inconsistent. The passages in the Holy Scriptures which teach these doctrines, or in some instances are supposed to teach them, involve the conception of God as Almighty Will, and not as Holy Love. (*a*) If God made man free that he might realise the ideal of personality, He did commit to man the decision of his own destiny, and did not anticipate that decision by any divine decree. If it was in holy love that God created man, what He desires and purposes for all is eternal life

and not death. Men may hinder and thwart God's purpose; and human history is the record of man's working alongside of God, both against and for His purpose. To interpret history as merely the carrying out in time of a complete divine programme, fixed in eternity in all its details, is to empty it of all meaning and worth by reducing it to a mere puppet-show, and to make God a showman who pulls the strings responsible for all the movements of the puppets. A logically consistent Calvinism ends in a pantheism in which God must be identified no less with all the evil than with all the good. The fulfilment of God's purpose depends on the free acts of man. God by His Spirit does morally and religiously direct and control the spirit of man, but always consistently with his freedom. To make God directly responsible for every event is to charge Him with willing evil as well as good. It is not piety to ascribe to God the results of human sin, unless as the inevitable consequences in the moral order of the free acts of men. What the Great War has brought home to many thoughtful men is the reality of man's liberty and consequent responsibility. God does not prevent war or promote peace by His omnipotence, although He does by His Spirit in the human reason and conscience restrain from evil and constrain to good. It is by His personal activity in man, and thus alone, that God through man is fulfilling His purpose.

(*b*) If God does not foreordain it is no less necessary for man's freedom that He should not foreknow. How a foreknown act can be a free act is inconceivable. How can what in God's mind is already fixed as actual be for man's choice only possible? This dilemma cannot be escaped by saying that the relation of God to man is inscrutable, for the difficulty is the creation of man's own speculative thought about God. The assertion of God's foreknowledge is no datum of experience: it is an inference from a certain conception of God. Granted that God knows all, He knows the actual as actual, and the possible as possible; otherwise His knowledge would not correspond with reality

just as it is. Further, such teaching as is given by Jesus about God's relation to man, His pain in man's sin, His joy in man's recovery, would be meaningless if God foreknew each human choice before it was made. If the shepherd knew that he would find the lost sheep, would his sorrow at the loss be as great? Such an analogy on the lips of Jesus can be confidently used against all speculative conjecture. Human history would lose its interest for God if He were eternally contemplating all that occurs. God can be man's fellow-sufferer, as man is God's fellow-worker in history only as it is for God the unfolding of His purpose, not according to a fixed, timed programme, but with hindrances, delays, recoveries, triumphs unforeseen due to the varying activity of man as partner with God, and God's varying activity in guiding man's actions as partner with man. We must set aside all speculative conclusions about God, and frankly and boldly render explicit all that is implicit in Christ's teaching about God's Fatherhood.

(iv) What can be offered in place of the assurance of salvation that the doctrine of election gave to those who believed themselves the elect? What certainty is there that God will accomplish the work of saving mankind? All security would be taken from religion if we were to think of God as with man engaged in a conflict, uncertain of victory, needing man's help, and not sure of His own strength. As has already been shown, Christ was absolutely confident as regards not only God's goodwill but also His power to give effect to that goodwill. The more fully we recognise the reality of history, the dependence of the fulfilment of God's purpose on man's free acts, the more necessary is it for us to cherish Christ's confidence in the sufficiency of God, not as physical omnipotence but as personal perfection. Unless we are to be put to moral and religious confusion, God's Fatherhood must mean to us that God can do what He wills. 'Hope putteth not to shame, because the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost which was given unto us'

(Rom. v. 5). We may say boldly that if God is Father, He would never have created a race that He could not redeem. These are responsibilites of a Creator—not to begin a work which He cannot finish, not to make an experiment which He has not the resources to make a success. Though God neither foreordains nor foreknows man's free acts, and man's freedom has full unhindered scope, He knows the limits within which that freedom, its use or abuse, can affect, to help or to hinder, the fulfilment of His purpose, and He knows what are His resources to meet every emergency. While we may not confidently affirm that every man will be saved, yet we may be sure that all the ways and works of God as Creator will at last find their vindication in God as Redeemer, the Father of all reconciling the world unto Himself in His Son. We may share with Paul the exultant and triumphant assurance of having been chosen of God, not out of but with the race, for salvation from the foundation of the world, for it was for this very end that, as far as we can construe the meaning of the world, the world was made and is kept in being by God. 'The Lamb hath been slain from the foundation of the world' (Rev. xiii. 8) that He might redeem 'unto God with His blood men of every tribe, and tongue, and people, and nation,' and might make them 'to be unto our God a kingdom and priests' (v. 9-10).

CHAPTER II

THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD AND MAN

I

(1) CHRISTIAN theology is not primarily concerned with the world as the object of the explanations of science, the interpretations of philosophy, but almost exclusively with the relation of the world to God, and with other aspects only as they bear on that relation. The Biblical cosmology has for it an interest and value as showing how men inspired of God, but limited to the knowledge of the world of their own age and surroundings, conceived that relation; but it has not an authority which would supplant that of science in its own sphere. If it knows its own proper business it will not attempt to reconcile geology and Genesis i., or confront biology and anthropology with the account of man's origin in Genesis ii. While with the writers in the Holy Scriptures it will affirm the truth that God is Creator, as regards the process of the Creation of both the world and man it will ungrudgingly and even heartily accept the light that science may throw upon the subject. Only when science trespasses beyond its own proper territory, and attempts to answer those ultimate questions which neither its methods nor its results make it competent to deal with, or when theology, ignoring its own limitations, tries to impose answers to questions with which science alone can deal, can there be any conflict between science and theology. Even if it be a counsel of perfection, it would be well if scientists knew enough about theology, and theologians enough about science, not to invade the one the other's province. The

theologian needs to remember always that the Bible was given to make men wise unto salvation and not unto science, and the man of science that there are things in heaven and earth not dreamed of in his philosophy. Theology must challenge any philosophy which, based exclusively on the conclusions of science, ignores the testimony of the moral conscience and the religious consciousness, and most of all the fact of Christ, on the ground that it has not taken due account of all the data for an interpretation of total reality. Theology, on the other hand, cannot ignore either science or philosophy, in so far as any of their conclusions have any bearing on the subject which is its dominant interest. As to the mode of Creation it will gladly go to school with science; as regards the categories of thought which it must employ it will give heed to any scrutiny to which philosophy may have subjected them. It will not meet them 'as enemies in the gate,' but work with them as allies in the one common task of discovering the truth.

(2) In the previous chapter reference has already been made to the divine attributes of infinitude and absoluteness, transcendence and immanence. As transcendent, above and beyond the world, God is infinite and absolute, not without limits or relations, but self-limited and self-related, He has what theologians have called *aseity* and *proseity*: ultimate cause of the world, He is His own cause; final purpose of the world, He is His own purpose. He has sufficiency in Himself, and does not depend on His relation to the world for His reality. He is eternal as not in His own existence subject to time, and He is immense as not subject to space. While the religious consciousness itself may not be aware of these conceptions, they are legitimate speculative deductions from what religion believes God to be. God's eternity and immensity are thoughts familiar to all profound religious experience. God must be so conceived when we make explicit all that is implicit in man's sense of God's sufficiency and his own dependence. As immanent, God is in the world, and one of the most crucial

problems of theology is the relation between this immanence and this transcendence. This transcendence in the immanence is expressed in the three terms familiar to religious thought generally—omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence; the first part of each of these words indicates the transcendence and the second the immanence. God is not present, diffused throughout space, as is the hypothetical ether; He is wholly present in every point of space and moment of time. He knows all that is as it is. (This does not necessarily involve foreknowledge of free acts, as has been shown in the previous chapter.) He can do all that can be done. (This does not, however, mean that He does all that is done; man's free acts are excepted, and, if even in living organisms there is any spontaneity, the process of life is not directly and exclusively God's activity.) There is a universal activity of God in the Universe sustaining in existence what God has created; and this activity is conditioned by the nature of the reality God has brought into being. Each event is not separately, independently willed by God, but there is an order of nature in which is the immediate cause of this effect, although it is God's activity which is the ultimate cause of this system. To these three terms we should, in accord with the revelation in Christ, add a fourth, *omnipatience*. God feels with and in all His sentient creatures. It is thus the whole of God as personal which is wholly present in the Universe.

(3) These terms state the problem, and do not solve it. How can we get from the One to the many, from the Infinite to the finite, from the Absolute to the dependent, from the Eternal to the temporal? The Incarnation is the clue to Creation and Conservation. Paul in giving the Lord Jesus Christ as an example of humility and consideration (Phil. ii. 5-8) has stated a cosmic principle. It is by *kenosis*, self-emptying, that God reaches self-fulfilment, *plerosis*, in His universe. This is not intended to be understood in the Hegelian sense that God Himself as God evolves with the Universe, and reaches full self-consciousness

in the Hegelian philosophy: it does not mean even that God realises Himself as God in the Christian revelation and redemption. To the transcendence of God we must hold fast as an anchor of our thought without which we should drift into all kinds of speculations perilous to morality and religion. It is God as immanent in the Universe in whom we may recognise self-limitation for self-expression and self-communication. It is love which can so find itself in losing itself. From the Christian standpoint we may boldly affirm that it was love which was the motive of Creation. God is not such uncontrolled fullness of reality that it must overflow into the Universe, God is not such unsatisfied desire that He needs to make a world to meet His needs. We may not ascribe to God any need except love's need of loving and of freely giving of its fullness. If it be objected that such a view makes God dependent on the Universe, and that before the world was there must have been an incompleteness in God, we may give a twofold answer. According to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the exposition of which must, however, be reserved to the very end of this volume, God is in Himself both subject and object of love: the love of the Father and of the Son is perfected in the unity of the Spirit. And further, although the world as we know it gives indications of a commencement and also of a consummation of its evolution, the creative, preservative, and perfective process in space and time, we must not affirm that God's love was not active in worlds other than this. We must not with Greek dualism affirm an eternal matter, which the divine mind brings from potentiality to actuality; but Christian faith does not demand any denial of the possibility of other worlds dependent for existence on God.

(4) As love is that in which man is most akin to God, we may use the analogy of human love in trying to conceive the divine kenosis. Human love, especially of the mother for the child, needs and shows self-limitation for self-expression and self-communication. The mother must become a child to teach and

train her child. She must limit herself to the capacity of the child to respond and to receive. We cannot imagine the process of Creation, but we can conceive its principle. Physical forces are God's infinite power in finite exercise; natural laws are God's infinite wisdom in finite expression. Whatever God thus brings into existence has reality for God, and the further process of Creation is conditioned by that reality. Evolution as the mode of this process is much more intelligible and credible than successive acts of creation not continuous with one another. Evolution means continuity with change. The succession is not mere succession, but progress. Theistic thought should not insist on breaks or pauses in the divine activity. It recognises stages, in each of which something new comes into existence, not unrelated to but dependent on what already is. We need not for our purpose concern ourselves with the physicist's speculations about the ultimate nature of matter, atoms or electrons, except to point out that the matter of the old materialism is fast dissolving into something which presents a less absolute contrast to mind. Nevertheless, matter, however we may conceive it, is that which is furthest removed from the conception of God; may we express it thus: it is the furthest limit of God's self-emptying? Life more fully expresses what God is than does matter. While physical conditions and chemical processes are involved in the continuance of life, yet life is not explicable in terms of matter and force only. Physics and chemistry do not solve the problems of biology; this we may emphasise without committing ourselves to any theory of vitalism. Whether we can distinguish life and mind is very doubtful; there seems to be a mental factor in all organic development:[1] but we need not commit ourselves to panpsychism. Certain it is that the physiology of the brain and nervous system does not remove the need of the psychology of the mind.[2] When mind becomes con-

[1] See Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii., Lecture X.
[2] See Tansley's *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life.*

scious, and still more when consciousness becomes self-consciousness, fresh stages of evolution are reached. If the whole process be divine activity, at these marked stages in the process, we may venture to speak of a divine initiative. The self-expression becomes clearer, and the self-communication fuller. As far as our knowledge can carry us, this evolution has its consummation in man. What must be said about man's place in Creation must be reserved for another section; but here it will suffice to state that in man's development rationally, aesthetically, morally, socially, religiously, the creative process is continued, although its content is now changed; it is not from matter through life to mind: it is within mind. Christ as the firstborn of many brethren marks a new stage in that creative process, the stage which will be consummated in the redeemed family of God in perfection, glory, blessedness, the plerosis of God accomplished by His kenosis. So may we conceive Creation from the Christian standpoint in accord with the conclusions of science.[1]

(5) There are other conceptions of God's relation to the world which need explication in the same way. The creative process is continuous; but what has been created remains real for God, and conditions that process. Thus life is dependent on physical conditions and chemical processes, and mind as we now know it in man is conditioned by the living organism. The continuance of what is as the condition of what is coming to be is usually described as *conservation*. Paul expresses this truth in relation to man in the words, 'In Him we live, and move, and have our being' (Acts xvii. 28). To the creature God gives a permanent reality not independent of His activity, and yet preserved in its distinctive nature. When we come to man, that conservation allows a relative independence; so that while God is sustaining the existence of the human personality, there is an activity which is not directly God's, but

[1] A very full discussion of this subject will be found in *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, by J. Y. Simpson.

has its source in the personality God has created as free will. That freedom is within the limits set to the capacity of human personality, and the control which man can exercise over nature. The consequences of man's activity in his own character, and circumstances, further circumscribe that activity. He who sows to the flesh cannot from the flesh reap anything else than corruption, as he that soweth to the Spirit will from the Spirit reap life everlasting (Gal. vi. 8). There is a physical order and a moral order which man can discover by his reason and conscience, which sets the bounds to his activity. It is thus that God *conserves* man; and as this conservation is not apart from but through man, it may be called *government*. As God has a personal relation to each man, a purpose for mankind which He is fulfilling in and by each man, there is an activity of God, both through the system of nature and the course of history, which is named His *Providence*.

(6) There are few subjects on which there is so much crudity of thought among Christian people as on the subject of providence. The Hebrew prophets interpreted the history of their nation as divine providence. God used the great empires, into contact with which His people came, as the instruments of His purposes of judgment or mercy. Jesus taught very clearly God's constant activity in caring for His children. There is a universal impartial beneficence in sunshine and shower (Matt. v. 45); and there is an individual guidance and guardianship (x. 29-31). God provides for all and for each. As the Hebrew prophets recognised a divine purpose, so did Jesus; God controls nature and directs history for that purpose.

(i) It is as men relate themselves to that purpose that the divine providence (Luke xii. 32) becomes more manifest in their lives. If their interests and pursuits are remote from that purpose, they cannot have the same assurance of God's keeping and leading. The man who follows his own wishes and sets aside God's claim has no right to expect God to shield him from the consequences of his own acts, or assure him

of the satisfaction of his own desires. To claim that every occurrence is of God's appointment is to make God responsible for man's sin and its consequences. God's providence does not mean that every man will get what he wants; even the saint may suffer, but get gain by the way he endures it, while for the wicked the same suffering may result in hardening of heart (Rom. ix. 18). God is not a means to man's ends, and only as a man makes God's ends his own in love for God can he be sure that all things will work together for good (Rom. viii. 28).

(ii) It is through nature and history that God's providence is realised; and it is an error that only in occurrences which are strange and seemingly inexplicable is God's providence recognised. This is not Christian theism, but a survival of the deism of the eighteenth century. God is for the most part regarded as absent or inactive in the world, with only occasional incursions into a world that otherwise goes on without Him. To believe in God aright is to believe that He is always and everywhere present and active in nature and history. It is from the standpoint of belief in the constant and efficient immanence of God that we must regard the problem of miracles. It is not strength but weakness of faith to look for God's care and bounty, guidance and guardianship, only in events which can be regarded as miracles, and to overlook His goodness in the order of nature or the course of history. So common, however, is this attitude, that the subject of miracles demands a close scrutiny.

(7) We may at once set aside the older definitions of miracles as interferences with or suspensions of the order of nature, for there is no order of nature apart from God's conserving activity. God does not contradict or oppose Himself. The regularity of the order of nature is the constancy of God. As that order shows His wisdom and goodness as well as His power, to assume that He sets it aside to bring about His ends is to charge Him with fickleness. What mental confusion and physical disaster would result if men could not rely on the regularity of that order!

Men can control physical forces as they understand and conform to natural laws; and man's culture and civilisation would fall in ruins were God not constant in His activity in nature. But consistently with that order we may conceive an activity of God which is not explicable by that order as our science has got to know it. For the ends of the revelation of God or the redemption of man such activity may be necessary, as the natural order, adequate as it is for most of God's dealings with man, may be insufficient for the more intimate relation of God to man in revelation and redemption. If a human analogy may with due reserve be used in illustration, we may describe the laws of nature as showing God's *habits*, and miracles as *original acts*, not inconsistent with but not conforming to those habits, to meet an emergency. No man is so much a slave of habit that he cannot in a crisis do what may be a surprise to himself as well as to others. The relation of God to the world is so immediate and so constant, on the view here held, that a miracle must be regarded only as a variation in the mode of God's activity, and not as an increase in the amount of that activity. God is not more active in a miracle than in the order of nature, although man's attention to that activity may be more quickly arrested by the miracle. That may be one of the functions of miracle in the economy of revelation and redemption, and its beneficent character may impress as no ordinary occurrence could what is the character of God so revealing Himself and redeeming man. Such a view does not justify the expectation of frequent miracles, or excuse any neglect to scrutinise with all possible candour the evidence which is offered for any miracle, and to demand that each miracle shall authenticate itself by its relation to the purpose of God. Unless the Christian sources are to be regarded as unhistorical, Christian faith cannot abandon the belief in miracle, or Christian theology the effort to offer an intelligible theory.

(8) There are two questions raised by what has been stated regarding the relation of God to the world.

The first is this: Why has the mode of the divine activity been evolution? and the second: Has this time-process reality for God Himself?

(i) To our limited intelligence it may sometimes seem strange that God did not at once make the world perfect, conforming entirely from the beginning to the divine intention as disclosed at the end. Why should matter precede life by so many aeons? Why should life evolve from *protista* along the line of the *protophyta* to the oak, and the line of the *protozoa* to the man? Why should mind, as it were, slumber in the plant, be half awake in the instinct of the animal, and only be fully aroused in the conscience and the reason of man? Why should human development in knowledge, art, morals, society, religion have been so gradual, even if we assume that primitive man was less degraded than the savage is? (This instance must be mentioned to complete the series, although the full discussion belongs to the next section.) The only answer that can be suggested is, that whether the necessity for such a mode of creation lies in the very nature of finite reality or not, it may be that God Himself finds fuller satisfaction in such a method than in any other we could imagine. A product of our human activity has more worth and meaning for us, if it has cost us toil and time. There may be a joy for the Creator in the increasing variety of His creation. It may be, too, that in His condescension He thus obtains the co-operation of His creations in the creative process itself, the lower stage of the evolution being the condition of the higher stage, until in man that co-operation becomes fully conscious and freely exercised, and thus discloses the secret of the whole process.

(ii) We are thus led to the answer to our second question. In the discussion of God's attributes as eternal and immense, it is affirmed, and rightly, that God in His own reality is not subject to the limitations of time and space. This does not, however, justify the rash inference that for God there is no reality, relative though it be, in the here and there, the then and the now. If the Christian doctrine of the

Incarnation be true, if there be a real participation of God in human history, then the time-process at least has reality for God. The past of history is in some sense past for God, and the future future; all is not an indistinguished present. Although in His character God may be without variation or shadow that is cast by turning (James i. 17), yet in the fulfilment of His purpose the defeat or the triumph is real enough for Him to bring Him sorrow or joy. The time-process is invested with greater worth for man if it is not without meaning even for God. Would God be for our thought in every deed a living, working, suffering, and loving God did He in eternal reality abide above and beyond the time-process? Because ancient thought regarded God as so transcendent that He could be described only by negations, it sought and found a connection between Him and the world in the mediating agency of the Logos. That conception is, however, capable of being regarded in two ways. If it is used to emphasise the separation of God from the world, then it becomes a hindrance and not a help to Christian thought. Only when understood as bringing God into immediate contact with and immanent activity in the world does it make the conception of the Incarnation intelligible and credible. The use of the term Word in the Fourth Gospel prepares us for the representation of the immanence of the Father in the Son, and of the Son in those to whom He gives the right to become children of God. The use of the term Logos in the subsequent developments of Christology tended to assert such a separation of God and man as made the doctrine of the Incarnation a mystery. If the earthly life of Jesus had such reality for God that we may regard God as in Him sharing the life of man, then the time-process must have reality for God Himself. An analogy may help to suggest the relation between time and eternity in the divine mind. A biography, a drama, a poem, a symphony may be held in the human mind both in the variety of its details and the unity of its distinctive character.

(iii) Recognising fully that we must not unduly press the analogy between divine and human fatherhood so as to ignore the difference between Creator and creature, we are justified in urging that the conception of fatherhood enables us to understand why evolution was the divine method of creation, and why the time-process has reality for God. Would any human father who has accepted the responsibility and used the opportunity of fatherhood in the development of his child desire that child to be given to him full grown? How great a good is there in the guiding of that development, and the watching of it from stage to stage! How much more is the grown-up son to the father because he has thus shared his child's growth from infancy to maturity! If God made man in His likeness, and human fatherhood is a reproduction of the divine, then we may recognise the significance for God Himself of the time-process, and the value for Him of the evolution of the universe as the mode of creation.

II

It has been impossible in discussing the relation of God to the world to leave man out of account altogether; but we must now concentrate all our attention on the relation of God to man, and in this connection offer a fuller reply to the objection made to the belief in God's fatherhood on the ground of the insignificance of man in the world.[1] (1) In the dogmatics of former times there was included an anthropology, or doctrine of man, which on the authority of Scripture included a great deal which does not properly belong to theology at all. We do not now, and we cannot from the standpoint of modern knowledge, accept as literal history the record of the creation of man in Genesis i. or ii., whatever religious significance and moral value we may discover in it. That at the end of the creative process man was made by God, that he has a likeness to God and can hold a

[1] The subject is discussed in its manifold bearings in J. Arthur Thomson's *What is Man?*

fellowship with God such as no other creature can, that he has, therefore, a position of sovereignty among other creatures, that he has personal liberty and responsibility—these are truths suggested by these narratives, which we must include in our doctrine of man. Neither need we accept what has been called *biblical psychology*[1] as a scientific account or philosophical interpretation of human personality; the old controversy as to whether that psychology is *tripartite*—body, soul, and spirit—or *bipartite*—body and soul or spirit—has now only a historical interest. The truth this psychology conserves is that man, possessing his own individuality (soul) is related on the one hand to the lower creation, sharing their creaturely weakness (flesh), and on the other to God, dependent on Him (spirit). God breathed into the dust (flesh) His Spirit, and man became a living soul (Gen. ii. 7). This statement of the making of man enshrines the truth that in man creature and Creator meet, that man, linked on the one hand to all living creatures, is on the other hand joined to God by affinity of nature and community of interest and purpose. The Hebrew conception that it is body and spirit which constitute the man, neither without the other, comes nearer the reality than the Greek conception of man as soul buried or imprisoned in body and escaping therefrom at death. The Hebrew conception of resurrection is also, as will afterwards be shown, relatively truer than the Greek idea of immortality.

(2) While this is all that we need now to consider in regard to biblical anthropology and psychology, it is the biblical estimate of man which we must seek to justify in the terms of our modern knowledge.

(i) As far as we can read the records of the universe, man is the consummation of the process of evolution. There are animals which are bigger and stronger than he; instinct in animals is capable of achievement which may fill us with wonder; some means of communication with one another gregarious animals have; what look to our observation very like processes of

[1] See *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, by H. Wheeler Robinson, M.A.

reasoning there are; but animals do not seem to go beyond *perceptual inference*, the association of impressions of sense, to *conceptual inference*, reasoning with ideas; some moral qualities, too, can be discerned, as in parental care, and the affection of domestic animals for those with whom they often come into contact. There are anticipations in the lower animals of powers and qualities which appear in man. Man himself shows traces of an animal ancestry; and his inheritance includes animal necessities, appetites, and instincts; and to these the 'new' psychology is very persistent in calling our attention. While Darwin held that the descent of man from the lower animals could be traced, Wallace, who had discovered the principle of natural selection independently, before Darwin gave his discovery to the world, held that the distinctively human qualities could not be so derived, but demanded a special 'spiritual influx.' Whether we should speak of a *special creation* of man or not is a question the answer to which depends on the conception we form of the relation of God to the world in the creative process. If the divine activity be continuous, as we should probably have to regard it, then we must not think of, as it were, a fresh start, or a break with what went before; and yet we may think of a divine initiative, a fuller communication of the mental, moral, and spiritual resources of God in and to man in the creative process than had gone before. That man's brain weighs far more than twice that of any animal and continues growing very much longer than that of the apes is a subordinate consideration in the proof of man's difference from all his fellow-creatures; it is what man has become in his historical development, which is the proof that at his creation he had a promise and a potency such as no other animal possessed. Man may within limits train the lower animals to do what of themselves they would never have done, so that some capacity for improvement does exist; but progress is not found among even the highest species of animals, and it is characteristic of man.

(ii) Those who would minimise the difference between man and the lower animals assume that the savage of to-day represents what primitive man was. That assumption of much of the current anthropology must be challenged. Granted even that the savage is as bestial as he is sometimes represented as being by the superficial observer, although a closer scrutiny contradicts that hasty conclusion, there is no evidence that the savage at his worst is what primitive man was at his beginning. That primitive traits may be more easily discovered in the savage than in the civilised man, that relatively there has been less change in the savage than in the civilised man, may be admitted. But evolution may mean deterioration as well as improvement; and accordingly the unfavourable conditions of life may have made the savage worse, as the more favourable conditions may have made the civilised man better, than was the primitive man. That man at the beginning had that perfection which Christian theology has assigned to him, or as Milton describes Adam as having, we cannot maintain. What can be insisted on is this: that as primitive man is the common ancestor of savage and civilised man alike, he was so endowed that the subsequent progress was possible.

(iii) The argument has been summarised as follows by Dr. Fairbairn:[1] 'In the face, then, of their contrasted histories, let us now put man and the man-like ape together and ask, What is the problem they offer to science? Do the eloquently minimised differences which we find in the structure of the man as distinguished from the man-like ape explain the differences in their histories? If they do, then we ought to be told how such small differences in structure have become causes of effects so wondrously and vastly opposite. If they do not, then why speak as if man and the man-like ape stood in the same system, and were in any tolerable sense related as ancestor and progeny? When their respective histories are viewed together and honestly compared, is it true that man

[1] *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 45.

is in faculty as in structure one with the brutes? Must it not rather be affirmed that man starts with some endowment which the brute has not? If Darwin needed his first form before he could trace the genesis of species, so not less is it true that we must have mind before the history of man becomes possible or capable of intellectual realisation. But if it be mind that constitutes the differentiation of man from brute, then to imagine that the distance between them is reduced by the discovery of similarities in their organic structure is a mere irrelevance of thought.' Mind is evidently used in this statement in the restricted sense of mind as it is in man, and what it has achieved in human history. We do not deny, as has already been shown, that wherever there is life there seems to be mind, that in the lower animals a rudimentary intelligence is to be found, and that not in the form of instinct alone; but it is developed mind as self-consciousness, reason and conscience, science, art, literature, civilisation, morals and religion which so distinguishes man from all other living creatures that his advent marks a fresh stage in the evolution of the world. That the living organism, which is the organ of the mind, has been gradually developed out of lower forms need not be denied, indeed cannot, as the human embryo recapitulates the organic development. But a problem does remain. The mind and its organ are so closely related, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how, apart from the gradual impartation of the higher endowment which belongs to man, an organism could be gradually developed capable of receiving that higher endowment. The conviction that man is so immeasurably different from the lower animals has a solid basis, and does not rest on this or that solution of any biological problem.[1]

(3) It has been assumed in the previous discussion

[1] Thomson, who maintains the continuity of the process of creation, states the difference between man and animal as follows: 'The big differences seem to us to be man's capacity for looking at himself objectively, for framing and experimenting with general ideas and controlling conduct in relation to them, and for expressing judgment in language' (*op. cit.* p. 76).

that mankind is one, and that we can assume a common ancestry for all mankind, irrespective of colour, etc. It is true that one French school of anthropology, that of Lévy Brühl, tries to prove that the savage has another mentality from the civilised man; but when we examine the processes of thought of other races, black, brown, or yellow, unlike as their results may be to our own thoughts, we can make intelligible to ourselves from what data of experiences, and by what association of ideas, these conclusions have been reached. With a fair measure of success we can school ourselves to 'think black' as well as 'white.' Again, among the peasantry of the more backward European nations we can find similar ways of thinking. And in the civilised religions there are survivals of kindred modes of belief.[1] It was assumed that the aborigines of Australia were savages so degraded that they had no religion, but closer inquiry has revealed a most complex system of religious belief and culture. The story is well known of how Darwin was convinced that the Patagonians could be raised out of their low condition to Christian belief and life. When we consider the marvellous monuments which the buried civilisations and cultures of the past, Egyptian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian, have left behind, we dare not claim that the European peoples have some inborn superiority to other races. The ancient civilisations of India, China, and Japan also survive to rebuke any such conceit. There are some races, it is true, such as the Red Indians, who seem to be unable to survive the contact with the white race; but it is a serious

[1] At the first Universal Races Congress, held in London, July 26-29, 1911, Dr. Charles S. Myers of Cambridge submitted and proved the four following propositions:—

'I. That the mental characters of the majority of the peasant class throughout Europe are essentially the same as those of primitive communities.

'II. That such differences between them as exist are the result of differences in environment and in individual variability.

'III. That the relation between the organism and its environment (considered in its broadest sense) is the ultimate cause of variation, bodily and mental.

'IV. That this being admitted, the possibility of the development of all primitive peoples must be conceded, if only the environment can be appropriately changed.' (*Inter-Racial Problems*, p. 73.)

consideration whether that is due to any native inferiority on their part, or to the unwisdom and even unrighteousness of their treatment by white peoples. Probably it is as regards the negro race that inferiority by nature is most confidently asserted. But if we give due weight to the influence of environment we shall hesitate about accepting such a conclusion. Climatic conditions in Africa itself go far to explain the stagnation or even retrogression of the black peoples. The negro in America, who is descended from a slave ancestry, has not yet had his full opportunity for a long enough time to show what his race is capable of, although there are outstanding individuals who rebuke such race prejudice. It must be admitted that in America as in Africa the black people, even when converted to Christianity, still need the tutelage of white men, and often show an emotional excitability and moral instability which necessitates such guardianship. It is not at all necessary to deny that there are psychical as well as physical differences of the races which may offer some ground for the objection to 'mixed marriages' apart from colour prejudice altogether, or to desire that these differences did not exist, in order to affirm the ultimate unity of the human race, the capacity of all men to respond in sonship to the universal fatherhood of God.

(4) This discussion has already involved the use of three terms which need to be more fully explored—heredity, environment, and individuality. These are the factors which go to the making of human personality.

(i) It is commonly assumed that children will resemble their parents in physical features, mental capacity, and even moral character. The popular phrase, 'a chip of the old block,' expresses this common assumption. But in accounting for the facts which justify this assumption we must carefully distinguish *physical heredity* and *social inheritance*. By physical heredity we mean the transmission from parents to children by the vital organism, including such mental

modifications as are dependent on that organism. Tastes, habits, vices or virtues it is certain are not transmitted in this way. The Darwinian theory assumes that 'acquired characters' are transmitted from parents to offspring. This is denied by the school of Weismann; and 'it is in this direction that the bulk of the scientific evidence points.'[1] However it may be accounted for, there are good stocks and bad stocks, in which excellences or defects are dominant. While the embryo in the womb is protected from most infections, there are racial poisons, due to alcoholism and venereal disease, which do injure the unborn babe. Within narrower limits than theology has often taken for granted, science does confirm the statement that God in the natural order even does visit 'the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate' Him, and does show 'mercy unto thousands of them that love' Him 'and keep' His 'commandments' (Exod. xx. 5, 6). But that Adam's sin should have involved all mankind in total depravity, the modern scientific view of heredity does not allow us to affirm. (To this subject we must return in the next chapter.) The two objections to this doctrine the writer has stated elsewhere.[2] 'Two considerations may make us pause before we ascribe moral resemblances to physical heredity. *Firstly*, unless organism determines personality to a greater extent than appears probable, we cannot even conceive the vital mechanism by which moral character could be transmitted from parent to offspring. The Mendelian theory is based on physical characteristics, such as size, colour, etc., and it is a rash and bold assumption that vices and virtues can be accounted for similarly. *Secondly*, the environment affects the development of the child most potently in the earliest years, and the moral resemblances may be due to parental influence after birth, rather than to heredity before. It has been proved again and

[1] Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[2] *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, pp. 169-70. The second consideration above holds if the stock itself is not bad.

again that if the child of evil parents be removed in infancy or early childhood to a good moral environment, there is no moral resemblance to them. Heredity cannot be proved an inescapable moral fate. Just as the great majority of children are born physically healthy, and infantile mortality is due to evil conditions, so we may maintain that as regards moral heredity children are born without any moral determination for good or evil.' Heredity is seen more in the primary instincts than in the individual characteristics.

(ii) The environment, especially in the earliest years, is a potent factor. The disposition, temper, character, and conduct of the parents are moulding the personality of the child from the very beginning ; the mother is the child's earliest and in many ways most influential environment, as she influences even the unborn babe. A mother may be punishing her own bad temper as reproduced in her babe. It is through the environment that the social inheritance comes to the child, the opinions and beliefs, the moral habits and standards, the religious disposition and aspiration of a society, the product of the development of past generations. By these the child is moulded for good or evil, weal or woe. It is not at all probable that human nature as such has been to any great extent modified in the course of human development ; the civilised man, when the restraints of a civilised society are removed, if he be not constrained by the moral principles and the religious convictions which have come to him in his social inheritance, but which he has made his own, will very readily relapse to the savage. War lets loose the wild beast in many a man. As has just been indicated, the social inheritance may affect the personality in two ways, either as only an outward restraint, or as also an inward constraint. The aim of education should be to transform the one into the other. Only when a man has assimilated that social inheritance, made it his very own, inseparable from himself, has it had its full influence upon him. Nurture is of great importance in the

making of personality, environment counts as well as heredity; this is a hopeful view, as nurture is more flexible than nature, and we can control environment to a greater extent than we can heredity. But even environment is not finally decisive of character. Potent moral influences on personality can secure a triumph over an adverse heredity or environment. As it would be a dangerous cruelty to make the moral struggle for any man more severe than in any case it must be, the recognition of this fact should not make us indifferent to any efforts to modify the heredity, so far as that may be possible, or to improve the environment, which is in so many ways practicable.

(iii) No human being is merely the product of heredity and environment; even if with the biologist we could sum up all that belongs to his heredity, or with the sociologist all that has affected his environment, we should not have fully explained the man. There may be striking physical resemblances, on which literary genius may base a *Comedy of Errors*; we may describe the children of the same parents as being 'like two peas in a pod,' even although the two peas in a pod are not exactly alike; nevertheless, no two persons are complete copies of one another. We must recognise as a third factor in the development of personality *individuality*. Each man is not a product only, he is a producer. He makes himself what he is, and in his own way. Heredity and environment may provide much of the raw material, it is individuality which determines the pattern of the fabric of life. And in this individuality we may distinguish two elements, one constant and one variable. (*a*) Each man has his own capacities and characteristics, peculiar to himself and constant, although he must develop, and in that development may modify them. The common saying, 'You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear,' indicates that individuality, even as heredity and environment, is a limitation on human development. A stupid man cannot be made, or make himself, into a genius; it is doubtful whether a melancholy temperament can be changed into a

sanguine; the tendency to quick temper may be controlled, but probably cannot be suppressed altogether.

(*b*) But what also belongs to individuality is liberty within the limits which have already been indicated. It is not needful for the present purpose to go over the old battle between determinism and indeterminism. The determinist assumption that it is the strongest motive which determines the choice can on a careful psychological analysis of the relation between desire and volition be shown to be false.[1] It is because the self identifies itself and seeks its satisfaction in the fulfilment of one of the conflicting desires that that desire becomes the motive of the action. It is the exclusive concentration of the attention on the object desired that results in the action necessary for its attainment, and this attention is directed by the *selective interest* of the person making the choice; he is attracted to and fixes his attention on what he thinks will satisfy him. The indeterminist is no less in error in his analysis, when he assumes motiveless volition, or when he treats the will as a separate entity, and talks about the will choosing. It is the self that chooses, and its choice is its willing. The self chooses what at the time it regards as its good—this is what we mean by the freedom of the will. We may carry our analysis a little further. There is the good chosen, and there is the self choosing. Now, the self may be mistaken as to its good; it may choose what it regards as its good but what is only a partial or momentary good, not the complete, permanent satisfaction of the whole enduring personality. It may thus bring itself into subjection to appetites and passions which limit its freedom, in hindering it from becoming really the self it was meant to be. By such mistaken choice man may freely will his own bondage, from which, however, he cannot so freely will his own deliverance, as in so doing he has lessened his freedom. If the self were the product only of heredity and environment, and the constant individuality, then

[1] See *The Elements of Ethics*, by Muirhead, pp. 43-61.

self-determination would still be a negation of freedom. We must then conclude that the self is not merely a measurable actuality, but an incalculable possibility. We get beyond the region of quantitative relations of cause and effect. In the exercise of its freedom the self is above and beyond the phenomenal, and has risen into the noumenal order, as Kant affirmed.[1] The categories of the understanding which we may apply to the data of our experience do not apply to the subject of this experience. Psychology may trace a continuity of desire, motive, volition as the successive contents of our consciousness; but it cannot apply the category of causality to that free act of the self by which the desire becomes the motive of the volition. The character which has already been formed as the result of previous conduct does not exhaust the self, and so from a man's character we cannot infallibly predict what his conduct in any situation will be. There are reserves of personality which appear in conversion, for instance. The only way in which we can conceive this freedom is as the delegated creative power of God in man. Man is always making himself, and is always more than he has already made himself. Just as the physical conditions and the chemical processes in the organism do not explain life, but life transcends while using them, just as the nervous system and the brain do not explain mind, but mind transcends while using them, so heredity, environment, individuality as constant, and even character as formed, do not explain the free act, but the free self is master of them all. We are thus led out of the region of physiology and even psychology into the realm of metaphysics, the nature of ultimate, essential reality, even to theology, the relation of God Himself to each self which in its freedom is exercising, even if within limits, creative power.

(5) We are thus confronted with the question of the *origin of the soul.* On this matter there were in the

[1] *The Critique of the Practical Reason,* Book II. chap. ii. See *The Critical Philosophy of Kant,* by Caird, II. chap. iii.

patristic period three theories held, which Harnack has briefly summarised.[1] 'The different psychological views of the Fathers are reflected in the various theories as to the origin of individual souls. The oldest of these was the *traducian* theory of Tertullian, which was also represented by a few Greeks—Gregory of Nyssa, Anastasius Sinaita. According to it the soul was begotten along with the body. Its extreme opposite was Origen's idea of *pre-existence*, which had still many adherents in the fourth century, but fell more and more into discredit, until, finally, it was expressly condemned at the Synod of Constantinople, A.D. 553. According to this doctrine, all souls were created at once by God along with the upper world, and fell successively into the lower world and into their bodies. The middle view—an expedient of perplexity—was *the creatian*, which gradually gained ground all through the fourth century, and can be characterised as the most widespread, at least in the West, from the beginning of the fifth. It taught that God was ever creating souls and planting them in the embryos. The East contented itself with disowning Origen's theory. Augustine, the greatest theologian of the West, was unable to come to any fixed views regarding the origin of the soul.' If we are to reach any intelligible conception we must abandon the old category of substance, and accept the new category of subject as regards the soul. Or, to use another contrast, our view must be *dynamic* and *not static*: we must think of the soul, not as a fixed thing but as a progressive activity. Much would be gained if everywhere in the New Testament where *psyche* is used, the term were rendered *life*, and not soul. We can think of a continuity of life from sensibility to self-consciousness, and we must not think of soul in the embryo as self-consciousness.

(i) The facts of heredity would give support to *traducianism*, although much modified from Tertullian's statement. What is transmitted from parents to offspring is not inorganic matter, but organic life

[1] *History of Dogma*, Eng. trans., iii. pp. 259-60.

itself; and as the development of life can be understood only as directed by mind, not matter and life only but mind also seems to be transmitted in however rudimentary a form as subconscious. Mental as well as physical characteristics are inherited. That does not mean that the soul of the older metaphysics, the indivisible unity, is transmitted, for the question would then arise, does the father or the mother transmit the soul, or does each contribute a part? To ask such a question is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory of a soul being begotten as well as a body.

(ii) While the theory of Origen regarding the pre-existence of the soul as spirit, and its lapse and entrance into the body, is a speculative conjecture, a mythological fancy one might almost call it, and the reproduction of it in modified form by Julius Müller[1] adds nothing to commend it, yet the idea of pre-existence is not to be so easily dismissed. (*a*) If the soul continues after death, did it commence at birth, or conception? We may approach the subject first of all from the standpoint of physical science. 'There are grades of incarnation,' says Lodge;[2] 'the most thorough kind is that illustrated by our bodies: in them we are incarnate, but probably not even in that case is the incarnation complete. It is quite credible that our whole and entire personality is never terrestrially manifest.' If this be so, need we assume that the soul begins to be when it becomes incarnate, or ceases when that incarnation, partial as that may be, is ended at death? Again, from the standpoint of philosophy or psychology, the relation of the brain to thought is not *productive*, but *permissive* or *transmissive*, according to William James.[3] The body is the organ of the mind for its self-expression, as the instrument is of the musician; but in the one case no more than the other is the agent produced by the organ, or identical with it. A piano does not bring Paderewski into existence, although it may be

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Eng. trans., ii. pp. 357-401.
[2] *Life and Matter*, p. 123.
[3] *Human Immortality*, pp. 32-48.

the best medium of his self-expression. James seems even in his exposition of this relation of mind to brain to commit himself definitely to the idea of pre-existence. 'Just how the process of transmission may be carried on, is indeed unimaginable; but the outer relations, so to speak, of the process encourage our belief. Consciousness in this process does not have to be generated *de novo* in a vast number of places. It exists already behind the scenes, coeval with the world. The transmission theory not only avoids in this way multiplying miracles, but it puts itself in touch with general idealistic philosophy better than the production theory does. It should always be reckoned a good thing when science and philosophy thus meet.' If the soul or life does not end with death, if the incarnation is partial, and there may be a reserve of personality for progressive manifestation and activity through the body, need it be affirmed that the soul begins at birth or conception?[1]

(*b*) The poets have been attracted by this idea of pre-existence. Wordsworth's ode, 'Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood,' is probably the most familiar expression of that belief:

'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!'

[1] Thomson inclines to the monistic view, but he does not rule out the dualistic on the ground of science. 'It is not difficult to find men of scientific distinction and noble outlook who are convinced dualists, who believe that the psyche is the dominant partner throughout, and a reality that may last after the dissolution of partnership. Similarly it is not difficult to find men of scientific distinction and noble outlook who are convinced monists, who believe that all psychosis has its counterpart in biosis, that increasing complexity of organisation has allowed the emergence of an aspect of reality which in the simple forms of life is seen only, as it were, in sparks, whereas in man it expands into daylight, in some into a more or less perfect day' (*op. cit.*, p. 79). These views are not so antagonistic as to exclude reconciliation. If 'the emergence of an aspect of reality,' the inner life of man, is conditioned by,

This idealisation of childhood goes beyond experience; and memories of a previous state are fancy and not fact. Less definite, but similar, is the thought of Tennyson:

> 'A soul shall draw from out the vast,
> And strike his being into bounds,
>
> And, moved thro' life of lower phase,
> Result in man, be born and think,
> And act and love, a closer link
> Betwixt us and the crowning race.'
> (*In Memoriam*, Epilogue.)

(*c*) Against the theory of a succession of incarnations there may be urged the following considerations. As there is no remembrance of that previous state, no advantage can be gained from such lessons as might have been learned. The realisation of the ideal of personality in truth, beauty, blessedness, holiness, love, loses its absolute value, if it is but one life in a succession of states of existence unrelated for self-consciousness. The development towards personality in this life loses its significance, if it is only a repetition of previous processes, that have left behind no sense of gain or loss which can now be used for encouragement or warning. When to the theory is added the Hindu doctrine of *Karma*, the determination of each life by the resultant of the works of the previous life, the soul is involved in a bondage from which its one desire must be to find relief.[1] Such relief Hinduism offers in the soul's discovery of its identity with Brahma, the sense of individuality being but a delusion; and Buddhism in *Nirvana*, non-existence, or non-conscious existence, or existence with no definite content (whichever be the true interpretation of that term).

(*d*) The rejection of this theory does not, however, exclude the view that the soul may have existed, not, it may be, as individually conscious, but as part of the universal life pre-existent as created by God, a

but not itself the result of 'the increasing complexity of organisation,' Thomson's view can be harmonised with Lodge's and James'. The position which is taken in this volume seems to be quite reconcilable with all the facts which science can produce as the data on which we must base our conclusion.

[1] See *Redemption, Hindu and Christian*, by Cave.

reserve from which, the conditions for a fresh person having otherwise been fulfilled, the individual soul may be drawn: or that universal life may even be regarded not as created in the same sense as we may speak of the creation of matter, but as a communication of life under conditions of finitude from the fullness of life in God Himself. This second conception would give more than a moral and religious content to the conception of God's fatherhood and man's sonship. Men may become the sons of God morally and religiously because that relation is already potential in this impartation of the life of God even in what is described as natural life. Such impartation need not be in a single act, but in a continuous process, even as we now conceive the creation of the world as having been. We could then put the full Christian content into Paul's words at Athens, 'in Him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain even of your own poets have said, For we are also His offspring' (Acts xvii. 28). Because the Son was so intimately related to the Father, as none of those who by His grace alone become fully sons is, He alone had the intuition of His pre-existence, the consciousness that His relation to the Father was eternal. When we become fully sons, it may be the certainty of an eternal relation to God will come to us also. To many this may seem only idle speculation, but it does offer a solution of the problem of the human soul consonant with the Christian estimate of the value and sacredness of man.

(iii) The theory of creationism in its crude form can be dismissed, but it does present a truth which must not be ignored. And it is this, that the process of creation is continuous; whether the soul comes from reserves of already created life, or is imparted from the life of God Himself, it is God's activity which brings each new personality into existence, not independently of, but in concurrence with, the continuous evolution of the life already in this world existent. We need not suppose a distinct volition on the part of God at each conception, but such a permanent

relation of this transcendent life and the life already immanent in the world that, given the necessary conditions in the one, the other at once takes place. This saves us from the conclusion, which to many seems incongruous, that even when the conception of the child is the result of illicit intercourse, of sinful passion, God intervenes to create a soul to be attached to the body, the life of which is thus begun. He so limits His own independent volition, that it is by the will of man, from whatever motive, that the initiation of a new personality is begun. With all reverence we may say that while God's creative and conserving activity does not cease, He makes man a partner in His creative purpose, and man may will that another life be begun.

(6) It is desirable that we should distinguish soul in the sense of the promise and potency conceived and born, and personality as the product of the whole development. To recall Lotze's distinction,[1] God alone is perfect personality, man is only personality in the making. What are the characteristics of personality which man in his development should seek and strive to acquire?

(i) Man is *rational* as contrasted with animals. In the new psychology [2] reason is treated as a by-product of human development, and all the stress is laid on the instincts (self, sex, and herd). Thomson objects to this wide use of the term, for what should rather be called appetites or impulses, which man has in common with the lower animals, and maintains that man has very little in his life corresponding to instincts as seen in animals.[3] His definition of instincts is as follows: 'There are inborn or hereditary capacities for doing apparently clever things—they need no learning; they are shared equally by all members of the species, except that there may be differences between the two sexes; they are always related to particular circumstances which are of vital importance,

[1] Lotze's *Mikrokosmus*, Book IX. chap. iv.
[2] See Tansley's *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life*.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

and thus they are apt to be futile if the circumstances are slightly altered. . . . Instinctive behaviour considered physiologically corresponds to a long chain of reflex actions; but there are facts which suggest that in many cases at least, there is dim awareness and a strong background of endeavour—in other words, cognitive and conative factors.' [1] Instinct is not to be regarded as either 'a rudimentary form of intelligence' or due to 'the lapsing of intelligence in regard to a routine often performed.' It is another path of mental development than intelligence. Among animals, however, we may observe intelligent behaviour also. 'It differs from instinctive behaviour in requiring to be learned, in not being as such hereditary, in varying notably among individuals of the same species, and in being plastic.' [2] Animals seem to be able to form associations of impressions, *e.g.* a dog who has been thrashed for stealing a bone associates the pain of the thrashing with the taking of the bone. Man alone has reason. He can form general ideas from his particular perceptions, such as man, etc. He has categories of thought, such as substance, subject, quality, number, cause, and law. He can thus bring an intelligible unity into the manifold of his experience. Because he can reason, his thoughts can pass from one datum of his knowledge to another. Some thinkers have distinguished *reasoning* as the activity of the *understanding* from *reason* in the narrower sense of the word, the capacity for ideas which unify knowledge, and ideals which harmonise life. Kant distinguished the pure or the *mere* reason from the *practical* reason, which we generally speak of as *conscience*. After the data of experience have been connected together in *the intuitions of time and space*, and by *the categories of the understanding*, quantity, quality, relation, etc., knowledge is unified by *the ideas of the reason*, the world as a totality, self as a unity, and God as the possibility of all existence. It is true that he held that these ideas of the reason were only *regulative*, but not *constitutive* of know-

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 61-62. [2] Pp. 63-64.

ledge, namely, that as no datum of experience could be claimed for these ideas, we must not assume any reality corresponding to them. But it is sheer scepticism to assert that what is a necessity for thought is no more than a possibility of existence. Kant's successors, the German idealists, assumed, and truly, that as man thinks, if he thinks as he must think, he does not get further away from but nearer truth. For man as thinking there is an end, a goal, an ideal, *truth*, to reach which he gathers knowledge and exercises judgment. We cannot say that truth is correspondence between our thought and reality, for we know reality only as the content of our consciousness, and so cannot test the correspondence. It is rather the coherence of all the parts of our knowledge in a whole of thought, which makes reality intelligible to us. There can be no doubt that the three ideas of the reason do give such coherence to the world on the one hand and self on the other, and the relation of the one to the other in God as the final unity. Despite this inclination of the new psychology to treat reasoning in man as a comparatively insignificant by-product of the organic process, we are warranted in affirming that man is rational personality capable of realising the ideal of truth, of knowing God, and of understanding the world and self more fully because of that knowledge.

(ii) Between *cognition* and *conation* lies *feeling*, often the result of the first, and the occasion for the second. Man feels pleasure or pain; he hopes for the one, he fears the other; he likes what brings the one, he dislikes what causes the other; he seeks the one, he shuns the other. Into the psychological niceties we need not now enter. We may, however, distinguish three phases of man's feeling: the sensuous, the aesthetic, and the spiritual. The *sensuous* is the satisfaction of man's physical necessities, his animal appetites, his individual desires (as for wealth, fame, power). That need not sink to the sensual, although it fails to be spiritual. To use the distinction Paul makes, it may be *sarkinos*, and not *sarkikos*. Such

satisfaction we may call happiness, and its opposite misery. The *aesthetic* is the satisfaction of man's sense of *beauty*. That is transitional from the sensuous to the spiritual. Colour, shape, sound are its sensuous material; there must be such a unity-in-variety, such a blending into oneness of the manifold for the senses, that there is repose and not disturbance of feeling. There are organic conditions, no doubt, for such aesthetic satisfaction, and these we need not discuss. But this is not all, although probably those who clamour for art for art's sake might claim that it is all. There belongs to beauty also *expressiveness*. An exact imitation of a beautiful object will not satisfy the aesthetic sense, unless through picture or statue or symphony the artist expresses not only what is individual to himself, but what is universally human. Art is the expression through the sensuous of the spiritual, the image which conveys the idea. This does not mean that the expression of commonplace thought, shallow sentiment, is beautiful. But that the beautiful must have meaning to have worth as such. There are realities of the spiritual which the senses cannot express; and here art must become *symbolical*, conveying the reality, the influence of what it cannot express. A symphony may bring the soul into a holy of holies. This sense of beauty is also one of the marks of God the potter on man the clay, which He has made, and not marred, as a vessel of honour. The spiritual satisfaction is in the realisation of the ideals, in the possession of Him who is the reality of all these ideals. This may be called *blessedness* in distinction from the *happiness* that the gratification of lower, even although legitimate, interests brings. This spiritual satisfaction may include the *aesthetic*: there is a beauty of truth, the harmony of all knowledge; there is a beauty of holiness, the harmony of all endeavour; there is a beauty of love, the harmony of personal relations; there is a beauty of God, the harmony of all perfections of truth, holiness, and love. A man lives as made by God, and for likeness to and fellowship with God fully

only as he cherishes beauty and experiences blessedness, whether happiness be his lot or not. Jesus had a sense of the beauty of nature; in His own teaching He was the artist in imagery and words; His life was a masterpiece in the art of living; and blessed was the life that ended on the Cross, for to do the Father's will was His meat and drink.

(iii) Man acts as well as thinks and feels; and although his action is free, it is under law, it is a means to an end. In other words, man is *moral*. We do not only know our own acts as facts; we judge them as to their quality, as right or wrong, as good or bad. The use of these two sets of terms indicates that there are two standards of judgment applied, although it is only by reflection that we are led to recognise their difference. When we call an action right or wrong, our standard is a rule, law, or norm, to which the action conforms, or which it violates, keeps, or breaks. When we call an action good or bad we think of an end, or purpose, the attainment of which it helps or hinders. We usually think of conscience as an inward law or norm, which goes beyond the outward law of human society, and yet only partially and inadequately reproduces the law of God. This, however, is not the highest conception of morality. God has a purpose or end for man, of which morality as conformity to law is an essential part, but not the necessary whole. The human good, which God wills for man, includes truth, happiness, beauty, blessedness, as well as holiness or moral perfection. While we may for one of the higher interests of life endure pain, and even inflict pain, yet we do judge an action wrong as well as bad which needlessly causes pain to ourselves or to others. The conduct of the man who wantonly defaces beauty and exposes ugliness is also wrong and bad. To pursue truth through knowledge is both right and good. Christ has taught us that love is the fulfilling of the law, and love aims at the whole good of self and of others according to the whole will of God for man. Although love is not under law, yet it is not

without law, for if we want an end we must use the means adequate and appropriate. Moral law is the necessary means towards the human good, but it is not a mere means, as the good is a moral good, and includes necessarily moral conduct and character. Just as conscience does not completely and perfectly reproduce the law of God, but is only gradually gaining the full and clear knowledge of that law, the moral perfection God Himself is, and wills for man, so the good for man is only gradually being disclosed in human history ; that process is for the Christian the coming of the Kingdom of God. To this theme we must return in subsequent chapters in which we shall deal with the Christian life and Christian society.

(*b*) Morality presupposes freedom, man can do what he ought to do. That generalisation, however, goes beyond experience. A man's reach does always exceed his grasp. His ideal, if at all worthy, excels his achievement. We must allow time for development. A man is morally blameworthy only for the good he could do, and did not do, not for the whole good which he can conceive, but cannot yet attain. As Kant [1] taught, *freedom* is a postulate of the moral consciousness as the condition of obedience to the categorical imperative of duty. This freedom, however, is always a limited freedom, but also an expanding freedom. By the right or good action a man not only expands his grasp, but he also extends his reach ; the categorical imperative gains a wider and higher content in the measure in which it is obeyed. Will a man's freedom ever fully correspond in its exercise with his duty ? Kant's answer was : not in this life ; and therefore for him immortality was another postulate of the moral consciousness. We must be careful, however, in stating this postulate. To say that man will survive death because he has failed in this life to become what he ought to have become does not sound a convincing argument. What we should state is that the good for man is so great that

[1] *The Critique of the Practical Reason*, Book II. chap. ii. See Abbot's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, pp. 206-30.

this life does not afford either the time or the conditions for its full realisation. So put, it is a valid argument for immortality. Another assumption that has been often made by the moral consciousness also goes beyond experience: it is this, that the good are happy, and the bad miserable, as God in His providence always conforms circumstances to character. This is the conviction expressed in the first Psalm; the problem with which the book of Job wrestles, and for which the prophecy in Isaiah liii. of the Servant of God who saves by His sufferings finds the solution in the sufferings of the righteous. A man may here lose happiness, and find blessedness, nay, for the sake of blessedness he may surrender happiness, and find that 'sweet are the uses of adversity.' Kant, however, tried a solution on lower ground. The moral consciousness, he argues, postulates the existence of God, who, as the Ruler of nature, will, if not in this life, yet in the next, bring about the harmony of circumstance and character. To this solution two objections hold. A man can rise from happiness to blessedness, and thus even now find the problem solved, although he may hope for a still fuller solution, when man attains a life in which sensuous pleasure or pain exists no more. As an argument for the existence of God it is inadequate, and artificial. The whole nature of man bears witness that God is.

(iv) In such an analysis of human personality it is impossible to treat each aspect separately without some reference to or anticipation of another aspect. Thus morality presupposes society. For, although man has a duty to himself to love himself, yet that self is an unreal abstraction apart from other selves, and it is in relation to other selves that morality is for the most part realised. Whatever rudimentary self-feeling consciousness may begin with,[1] the consciousness of the world around and of others comes before self-consciousness, such as a reflective morality which distinguishes duties to self and duties to others involves. Man belongs to the gregarious animals,

[1] See Lotze's *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., pp. 55-8.

and in him survives the herd instinct or impulse. It is tribal custom which is the beginning of morality before the individual conscience has emerged. What is usually done is what ought to be done, and fear of the displeasure or hope for the favour of the other clansmen or the chief is the motive of so doing. The organic basis of human affection is the relation of the sexes, and of parents to children; and this is anticipated among the lower animals.[1] It is not at all probable that human society began with promiscuity, but with monogamy, again also anticipated among some animals.[2] How the family expanded into the tribe, and tribes combined in nations, and nations were subjugated in empires, is an interesting story which cannot here be retold. What must here be asserted is that the making of woman was not an after-thought of God's, as the more primitive story of the Creation in Gen. ii. 18-25 states, but that from the beginning God made man male and female that they might multiply and replenish the earth (Gen. i. 27-28). Man by his very nature is social. The ideal of social relations is love, which is not feeling only, but thought and deed as well; it is, as has already been shown, a judgment of value, a sentiment of interest, a purpose of good. Human persons have worth for one another, suffer or rejoice together, seek the good the one of the other. The individualism which last century invaded morals and religion no less than economics and politics is a misrepresentation of human personality, which is essentially social, and can fully realise itself only in society. The teaching of Jesus (Matt. xvi. 25) that a man finds his life only as he loses it has its confirmation in the latest conclusions of sociological inquiry that there is no real conflict of egoism and altruism, but that individuation and socialisation go *pari passu*, that a man becomes most himself as he lives most fully and freely in and with others.[3]

[1] See *The Ascent of Man*, by Henry Drummond.
[2] *What is Man?* by J. Arthur Thomson, pp. 35-9.
[3] This is admirably worked out in *Community*, by M'Iver.

(v) Human personality is only partially realising its ideals, truth, happiness, beauty, blessedness, holiness, love, now; but as it is progressively realising them, it postulates its own continuance in order to realise them completely. Must this postulate remain without any confirmation? Are there any other arguments for immortality? It has already been shown that intimate as is the relation of body and soul, it is not a productive relation, and life may, and probably does, transcend its material organ. Physical science cannot prove the fact of immortality, but it cannot forbid the hope. While we cannot to-day argue as did the philosophers [1] formerly, for immortality from the nature of the soul as an indivisible entity; yet the development of personality in 'self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control,' in clearer consciousness and fuller command of self, in greater detachment from outward circumstances, and greater concentration on the inner life, at least suggests that there is being created a permanent reality, less and less dependent on the world and the body, and so capable of continuance under different conditions from those of this present incarnation. We may set aside the judicial argument that there must be a future life to readjust the injustices and inequalities of the present, if we take the position that judgment is not a future event, but a present process, that a man already here and now is reaping as he has sown. The holy man is blessed, whether his lot be happy or not, and the wicked is cursed even in his prosperity, for he is losing what alone has an enduring value. With such qualification, the argument is valid, for we may assume that in the next life the whole good of man will be realised with more helps and fewer hindrances than here and now. One of the most persuasive reasons for the hope of immortality is love, its value postulates its duration. That the personal relationship, which has developed through many years of mutual devotion, service, and sacrifice, should be

[1] For instance, Berkeley: *Of the Principles of Human Knowledge*, p. 141; Fraser's *Selections from Berkeley*, pp. 131-2.

severed by death is incredible if this be a universe in which values are conserved. All in the last analysis depends on faith in God. If God is, and is as faith believes and trusts Him to be—Father, then immortality is sure. Even in the Old Testament the hope dawns that God's companions cannot be death's victims, and that hope Jesus confirmed when he said that God is 'the God not of the dead, but of the living' (Mark xii. 27).

(vi) The crown of manhood is religion, for in it man raises himself above and reaches beyond the world and himself to believe and trust in, and to surrender himself to God. Lowly as may have been the beginnings of religion in the human race, it is in its highest form, Christian faith, hope, love, that its true meaning and full worth are to be seen. While it was at one time held that there were savage tribes without religion, it is now generally recognised that religion is universal in mankind, and necessary to manhood.[1] Human personality is completed only in dependence on, and submission to God, and faith as man's receptivity for, and responsiveness to God so unites man to the ultimate source, the essential reality, the final purpose of himself and his world, that only in God can the course of man's aspiration and endeavour reach its goal and reward. While religion does answer the questions of the mind, and meet the longings of the heart, it is mainly concerned with the needs of the life. It is the reply from the heights to the cry from the depths, Who will show us any good? The good has been variously conceived; in the first phase of religion, man seeks earthly goods by the aid of the spirits or gods; at a higher phase he seeks divine support in the struggle for moral goodness: this is taken up and changed from struggle into victory in the highest phase, where man's hunger and thirst for the living God is satisfied by the realised presence and experienced communion of God Himself. Religion casts many roots into the human personality, emotion, imagination, intellect,

[1] *Introduction to the History of Religion*, by F. B. Jevons, p. 7.

desire, aspiration, purpose; its very core, however, is what many would call the *mystical* experience, but as mysticism is an ambiguous term, and connotes many experiences which belong to the byways rather than the highway to God, we had better call it the spiritual experience, the immediate contact and the intimate communion with God, direct dependence on Him, and entire submission to Him, in whom 'we live and move, and have our being.' This relation to God is mutual; God gives Himself to those who, seeking, find Him; nay, rather, their search is in response to His approach and appeal. Religion thus implies revelation: there is real revelation wherever there is sincere religion. But as the revelation with which this volume is concerned is redemptive, conditioned by the fact of sin and pain, the discussion of the subject must be reserved for a later chapter.

(7) We have now gained a vantage ground from which to attack a problem which had to be left partially unsolved in the previous chapter.

(i) Against the Christian belief in God as personal and as Father, it is often argued that man is so insignificant a portion of the Universe, since his home is but a speck, and his history but a span, that to think of God as related to man so intimately is an audacity of thought and an arrogance of feeling. But the same objection would hold against any kind of belief in God, even against any sort of interpretation of the universe which the mind of man can offer, against science and philosophy no less than theology, for the one uses the categories of the human understanding and the other the ideas of the human reason. If man be so insignificant, what presumption to suppose that his science can in any sense reach truth, his philosophy interpret reality! That man knows at all raises him at once above this insignificance. He is not merely one object among many other objects: he is the subject for whom these objects not only exist, but can be made intelligible. In all his science and philosophy he is finding mind in the Universe; he can and must conceive the immeasurable energy as

will, and the marvellous law, order, adaptation as expressing intelligence. It is he who thinks himself insignificant because he has discovered the vastness, the wonder, and the glory of the Universe, and he can compare himself with it. He contemplates two sublimities, the starry heavens above, and the moral law within. If the first makes him feel insignificant, the second discloses his own value.[1] Even physically man is not insignificant, for by discovering the laws he can control the forces of nature. The snow-clad Alps are in view as these words are being written; but not only have men scaled these heights by climbing, they have carried railways almost to their summits. Still less insignificant is man, who can not only make the world intelligible and available for his need, but can cherish ideals of truth, beauty, holiness, love, and amid sorrow and with struggle can realise them increasingly. These things cannot be numbered, measured, weighed, and are incomparable with material reality in time and space. A mother's love or a martyr's sacrifice has value, be the dimensions and the duration of the physical Universe what they may. Man, as far as our knowledge reaches, is the consummation of the cosmic evolution; and his progress continues and completes that process, and gives it a meaning and a worth it would not otherwise have. In man the Universe comes to self-consciousness, and in some measure to self-direction, and in his religion that consciousness reaches, because it is raised to the consciousness of that reality which is in all, and through all, and over all, even God Himself.

(ii) If God's Fatherhood means, as has been already shown, not that man in his pride lifts himself to claim equality with God, but that God in His grace stoops to raise man into fellowship with and likeness to Himself, then that relation, offered in grace and accepted in faith, seems to be the most fitting completion of the Universe. God has been giving Himself as Creator in matter, life, mind, and finding Himself

[1] Cf. Psalms viii. and xix.

in the common life of love as Father with mankind as His family. Within this consummating creative act of God the personality of Jesus Christ is not only supreme, but originative. It is in Him and through Him that this family of God is constituted. The place of man in the universe warrants our thinking of Him in this filial relation to God, and the place of Jesus Christ in human history warrants our accepting His convincing testimony, not in word only, but in life also, as authoritative in regard to all that this relation means. As this chapter has tried to show, neither science nor philosophy contradicts the conception of man, or challenges the estimate of man of the Christian revelation. Whatever other difficulties for our thought the facts of the world and of life offer, we may approach them with the confidence that in Christ's revelation of God and redemption of man we can, if we will, find the solution of problems which apart from Him reason could not so adequately solve. We must now address ourselves to the most serious difficulty for theistic belief or Christian faith: the problem of evil—pain and sin.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

We have already discussed in a previous chapter the opposition which some thinkers have discovered between God's almightiness and God's all-goodness, and tried to show that we are not forced, as has been too rashly concluded, to abandon the one or the other attribute of God. The argument was there left incomplete inasmuch as the problem of evil could not be fully discussed until the relation of God to the world had been dealt with, as it has been in the previous chapter. We must first of all distinguish evil as physical and evil as moral, or as pain and as sin. While they are closely related, they must be dealt with separately, as there is pain in the universe which is not connected with sin. Facts do not allow the solution that physical evil was consequent on, or anticipatory of moral evil; for physical evil existed before man was made, and before sin entered into the world; and the view of foreknowledge and fore-ordination advanced in a previous chapter forbids what theologians formerly assumed, that God, knowing that man would sin, so created the Universe that the appropriate punishment for sin, as soon as it emerged, was provided. Jesus has once for all forbidden the assumption of an exclusive and inevitable connection of physical and moral evil (Luke xiii. 4-5, John ix. 2, 3). As we shall show, there are some physical evils which have served for man's personal discipline and development, and there are others which are the consequences of sin, although the severest and surest penalty of sin is inward, and not outward. Nevertheless, a separate treatment is necessary to avoid confusion of thought and perversion of judgment.

I

(1) We must first deal with what was prior in time, and is much more widely diffused, as it embraces the lower animals as well as man—physical evil.

(i) What impresses us, as we go out into the world, is the abundance of life, and its variety. On the bare mountain-side, wherever a little soil can rest, seeds fall and plants spring up; between the flag-stones of a street the tender blade of grass shows itself. Even if we may not endow the vegetable realm with any sensibility, the luxuriance, beauty, and fragrance which greet us, wherever the physical conditions give what seems even the least opportunity, suggest that life is good. When Gray wrote in his *Elegy*,

> 'Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
> And waste its sweetness on the desert air,'

he wrote bad science; for the beauty and the fragrance of the flower exist not for man's delight alone, but serve a vital function for the plant, as attracting the insects which are ministers of its life in securing its fertilisation. In the animal realm, in the activities of bird and beast, and even insect, are we guilty of the pathetic fallacy if we detect signs of the joy of living? We do encounter decay and death, struggle and pain; but if we examine all the facts we are justified in our conclusion that suffering and cruelty do not so abound as a misunderstood Darwinism has led many to assume.

Even if one animal inflicts pain and death on another, we are *anthropomorphising* if we speak of cruelty, for cruelty is the conscious and voluntary infliction of pain, and that we are not justified in ascribing to the lower animals. 'The struggle for existence' has no resemblance to a human battle-field; 'the survival of the fittest' does not mean always the violent removal of the unfit. The living organism which cannot adapt itself to its environment may die, and is not necessarily killed by another,

and the elimination of the unfit is a condition of organic progress. Nature is not nearly as 'red in tooth and claw' as highly imaginative writers may depict it. There are many species of animals which are herbivorous. That many species are carnivorous and prey upon other species, proves neither ferocious cruelty on the part of the devourer, nor awful suffering on the part of the devoured. As the animals which are the prey of others do not remember past dangers or anticipate future ones, their lives are not lives of constant terror. The fear of danger, with consequent flight if it is possible, comes suddenly upon them. When caught it is even probable that such sensibility as they possess is lessened. When we see a cat playing with a mouse, we must not charge the cat with the cruelty which we should ascribe to a human being, nor think that the mouse is suffering as we should in the same position. So fertile are most living organisms, that the earth would very soon be overstocked with life, were not this constant process of removal going on. Can we say that a few long lives would be a higher good than many short lives? Death is thus the minister of life, and life more abundant.[1] There is struggle for the life of others as well as for self among animals. In recent years several writers, among whom may specially be mentioned Henry Drummond and Prince Kropotkin, have shown us nature as not only or chiefly a battlefield, but as a home and a workshop, in which are seen parental solicitude and mutual co-operation. Instinct even guides insects in a life with and for others. What a marvel of concerted effort is a beehive! What an idyll of family life is a bird's nest! Even a beast otherwise timid will fight for her young, and the she-wolf grows fiercer when she has cubs. If Drummond was sometimes poet rather than man of science in finding love in the process of evolution, as the term should be reserved for conscious and voluntary affection towards others, Huxley did give a distorted view in the *Romanes Lecture* when he

[1] See *A Study of Religion*, by Jas. Martineau, ii. pp. 58-76, 87-91.

found altogether another law in the cosmic process than in the moral progress of mankind. Care for others as well as care for self has been a necessary factor in the preservation and improvement of living organisms. Facts as they are do not warrant the optimist's contention that this is the best of all possible worlds, if universal happiness be the test of what is best. There is pain, much pain, great pain among animals as well as men, even if we allow that animals are much less sensitive than men. We cannot find an adequate solution of this problem, unless we apply some other test than that of happiness.

(ii) To these general considerations there may be added a summary of the statement of a man of science on this theme, Prof. Jas. Y. Simpson, in his book on *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*.[1] He offers with ample illustrations four conclusions :

(*a*) ' The comparative study of the nervous system in the animal kingdom seems to show a varying capacity for pain which in the highest animals even is very different from the capacity in savage man ; and as we descend the animal scale, the capacity lessens.' ' Susceptibility to pain reaches a maximum in the case of those who have the greatest capacity of mental power. . . .' ' In relation to the alleged cruelty of the struggle many additional data have been collected tending to show that insensibility to pain attends the most characteristic methods of feral warfare and execution.'

(*b*) ' Examination of the conditions of organic progress shows that it has always been the outcome of a certain saving discontent. Progress follows acute organic dissatisfaction.'

(*c*) ' No account of the struggle for existence can pretend to be complete which fails to take notice of the mutual service or self-sacrifice that enter into it so objectively.'

(*d*) ' When we have estimated the real worth of the charges of cruelty against nature, have realised the price of progress, and considered the place of

[1] Pp. 131-42.

altruism, we may return to ponder the fundamental place of suffering and of service in the world. . . .' ' Sacrifice and suffering are means for perfecting the adjustment of living things to the world around them, and, as so increasing the sum of life, are a good.'

(2) In dealing with human suffering, we may distinguish three sources—nature, society, and the constitution of the individual man.[1]

(i) There are great catastrophes of nature—earthquake, volcano, flood, tempest, famine—which bring widespread misery in their train. It may be that in such calamities no individual suffers more than he might from disease and that the number of deaths falls short of the number of preventable deaths within a year in a civilised community. What attracts attention to these tragedies, and makes many persons challenge the ways of God's providence, is that they are unusual, that often they come suddenly, that a large number of persons is involved in the one experience of pain. These outbreaks of nature, although they are often cited in impeachments of God's goodness, or almightiness, do not involve any greater problem than do disease and death, so familiar that most men are not moved to think about them at all. Regarding these assaults of nature on man's safety and happiness, two things can be said, ' in relief of doubt ' and in support of faith.

(*a*) First of all, these catastrophes are the results of physical forces in accord with natural laws in an order of nature which is, with only such exceptions, uniformly beneficent. Men ask an explanation of these occurrences, just because they are infrequent and unexpected. The ordinary course of nature, which is ever bringing good to man, passes unheeded: and thus an altogether disproportionate estimate is formed of the extent of physical evil resulting from nature. If men were as grateful for all the good that nature brings to them daily, as they are rebellious against any evil, they would admit that in comparison to the good the evil is almost negligible.

[1] See *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, by A. M. Fairbairn, pp. 136-50.

But it may be retorted, why did God not create an order of nature wholly beneficent? This is a vain question, for what we can imagine and desire may be beyond the bounds of possibility. So far as our science can penetrate the mystery we seem to be confronted with an impossibility in the very nature of reality itself; and God's omnipotence, as has already been shown, is that He can do what can be done.

(*b*) We are not, however, left with unrelieved mystery, for in the second place it is just the less beneficent aspect of nature which has had most significance for man. It is in his struggle with nature, to understand its laws, and to control its forces, that man has developed in knowledge, strength, and skill, in sympathy and co-operation with his fellows. If fully developed human personality, and not happiness merely, be the end, a justification can be found for nature's seeming hardness to man. As it is also in the struggle with nature that men are drawn together, society is at least partially (for we must recognise other factors) a product of this struggle. Take, for instance, the earthquake in Japan; it has diverted the energies of that able and ambitious people into channels of reconstruction instead of preparation for war, and it has evoked such a spontaneous and generous sympathy in other nations, especially the United States of America, as to have improved international relations. It has been said with truth that man languishes under nature's motherly smile, and prospers under her stepmotherly frown. We should not say that these calamities are 'special providences' of God, else the first consideration offered would fall to the ground, and the difficulty for faith would be increased, and not relieved. But we may say that God has so made the world, and so made man, that man can wrest his best out of what seems the world's worst. Without any irreverence we may modify the saying that man's extremity of suffering, pain, or loss is also his opportunity, or God's through him, of wisdom, courage, generosity, and sacrifice.

(ii) Just as the order of nature, generally beneficent, sometimes involves physical evils, even so the order of society. And as in nature our attention is attracted to the injuries we suffer, and not the benefits we receive, so we complain of social wrongs much more loudly than we praise, if ever we do, social good. The debt that the individual man owes to society is incalculable. Robinson Crusoe is not a picture of what man would be without society, for he came to the desert island with resources of manhood which the society he had left behind had already conferred upon him. So helpless is human infancy that no babe would survive, were he not born into a family. Laying all proper stress on that fact, we must admit that society has been an agent of misery as well as of happiness for man. 'Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn'; and still 'more harm is wrought by want of thought than even want of heart.' Ignorance, indifference, indolence are responsible for more misery and suffering than even selfishness, greed, or cruelty as conscious motives of inaction or action. Sins of omission are more abundant even than sins of commission. Here the physical evil is due to moral evil. This misery or pain is a constant and not a futile challenge to moral endeavour; ignorance is corrected by knowledge, sympathy takes the place of indifference, and indolence is stirred to activity. Selfishness, greed, and cruelty are condemned by the common conscience, and even the transgressors are often made ashamed, and brought to repentance and amendment. Thus the evil in society becomes, even as the struggle with nature, a condition of man's self-discipline and self-development, and of more intimate relations with his fellows. Great as are the wrongs which in society men inflict upon one another, and urgent as is the need of and imperative the call to social reform, who, in view of man's social progress, especially the development of his social conscience, can maintain that the balance is more injury than benefit? God is not responsible directly for what men do in society; and

yet we may find a token of His good purpose in that He has so made man, that he is not only capable, but has need of such intimate relations with his fellows. Heredity and environment, the two social factors in man's development, are often channels of evil, but still more channels of good, else there had not been any progress; and they could not be the one without the other. That a man may by his conduct inflict pain on his descendants or his neighbours, or confer good, is a means of moral discipline, restraining from the course that is wrong, and constraining to the way that is right. Thus the problem of physical evil, of which the channel is society, is insoluble apart from the solution of the moral problem. A consideration which bears on the present situation especially may be added. There is a tendency to hypostatise, almost to personalise society, and to talk about social wrongs and social reforms abstractedly, apart from individual responsibility for the wrongs and individual obligation for the reforms. What causes social wrongs is individual sin, and what can bring about social reforms is individual righteousness and goodness, acting corporately, as the wrongs are often too great to be reformed by individual effort.

(iii) In the constitution of the individual man physical evil comes as disease and at last as death. (*a*) As disease is largely due to man's disregard of the laws of health, sometimes even to conduct of which disease is the penalty, and as much of it is communicated from one person to another, it is so far avoidable by knowledge and care. Much is the result of conditions for which society is responsible. The connection between disease and sin is most evident in the venereal diseases, which can be prevented only by chastity. Many plagues can be avoided by attention to sanitation. By notification and segregation the spread of infectious diseases can be arrested. That modern pestilence, cancer, is probably due to unnatural habits of life in respect of food and exercise, and we may hope that as the causation is discovered,

so the remedy will be successfully applied. Did men know how to live normally, and did they act as they knew, the greater part of 'the ills that flesh is heir to' (a phrase which expresses a mistaken view of the matter) would cease. We are not entitled to say that God wills disease. When all this has been duly weighed in our judgment, we must admit that there does exist an amount and an acuteness of suffering which remains inexplicable. All who love must have been racked with grief as they witnessed the pain, sometimes excruciating, of a loved one. It may be said that pain is a warning of physical danger; but why such a terrible warning in diseases in which escape seems now impossible? Human science may yet discover and remove the mysterious causes of these maladies, which fall on their victims without any apparent fault. But why the lesson should be learned at so great a cost is a question which can be answered only partially. To witness the perfecting of the character of the sufferer under such an affliction, and of those who by sympathy share the suffering in mind, if not in body, is to find some relief of the burden. The greatness of the soul is often most fully disclosed on the bed of pain under the shadow of death, and a home is hallowed for the after years by sharing such an experience. As the Son of God was Himself perfected to be the Saviour of men by His sufferings (Heb. ii. 18), as He learned obedience by the things which He thus suffered (v. 8), so do those whom He is not ashamed to call His brethren (ii. 11) become partakers of His perfection by treading the same *via dolorosa*.

(*b*) To dismiss the problem of death by describing it as a natural necessity, since a living organism must needs be dissolved, is to ignore the fact that man is not merely a living organism, and that, therefore, death means something more for him than for other animals. We know that death was in the world before man was made, and had sinned. Death as a physical event is not the consequence of sin; and when Paul tells us that 'the wages of sin is death'

(Rom. vi. 23), meaning as he doubtless did the physical event, we cannot follow him. But if by death is meant a *personal experience* on occasion of the physical event we may agree that for mankind generally death has been invested with a dread which holds many in bondage (Heb. ii. 15), and is regarded as doom because of sin (1 Cor. xv. 56). Death may be, for man as he is, a moral and a spiritual crisis, or judgment. It is only flippancy to dismiss this as superstition, for, as has been shown in a previous chapter, Christ in His agony in Gethsemane and His desolation on the Cross seems so to have regarded death, because in His vicarious love He made Himself one with 'mankind sinners.' Deliverance from the fear of death belongs to the salvation which Christ offers to mankind, and in His resurrection He has brought immortality to light, as He has brought men by His grace into the eternal life with God. Because we rejoice in His light, we must not ignore how dark are the shadows that apart from Him fall on death. It is the hope of immortality which scatters its shadows. Apart even from this fear of death, where there is not the hope in Christ death must often appear the arrest of a mental, moral, and spiritual development. It means the severance of personal relationships, hallowed by love, and that ideals cherished and striven for have remained unrealised. To go home, as did John Clifford, having fought the good fight, having finished his course, having kept the faith, assured of the crown laid up for him (2 Tim. iv. 8), is no mystery, but a revelation. When we do feel the mystery is in what with our limited outlook we call premature death, the cutting off in the freshness of youth of a life of promise, or in the fullness of manhood of a life of achievement. It was the number of such lives cut off during the Great War which for the common thought made the problem of death so insistent. Apart from the Christian hope some light does fall on the darkness. Even were continuance of life a natural possibility, it is better that there should be a constant succession of fresh

life in the race than the continuance of the same lives; for there must be death in order that for those born into the world there may be room and work. A man may leave what his life has achieved as an inheritance to enrich the lives which will follow his, and may not they make more of that inheritance than he could have made himself? There are limits to individual development under present conditions, and so a succession of lives seems to be a condition of progress. Even if Christ had not given us the certainty, might we not conjecture that another life will hold out to those who have passed into the unseen further and fuller opportunities than earth could have offered them? As regards those who are left behind, human affection need not be destroyed, but can be consecrated by bereavement. A solemnity and responsibility is given to the present life by the consciousness that it must inevitably pass to its close. The Epicurean conclusion (Ecc. viii. 15, Luke xii. 19) is by no means that which the serious-minded man will draw from man's mortality. 'Work while it is day: for the night cometh when no man can work' (John ix. 4) is rather the challenge to conscience that the brevity and uncertainty of life offers. For even what we call premature death there is a compensation in the influence which such an experience of bereavement may have on those who most feel the loss, in inspiring zeal, devotion, consecration of life to high ends, so that they may in some measure take the place and fulfil the task of him who has been taken from them to the world's loss. A personal confession in which Dr. Fairbairn clinches his general argument must here be quoted:[1] 'He who writes these things once knew a man who was to him companion, friend, and more than brother. They lived, they thought, they argued together; together they walked on the hillside and by the seashore . . . and together they had descended into the slums of a great city, where no light was nor any fragrance, and had faced the worst depravity of our kind. Each kept hope alive

[1] *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 145-6.

in the other and stimulated him to high endeavour and better purpose; but though the same week saw the two friends settled in chosen fields of labour, the one settled only to be called home, the other to remain and work his tale of toil until his longer day be done. But the man who died seemed to leave his spirit behind in the breast of the man who survived; and he has lived ever since and lives still, feeling as if the soul within him belonged to the man who died. And may we not say, this experience is common and interprets the experience of the race? Death has to be viewed not as a matter of a single person, but of collective man; and it works out the good of collective man by doing no injustice to the individual, but rather using him to fulfil the highest function it is granted to mortal man to perform. So let us say that however man may conceive death, it belongs to those sufferings by which mankind learns obedience, and is made perfect.'

(3) It is true that death may have none of these consolations and compensations for a great multitude; but their insensibility to the problem of death is in many cases the reason for their indifference to its solution, and even where there is no insensibility the refusal to accept the solution is not itself a proof of its inadequacy, if only tried. When we are dealing, however, with such a problem, we are entitled to consider, not those who make the least worthy use of life, or who refuse what good it offers, but those who are making the best use that can be made, and are claiming all its good. We are seeking for the divine intention, and 'the secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him' (Ps. xxv. 14). The shadows of evil which fall over the lot and life of man may thus be in a measure relieved, not sufficiently to silence all doubt, but sufficiently to justify faith. Not in a logical demonstration can the goodness of God over against the evil of the world be proved, but in a personal experience of forgiving love and redeeming grace. What can be set over against the pain and grief in the world is the fact of Jesus Christ and His

Cross, in which through vicarious, sacrificial love God draws nearest to man, makes Himself most fully known, and gives Himself ungrudgingly to man as Father. In that Christian experience the proof of God's Fatherhood is so persuasive and so convincing that faith can pass above the shadow to the sunshine of His Presence. And the shadow itself is made radiant, for suffering and grief gain a new meaning and a fresh worth when we see that God shares with men, and saves men by sharing all that seems most to challenge His Fatherhood. Pain is taken up into the very heart of the ever-blessed God : and so it too can be made good.

II

The problem of physical evil is, as has just been indicated, closely related to that of moral evil, for sin often brings pain both on the innocent and on the guilty ; and were sin to cease, much of the pain of mankind would cease also. The existence of moral evil is on first view even a more serious problem for Christian faith than the existence of physical evil, because it is more directly a contradiction and a challenge of the moral perfection of God. But on the other hand, to Christian faith there is offered a more convincing solution of this problem than of that. In the mode of God's solution of the problem of sin, some light falls on the shadows of the problem of pain. The doctrine of sin has had so large a place in Christian theology, and the change in Christian thought in regard to it has been so far-reaching, that it will demand a much fuller treatment.

(1) We may regard moral evil from three points of view. As an offence against human society it is *crime* ; as an injury to the nature of the doer it is *vice* ; as affecting the relation of man to God it is *sin*. These three aspects can be distinguished but not separated : for the individual is so bound up with society that he injures himself in wronging of others ; and as God is the ultimate cause, the essential reality,

and the final purpose of all things, nothing which affects a man or his fellows is unrelated to God: an injury to self or neighbour is an insult to God. The conception of sin, then, is the most comprehensive of the three conceptions.

(i) We can apply to it the two standards already mentioned, law and end; it is violation of law and frustration of end. As God is the source of moral authority, and His purpose for man is his highest good, fellowship with and likeness to Himself, sin is distrust of God's love as well as defiance of God's law. Accordingly, a man might be from the Christian standpoint even more sinful, whose conduct was more correct than another's, but whose heart was cold towards God. The common saying that what a man does, and not what he believes, alone matters, is not a truism as is often assumed; it is not true at all. The fruit of religion is morality, but religion is the root of morality in the Christian judgment; a man ought to love God as well as do right in order to become all that God wills that he should be as His son. We must think of sin, if we are to think in the distinctively Christian way, not in the atmosphere of the law-court, but in the spirit of the home, for to miss the fellowship of God is no less sin for man than to mar the likeness.

(ii) Again, we must apply to sin in the judgment of it not the human but the divine standard. Morally a man is blameworthy or praiseworthy as his conduct does not or does conform to the standard that he knows, or could know, not merely the standard that he chooses for himself, for in that case a man could evade his moral obligations by lowering his moral profession. Religiously this is not enough; in religion a man is not an end in himself; he must relate himself to God, not as a means to God's end, but as finding his own highest good only in God. The guilt of a man before God is not measured by his blameworthiness, but by his coming short of the glory of God (Rom. iii. 23), God's manifested purpose for him; and this is the measure of his need of redemp-

tion. That is the reason why the saint is penitent and humble. While others praise his virtues and graces, he confesses that he has not yet attained, nor is yet made perfect (Phil. iii. 12). While we thus distinguish the subjective human and the objective divine standard of judgment, and insist that man's sin is not to be measured by his own thoughts of himself, but by God's knowledge of him, we must always remember that God judges men as the Father who forgives, saves, and blesses. He reckons our guilt not as the measure of the punishment we deserve, but as the measure of the grace which we need, the redemption which His love is seeking and striving to bestow upon us. 'Because God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things' (1 John iv. 20), He is not a more severe judge, but a more gracious Saviour.[1]

(iii) Lastly, we must recognise that sin is a conscious, voluntary act, even although a man's own conscience is not the final measure of it, and that consequently to speak of an inheritance of sin, or a transfer of guilt, or a punishment of the innocent is to use language incorrectly, and tends to confusion of thought. Qualities may be inherited which are the occasions of sin; one man may feel the shame of another's wrongdoing, but he cannot share the guilt unless he is responsible for the temptation which led to the sin; the innocent suffer physical and social consequences of transgression, but for them these consequences are not penal, nor can be. These are considerations it is necessary to insist on.

(2) As this is not a volume either on *biblical theology* or on *history of doctrine*, but a constructive essay in theology, only those of the many questions which have been raised in the Christian Church can be dealt with which are immediately relevant to that purpose.

(i) While the Old Testament teaches the reality, the universality, and the natural inherence of sin, apart from the story in Genesis iii. of the Fall, it has no theory of its origin, and that story is nowhere

[1] In the matter of the standard of judgment to be applied to sin, Tennant's treatment in *The Concept of Sin* must be regarded as defective.

referred to in any other part of the Old Testament. It is only in the Apocryphal writings that the explanation is sought. 'Before the Old Testament was completed, Jewish thought had arrived at the truth of the absolute universality of human sinfulness, and had come to regard it as a state which was inherent in man and received by him at birth as part of the nature he inherits; no cause for such uncleanness or corruption, where it is regarded as prior to habit established by voluntary acts, is definitely assigned, though the writer of Job, at least, seems to have seen its source in the necessary and normal infirmity which pertains to the finite creature. The identification of this inherent tendency to sin with a corruption of human nature wrought once and for all by Adam, and *thence* naturally engendered in his posterity, alone is wanting of the constituent elements whose union is essential to the later doctrine of the Fall. The increasing sense of individual moral personality, which is conspicuous in certain later books of the Old Testament, is a tendency which might be supposed to make against the acquisition of such a doctrine of solidarity in a "first father" of the race, or in the effects of his transgression, but indirectly it aided the formation of such a view, by adding point to the individual's sense of personal sin, and so fertilising the soil in which the doctrine of hereditary acquired corruption has its root.'[1] Of special interest in this connection is the book of Ecclesiasticus, or the Wisdom of Ben Sirach, as it serves as a connecting link between the Old Testament and Jewish teaching in the time of our Lord. Although his attitude on the subject is generally individualistic, recognising 'moral solidarity' as regards the sufferings of children for their parents' sin, and the influence of example only, and insisting on personal liberty and responsibility, he does quite explicitly refer to the Genesis story, as recording the first sin, and as explaining the origin of death. 'From a woman was the beginning of sin; and because of her we all die' (xxv. 24). (Cf. xl. 1, 'Great travail

[1] Tennant's *The Fall and Original Sin*, pp. 104-5.

is created for every man, and a heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam.') Without following the details of the discussion, Tennant's conclusion may be quoted: 'The author of Ecclesiasticus taught that death was a consequence of the sin of the first parents of the race: and whilst seeing in this transgression the first of a series of human sins, he suspected no causal connection between the first and the succeeding members of that series.' [1] Individual sin he traced to the evil inclination (*yezer*). 'He Himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel' (xv. 14). The existence of such a tendency to sin within man seems to be recognised in xxi. 27: 'When the ungodly curseth Satan, he curseth his own soul.' Probably it is not physical but spiritual death of which the writer of the Book of Wisdom is thinking, when he states how the divine intention was thwarted:

> 'God created man for incorruption,
> And made Him an image of His own proper being;
> But by envy of the devil death entered into the world,
> And they that are of his portion make trial thereof,
> But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God,
> And no torment shall touch them.'
>
> (ii. 23-iii. 1.)

An element here added is the reference to the agency of Satan, 'the envy of the devil.' But there is no doctrine of an inherited corruption of nature from Adam, for Solomon is represented as saying of himself:

> 'Now I was a child of parts, and a good soul fell to my lot,
> Nay rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled.'
>
> (viii. 19-20.)

A corrupted nature is, however, assigned to the Canaanites as a result of Noah's curse on their ancestor. 'They were a seed accursed from the beginning' (xii. 11). The Jewish teaching which comes nearest to and may have been influenced by the Christian teaching is that of 2 Esdras (4 Ezra). 'The first Adam bearing a wicked heart transgressed, and was

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

overcome; *and not he only*, but all they also that are born of him. Thus disease was made permanent; and thus the law was in the heart of the people along with the wickedness of the root; so the good departed away, and that which was wicked abode still' (iii. 21-22). It is to be noted, however, that the evil heart preceded and did not result from Adam's transgression; it was the occasion of the Fall, and not the Fall the cause of it. Again, to quote Tennant,[1] 'the disease of infirmity which is here stated to have been made permanent in the race is not said to have been made so by the Fall: the permanent infirmity seems to be simply the transmitted evil inclination or the universal following of Adam's example in yielding to it.' It recognised that there has been an increase of this tendency in human history. 'An evil heart hath grown up in us, which hath led us astray from these *statutes*, and hath brought us into corruption and into the ways of death, hath showed us the paths of perdition and removed us far from life; and that not a few only, but wellnigh all that have been created' (vii. 48). In one passage spiritual as well as physical consequences are assigned to Adam's transgression. 'It had been better that the earth had not given *thee* Adam; or else, when it had given *him*, to have restrained him from sinning. For what profit is it for all that are in this present time to live in heaviness, and after death to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done? for though it was thou that sinned the evil is not fallen on thee alone, but upon all of us that come of thee. For what profit is it unto us, if there be promised us an immortal time, whereas we have done the works that bring death?' (viii. 46-49). While Adam's sins and our sins are thus associated, yet it is not expressly asserted that we sin because Adam sinned; the same ambiguity is left us by Paul in Romans v. 12. In the *Apocalypse of Baruch* individual liberty and responsibility are maintained; but in one passage (xlviii. 42-43) there is agreement with 4 Ezra: 'O Adam,

[1] *Idem*, pp. 227-8.

what hast thou done to all those who are born of thee? And what will be said to the first Eve who hearkened to the serpent? For all this multitude are going to corruption, nor is there any numbering of those whom the fire devours' (Charles' rendering). Dr. Charles inclines to treat this passage as an interpolation; but if it be accepted as authentic, what must be insisted on is that while the book admits 'conditional liability to punishment for imputed sin, it argues, on the whole, for undiminished individual responsibility; and in no case does it sanction a doctrine of hereditary corruption of human nature, though in one particular it approaches such a doctrine.'[1] While there was a preparation in the Jewish teaching for Paul's doctrine, yet the later ecclesiastical dogma of inherited corruption as a result of Adam's transgression is nowhere taught.

(ii) Jesus did not in any way concern Himself with the origin of sin, but, calling men to repentance, He offered forgiveness. He described it as a disease, of which He was the physician (Mark ii. 17), as a bondage, to deliver from which He was going to give His life as a ransom (Matt. xx. 28). Sinners are lost to God, and 'the Son of man came to seek and to save the lost' (Luke xix. 10). A characteristic feature of His teaching is the inwardness of sin, its source in the appetites, desires, inclinations. 'The things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man' (Mark vii. 15). It is Paul who has fully developed the doctrine of sin. By an inductive proof he shows the universality of sin, and consequent guilt (Rom. i.-iii.), in order that he may assert the necessity of a no less universal salvation, since man's guilt incurs the wrath of God. By a personal confession of his own experience (Rom. vii. 7-25) he traces the development of sin in the individual. *Sin* as a power in the world objective to man brings him into bondage, and has its seat and vehicle in the *flesh*, which is not identical either with the body or even sensuous impulses, but with the whole of man's nature, asserting

[1] Tennant, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

its independence of God, opposing its will to God's, and withstanding the influences of the Spirit of God. The law which is intended to restrain sin provokes sin rather, and man, approving God's law, is impotent because of the flesh to obey it. He cannot deliver himself, and so needs the deliverance God offers in Christ. The *flesh* in Paul has some likeness to the *yezer* of Jewish thought; but he does not make clear whether he regarded it as a natural inclination to evil in man, or as a result of Adam's transgression, yet it is possible that he did associate, as did Ezra before him, the development of sin in the individual with the history of sin in the race. The passage (Rom. v. 12-21) in which he refers to the story of the Fall is not part of his argument for the universality of sin, nor does he introduce it as an explanation of that universality. It is introduced at a later stage of the discussion in Romans to prove that just as Christ is greater than Adam, so is the efficacy of grace greater than the influence of sin. The conclusion of the argument is in the words, 'Where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly.' Paul did undoubtedly teach that death as the penalty of sin came on the race as a result of Adam's disobedience. It is certain, however, that he did not teach an imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to his descendants: but he, with a certain inconsequence of thought, explains their participation in the penalty of death as due to their own transgressions (*v.* 12), and later (*v.* 13) declares that sin is not imputed where there is no law. The clause ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον cannot be rendered to mean that in Adam all sinned (*omnes peccarunt, Adamo peccante*, Bengel), either because all were included *physically* in Adam (as Levi 'was yet in the loins of his father,' Heb. vii. 10), or because Adam as the *moral representative* of the race was acting on behalf of it, as the Federal theology after taught. He seems to have held by the principle that, while the penalty is racial, the guilt is personal. He thus combines the older idea which runs through most of the Old Testament of the solidarity of the

tribe or nation (here extended to the race), and the later individualism which is found in Jeremiah and Ezekiel. He does not anywhere expressly teach that Adam's transgression so changed his own nature that he transmitted a corrupted nature to his descendants, although his doctrine of the flesh does undoubtedly suggest this.

(iii) As far as Paul's teaching is concerned the teaching of Augustine, Luther, Calvin on original sin and total depravity rests on a very uncertain foundation. The teaching of Augustine may be very briefly summarised. (1) Mankind is a mere *massa perditionis*, and the virtues of the heathen are only *splendid sins*. (2) Adam by his transgression lost his freedom to do right, and in him mankind also has become unfree, though still morally responsible. (3) There is from Adam a transmission both of guilt, so that even babes are responsible for Adam's transgression, and of a corrupt nature, so that men are born totally depraved; this inheritance is connected in a most unsavoury way with the facts of sexual reproduction, for even regenerate parents reproduce in concupiscence with the remains of their unregenerate nature. (4) The grace, which is the remedy of sin, is sacramental, as what is begun in baptism is continued in other sacraments. (5) Despite his doctrine of predestination, Augustine is led by this sacramentalism to affirm the possibility of a lapse from a state of grace.[1] Protestantism took over this doctrine of man substantially, with less sacramentalism, and more emphasis on justifying faith. The Federal theology found a justification for the connection with Adam asserted by teaching that he was representative of the race in both accepting and then violating the covenant of works. We may assent to Tennant's conclusion,[2] that 'the development of the highly complicated doctrine of Original Sin was less the outcome of strict exegesis than due to the exercise of speculation; speculation working indeed on the lines laid down in

[1] See Mackintosh, *Christianity and Sin*, pp. 99-105.
[2] *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, p. 41.

Scripture, but applied to such material as current science and philosophy were able to afford.'

(iv) The previous discussion justifies us in feeling entirely free to inquire what science has to teach us as to the origin of sin, its development in the individual and its history in the race. It is much to be regretted that men speculated about the origin of sin in the race before they had observed how it begins in the individual. The study of the child will teach us more than the study of the savage, for on the one hand within limits the development of the child not only physically, as embryology teaches, but even mentally and morally, recapitulates the evolution of the race, and on the other hand it is an unwarranted assumption that the savage represents primitive man without any deterioration. (*a*) We shall therefore begin with the child. The child starts with a double burden or boon, physical heredity and social inheritance. The promise and potency of its individuality are helped or hindered by the past of the race as it comes to it along these two channels. It is highly improbable that there is a transmission of acquired character, and still less probable that moral traits can be so transmitted than that physical features should be. ' If,' says Thomson,[1] ' individually acquired modifications, the direct results of peculiarities in nurture, are not transmissible, then modifications have no direct racial importance, and it is in this direction that the bulk of the scientific evidence points. There are only a few cases that suggest the other answer, so that we cannot count on this. Without foreclosing the question, we must act as if individually acquired modifications were *not* transmissible as such or in any representative degree.' The biologist is concerned with physical features ; but the moralist may here add, that as sin lies in the region of individuality, personal liberty, and responsibility, there is still less reason for assuming any transmission by physical heredity of moral character. There are vices, such as impurity and

[1] *What is Man ?*, p. 140.

intemperance, which may have physical consequences which may be transmitted to offspring as racial poisons; but this transmission does not involve the transmission also of the moral defects. The drunkard's child does not inherit the father's craving for drink directly, but it may be an enfeebled frame, which may weaken the power of resistance to the same temptation. We may dismiss from consideration the possibility of the transmission of moral depravity or corruption by physical heredity. What alone can be transmitted is physical and consequent mental incapacity, which is the occasion in an unfavourable environment of moral degradation. There are good and bad stocks, but we are not warranted in affirming that this difference is due to the transmission of any acquired characters, good or bad. What is demonstrable as a potent factor in individual development is the social inheritance, which through the environment is exercising a constant influence. Moral conduct results not only in moral character in the individual, but in moral customs, standards, and institutions in society. The parents and teachers of the child in their moral character and conduct are always either making or marring his character. If we remember that such influence begins with the unborn babe, we shall be readier to recognise that the resemblance of children to parents can be more reasonably explained by this social inheritance than by any physical heredity. The child is born into the world, not an actuality, but a possibility of good or evil; which possibility shall become actuality depends largely on the influence of the earliest environment. What is included in this possibility as the raw material out of which morality is to be formed? Man as a race has an animal ancestry, including instincts, appetites, and impulses, the vital purpose of which is self-protection, self-preservation, and self-satisfaction; and there is nothing morally wrong or bad in any of them. Man as a race did not start merely on the animal level, for as has been shown the final difference of man's development and

animal evolution does indicate an initial difference. We are not justified, then, in assuming that even this animal inheritance comes to the child as it does to one of the lower animals, or as it sometimes shows itself as developed in the savage. It is already modified by the distinctively human endowment of reason, conscience, and affection, although the animal inheritance does show itself in the child's behaviour earlier than the human endowment. With this qualification, that the human child is not born a *mere* animal, we may accept Dr. Tennant's conclusion.[1] 'We have seen that the inborn tendencies of the child are natural and non-moral. We may add that they are likewise neutral as regards promise of subsequent ethical outcome. They are the raw material out of which good as well as evil, virtue as well as vice, may be hewn and shaped. They are indifferent stuff, awaiting moralisation. The fear that is natural to all men is the basis alike of cowardice and of the highest courage, which is by no means identical with fearlessness; the natural emotion of anger is the source of righteous wrath as well as of vindictive passion. Our virtues and vices have common roots; and what shall grow from those roots depends on the action of the will alone.' This last sentence needs qualification, even in the light of what Tennant himself says afterwards; for before the will is or can be exercised, a right or a wrong direction can be, and is, given to the development by the education. As we have learned from the contribution to our knowledge of human personality recently made by psycho-analysis, there may be a repression of impulses which is a hindrance, or a sublimation which is a help in the formation of moral character. As conscience is not awakened till about the age of three, and usually by obedience to commands enforced by punishment, and is not reinforced by affection till somewhat later; as much later comes any independent reflection, or formation of an individual moral standard,—these instincts, appetites, and impulses get a start before

[1] *The Child and Religion*, p. 171.

the moral restraints or constraints can affect the will. 'The moral life,' says Tennant,[1] 'is a race in which every child starts handicapped. The pleasures of forms of conduct which are destined to be forbidden him have been tasted and known; pleasure-giving actions have already become forged into chains of habit; the expulsive power of the new affection which is to establish another rule cannot at first be strongly felt. When will and conscience enter, it is into a land already occupied by a powerful foe. And, in the opening stages of the moral life, higher motives cannot, from the very circumstances of the case, appeal so strongly as the lower and more accustomed already in possession. Into the "seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire" is introduced the new-born moral purpose, which must struggle to win the ascendancy.' This is probably a correct account of the moral development of the majority of children; it needs to be qualified where the environment is decisively good or bad. Christian nurture, through which the grace of Christ reaches the young life, may greatly strengthen both moral restraints and constraints, and make the development predominantly good. On the contrary, in an evil environment the development may be almost hopelessly bad, although, as has already been shown, unexhausted moral reserves may afterwards be disclosed.

(*b*) The moral development of the child is affected by the social inheritance, where what Ritschl[2] has called the Kingdom of Sin has been formed. 'The subject of sin is *humanity as the sum of all individuals*, in so far as the selfish action of each person, involving him as it does in illimitable interactions with all others, is directed in any degree whatsoever towards the opposite of the good, and leads to the association of individuals in common evil.' We may then speak of mankind as a sinful race; and we must investigate the moral history of the race. It is, as has already been indicated in several connections, an unwarranted

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 178. [2] *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 335.

assumption that mankind began in the condition of barbarism or savagery, and that its evolution has been a continuous upward movement. Progress there has on the whole been, but there has also been deterioration. 'We fancy,' says Thomson,[1] 'that the happy moments of primitive man were many, for we entirely disagree with reflecting modern slum conditions or *depressed* savage conditions on primitive man. He enjoyed himself when he had a comfortable cave with pleasant neighbours. He liked a sunbath, as his very distant relations, the monkeys, do. A swim, too, for he was punctiliously cleanly. He kept in good heart and in good fettle, else he would never have succeeded, even with all his wits, in the battle *Homo* versus *Mundum*—won not by us, but by primitive man.' Thomson disagrees from James' extreme view of the rough animality of primitive man. We may at once set aside the extravagances of theologians who represented Adam as a paragon of human perfection, and Paradise as the home of a culture and a virtue which humanity has since failed to attain; or the attempt recently made by Dr. Hall [2] to reconcile scientific theory with Catholic dogma by assuming that 'as man's primitive state was partly supernatural, an original righteousness was made possible by grace,' and that only after the Fall was man left to that natural development which science describes for us. We may, however, turn to a modern man of science who is also a Christian believer to discover what can be said about the Fall to reconcile faith and reason. Dr. James Y. Simpson agrees with Dr. J. Arthur Thomson in refusing to recognise the savage as the representative of primitive man, to whom he assigns a capacity for progress which the savage lacks, unless an external stimulus is applied. He also seeks in the individual moral development a clue as to what the racial history may have been. This is what he tentatively offers to us.[3] 'Any external descriptive account can, however, in no way even summarise the

[1] *What is Man?*, p. 52. [2] *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 123-48.
[3] *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 287.

inward process in virtue of which advance took place. Even could we be sure of the particular initial moment in which an individual became first aware of alternatives of conduct as higher and lower, and voluntarily chose the lower, it would be difficult to affirm that sin definitely entered at that moment. The action was certainly sinful, but the entrance and victory of sin has never been a momentary affair; it is an age-long process, alike in its origin, its persistence, its elimination. Yet is there nothing necessary or inevitable about it. We may discuss the origin and implications of sin, never its origin and function. It was no necessary stage in the development of man. The struggle is inevitable, not the fall. He might have overcome in the beginning; he might have followed the gleam. The instinctive impulse and appetite, strong in some cases because of their basal utility to life, the conscious desire when faced with the dawning recognition of a higher if more difficult way, present the arena for struggle and resistance. As when the electric current is turned on, and the arc lights flicker and burn unsteadily till the power avails to transfuse the recalcitrant material, so the darkness of man's early life was only gradually and fitfully illumined; that there was a return to darkness at all after the initial flash is the statement of "the Fall." The evolution of the race has not been, just as the development of the individual is not what it ought to have been; and we can therefore speak of a racial as well as an individual sin. The raw material of the animal ancestry and the distinctively human endowment, the influence of the environment and the social inheritance, combine in helping or hindering the free will in its obedience to conscience. Moral liberty and responsibility are not only preserved on this view, while limitations are recognised, but more securely preserved than on the older view of the inheritance of a nature so corrupt as a result of Adam's fall that man is free only to do evil, and incapable of good. His need of redemption from actual sin in the race and himself is no less asserted.

(3) Small as may have appeared the beginnings of sin, in view of what it has grown to in human history, 'a kingdom of sin,' claiming as its subjects all born into this world, using as its agency social customs, standards and institutions, opposing itself to, hindering, delaying, and even sometimes appearing to prevail over the Kingdom of God, the question must be asked, Why did God permit the entrance of sin into the world, why does He tolerate its continuance? While the problem of moral evil is more acute, its solution by the divine grace also is more adequate. It has already been shown to how great an extent pain is related to sin. Were men wiser, better, and more loving the amount of suffering would be so greatly reduced that what remained could more easily be understood as consistent with God's goodness as a necessary condition of man's personal development. The answer to the question raised is twofold: God permitted the possibility of sin in the making of man, because not otherwise could His purpose concerning man be fulfilled. While the actuality of sin was not necessary for the fulfilment of God's purpose He tolerated that actuality, and tolerates it, because by His method of grace He is dealing with sin more effectively in accordance with His purpose for man than He could in any other way which can be imagined or conceived.

(i) If man is to develop into moral and religious personality, doing the right and loving God, he must be free to choose the wrong instead of the right or to be as God unto himself. Without freedom no morality and no religion are conceivable, because no personality. God willed to have as the consummation of the process of creation a family of sons, freely choosing fellowship with and likeness to Himself. God as Father could communicate, and reproduce His own perfection, only in free human personalities. No possibility of holy love without freedom, and no freedom without the possibility of sin; to prevent sin would be to destroy freedom. God's omnipotence does not mean that God could have created man

free, and yet have excluded the possibility of the wrong choice being made. The theology which represents God as absolute will, free and able to do anything that can be conceived, cannot use such an argument legitimately; for such a view of God, sin must ever remain an inscrutable mystery. But, if we recognise that God's own character and purpose, and the nature of the reality He creates, involve limitations on the exercise of His omnipotence, then we are entitled to offer this solution of the problem of why God permitted the possibility of sin.

(ii) As in a previous section it has been argued that God foresees free acts not as actual, but as possible, we need not meet the further objection, that God not only in creating knew the possibility of sin, but foreknew the actuality; all we need affirm is that He knew sin as a possibility inherent in freedom. Did God then in creating take an incalculable risk, was creation a reckless speculation? There are the responsibilities of the Creator not to create a world that should finally disappoint His hopes, and defeat His aims. The fact that God has created the world should for Christian faith, which believes in God as Father, be a proof, a convincing proof, that God knew Himself to possess all the resources, rational, moral, and spiritual, to deal with any emergency. We may say with all reverence that it would have been wrong for God to create a world with the possibility of sin entering in, unless He had abundant grace to redeem that world from sin. We are not entitled to assert a dogmatic universalism, on the ground that the salvation of every soul is essential to the completeness of that redemption, which will satisfy the heart of the Father, and fulfil the purpose He had in creating man. We are entitled, however, to hope that the redemption will be very much more nearly if not altogether universal than a survey of the moral and religious condition of mankind as it now is might lead us to expect. There are wonders and surprises of the divine grace for which faith in God should prepare us. The solution of the problem, then, lies partly in

the future. We shall know why God allowed sin to enter when we know how He has cast it out from mankind.

(iii) Even if, withdrawing our gaze from the beginning of sin in the past, and the ending of sin in the future, we fix our eyes on the present, and what God is now doing in the world, we shall gain the confidence that the problem is being solved in fact, and thus also for thought. God is tolerating the continuance of sin in the race because He is in His own method of grace working out its redemption. Those who demand divine interferences in the course of human history, to put an end to sin and its consequences, those who expect a final divine interference in a supernatural manifestation of Christ at His Second Advent, do not, be it said with all respect for many good men, understand God's ways. If God were forced to use omnipotence to put an end to the sin and consequent misery of the world, He would have suffered moral and spiritual defeat at the hands of sin, for He would have shown Himself incapable of winning the victory by moral and spiritual means, the only means congruous with the nature of the conflict and the character and the purpose of God. It is disbelief in the sufficient and sovereign efficacy of grace to desire and to expect any other method of dealing with the sin of the world. Such an expectation, however dishonouring to God on close scrutiny it proves to be, might have some excuse, if history afforded proof that the method of grace has failed and is failing. But is there any justification for the belief that Christ is not seeing of the travail of His soul, and is not being satisfied with a race that is being by His Cross and Holy Passion as well as His sovereignty of grace redeemed from sin unto God? To assert this is to indulge in a pessimism which the evidence does not warrant, Sin abounds, but does not grace abound more exceedingly, or at least is there not promise of its so abounding? The possibility of the right choice for the race has not been excluded by the wrong. Mankind is not merely a *massa perditionis*.

That there has been human progress, if not in individual capacity and character, yet in the inheritance of good which one generation passes on to another, not constant nor certain, but real, is evidence that the possibility of good is becoming more fully actuality than the possibility of evil. In that progress human endeavour is not the only factor; it is the witness of religion that God is working with and for man. The confidence of faith is not in what man can and will achieve, but in what God is in His grace doing in and by man. In Jesus Christ and His Cross and Reign God's counter-working of evil for good reaches its completion. Man as redeemed from sin in Christ Jesus has a value for God such as a puppet, however endowed in other respects, could never have had. We dare not with Augustine speak of the *beata culpa*, the sin which has made grace so to abound, although we cannot imagine that the world without the Cross would have had as great value for God as the world saved by His sacrifice. When God's purpose is fulfilled in the redeemed race, then, and only then, will be fully disclosed God's reason for allowing sin to enter the world, and bearing so patiently with it when it had entered. In no other way, consistent with holy love, it would seem, could mankind become a free and redeemed family of God.

CHAPTER IV

REVELATION AND REDEMPTION

I

In a previous chapter religion as the highest function of human personality was dealt with; and it was then indicated that religion involves revelation, since it is a mutual relation between God and man, and the core of it is in the immediate contact and intimate communion of man with God. In this mutual relation we cannot conceive man as alone active in his search after God, and God passive, waiting to be found. The parables of the lost sheep and the lost coin illustrate the truth about this relation better than the parable of the prodigal son (Luke xv.).

(1) Mysticism is justified in claiming that there is an immediate contact of God with man, that 'in Him we live, and move, and have our being' (Acts xvii. 28), although those forms of mysticism are mistaken which think that the immediate contact can best be realised in a condition of ecstasy, when, consciousness lost, the soul swoons into oneness with God,—a God empty of definite content,—or which seeks the exclusive privilege of individual visions or voices to convey the assurance of God's present reality. When the soul is alive to God, it will ask the question of the Psalmist,

> 'Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit?
> Or whither shall I flee from Thy presence?'
> (cxxxix. 7.)

In that presence it will find a refuge in time of trouble.

> 'In the covert of Thy presence shalt Thou hide them that fear Thee from the plottings of man.' (xxxi. 20.)

In that presence it will find its source of gladness.

> 'In Thy presence is fulness of joy;
> In Thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.'
> (xvi. 11.)

And therefore the greatest evil it can conceive is the loss of that presence.

> 'Cast me not away from Thy presence;
> And take not Thy holy Spirit from me.'
> (li. 11.)

It will be observed that in two of these passages the Spirit is mentioned as the equivalent of the presence. The activity of God in man is so conceived in the Old Testament; it is in the New Testament, however, that the truth that God Himself is present in man by His Spirit finds its clearest and fullest expression, because it was through faith in Christ that believers most certainly and adequately experienced the presence and power of the Spirit of God. The discussion of the doctrine of the Spirit must, therefore, be reserved for the last section of the present volume.

(2) The presence of God is real; the contact is immediate; but man's consciousness of God is mediated through his personal activities in contact and commerce with the world which is his home. Why is this? It is in order that man may preserve his individuality, exercise his liberty, realise his responsibility, achieve his personality, that God, as it were, stands afar off, and hides Himself, so that man to find Him must seek Him. God's communicativeness is conditioned by man's receptivity and responsiveness, and his capacity for God is developed in his intercourse with God. God's revelation is measured by man's religion; and hence His revelation must be progressive, corresponding to man's religious development. The psychology of religion is the study not only of human processes, but also of divine methods. Just as the most learned scholar must begin with the ABC, so has mankind learned of God 'precept upon precept, precept upon precept; line upon line, line upon line; here a little, there a little' (Is. xxviii. 13). God hath spoken 'by divers portions and in divers manners' (Heb. i. 1). Nor need we assume that this gradualness of God's revelation is the result of sin, that it is man's false-

hood and error which alone hinder God's full revelation of Himself at once. Evolution is God's method of creation of the world and man, and it is no less the method of His revelation, for a communication beyond the capacity of man to receive and respond would be idle and vain. We may say that human development is by divine education. Hosea, the tenderest of all the prophets, describes God's chosen people at the beginning of its history as a child. 'When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt' (xi. 1). And as we read the Old Testament we discover that God taught Israel as a child. God has not been like the pedant who can talk to an infant only in polysyllables; He is like the mother who has her baby-talk. The beginnings of religion are so crude, appearing to us now so superstitious, that it is not easy for us to accustom ourselves to the thought that these were the glimpses of the dawn of the day of divine revelation, of which the Son of God as man was the noontide splendour. Yet even in what Christian scholars have called the ethnic religions, the religions of the Gentiles as distinguished from the religion of the Hebrews and the Jews, of which Christianity is the completion, we can trace a progress from the primitive philosophy of animism through the religion of polydaemonism and polytheism to varied forms, which approach, although they do not attain, the 'ethical monotheism' of the prophets. From the belief in and worship of a countless host of unnamed spirits (polydaemonism) man advanced to the recognition and adoration of a more measurable multitude of gods, named because more distinctly conceived, and more intimately related to men (polytheism); and even in *monolatry* he confined his regular worship to one god, while acknowledging the existence of many, or in *kathenotheism* he in the act of worship was absorbed in contemplation and adoration of only the one god at the moment addressed, or in *monarchy* he exalted one god in the pantheon as ruler of gods and men, or in *pantheism* he thought of God as the one reality, and all distinc-

tion from that God as illusive.[1] Only among the Hebrews was *monotheism* reached; but in other religions we may observe this movement toward a recognition and confession of the divine unity. While there was deterioration in doctrine and practice in paganism, such as Paul condemns in Romans i. and ii., it was not so deliberately false and wicked as it must have appeared to a Jew like Paul, to whom this 'ethical monotheism' was an inheritance; and there was progress also, as any appreciative study of the history of religions will prove. Such a general revelation of God to mankind is recognised by Paul in his speeches at Lystra and Athens (Acts xiv. 15, 17, xvii. 22-31), and in his argument regarding the universality of sinfulness (Rom. i. 18-23, ii. 14-16). We must recognise this general revelation of God as the background of that special revelation of which our Bible is the record; but before we can deal with this there are some considerations to be offered regarding the universal *media* of revelation.

(3) While God approaches man in many ways, we may specially mention three media of revelation, *nature*, *history*, *conscience*.

(i) The psalms, which are so full of the realisation of the presence of God, often express the manifestation of God in nature:

> 'The heavens declare the glory of God;
> And the firmament sheweth His handywork.
> Day unto day uttereth speech,
> And night unto night sheweth knowledge.
> There is no speech nor language;
> Their voice cannot be heard.
> Their line is gone out through all the earth,
> And their words to the end of the world.'
> (xix. 1-4.)

The voice of God in nature uses no language that can be heard by the hearing of the ears (*v.* 3), but it is understood by the mind of man. There follows in this same psalm a passage which may be described as mythology, converted to monotheism (*vv.* 5-6).

[1] See Jevons' *Introduction to the History of Religion*; and Moore's *The History of Religions*.

Elsewhere the processes of nature are described as the immediate activities of God. So in paganism all natural operations are conceived and described as the actions of gods. Sol drives his fiery chariot across the heavens; Aeolus releases his winds from the cavern in which he holds them captive; Neptune rules the waves. Illustrations need not be multiplied. Paul, as has already been shown, recognises this manifestation of God's power, wisdom, and goodness in nature. Jesus (Matt. vi. 26-28) saw the care and the bounty of the Heavenly Father in the food of the birds of the air and the clothing of the flowers of the field. It is measureless power, unfathomable wisdom, abounding goodness which nature discloses. But it surely discloses the glory of God in its beauty and its sublimity, where beauty breaks the bounds of finite comprehension and soars to infinite suggestiveness. It is through the beauty of nature that poets and artists have often found God. The prophet of this divine revelation in nature is pre-eminently Wordsworth:

> 'I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.'
>
> (*Tintern Abbey.*)

While morality is the function of man most closely related to religion, because goodness reveals more of the nature of God than beauty, yet art as the endeavour to capture the spirit of beauty has been too much ignored as also an interpretation of the perfection of God. What the poet feels as a presence, the philosopher tries to reach as the conclusion of an argument. Recognising fully that the existence, nature, character, and purpose of God cannot be proved by rigidly logical reasoning, as the conclusion must needs contain as much more than the premises

as God transcends all that He has made, yet the 'theistic proofs' have this measure of validity, that they show that the world appears more intelligible, rational, purposive, significant, valuable in a theistic than in any other setting.[1] Reason so far justifies religious faith and aesthetic vision.

(ii) As in history the activity of man plays a much larger part than in the operations of nature, which man can direct and control only in a very limited degree, the revelation of God is more often and to a greater extent obscured by the folly and wickedness of man. It would be an altogether distorted representation of history which would ignore the agency of man, and ascribe all events directly to the intervention of God; but it would be no less an inadequate interpretation of history which would ascribe all the merit to man, as did Comte in his *Positive Polity*, his religion of humanity, and ignore the providence of God. It is not piety to ascribe to God's will, and to acquiesce in and submit to the consequences of man's sin. A view of Providence which ignores historical causality tends to superstition, and away from religion. While this may be fully not only conceded, but even in the interests of a reasonable religion insisted on, yet a consideration of the history of mankind does justify the belief in Providence, a divine guidance and guardianship of the race in its onward march. The divine purpose has been hindered and hampered by human ignorance, indifference, indolence, or even hostility and defiance, but nevertheless

> 'There 's a divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough-hew them how we will.'
> (*Hamlet.*)

We cannot from human history exclude contingency and find in it all, as Hegel[2] strives to do, the necessary evolution of Idea or Spirit; but there is a philosophy of history which can find a wider meaning in it than the actors themselves conceived. We may agree with

[1] See Balfour's *Theism and Humanism.*
[2] *The Philosophy of History*, Eng. trans., by Sibree.

Matthew Arnold[1] that there is 'the Eternal, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.' The rise and the fall of empires do illustrate or demonstrate a moral order in the world. In the long run and on the big scale, though not immediately in individual experience, righteousness prospers, and wickedness perishes. Human agency is not set aside; but God is so immanent in man, that the consequences of human conduct negate sin and affirm goodness, and that men are restrained from evil and constrained to good as God's fellow-workers. It is in the history of the Hebrew nation itself, and from the standpoint of its records, that this interpretation of human history as divine providence is most convincing; but every nation, if it had a succession of inspired prophets, might in its own experiences trace such divine dealing in mercy or in judgment, and might thus discover a revelation of God in history.

(iii) The Hebrew language has no word for conscience, as Old Testament psychology had not yet reached an adequate analysis of human personality. That does not mean, however, that there was no recognition of the voice within. From Greek ethical thought the New Testament with its more developed psychology borrowed the word, although the word is not always used when that function of human personality is referred to. In both parts of our Bible the word *heart* is more frequently used. Morality among the Hebrews was so dependent on and dominated by religion, that man's capacity for moral judgment was not investigated.[2] It was Socrates who first started on this ethical inquiry. By discussion he believed men could discover the general principles which should regulate individual conduct; from just acts might be inferred what justice is, and then the standard might be applied to determine in case of doubt whether acts were just or unjust. Practice, be it observed, afforded the data for theory. Yet Socrates did not rely on reasoning only; there

[1] *Literature and Dogma*; and *God and the Bible*.

[2] See Wheeler Robinson's *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, chaps. i. and ii.

survived some of the religion which he had inherited in his belief in his *daimon*, or guardian spirit, who restrained him from actions which he ought not to take.[1] It may be that the content of any individual conscience may be proved to be a reproduction of social customs which have been invested with the authority of social standards, and are enforced by social sanctions of reward or punishment. And the conscience of most men is little, if anything, more than what public opinion or popular sentiment condemns or approves. But this is far from being all that can or need be said about conscience. Conscience is a capacity to receive a content of moral judgments, and to recognise their authority and assert their demands; and these judgments may generally be received from the society to which a man belongs; but it is also a capacity to receive a content from God, to be the channel of God's revelation of His character and purpose. All moral progress depends on the measure in which an individual conscience can become independent of social standards, so as to rise above them, and in course of time to raise them. Kant asserted the autonomy of the categorical imperative in each man, and yet he admitted that religion is the recognition of our human duties as divine commands.[2] We need not accept his antithesis, but may say that a man realises himself morally as he receives and responds to this revelation of God's character and purpose. There have been reformers who were guided by the moral conscience, uninfluenced by the religious consciousness — men who did not think of what seemed right to them as God's will, and thus as invested with a higher than human authority; the greater number, however, of those who have led the race morally have been inspired for the arduous and often even perilous task by the religious consciousness: 'Thus saith the Lord.' When the moral conscience thus functions it becomes a channel of

[1] See *Socrates*, by J. T. Forbes, chaps. v. and viii.

[2] Compare his *Critique of the Practical Reason* and his *Religion within the Bounds of Reason alone*.

divine revelation explicitly ; it is this implicitly even when, as in Socrates, the reason of man is exercised to determine what is right and good. We recognise then gratefully that God has not left Himself without witness in any land or age ; but that in nature, history, and conscience He has revealed Himself as well as in what has been already described as the core of all religion, the consciousness of immediate contact and intimate communion with God.

(4) We do not deny the reality nor depreciate the value, although we admit the insufficiency of this wider revelation, when we recognise that in the revelation through the Hebrew nation and the Jewish people by a succession of prophets God has more distinctly and certainly manifested His nature, character, and purpose. While our judgment of paganism may not be as severe as was Paul's in view of the aspects which came under his notice, yet we may recognise that human sin has perverted the development even of religion in man, that the light of God shone in a darkness which comprehended it not. Without regarding all pagan piety and morals as altogether due to artful wickedness, we must admit both degradation and inadequacy. What the progress of the divine revelation might have been in a sinless race, we cannot now conjecture. For man as he is, the wider revelation has not been sufficient.

(i) It was needful that there should be a revelation, from its beginning in the widest sense redemptive and reconciling, recovering men from error, wickedness, and hate, to truth, holiness, and love in communion with God. That it should be given through one people is quite in accord with God's method as we can observe it elsewhere. The human good has not been achieved universally, equally in all human beings. Within each society individual men have been selected for the furtherance of the common good, and so also societies in the human community. Limitation of interest and concentration of effort are the conditions of highest achievement in all spheres. The jack-of-all-trades is master of none. He would

be all things in general without being anything in particular. This principle applies no less to nations. The common illustration of this principle, because the most convincing, is the contribution of the Ancient to the Modern world in the Hebrew religion, the Greek culture, and the Roman law. When the world has been Christianised, doubtless India, China, and Japan will have a distinctive contribution to make to the application and interpretation of Christianity. No theist would deny that God was revealing Himself, some part of His nature, character, and purpose, in Greek culture and Roman law; but because the Hebrew contribution was religion, the conscious and voluntary relation of man to God, that revelation is explicit as in the other spheres it was rather implicit. Neither Greek sage nor Roman jurist said as did the prophet: 'Thus saith the Lord.' There was not the certainty of communion with and communication from God. It is the same God of infinite fullness and absolute perfection who is revealing Himself, but He does not reveal the same content by the same method.

(ii) If it be said that the difference is only subjective, and not objective, that there is only an increase of human receptivity and responsiveness, and not of divine communicativeness, it may be urged that the analogy of the human intercourse contradicts that assumption. A man lays bare his heart in his home as he does not in the world; he gives himself more freely to his friends than to strangers: his most sacred confidences are reserved for only a few, it may be only one, and poor is his life if he has not even one to whom he can thus turn. As Browning says, a man has a soul-side with which to face the world, and another to show a woman when he loves her. God's Fatherhood is universal, but His love is individually discriminating; with sinners He is grieved, His delight is in the excellent of the earth. God does surely impart His secret to them that fear Him; it is not merely that they are quicker than others to detect it. If we may use a physical analogy, it was the action of light on a more sensitive part of the

organism which gradually developed the eye. It is by the imparting of His light to select souls that their sight is developed as in no others. God is not passive, but active; it is His communication which develops man's receptivity and responsiveness. To say that the Hebrews had a genius for religion, or a tendency to monotheism, is to try to solve a problem by a phrase, and a phrase which does not correspond to fact. The Semitic kinsmen of Israel were not monotheistic, and the Israelites themselves were constantly lapsing into polytheism and idolatry. They were 'a disobedient and gainsaying people,' and God had to 'hew them by the prophets.' If we follow the history of prophecy from the eighth to the fifth century, we cannot regard the development of 'ethical monotheism' as simply a natural process; we must recognise an activity of God by His Spirit, and an activity which is different in its method from the universal activity of God in religion generally. As in a man's life there are habits in the common ways of intercourse with and influence on his fellows, and original acts in which he meets a new situation, or discloses himself more fully than he has ever done, so may we see that God in this nation by His prophets did act as nowhere else in human history to disclose His mind, unbare His heart, and assert His will.

(iii) The distinctive features of that activity are in God's providential dealing with that people, and in His inspiration of the succession of prophets. God's providence is over all nations, and each nation might write its own Bible. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 is, for instance, a parallel to the relief of the siege of Jerusalem in 701 B.C. But when we have allowed all this, the difference between the history of the Hebrew nation and that of any other nation is not simply that in the one case the human experiences were interpreted by the prophets as divine providences, and not in the other. We do not ignore or deny historical sequence or human agency; we do not assert continuous or frequent miracle; and nevertheless, as we watch this small nation, and the

contact of greater nations or mighty empires with it, and the influence of that contact on its moral and religious development, we cannot escape the impression of the Guiding and Guarding Hand of God. It was not an exaggerated patriotism or piety which led the prophets to interpret that history as the fulfilment of a divine purpose; theirs was no subjective illusion, but an objective illumination. 'Surely the Lord God will do nothing, but He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets' (Amos iii. 7). It is not on the records of miracles that this conclusion rests, but on the impression of the whole course of events. The records of miraculous occurrences are for the most part of so much later date than the events, that we are warranted in scrutinising them closely, and coming to the conclusion that the narrative can usually be explained by a misconception of a natural occurrence, *e.g.* the parting of the waters of the Red Sea, the provision of manna (Ex. xiv., xvi., etc.), or by a misinterpretation of a poetic phrase (as, for instance, the standing still of the sun, Joshua x. 12). The stories of Elijah and Elisha, it is clear, rest on popular tradition and are not as trustworthy as the historical narrative into which they have been fitted. It is not because of miracles, even should our studies lead us to admit their actuality—a question on which, in many cases, there must be suspension of judgment—but because the history itself is so significant morally and religiously that we include it as a medium of divine revelation. The record is undoubtedly pragmatic; sin and its punishment, repentance and its reward, do not so rapidly and invariably follow one another as the pious writers assume; but in the history as a whole a moral and religious purpose of God, which the events subserve, does disclose itself. The prophecy which interprets events as divine mercy or judgment, in so far as it is predictive, is conditional. God threatens a judgment which penitence may avert, or promises a mercy which unbelief may refuse. As has been already argued in another connection, we must not assume either foreknowledge or fore-

ordination by God of man's free acts. While God's intention is constant, His method is variable, adapted at each stage to man's response, whether of defiance or of submission. When we view the whole progress from Abraham and Moses to the prophets, and then its consummation in Jesus Christ, the Revealer of God and the Redeemer of men, we cannot doubt nor deny that this is 'the Lord's doing; it is marvellous in our eyes' (Ps. cxviii. 22). To think of all this movement of human history to such a goal as accidental is unreasonable. To ascribe it all to natural causality and human agency does not satisfy the reason. The moral conscience and the religious consciousness demand the recognition of the direction and control of the movement by God Himself. Such a view of revelation is much more impressive and convincing than the view that God dictated the record of it, defective as historical inquiry proves that record in many particulars to be; for God here teaches man in facts, and not in words, to lead, to succour, and to bless.

What makes the preparatory revelation in history so congruous with its consummation in the fact of Christ is that it is redemptive. Paul for the purpose of his argument and in relation to his opponents was entirely justified in contrasting Law and Gospel; but we should do grievous injustice to the previous history if we interpreted it as revealing God as Lawgiver primarily, and not as Saviour. The Exodus from Egypt and the Return from the Exile in Babylon are instances of national salvation wrought by God, and in between these are recorded many deliverances. And what is still more significant than the outward salvation of events is the inward salvation of experience. The 'ethical monotheism' of the prophets is a redemption of the mind and soul of man from error and sin. Forgiveness is not an unfamiliar word in the Old Testament. The relation of God becomes more individual than national, as the revelation progresses, and the Psalms contain confessions which Christian faith can still use of individual experiences

of the Saving God. It is a redemptive revelation in national history and individual experience that runs as a golden thread throughout the Old Testament records.

(iv) As we read the prophetic interpretation of the history as divine providence, we must ask ourselves: how could these men speak with such certainty and authority? They claimed to be the messengers of God, because God Himself had given them their message. Was theirs a 'vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself,' or did they speak the words of truth and soberness? The moral and religious quality of their teaching, so great a contrast to the religious and moral traditions and customs of their surroundings, assures us that they were not mistaken as to its source; it was not of man, and the will of man alone, but of God. They were inspired men, men conscious of God's presence with them, God's Spirit bringing enlightenment to their minds, enthusiasm to their hearts, energy to their wills, consecration to the one end of their lives. They were saved and consecrated men, and so their whole personality was not suppressed, but expanded and liberated as the channel of God's truth and grace. To say that God dictated their words would be to lower and not to heighten their claim. It was they who spake or wrote, each in his individual way, according to his talent, temperament, character, spirit; but it was God who by His Spirit made them the men they were. To transform human personality so that it becomes capable of conveying a divine message in human utterances is a greater thing than to dictate the message itself. That what now appear to us abnormal psychical conditions—visions and voices—accompanied the mood of exaltation in the prophet when in the presence of God we cannot doubt. These features have reappeared in religious revivals at different times and places. Necessary they may have been to the prophet himself to assure him that it was God's message which he was conveying in the moral and the spiritual intuitions which came to him. The

value of the prophetic inspiration for us now does not lie in any of these accompaniments, but in the prophet's moral and religious discernment, a discernment which was a quickening and a heightening of his personal capacities, and not a suppression of them. To attach importance to the abnormal as a proof of God's activity more convincing than this elevation and expansion of human personality is not religion, but superstition. God's activity is most manifest where He reproduces in men His own perfection in the measure in which they can receive it. That there was a succession of prophets, that we can discern a progressive revelation in their utterances, that these utterances were related to the signs of their times, is a concurrent argument, a threefold cord which cannot be broken, that God was indeed in this nation fulfilling a purpose central to human history.

(5) The fulfilment of this purpose is in Jesus Christ. We best understand the revelation recorded in the Old Testament as a Godward movement of man and a manward movement of God, coming to a unity in the God-man, perfect realisation of manhood, and perfect revelation of God. In the first section of this volume the fact of Christ has already been dealt with. The New Testament is the literature of the revelation of God in Christ, either the testimony to what He was, did, suffered, and achieved in His earthly manifestation, or the confession of what He proved in the living experience of believers as the living Saviour and Lord in His heavenly presence and power. To all believers was given in measure of their receptivity the Spirit of God. An inspired succession of solitary prophets is followed by an inspired community. There is no repetition of that objective manifestation of the divine truth and grace in the historical activity of Jesus Christ, but there is a continuation of that redemptive revelation of God in the subjective experience of believers within the community of the Spirit of God. It will be the purpose of the last section of this volume to show how God's purpose is being fulfilled until the end.

(6) It is necessary in view of current controversies to consider the question of the inspiration of the Bible, although it is a misfortune that that term has ever come to be used; for inspiration is personal, and writings are inspired only as they are written by inspired persons.

(i) In view of differences of readings in different MSS., and renderings in different versions (as, for instance, the Massoretic Hebrew, and the Septuagint Greek), it is simply impossible to maintain the theory of verbal inspiration. To fall back on the inspiration of the original autograph is a counsel of despair, as we do not possess it, and are not likely ever to recover it. To insist on inerrancy in the record of fact is to ignore the discrepancies that the historical documents themselves disclose, as between *Kings* and *Chronicles*, and between the Synoptic and the Johannine reports; the methods of composition which an examination of the writings makes evident; and the improbability of the continuous miracle which would have been necessary to preserve the writers from error in the conditions under which their work was accomplished. To claim that the whole Bible is infallible in practice or doctrine is not only to involve the believer in mental, moral, and religious confusion, but to deny what is not a defect, but a merit of God's method of revelation, that it is progressive, adapted to the stage of human development reached. Polygamy and slavery are not expressly condemned in the records of these practices, and yet the Christian conscience has learned by the enlightening of God's Spirit to condemn them. Christendom has suffered incalculable injury by assigning equal authority to the preparatory and to the consummating revelation. Christ alone had the Spirit without measure, and He alone is infallible as Revealer of God and Redeemer of men. By Him must the worth of every part of the Bible be tested, and if this is done it will be impossible to maintain that every part is of equal authority for thought and life.

(ii) What we mean by the inspiration of the Bible

is that it is fully adequate to make wise unto salvation (2 Tim. iii. 15), to equip the man of God for every good work (*v.* 17), to lead him who seeks salvation to the Saviour, and to nourish the eternal life in the saved through closer intimacy with the living Lord. It is inspired as it inspires, as it becomes the medium of the Spirit of God to enlighten, quicken, renew, purify, and perfect the soul. It is the literary channel through which the redemptive revelation in Christ is permanently preserved and universally diffused in the world; but precious as the vessel may be, we must not confuse it with the treasure which it contains and conveys, the Living and Mighty Word of God, the self-manifestation and self-communication of God to men. We must not substitute an inspired book for inspired men, nor inspired men for the God who inspires them. If all Christians were themselves more inspired by the Spirit of God, the Spirit of truth and wisdom, of confidence and courage, of holiness and, most of all, love, the nature, character, and purpose of God, they would not contend as they unhappily do about theories of inspiration. A theory, however tenaciously or even pugnaciously asserted, which is not sustained by and does not give evidence of an experience of the Spirit's presence and power, and a corresponding character in the fruits of the Spirit, has no convincing force.

(iii) The theories which have been briefly touched upon and which have been rejected must be so dealt with because they can bring only confusion and conflict into Christian thought and life. It is such theories, and such theories alone, which bring the Bible into antagonism to science and history, reason and conscience. To oppose *Genesis* to geology is to court defeat for the religion which offers such a challenge to assured knowledge. To harmonise by mental violence records that are discordant is only to irritate those who know and use approved historical methods of inquiry into the records of the past. To assert on the basis of a number of texts a conception of God which a sound reason must reject is to turn an ally

into an enemy of religion. To justify conduct which offends conscience on the ground that it is recorded without condemnation in the Bible is to provoke the man of sound moral judgment into unbelief. Many of the difficulties which a popular scepticism puts forward to the distress of anxious inquirers after truth disappear altogether when the true purpose of revelation, and consequently the real nature of inspiration, have been recognised. What has here been written has not been written to depreciate the Bible, but rather that the Bible may be properly appreciated as the human literature, which does not supersede any of the manifold activities of the personality of man, but is the channel of that gift of God to man which man by no search or striving could for himself attain, the knowledge of and the life in God.

II

(1) Because there is evil in the world the revelation of God must be redemptive, in the widest sense of redeeming men from pain as well as sin, error as well as hate, social wrong as well as individual vice. The redemptive revelation of God is consummated in Christ and His Cross. This transcendent saving act of God has already been fully discussed in the first section of this volume. But regarding it some things may here be added.

(i) Christ must not be separated even in His Cross from the previous history which finds its fulfilment in Him. As has already been indicated, the process of redemption had been going on from the beginning, and God had again and again proved Himself the Saviour God. In nature there are redemptive processes: there is the *vis medicatrix naturae*; how speedily does nature restore the ruin which earthquake, fire, or tempest have wrought! whenever a living organism is injured the process of healing is begun; when this process fails, the failure attracts our attention; but we do not realise how many bodily hurts are cured, how many a danger to health is escaped.

Pain itself is a signal of a danger against which precautions may be taken, or a disease for which the means of cure must be used. If, as reason conjectures, but faith affirms, there is immortality for man, then even out of death God saves into life, and we have ground for hoping into more abundant life. In history there are redemptive events, the deliverance of a nation or nations from cruelty, oppression, bondage, despair. The Bible is the record of the succouring hand of God. But it is in the personal life of man, his recovery from sin and its consequences by penitence and faith, which the Spirit of God inspires, that there is the clearest proof that it is not God's will that any should perish, but that all should be saved, that judgment is His strange work, and that in mercy is all His delight, that He has joy in forgiving.

(ii) Christ on His Cross must not be separated from God, the Son from the Father. That the sacrifice might be complete, that the Saviour might experience the final consequence of sin, it was needful that He should pass through that desolation of soul which was uttered in the cry of dereliction; but we should not so understand that experience as to infer that because He felt forsaken by His Father, God had forsaken Him. In that hour the Father was suffering in and with the Son. Any theory of the Atonement which represents Christ as doing something for man's salvation apart from God, or to bring about a change in God, is false. Christ's Cross is not a sacrifice man offers to God, but a sacrifice endured by God that by it man might be saved. God is a fellow-sufferer with man, centrally, supremely in Christ and His Cross, but always and everywhere also where men suffer. Even the sorrow sin brings God shares, and surely because it is brought by sin it is the greater sorrow to God. And also, because God shares it, when man realises what it costs God, as is most clearly and fully shown on the Cross, God's passion becomes redemptive, restoring man through penitence and faith to Himself.

(iii) If we thus see God in Christ sharing the Cross, we shall put a far deeper meaning into the redemptive

character of God's revelation. It has sometimes been understood as meaning that it is the communication of the truth that God as Father loves and forgives, which, when believed, saves. But the truth of God's eternal nature is revealed, not in words, but in action and passion in history, in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. God's revelation redeems, because God in Christ is revealed as doing and suffering all that is needed to change the heart of man by disclosing God's judgment on sin in the sacrifice by which forgiveness is conveyed. This subject need not be pursued further in this connection, as it has been adequately discussed, but so much must be said to ward off a shallow and narrow intellectualist conception of revelation and redemption. The sacrifice which saves is a real experience to God, as He is immanent in the history of man as fellow-sufferer with men.

(iv) What is thus revealed in history is what belongs to the eternal nature of God. He is ever sacrificial and redemptive love; to use the symbolic language of Scripture, 'the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world,' 'in the midst of the throne there is a Lamb as it had been slain' (Rev. xiii. 8, v. 6). It was this sacrificial and redemptive love, sufficient to solve the problem of sin and pain in the world, that was the motive of creation. God could create a race that could fall into sin and bring on itself the curse of sin, because He could redeem by a love more effective in the realm of the spirit than any creative power, wisdom, or goodness. As we gaze on the Cross of Christ, the heavens are opened, and we discover as ultimate and final in the world Love, which saves because it suffers.

(2) A new light is thrown on the mystery of pain; salvation is by sacrifice; and we must not assume that the sole reason for this is sin. For it is in sacrifice that what is best in man and (in reverence even we dare to add) in God is exercised and expressed.

(i) It is worth while to consider how in the preparatory revelation this truth was reached. The assumption common in morality and religion is this,

that the righteous prosper, because God rewards them, and that the wicked perish, because God punishes them. This is the assumption of the historical records, and this is the problem of the Book of Job. The Psalter (Ps. i.) begins with an unqualified assertion of it. When it was discovered that it was not so in fact, God was invoked to take vengeance on sinners: 'Men of the world, whose portion is in *this* life, And whose belly Thou fillest with Thy treasure: They are satisfied with children, And leave the rest of their substance to their babes' (Ps. xvii. 14). A solution of the problem was sought in two directions. The last verse of this psalm suggests a solution, or rather, as the language is ambiguous, one or other of two closely related solutions. The words (*v.* 15, 'As for me, I shall behold Thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with Thy likeness') mean either that the inner life of communion with God compensates for all outer sorrows or sufferings, or that in a future life there will be compensation for the ills of the present. It depends on the date which we assign to the psalm whether we can adopt the first or the second interpretation. These are related to one another, for it is the present communion with God which gives assurance of future blessedness. The other fact in which a solution was sought was expressed in the popular proverb the use of which both Jeremiah and Ezekiel rebuke: 'The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge' (xxxi. 29 and xviii. 2). Both oppose to it an unqualified individualism, inadequate in itself to solve the problem, but in the circumstances needing to be emphasised. If the fathers do not suffer for their sins, their children will. In Psalm li. a significance is found in suffering. The sorrow of penitence secures God's forgiveness: 'The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise' (*v.* 17). But in Isaiah liii. the highest solution is found; the righteous saves by his sufferings. That prophetic vision became historical reality in Jesus Christ. These previous solutions

were part of the truth. There is a moral order in the world, sin has its consequences for the individual, his descendants, and the society to which he belongs. Alike in the inner life with God and in the hope of blessedness hereafter there is compensation for present sufferings. Good is the grief of the penitent, but best for sin's judgment and the sinner's deliverance is the vicarious suffering of the holy and loving.

(ii) The suffering does not profit only the sinners: the saint who so suffers is made the more a saint thereby. In sacrifice personality finds itself in losing itself. Were there no pain in the world, where were endurance, courage, heroism, venture, sacrifice, compassion, sympathy, the finest qualities of the soul of man? Pain is not in the world solely because of sin, as its consequence or its remedy. It was in the world before sin entered, it may still be when sin has passed. It is more deeply rooted in the constitution of the world than sin is, because it is in the very nature of God as sin is not, and cannot be. Even in a sinless world there might have been an Incarnation, and an Incarnation which was also a participation in such pain as might have been in a sinless world. So long as we think of pain as an unmitigated evil as sin is, we shall not be able to see clearly in the world the revelation of God, which by the very constitution of the world, and in the very nature of God, must be redemptive, salvation if not from sin, yet from pain, by sacrifice, from an unblessed pain by a sacrifice thrice blessed. We must go to the most Christian of the poets of last century for the best expression of this truth:

'Would I suffer for him that I love? So wouldst Thou—so wilt Thou!
So shall crown Thee the topmost, ineffablest, uttermost Crown—
And Thy love fill infinitude wholly, nor leave up nor down
One spot for the creature to stand in! It is by no breath,
Turn of eye, wave of hand, that Salvation joins issue with death!
As Thy Love is discovered almighty, almighty be proved
Thy power, that exists with and for it, of Being beloved!
He who did most, shall bear most; the strongest shall stand the most weak.
'Tis the weakness in strength that I cry for! my flesh, that I seek

> In the Godhead! I seek and I find it. O Saul, it shall be
> A Face like my face shall receive thee: a Man like to me
> Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever! a Hand like this hand
> Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee! See the Christ stand!'
>
> Browning's *Saul*.

What the poet represents as alone sufficient to meet Saul's desperate necessity, that all mankind needs.

(3) The revelation of God is not yet ended. God has not withdrawn into indifference and inactivity.

(i) There is not, it is true, a chosen people with a history which a succession of prophets is interpreting as divine providence. All humanity is now elect of God unto salvation, if faith receive the grace freely offered; and to all believers the Spirit is given according to their faith. The Son of Man, and Son of God, Saviour and Lord, has not been excelled, cannot be superseded; He is the universal presence and the supreme authority (Matt. xxviii. 18-20). A revelation more adequate, or a redemption more effective than His is not to be desired or expected, indeed cannot be conceived. But with Him as Head there is being formed on earth a body in which He by His Spirit lives, a temple for God worthier and fitter than any temple which human hands could fashion (Eph. i. 23, ii. 21). As the Son was manifested, so through Him there shall yet be the manifestation of the sons of God (Rom. viii. 19). That is being actualised universally which was in promise and potency individually realised in Jesus Christ, the firstborn among many brethren. Just because God is by His Spirit so immanent in men, this revelation of God has not the objectivity which the revelation consummated in the historical manifestation in Christ had, but it is not on that account the less real. For a succession of inspired prophets there is an inspired community of believers. For the providence then discovered in the history of their nation there is a universal purpose of God, the Kingdom of God, being fulfilled. For the solitary Son there is that Son as the Captain of salvation leading many sons unto glory (Heb. ii. 10). According to the teaching of Jesus Himself the mission

of the Spirit is subordinate to the mission of the Son, the interpretation and application of the revelation in Him (John xvi. 13-14), but it is no less a continuation of His mission, a completion of the revelation of God in the world to men. The love of the Father revealed in word and deed, action and passion, life and death, sacrifice and salvation in the grace of the Son is being progressively realised in mankind by the community of the Holy Spirit. This subject will be dealt with in the next section. What alone needs at this point to be emphasised is that there is continuity of revelation. God has not ceased to reveal Himself, and it is the same God who is being by His Spirit revealed in individual and collective Christian experience as was revealed by the prophets, and in the Son. He is realising His Fatherhood towards mankind in reproducing His perfection in His sons.

(ii) With change of method there is the same essential character; the revelation is still redemptive. The sacrifice of the Cross was offered once for all; it need not be repeated, nor can it be added to; but the grace which it conveys must be appropriated by faith. Believers must be crucified with Christ in their penitence, so as to die unto sin, and be raised again in their faith, so as with Him to be alive unto God (Rom. vi. 3-10). While that Cross stands solitary in its supremacy as the manifestation of the holy love of God, judging and forgiving sin, and thus atoning for it, the eternal nature of God, which is there temporally expressed, and the historical process of which this is the culmination continue. God is still suffering with man as He is saving man: and He is suffering in His saints, whose sacrifice is making that sacrifice of Christ universally and permanently effective unto salvation. God has no other method, and it is to depreciate the method of salvation by sacrifice to desire or expect God to substitute any other. Second Adventism, when we examine it closely, really involves unbelief in God and man, unbelief that God can save in this method, and unbelief that man can be so saved. Whatever the consummation of

human history may be, it will not be by a miraculous interference of the divine omnipotence, but by the completion of the redemptive revelation of God, the Saviour seeing of the travail of His soul and being satisfied (Is. liii. 11). Here again we must insist on the consistent and courageous application of the regulative theological principle, that we must interpret God in His nature, character, and purpose through Christ and Christ alone, as Father, as holy love, as love sacrificial and redemptive, active only for the ends and by the means congruous with what the Father is seen to be in the Son. Thus and thus alone can we have a genuinely and distinctively Christian theology. To possess such a theology is not merely an intellectual interest; it is a practical necessity. We can have the Christian experience, the Christian character, the Christian society, the Christian consummation, as all thought and life are guarded by Christ's revelation as Son of God as Father. The love of the Father through the grace of the Son can alone issue in the community of the Spirit.

SECTION III

THE COMMUNITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

INTRODUCTORY

(1) The third clause in the Apostolic Benediction has not received the attention in Christian thought and life which should properly be assigned to it. The love of God (the eternal reality) revealed in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ (the historical mediation) is realised in the community of the Spirit (the social personal experience). The movement of God manwards in revelation and the movement of man Godwards in religion unite in the typical divine-human personality, Jesus Christ; the purpose of God in Him, however, is not completed until through His mediation the community of the Spirit, the family of God on earth, is fully constituted. To the historical facts and the doctrinal truths of Christianity much more attention has been given than to the Christian experience, character, and society which are the results of the manifestation of God in history. Ecclesiastical controversy has on the one hand been concerned about the doctrine of the Church; individual pietism has on the other hand concerned itself about the doctrine of the Spirit with good intent, but not sound judgment. In the theological development of the Church an adequate importance has not been attached to the doctrine, and it has not been so exhaustively treated as the other themes. The continuity of the doctrine of the Spirit with the doctrines of God and Christ has not been sufficiently emphasised, and the doctrines which are usually mentioned in the third section of the historical creeds have not been unified as they should have been in the doctrine of the Spirit. Two recent writers, Dr. Denney [1] and Dr. Thomas Rees,[2] so identify the Spirit with the

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, pp. 307-12.
[2] *The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience*, pp. 210-11.

Living Christ as virtually to deny the necessity of a separate treatment of the two doctrines. The writer of this volume is convinced that this tendency is altogether mistaken, and that Christian life no less than Christian thought loses because the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is neglected. All that belongs to the experimental, practical, social realisation of the Christian revelation and redemption is bound up with the presence and activity of the Spirit of God in the individual, the Church, and the world. A recognition of the truth that God is continuing and completing His revelation and redemption of man in Jesus Christ by the Spirit is a necessary condition for such a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity as will make it not a burden on the thought, but a boon to the life of Christians. Whether he succeed or not the writer will at least endeavour so to deal with this theme as to give effect to this conviction.

(2) The consideration of the subject must be begun with a statement regarding the nature and operation of the Holy Spirit, based on the Holy Scriptures, but also illustrated by the history of the Church. In the next place must come the doctrine of the Church, treated not controversially, but constructively, not primarily as an historical organisation, but as a spiritual community, invisible in its essence, but made visible in its witness, worship, and work. This rightly is placed before the treatment of individual experience and character, as it is by the testimony and influence of the Church that the Christian life is individually begun, the personal relation to Christ as Saviour and Lord being historically mediated by the Christian community; and as it is continued and completed in the fellowship and service of that community. Since the Christian experience and character do not fulfil their promise, or realise their possibility in this earthly life, Christian faith and love reach beyond 'the bourn from which no traveller returns,' in Christian hope, the earnest of which is the presence and working of the Spirit in the individual experience and character (2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Eph. i. 14). As,

however, Christian personality is by its very nature and ideal social, dependent on and contributory to the Christian society, and as the Christian society is in the world to make all mankind one family of God, the Christian hope is not and cannot be merely individual. It must expand into the expectation of the Kingdom of God, established on earth, and yet only consummated in heaven, the temple of humanity, a habitation for God by His Spirit (Eph. ii. 21-22). Ecclesiastical and eschatological questions about which there has been so much debate will be approached from this highest standpoint, God's fulfilment by His Spirit of His purpose in Christ.

CHAPTER I

THE HOLY SPIRIT

(1) If this volume dealt with Biblical Theology it would be necessary to treat fully the doctrine of the Spirit in the Old and the New Testament; but for this essay in Constructive Theology a brief summary must suffice.

(i) The Old Testament doctrine has as its background the *animism* which is an almost universal element in man's religious beliefs. Whether it is, as was once assumed, the most primitive philosophy, or explanation of the world and man, or there lie behind it still simpler modes of thought, as is now maintained, such as *animatism*, the consciousness of being alive in a world alive, or *dynamism*, the sense of power in self and things around, or *teratism*, the feeling of wonder or mystery, need not now be determined.[1] It is enough for us to begin with *animism*, the belief in a soul or spirit resident in, active through, and yet separable from the body, temporarily in sleep, permanently at death. This view is assumed in the earlier account of the creation of man, and brought into relation with the monotheistic belief. 'And Yahweh shaped man from dust out of the ground, and blew into his nostrils breath of life, so that man became a living soul' (Gen. ii. 7). The term here used is *nephesh*. A similar term, although it came to be used afterwards with a different shade of meaning, is *ruach*. Man in his creatureliness and weakness is *flesh*; as an individual living being he is *soul* (*nephesh*); as related to, and dependent on God

[1] See *The Threshold of Religion*, by R. R. Marrett.

he is *spirit* (*ruach*) ; but we must beware of supposing that man is thought of as composed of three parts, and not as presenting three aspects of one whole. The term *ruach* claims closer consideration. ' The remaining term, *ruach*,' says Wheeler-Robinson,[1] ' covers a wider range of usage, in a development less easy to trace. It occurs 378 times, denoting (*a*) wind, natural or figurative (131) ; (*b*) supernatural influences acting on man, rarely on inanimate objects (134) ; (*c*) the principle of life (like *nephesh*) or of its energies (39) ; (*d*) the resultant psychical life (74). The classification itself, with the proportion of usage, shows that we have to do with something more than a mere synonym of *nephesh*, and this is corroborated by certain details of the process of its development.' In the later literature the use of the term is kept ' at a higher plane of meaning than that of *nephesh*,' and relates man more closely to God as having his life from God. While man is living soul because God has breathed spirit into body, God Himself is Spirit without body. We must now consider the doctrine of the Spirit of God.

(ii) ' It was enough for Hebrew faith,' says Wheeler-Robinson,[2] ' that Nature and history alike are at God's disposal, and for Hebrew experience that man is able to rebel against God, though he cannot escape from God. The conception of the Spirit of God initiates a deeper conception of the relation of man to Him. The term " spirit " (*ruach*) occurs about 134 times in the Old Testament in regard to supernatural influences, acting on man in almost every case ; it is rarely used, as in Genesis i. 2, of influence on inanimate objects. The idea of the specific influence develops with the idea of God Himself. In its personal use we may trace at least five stages, according to the effect produced, the classification being broadly chronological as well as conceptual. (1) In the earliest literature such phenomena as

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, pp. 17-18. *Cf.* Rees, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 64-5.

madness (1 Sam. xvi. 14), ecstatic prophesying (xix. 20), or superhuman strength (Judges xiv. 6), are ascribed to divine influence. (2) This is also seen in remarkable events (Judges vi. 34), or lives (Gen. xli. 38). (3) To the *ruach* of God is ascribed the prophetic consciousness (Num. xxiv. 2; Ezek. ii. 2), though the prophets of the eighth century avoid a term probably discredited by some of its alleged manifestations. Later on, however, revelation in general is thought to be mediated by the *ruach* of God (Zech. vii. 12; Neh. ix. 30). (4) To the same source are ascribed technical skill (Ex. xxviii. 3) and practical ability (Deut. xxxiv. 9) when exhibited in some marked degree. (5) Finally, we reach a group of cases in which the effect of the *ruach* of God is seen in more general conduct and character, as when the Psalmist prays, "Take not thy holy *ruach* from me" (li. 11); or the *ruach* of Yahweh is said to be on one who gives himself to the proclamation of the Old Testament Gospel (Is. lxi. 1*f.*). In this group we reach a direct point of contact with the New Testament doctrine of the Spirit of God; the outpouring of the Spirit on all flesh declared by Joel (ii. 28*f.*, *cf.* Is. xxxii. 15, xliv. 3, lix. 21; Zech. xii. 10) is said by Peter to be fulfilled in the era inaugurated by Pentecost (Acts ii. 16). The connection in this case is more than verbal; the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit of God is in closest genetic relation to the New Testament doctrine of man's renewal by the Spirit of Christ, and divine providence fitly culminates in the experience of Christian salvation.' In some of the uses of the term we see the tendency of religious thought to regard the abnormal, or extraordinary, as supernatural, and so to ascribe it to the direct action of God, as we should not do to-day. The illumination of the prophet or the purification of the saint we should still regard as the work of the Spirit of God in man. This distinction is, as we shall afterwards show, of very great importance. J. G. Simpson[1] has tabulated the

[1] Hastings' one-volume *Dictionary of the Bible*, p. 358.

activities ascribed in the Old Testament to the Spirit of God :



(iii) We must ask this further question : What is the relation to God of the Spirit of God, and of the parallel conception of the Word of God ? This is Schultz's answer :[1] 'God's vital force, which is represented in a concrete way as His breath, proceeds from Him, and becomes the source of created life in whatever it breathes upon. . . . His word creates the world—that is, God's inner world of thought becomes, through his will, the source of life outside of Himself. The Spirit and the Word of God are represented as forces locked up in God. The Spirit appears as very independent, just like a hypostasis or person.' The Old Testament, however, has no doctrine of personal distinctions within God Himself. The Spirit and the Word are God's immanent activity in the world, often so spoken of as to be distinguished from one another, and even from God as He is in Himself in His transcendent being. In the later conception of Wisdom there seems to be even more the tendency to hypostatise, that is, to assign a separate existence distinct from God Himself, but it remains only a tendency. As the term Spirit of God is used in the Old Testament it cannot be regarded as due to a separation of God from the world, an emphasis on His transcendence ; it rather asserts God's connection with nature and man, an emphasis on His immanence. But thought has not gone so far as to raise the problem of the relation of the tran-

[1] *Old Testament Theology*, Eng. trans., ii. p. 184.

scendence and the immanence, the function of the Spirit of God in the inner life of God Himself. The fuller revelation of the New Testament was necessary to challenge the mind of man with this problem.

(2) The features of the Old Testament representation are continued in that of the New Testament.

(i) The descent of the Spirit on Jesus at the Baptism means, as the subsequent Temptation shows, that He then became fully conscious of His Sonship, and of the accompanying endowment of supernatural power (Matt. iii. 13-iv. 11). As was the community of believers at Pentecost, so was He filled with enthusiasm for His calling, and it was with this enthusiasm He entered on His ministry (Luke iv. 14). He claimed to preach as endowed by the Spirit, even as did the prophet of old (*v.* 18). His was the Spirit-filled life ; the Spirit was not given to Him by measure (John iii. 34, A.V.), or without measure He could impart that gift (R.V.). It was by the Spirit of God that He cast out devils (Matt. xii. 28). Thus the immanent activity of God was even in the Incarnate Son as in other men conceived as the presence and activity of the Spirit of God. The significance of this truth for the doctrine of the Trinity will need to be considered at a later stage of the discussion. Jesus promised the Spirit to the disciples as their inspiration, when defending themselves against their persecutors (x. 20), and bade them wait in Jerusalem till ' clothed with power from on high ' (Luke xxiv. 49), the baptism of the Holy Ghost (Acts i. 5).

(ii) This promise is presented with much greater detail in the Fourth Gospel. Here the reminiscences of the eye-witness are developed in reflections which he believed to be the unfolding by the promised Spirit of the meaning of the words of Jesus. It is impossible to discuss the passages in John xiv.-xvi. in detail, but a summary based on a minute exegesis may be given to throw into relief the main truths presented. By prayer the Master, in view of His separation from His disciples, secured for them another Counsellor and Helper (*ἄλλον παράκλητον*), who will be present

to them, and Christ in Him, while unseen by the world (xiv. 16-20). (The Spirit is both the Spirit of Truth and the Holy Spirit, truth being the means used and holiness the aim attained.) As coming in Christ's name the Spirit will continue the revelation of God in Him by recalling the teaching already given, and adding such teaching as the disciples may need (*v.* 26). This continuation of the work of Jesus by the Spirit is to extend to the world, as the disciples who have known the whole of the earthly ministry will bear a witness which will be confirmed by the Spirit (xv. 26-27). Jesus must Himself depart before the Spirit can come. (The new phase of the disciples' experience cannot begin till the present phase is over. And the new phase will be possible only when the work of Christ—His death and resurrection—is accomplished.) The world will be convicted by the Spirit in three respects. He will expose the world's sin, its unbelief in the Messiah. He will demonstrate the righteousness of the exalted Son of God. He will make manifest that it is, not Christ, but the power of evil that has been tried and condemned. (The convictions of the human conscience in regard to the significance of Christ's death are here represented as the Spirit's work.) In contrast to the work of the Spirit in the world is His work in the disciples. Because of their immaturity the Master has left His work unfinished. The Spirit will both show them the meaning of truths which they have not understood, and teach them truths they have not been able to receive at all. Not a new revelation is to be given, but the revelation already given will be unfolded. The Spirit's function is throughout this passage (xvi. 7-15) subordinated to the person and work of Christ. The clause in verse 13, 'He shall declare unto you the things that are to come,' expresses the older view of the predictive function of the Spirit, and is probably an editorial addition which is inconsistent with the context. The Fourth Gospel marks the highest stage in the development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament. Except in the one reference

to prediction, what may be called the supernatural elements of knowledge or power disappear; and the Spirit's function is to continue the work of Christ as illumining the minds of the disciples so that they should remember and understand the teaching of Jesus. The Spirit does not supersede Christ, but makes His invisible and inaudible presence real. He does not supplant or add to the revelation in Christ, but interprets and applies its truths according to the disciples' need. As we shall see, the development of the doctrine in Paul lays emphasis on the Spirit's work of sanctification; here the stress is on illumination.

(iii) In the Acts of the Apostles we have a return to the more primitive type of representation. (*a*) The Spirit comes upon and fills the company of believers; there is a fresh enthusiasm and a new energy; there are what are regarded as supernatural manifestations, some of which we should to-day regard as abnormal psychical conditions due to intense excitement and similar to those which have been witnessed at other religious revivals (Acts ii. 1-13). The apostles showed a boldness and readiness of speech such as was not expected from men not trained in the Rabbinic schools (iv. 13), and performed miracles in the name of Christ (iii. 6, etc.). The preaching was with such convincing and converting power that large numbers were added to the company of believers (ii. 40-42). The 'holy contagion' spread; for on the believers in Samaria, won by the preaching of Philip, the Holy Ghost fell, when Peter and John laid their hands upon them (viii. 14-17). We need not assume anything magical; the receptivity for the common gift would be stimulated by this contact with the representatives of the primitive community in Jerusalem. We need not now give the explanation of this inward change that at the time these believers themselves held.

(*b*) As we read the record we frequently meet the phrase 'filled with the Holy Ghost' or 'filled with Holy Ghost' (with or without the article). Whether

Dr. Bartlet's[1] explanation that the absence of the article indicates that not the divine agency but the human condition is being described be correct or not, yet what is referred to is well expressed by the phrase he suggests, 'holy enthusiasm.' A religious revival with an intense emotional character is the nearest analogy to enable us to understand what, consequent on Pentecost, the condition of the primitive community was. In endeavouring thus to understand the subjective condition we are not denying or depreciating the divine agency, the presence and the work of the Holy Spirit. There came a certain and confident consciousness that the promise of Christ had been fulfilled, and that His visible presence was being replaced by this invisible Companion and Helper. Such a consciousness was accompanied by intense emotion, emotion so intense as to break down habitual control, and to burst forth in abnormal psychic states. That our psychology can offer an explanation of the genesis of these states in the intense emotion is no challenge of the truth of the consciousness, its correspondence with reality. Why this experience came as and when it did, is also capable of psychological explanation. Pentecost was consequent on the Resurrection. But time was needed for the conviction of the witnesses that Christ was not dead, but risen, and was living and reigning, to get firm root in their own minds, and to spread to and get rooted in other minds, until the certainty possessed the whole of the community. He who has been engaged in the pursuit of truth knows with what glow of feeling he passes from doubt to assurance. It was when faith in the Risen Lord was fixed, that there was the necessary receptivity for and responsiveness to the divine reality, the Spirit of God promised by Christ Himself. It was as believers continued together in prayer and meditation and converse that this consciousness was spread to all and was strengthened in each. It is now recognised that a crowd thinks, feels, and acts together, as individuals in it

[1] Acts, in *Century Bible*, pp. 386-8.

would not act alone. It was because they tarried together that the promise was fulfilled in this common experience.

(*c*) There is one feature of the manifestation at Pentecost which claims closer consideration, the speaking with tongues, ' other tongues ' (*v.* 4). The explanation that the writer of Acts gives that foreign languages were spoken (*v.* 11) is now generally set aside by even conservative scholars, mainly because Paul's explanation of the phenomenon is so different and very much more intelligible (1 Cor. xiv). Jesus always refused to work a miracle as a sign from heaven to overcome unbelief (Matt. xii. 39, xvi. 4). He only used His power when there was adequate occasion for it. His were miracles of compassion and succour, not of ostentation; such a use of His endowment He set aside in His refusal to cast Himself down from the pinnacle of the Temple (Matt. iv. 5-7). Had the apostles on this occasion spoken in foreign languages, there would have been a miracle of *show* and not of *need*. These ' Jews, devout men, from every nation under heaven ' (*v.* 5), all spoke Greek, the *lingua franca* of the Jews scattered among the Gentiles, even if they had not acquired Aramaic, the language commonly spoken in Palestine. Even if they knew another language, spoken in the country from which they had come, how could they distinguish it in the confusion of sound, when in their intense excitement the whole company of believers was uttering praise at the same time? There is not a trace of evidence in the subsequent history that the messengers of the Gospel were helped in the discharge of their task by a knowledge of the language locally spoken. Barnabas and Paul did not understand the language of Lycaonia (xiv. 11). It is not God's method to supersede human labour by miracle. Peter in his speech makes no reference to any such miracle, and the other references to the gift of tongues in Acts (x. 46, xi. 15, xix. 6) require no such explanation. Would the use of foreign languages understood by the hearers lead to the charge of drunkenness

(*v.* 13) ? In Paul's letters there are references to this gift of tongues as 'ecstatic prayer, song, or blessing by inspiration, but without the full co-operation of the understanding (1 Cor. xiv. 14-17).'[1] In verse 2 Paul shows what this speech was : 'He that speaketh in a tongue speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . in (a) spirit he speaketh mysteries.' The tongues to be made intelligible to others needed to be interpreted, and the ability to do this was also regarded as a gift of the Spirit (xii. 30). The impression on the unbelieving of the speaking with tongues is described by Paul in the words : 'Will they not say that ye are mad ?' (xiv. 23). It is clearly the same phenomenon Paul is describing.

(iv) In regard to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit Paul has given an explanation, offered a contribution, and set a problem. He has enabled us to understand the spiritual gifts as the record of Acts does not. He has developed the doctrine of sanctification by the Spirit. He has raised the difficulty for our thought of the relation of the living Christ to the Spirit. (*a*) We can almost feel grateful for the difficulties and perplexities which Paul met with in his 'cure of souls,' 'his care of all the churches,' because in dealing with these he has cast light on many dark places in the history of the early Church. Had not abuse in the exercise of the spiritual gifts in Corinth led to disorder in the assemblies for worship, we should not have had an explanation of the gift of tongues. 1 Corinthians xii. gives us a fuller account of the spiritual gifts than any other passage. Paul insists on the unity of their source in the diversity of their modes, and the consequent duty of harmony and not discord in their exercise. Not individual conceit is to be gratified, but the common edification promoted. As love is superior to them all, so love is to be the motive, and determine the manner and the measure of their exercise. These gifts seem to fall into three classes for our thinking. (1) There are natural gifts which are stimulated by the Spirit ; wisdom, knowledge, faith are all normal

[1] Bartlet, *The Acts*, p. 140.

activities of human personality; (2) there are abnormal psychic states, as divers kinds of tongues (ecstatic utterances); (3) there are what from the description of them we should describe as supernatural endowments, such as gifts of healings and workings of miracles and prophecy as prediction. It may be that modern psychology will enable us to offer an explanation of the third class, which will bring them more within the range of normal human endowments, even if only exceptionally possessed. Paul included the governments (or 'wise counsels,' R.V. marg.) as well as apostles, prophets, and teachers as spiritually endowed. The Christian Church was a community of the Spirit, and all members were qualified for their respective functions by their diverse gifts. None of these gifts was depreciated by Paul; in all he recognised the presence and power of the Spirit of God; but he showed his discernment in valuing more highly the gifts that were used in service than the gifts which could be used for show, whereas many of the Corinthians thought more highly of display than of duty. It is a misfortune that the thirteenth chapter has been cut off from the twelfth, as it is the climax of the argument. The way more excellent than the exercise of any gifts is the way of love. This leads us to consider Paul's contribution to the doctrine of the Spirit.

(*b*) The tendency in the record in Acts, as in the churches generally, was to identify the work of the Spirit with the abnormal or supernatural manifestations. Paul saw the danger, and sought to meet it by his doctrine of sanctification by the Spirit. He recognised that his own exposition of justification by faith in Christ and His atoning death alone might be so misunderstood and misrepresented as to be an encouragement to moral laxity. The objection to his view expressed by him as a question, 'Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?' (Rom. vi. 1), was no man of straw, set up to be knocked down. There was a real danger, and the history of the Christian Church has shown the reality of the danger. He meets it in that passage by asserting that faith

is so immediate a contact and so intimate a relation with Jesus Christ that there is identity of interest, purpose, and effort. The believer dies with Christ unto sin, and rises with Christ to live unto God (*vv.* 1-14). This process of inward change is by him called sanctification, and the divine agency in the process is the Spirit. In the next paragraph we shall consider how the Living Christ and the Spirit are related for Paul's thought. What now claims emphasis is that Paul saw the work of the Spirit more clearly and fully in Christian character than in any spiritual gifts, and the determining principle of Christian character was for him as for Christ, love, which 'worketh no ill to his neighbour: love therefore is the fulfilment of the law' (Rom. xiii. 10). This love itself, however, is not obedience to commandments; conduct follows from motive, purpose, aspiration. It is not conformity to an outward law; it is transformation by an inner life. 'The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance; against such there is no law' (Gal. v. 22-23). Romans xii., after dealing with the exercise of spiritual gifts, expounds what is involved in human relations by the activity of love unfeigned. In the chapter dealing with the Christian life, Christian ethics will be discussed more fully, as also the subjective aspect of this process of sanctification by the Spirit. What here demands notice is that in Paul's theology there is a development of the primitive doctrine of the Spirit, parallel to that in the Johannine writings, but here the stress is on sanctification, and there on illumination. But both developments have their roots in the Old Testament teaching. The prophets spoke the Word of the Lord as illumined by the Spirit; the Psalmist (li. 11) prays that God's Holy Spirit may not be taken from him.

(*c*) The problem which Paul's treatment of the doctrine of the Spirit presents is this: Does he consistently distinguish the Spirit from the Living Christ, or is there an occasional identification? And if he distinguishes, how is the immediate contact and

intimate communion with the Risen Lord which he claims related to the operation of the Spirit within? That he does generally distinguish is apparent. In the Apostolic Benediction the community of the Spirit is distinguished from the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God (2 Cor. xiii. 14). In 1 Corinthians xii. the diversities of workings are ascribed to the same God who worketh all things in all, the diversities of ministrations to the same Lord (*i.e.* Jesus Christ) and the diversities of gifts to the same Spirit (*vv.* 4-6). In the passage which follows dealing with the gifts the one Spirit alone is mentioned (*vv.* 7-11, 13-14). As all the members of the body are one with and one in Christ, He is the body, and the Spirit pervades the body (*v.* 12). It is through Christ as our peace, who through His Cross reconciles to God, that we have access in one Spirit unto the Father (Eph. ii. 18). Again, Jesus Christ is the chief corner-stone of the holy temple in the Lord, which is a habitation of God in the Spirit (*vv.* 20-22). From these passages it is evident that Paul does discriminate the functions of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in man's salvation. But he does not always express himself with such care. For instance, in 1 Cor. vi. 11 he places sanctification before justification, and does not assign, as consistently with his general treatment he should, justification to Christ and sanctification to the Spirit, but conjoins both in both processes. 'But ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God.' In Romans viii. 9-11 the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ and Christ Himself are used as interchangeable terms. Compare 'Christ is in you' (*v.* 10) and 'the Spirit . . . dwelleth in you' (*v.* 11). He comes nearest to an identification in 2 Cor. iii. 17-18, 'Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. But we all, with unveiled face reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit.' We cannot evade the difficulty as Dr.

Bernard [1] does by identifying the Lord with Jehovah, for Paul does habitually use the term Lord for Christ, even when he has used a quotation from the Old Testament, in which the reference is to Jehovah (Rom. x. 12-13; 1 Cor. x. 22). The Lord whose glory believers behold or reflect, and into whose likeness they are changed, is no other and can be no other than Christ. What Paul does here state, with an emphasis which may lead to misunderstanding, is that faith in Christ is so invariably followed by the inward renewal by the Spirit, that the consequence of that faith may be directly ascribed to Him who is its object. In view of the other passages referred to, we may conclude that while there is an occasional ambiguity in his language, yet the general tendency of his theology is to distinguish Christ and the Spirit. In support of this conclusion three considerations may be offered. In the Old Testament the Messiah is distinguished from the Spirit of God; Jesus Himself always spoke of the Spirit as another; and the primitive community made the distinction between the risen Christ and the Spirit.

Starting from this conclusion we must, however, try to conceive as clearly as we can how Paul distinguished, if indeed he ever thought of distinguishing, his life in Christ, or Christ's life in him, from the indwelling and inworking of the Spirit. He lives, but not he, Christ liveth in him (Gal. ii. 20); to him to live is Christ (Phil. i. 21); he is crucified and risen with Christ (Rom. vi. 3-10); he lives and walks by the Spirit (Gal. v. 25). We cannot, with Deissmann,[2] relieve ourselves of the task of dealing with Paul as a theologian, who was expressing distinctions in his own mind when he used different words or phrases. *First of all* we may conjecture that when Paul was vividly conscious of the objective reality of Jesus Christ the Lord as present with Him in immediate contact and intimate communion, he used the terms regarding his relation to Christ. When that con-

[1] *Expositor's Greek Testament*, iii. p. 58.
[2] *The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul*, pp. 154-5.

sciousness was not so vivid, and yet he knew that what he was experiencing was of God, he used the terms about the Spirit. The historical record, including the vision on the way to Damascus (Acts ix. 1-9), gave to the Risen Lord a distinct personal reality which the Spirit did not and could not possess. Christ was objective to Paul as the Spirit was not, nor indeed could be. For, *secondly*, we seem justified in inferring that it was by the subjective operation of the Spirit in the personal activities of Paul that he was enabled with such certainty and intensity to realise the objective presence of Christ in and with him. A physical analogy may make this plainer. The presence of Christ was the Light, and the operation of the Spirit so quickened the inward sight of Paul that he could behold the Light. God's Spirit in him made Christ so real to him.

(v) This is a matter of so great importance for Christian theology that it demands fuller treatment. (*a*) Dr. Ernest F. Scott[1] has stated the position clearly and fully : ' It cannot be made out that Paul anywhere identifies the Spirit and Christ. His aim, on the contrary, is to keep them distinct, and his very phrase, "the Spirit of Christ," which brings them so closely together, implies an effort to distinguish. . . . Probably it never occurred to him that they could be thought of as identical. When he spoke of Christ he had before his mind a personal being, the apocalyptic Messiah who had been manifested in Jesus. When he spoke of the Spirit he thought of a divine power which had been vouchsafed to men in consequence of the work of Christ. Nevertheless, he is unable to keep the two conceptions entirely separate. The functions which he ascribes to the Spirit are similar to those of Christ, and sometimes in the same sentence he passes almost unconsciously from the one idea to the other. This confusion is the more inevitable as the Christ of Pauline thought is the risen and indwelling Christ.' The two conceptions, according to Scott, are merged, because for Paul the indwell-

[1] *The Spirit in the New Testament*, pp. 182-6.

ing Christ as a divine being discharges all the functions usually assigned to the Spirit. Nevertheless, Paul retains the distinction because (1) the belief in the Spirit was included in the primitive Christian tradition; and (2) he was himself exceptionally endowed with the spiritual gifts. While there seems to be only a confusion, Scott maintains that 'on a deeper view the effect of his virtual identification of Christ and the Spirit is to make both of them infinitely more significant. The historical Christ becomes a universal presence, dwelling in the hearts of men; while the Spirit ceases to be a vague supernatural principle, and is one, in the last resort, with the living Christ.' While we cannot separate Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in our faith in the one God in all, through all, and over all, the question still remains whether we cannot enrich our conception of that one God by distinguishing, as far as our thought can, the functions and activities of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in revelation and redemption. This question is answered with a very decisive negative by two recent theological writers, Dr. Denney and Dr. Thomas Rees.

(*b*) Dr. Denney [1] states his position with his usual decisiveness. 'As has often been pointed out, in Romans viii. 9-11 the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Christ, and Christ Himself are practically indistinguishable. It is all one if we can say of people that the Spirit of God dwells in them, or that they have the Spirit of Christ, or that Christ is in them. All these are ways in which we can describe the life of reconciliation as it is realised in men. They make it plain that the explanation of that life is divine, and they prevent any misapprehension about the Divine Spirit by frankly indentifying the indwelling of the Spirit in the Christian sense with the spiritual indwelling of Christ Himself. But there is no justification in this for representing the Spirit as a third person in the same sense as God and Christ. Paul never knew Christ except as Spirit, except as a being who could enter into and tell upon his life as God

[1] *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 311.

Himself entered; and his whole concern in this passage is not to distinguish Christ and the Spirit, but to show that nothing is entitled to be recognised as really Spirit among Christians if it is distinguishable from Christ and from the divine power with which He acts in the souls and in the life of men.' As the statement by Dr. Scott and the previous discussion have shown, Dr. Denney, with his characteristic impatience, and almost intolerance to ideas not congenial to his own type of piety, evangelical but not mystical, is not accurate either in his exegesis or his theology. As the last chapter of this book will try to show, the use of the word 'person' in the doctrine of the Trinity is open to misconception, as the term has acquired a connotation to-day which it had not for those who framed the creeds, and tends to substitute a tritheism for the belief in the triune God. It need not be maintained, then, that we are to speak of the Holy Spirit as a 'person.' The one God is personal for our thought, though not a 'person' as an individual among others, seeing He as Life, Light, Love is in all and through all and over all, because the Universe can be most intelligibly explained in terms of personal nature, purpose, and activity. The Risen Christ as continuing personally the historical reality of the earthly Jesus is even more definitely personal for our thought than God. We cannot think of the Holy Spirit so definitely as personal, but He as the Spirit of God must be conceived as personal as God is. That there can be no separation of the Spirit from Christ, His activities from Christ's presence, is no adequate reason for not taking up into our constructive theology the distinctions which the writers of the New Testament make. The writer himself, as will afterwards be shown, attaches very great significance and value to these distinctions in attempting to construct a doctrine of the Godhead.

(*c*) Dr. Rees[1] is even more emphatic, not to say dogmatic. 'If the Spirit is conceived as another divine presence, distinct and different from Christ,

[1] *The Holy Spirit*, p. 211.

operating as a distinct activity and in a different province of religious experience, it so far ceases to be the Spirit of Christ, and the presence and activity of Christ are therefore neither universal nor co-extensive with religious experience. If, on the other hand, Christianity is the universal and final religion, if all knowledge and communion and action of God are mediated to men through Jesus Christ, then the Holy Spirit for Christian thought and experience cannot be separate or distinct from Christ Himself, in His living presence and power in the hearts of men, and the Church burdens itself in vain with the formula of three hypostases which it inherited from Greek theology.'

What the author of this passage confuses is the dogmatic formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, for which the writer of this volume does not here enter any defence, and the experimental basis of the doctrine as it is presented in the New Testament, which should be the starting-point of any constructive theology. The presence and activity of Jesus in His earthly life was of one kind ; His presence and activity now is of another kind : the one sensible, the other spiritual. It is the Spirit of God dwelling and working within the soul who makes the soul receptive for and responsive to that spiritual activity of Christ. We do not separate and yet we distinguish : Christ, objectively manifest as Revealer of God and Redeemer of men, is subjectively experienced in illumination, regeneration, sanctification by the Spirit of God. Again, we may believe that Christianity, as it is the final, so it will be one day the universal religion ; but it is not yet known to all men, and ' all knowledge and communion and action of God ' are not yet mediated to men through Jesus Christ, unless we use the term in a less definite sense than the names themselves demand, namely for the historical reality, whom faith confesses as God Incarnate. God by His Spirit is enlightening and cleansing men, even beyond the reach of the Christian Gospel, although where Christ is known as Saviour and Lord that inward experience

is so much surer and wider and deeper. We may limit the term Holy Spirit to the Spirit of God as active within Christian experience; but we must not deny, as Dr. Rees does, or appears to do, by ambiguous use of language, the operation of the Spirit in the religious experience, to which Jesus Christ is not yet known.

(3) In the preceding pages no attempt has been made to give a complete account of the teaching of the Bible on this subject. Only the main features have been noticed, which are directly relevant to a constructive theology for to-day. The development of the doctrine in the Church may be even more briefly treated.

(i) As the Church passed more and more from the Jewish environment to the Gentile, its theology was more and more affected by the intellectual influences of that environment. The doctrine of the Logos displaced the doctrine of the Messiah for two reasons: (1) The significance of Christ was thereby widened; it became cosmic as well as human (Col. i. 15, 16 and John i. 3-5 already show this expansion of thought); (2) The relation of Christ to God was made more immediate; He by nature belongs not to the creatures but to the Creator. This development not only met an intellectual demand for a rational creed, but also a religious need, the certainty of a universal salvation for man in Him. As in Paul and John the conception of the Risen Christ in His manifold activities cannot be rigidly distinguished from the operations of the Spirit, so to the Logos-Christ are attracted many of the functions hitherto assigned to the Spirit. 'The theology of the Church,' says Dr. Scott,[1] 'attached itself in increasing measure to the foreign conception, and one by one the attributes of the Spirit as creative, revealing, life-giving, were transferred to the Logos. How are we to account for this surrender? For one thing, the idea of the Spirit, in the course of its long history, had acquired a well-defined meaning and could not be readily adapted to the new theological

[1] *The Spirit in the New Testament*, pp. 190-1.

needs. . . . But there was a further and more cogent reason for the preference given to the Logos doctrine. It came into Christian thought with a philosophical background. It had gathered into itself the results of centuries of Greek speculation on the mystery of the world. By the adoption of this doctrine it was possible to link the Christian message with the whole religious movement of the time, and thereby to deepen its significance and strengthen its appeal to the Gentile mind.' The reason for the waning of the doctrine of the Spirit was not merely theological; it was religious also. The enthusiasm of the early days passed away; believers became less conscious of the Spirit's presence and power; the doctrine fell into the background with the experience. The Church was consolidated as an institution, and tradition and convention took the place of the freshness and fullness of life. Prophets even came to be regarded with some suspicion, as the *Didache* (chapter xi.) shows, and in some cases there was ground for the suspicion that they were 'making merchandise of Christ.' The local officers of the Church gradually strengthened their position, and asserted their authority. The hope of the Second Advent faded into 'the light of the common day.' The Christian Church settled down to a permanent existence in this world, and began to adapt itself to its environment. The ebb-tide followed the full; and the doctrine of the Spirit always comes into prominence in a time of religious revival, and recedes when the experience of such a period passes away.

(ii) This general statement may be illustrated in some details.[1] Hermas identifies the Son of God and 'the Holy Pre-existent Spirit.' But Ignatius maintains the distinction. 'Have we not one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of Grace that was shed upon us?' asks Clement of Rome (1 Cor. 46). As in Matthew xxviii. 19, baptism in the *Didache* is

[1] *The History of Christian Doctrine*, by G. P. Fisher, may be consulted for further details. See also Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Eng. trans., iv. pp. 108-37.

'into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost' (vii. 1). The Apologists were so influenced by the conception of the Logos, that no distinctive function was left in their theology for the Holy Spirit. While Justin distinguishes the Spirit from the Father and Son as subordinate, the activities of the Logos are so described as to leave no room for the Spirit; even the conception by the Virgin Mother is included (*Apology*, i. 33). Irenaeus too subordinates the Spirit to the Son, as the Son to the Father; but is vague about the Spirit's work. Clement of Alexandria uses the phrase 'the Holy Triad' (*Strom.*, v. 14), and speaks of the Spirit as a distinct hypostasis, but does not define His relation to the Father and the Son. Origen leaves the question open whether the Spirit has been created or not, assigns divine dignity to Him, but subordinates Him to the Son. A peculiarity of Origen's teaching is that he confines the activity of the Spirit to the souls which He renews and sanctifies (*De Princip.*, I. iii. 5). The Father's sphere is universal existence, the Son's the rational realm, and the Spirit's the Christian community. It was Tertullian who supplied the Latin terminology for the doctrine of the Trinity, a term which he is the first to use. He has, however, a descending Trinity. 'The Spirit is third from God and the Son, as the fruit out of the tree is third from the root, and as the branch from the river is third from the fountain, and as the apex of the sunbeam is third from the sun' (*Adv. Prax.*, 8). The Spirit was generally conceived either as a divine power, or if regarded as personal, then as entirely subordinate. The existence of the Spirit was recognised on the authority of the Scriptures, but the doctrine had no basis in present experience.

(iii) Even Athanasius in the first decade of the Arian controversy never thought about the Spirit. It was when the Arians used the general agreement regarding the inferiority of the Spirit to the Son as well as the Father as an argument for the subordination of the Son to the Father, that he was forced to face the question. After 358 Athanasius affirmed

that the Spirit was θεὸς ὁμοούσιος, not that he had any interest in the doctrine of the Spirit, but because such a declaration seemed necessary to give logical consistency to the doctrine about the Godhead, and the Son's relation to the Father. This view was affirmed at the Alexandrian Synod of 362. Macedonius, the Bishop of Constantinople, was regarded as heretical because he taught that the Holy Spirit was a creature subordinate to the Son, and his followers received the nickname of Pneumatomachians. But even the Cappadocians (Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, and Basil), although they advocated Athanasius' formula, confessed the absence of any available tradition, advised the greatest caution, and maintained that the formula should be kept as a secret doctrine. The exposition of the doctrine in this school tended to tritheism: the Gregories, for instance, compared the relation of the persons in the Godhead to that of three men to their common humanity. This statement must be qualified as regards Gregory of Nyssa, however, since, as a Platonist, the common humanity is for him not a mere class name, but a reality. The relation of the Father to the Son was described by the term generation; for the relation of the Spirit to the Father the terminology of the Fourth Gospel is adopted, ἔκπεμψις or ἐκπόρευσις. The Father alone is cause (αἴτιον); the Son and the Spirit are effects (αἰτιατά). Nevertheless, for Gregory of Nyssa, there is a mutual pervasion (περιχώρησις) of the persons, so that there is an inseparable unity. In later Greek thought subordination was more insisted on, and thus the differences were emphasised. The ἀρχή in the East always remains with the Father. The Creed of Constantinople (although it did not originate in the Council, held 381, but was developed out of a confession composed by Cyril of Jerusalem before 350) formulates the othodox belief in the East on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. It is now generally known as the Nicene Creed, of which it is an enlargement. The article dealing with the Holy Spirit may be quoted. '8. καὶ

εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον, καὶ τὸ ζωοποιὸν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ παλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.' It is to be observed that, following the Scriptures, functions are again assigned to the Spirit which the Apologists had transferred to the Logos.

(iv) John of Damascus tried to bring the Eastern doctrine nearer the Western by minimising the differences of the persons and emphasising the unity of nature, but the subordinationism and the consequent tendency to tritheism remained. For where differences are emphasised, the unity of the Godhead has to be preserved by an insistence on the subordination of the Son and the Spirit to the Father, in whom the monarchy inheres. Where the unity is put in the forefront, the differences must fall into the background. This is the difference between the Greek and the Latin formulations of this doctrine. In Augustine's *De Trinitate* it is the divine unity which is made most of, and the persons are distinguished only in their relations to one another. He would gladly have left all exposition of the subject alone, had not the common faith of the Church required the recognition of the differences of the three persons within the divine unity. ' Dictum est tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur ' (*De Trin.*, v. *c.* 9). With the theology of the West he affirmed the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. This difference between the East and West became matter of acute controversy. Photius in 867 charged the Western theologians with an innovation, and even with the falsification of the Constantinopolitan creed by the addition of the word *filioque*. This addition was first made in Spain. The Greeks became suspicious even of the modification διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ. The Athanasian Creed marks the full development of the doctrine in the West. It has now become a mystery of the faith, which has to be accepted on the authority of the Church as the condition of salvation. The differences in the conception of the relation of the persons in the Godhead may be summarised

as follows. The earlier doctrine was that the Spirit was subordinate to the Son as the Son was to the Father; and the later Greek that both Son and Spirit were dependent on the Father, the one as generated, the other as proceeding. The later Latin affirmed an equality of the three persons in insisting that the Spirit proceeded from the Son as well as the Father. These differences may be represented in the following way :—



Although the doctrine will be discussed constructively afterwards, this comment may here be added. All the Scripture statements would lead us to say that the Holy Spirit comes from the Father through the Son. The revelation of the Father in the Son is realised in individual and collective experience through the Spirit.

(v) At the Reformation there was a movement comparable to Montanism. Carlstadt with his followers, carried away by their fanaticism, made the Spirit independent of the Word, and claimed His authority for the innovations they proposed. Calvin based the authority of the Scriptures as of divine origin, not on external proofs, but on 'the testimony of the Holy Spirit.' This inward witness certifies the inspiration of these writings. The Reformers accepted the doctrine of the Trinity as formulated in the creeds, but of the Athanasian Creed Calvin says that no legitimate church would have accepted it, since on this subject 'we ought to philosophise with great sobriety and moderation' (*Inst.*, I. xiii. 21). The Arminians, opposed though they were to Calvin's theology, did insist on the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit. The Synod of Dort limited the

operation of the Holy Spirit, described as inscrutable, to the elect only, so that in them only does the Atonement become efficacious. There was much discussion in the theological schools about the nature of this operation of the Holy Spirit. John Cameron excited opposition, though his substantial orthodoxy was afterwards admitted, by teaching that the Spirit acts not directly on the will, but through enlightening of the intellect; and somewhat later Pajon further developed this view, by adding to the Spirit's use of the Gospel as influencing the intellect, also the circumstances of the individual's life as providentially appointed for the purpose of his regeneration. The Quakers gave a central position to the doctrine of the Spirit. It is by the working of the Spirit that the truth in the Scriptures is made effective; and further truth may be added by the Spirit which illumines all men. Wesley, whose theology was Arminian, insisted on the necessary agency of the Spirit in conversion and sanctification, the attainment of the Christian perfection, which he held was possible for all believers. James Morison in 1840, in opposition to Calvinism, asserted what were known as the three universalities: God's love for all, Christ's death for all, and the Spirit's working in all. With this declaration this historical sketch may fitly end.

(4) It is much to be regretted that the doctrine of the Spirit has not received the attention which it deserves from instructed and competent theologians, and that so much of the literature of the subject comes from a narrow pietism. The attitude of the two writers already referred to, Dr. Denney and Dr. Rees, is greatly to be regretted, as there is at present a favourable opportunity for giving to the doctrine its rightful place in Christian theology. Simply to substitute for the operations of the Spirit, as the Holy Scriptures and Christian theology have usually described them, the activity of the Risen Christ, would be to deprive us of data, valuable not only to theology, but even to religion.

(i) As has already been indicated, the reason why

the doctrine of the Spirit fell into the background in the second century was that Christian experience relapsed from the enthusiasm of the Apostolic Age into a traditional and conventional profession, real but not intense. That it has had so little place in Christian thought is due to this, that the presence and power of the Spirit have not been greatly prized in a great deal of Christian life. In the Eastern Church speculative interests replaced the experimental, and even salvation was metaphysically conceived; in the West ecclesiastical authority became too dominant to allow the free movements of the Spirit, except sporadically. At the Reformation the spiritual movement was only too soon caught and held in the fetters of a Scriptural dogmatism. The historical interest which was so characteristic of last century concentrated attention, needfully and rightly at the time, on the historical personality of Christ, His revelation of God and redemption of man as *fact*; and the whole course of the discussion in this volume shows that the writer fully appreciates the value of this tendency. There is a danger, however, of externalising the Christian religion, unless to the historical interest there is added as its complement the experiential; the historical reality must be appropriated and assimilated as personal experience, individual and collective. Psychology and sociology are the two mental sciences of greatest interest to-day, and the aid of both can be invoked in developing the doctrine of the Spirit. As Christian theology should be quickly responsive to the intellectual tendencies of the age so as to commend its Gospel to thoughtful men, there seems to be need both for a revival of interest in the doctrine of the Spirit, and encouragement to the theologian to use the mental resources of the age to make the doctrine more intelligible. Accordingly, the following constructive considerations are offered.

(ii) As the starting-point is experience, individual and collective, we are concerned here with the *economic* and not the *ontological* Trinity, not with God as He is in Himself, but with God as revealing and imparting

Himself to man. In the last chapter of this volume an attempt will be made to state what seems possible with our human limitations about the nature of God, as we can infer that from the revelation of God to man, and the activities of God in that relation.

(iii) In that activity it does seem to the writer that we ought still to distinguish the operations of the Spirit and the activities of the Risen Christ. We should follow the older tradition of the Holy Scriptures and not the development in the Early Church of the doctrine of the Logos by which the functions of the Spirit were transferred to the Logos. For in the *first place* there was a living experience behind that tradition about the Spirit, both individual and collective; and the change of emphasis, which was partly the result of the waning of that experience, was also partly the cause of that experience waning still more.

Secondly, the substitution of the Risen Christ even for the Spirit, toward which there is a tendency in the Pauline and Johannine theology, seems to be beset by some theoretical as well as practical disadvantages. There is often a confusion of the sphere of activity of the Christ and the Word or Logos. The term *Christ* should not be used of the pre-existent Son in the Godhead, but of the historical personality, the God-Man, who historically revealed God and redeemed man; and we should not speak as if the Christ were present and active before the Incarnation, or since the Ascension, where the Gospel of His revelation and redemption has not yet been preached. The more general activity of God in the thought and life of man should be described as the work of the Spirit of God. This is urged not in depreciation of the function of the Christ, but in order that the distinctiveness of His work as Revealer of God and Redeemer of man should not be merged in and confused with this less adequate manifestation of God by His Spirit apart from the Christ, and that the latter should not be regarded as a substitute for the former, and so the

motive of evangelisation of the world be weakened. Whatever the heathen had, or now have, of enlightening and quickening by the Divine Spirit, they have not the truth and the grace of the Word Incarnate, the Crucified Saviour, the Risen Lord. But even in Christian experience it is desirable to maintain the distinction between the objective revelation of God in His redeeming love, completed in its essential import in the historical reality of Jesus the Christ our Lord, and the interpretation and application of that revelation subjectively in the experience and character of believers; for this carries with it the danger of our placing on a level of the same authority our subjective impressions and the objective communication of the character and purpose of God. For the sake of Christian life as well as thought it is well to maintain the distinction.

Thirdly, the Johannine teaching about the Spirit asserts what we should not forget, that the revelation of the Spirit does not complete the revelation of the Son in adding to it new truth or fresh duty, still less in any way superseding it, but only in making its content intelligible, and its influence effective in the individual believer and the community. There is permanence and finality in the revelation of Christ, there is adaptability and progressiveness in the Spirit's interpretation and application. Is it not well for us to keep the two aspects of a truly and fully divine activity apart in our thought, though they blend in our experience? It is not suggested that the individual believer should attempt to distinguish in himself what is the work of the Risen Lord and what the work of the Spirit; but Christian theology not only may, but should do so.

Fourthly, by this distinction we enlarge our conception of God. God is the eternally and infinitely transcendent, yet in His relation to man immanent, because in the Son God reveals Himself to us as Father and redeems us unto Himself as children in the objective historical reality of Jesus the Christ our Lord; and that is not all, because in the Spirit

He dwells and works in our innermost life, so that our faith, hope, and love are not merely a human response to that revelation and redemption in Christ, but God's own activity in us. If we leave out the doctrine of the Spirit there is the danger of our thinking of our Christian life as only the impression and the influence upon us of the historical reality, and not as the expression of the divine life imparted to us by the Spirit.

(iv) It has already been indicated how ambiguous is the sense of the term ' person ' as applied to the Godhead, and how much more difficult it is for us to think of the Holy Spirit as *person*, as we can think of the Father or Christ; for when we think of the Father as personal we are really thinking of God in His entire manifestation and activity in nature and history, revelation and redemption, and not of the Father as individually distinguished from the Son or the Spirit; and when we think of the Son as personal we are not thinking of Him as individually distinguished from the Father, but we are thinking of the historical person Jesus Christ our Lord. But just because the Spirit is God most immediately related to our own inner life, and most intimately communicating His own eternal life to us, we cannot so objectify God to ourselves as Spirit, apart from Father and Son, and even apart from ourselves in whom He dwells. This does not mean, however, that we make the Spirit a power or an influence that is impersonal, for what can spiritual power or influence be but personal? Impersonal spirit is a vague abstraction. God as Spirit dwelling and working in us is just as personal as God or Christ, for He is God's activity within, and it is the things of Christ He takes and imparts to us. What must constantly be insisted on is that we do not separate what we distinguish. We do distinguish Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as complementary modes, activities, or ' persons ' (in the sense of the creeds and theologians who know their business, and not the vulgar sense of the popular tritheism); but we do not separate them, for it is the one God who acts,

and He alone is perfect personality. This subject must be further pursued in the last chapter.

(v) This chapter does not complete the doctrine of the Spirit, as this whole section deals with the work of the Spirit. The Church is the community of the Spirit, and the believer as sharing the common life is a member of the Church. In the Christian life, the Spirit is ever active, whether it be in experiences which come 'with observation,' such as religious revivals and individual conversions, or in the unobserved development of Christian faith, hope, and love. It is this Christian life which is the basis of the Christian hope, both in affording assurance of it and indication of the character of what is to be hoped. Lastly, it is by the Spirit, transforming individuals and societies, that the Kingdom of God will come, and at last God shall be all in all.

CHAPTER II

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

This chapter is not in any way concerned with ecclesiastical organisation, with creeds, codes, polities, rituals, orders, although reference may be made to these matters when relevant to the subject. So far as the distinction can be maintained, it is not the historical institution but the spiritual creation with which we are here concerned. It is the spiritual creation which must always be the standard of judgment for the historical institution, for it cannot be maintained that the latter has always and everywhere been 'a copy of the pattern in the Mount,' and that leaders and teachers in the Church have never been blind or disobedient to the heavenly vision. But on the other hand, it is from the imperfect image that we can rise to the perfect idea, and that as the image becomes less imperfect the perfect idea will be more clearly apprehended and fully appreciated. It is, then, with the Church as the body of Christ, the community of the Spirit, that we have primarily to do, but we must base doctrine on history.

(1) The fact that the word ἐκκλησία (*ecclesia*) is the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew *Kahal* (קָהָל) reminds us that the Christian Church has Jewish as well as Gentile antecedents. The Greek *Ecclesia* was a gathering of citizens called out from their homes to some public place for common counsel or action. The Hebrew *Kahal* was a gathering of the Israelites especially for some sacred purpose. The preparatory revelation was to a nation, chosen and called and separated from other nations for the fulfilment of the divine purpose. The perfective revelation is also

to a society, gathered out of the nations, and united not by one blood, but by one Spirit.

(*a*) When Jesus called men it was not to be individual disciples, indifferent to, or separated from one another, but into a company of disciples. Individual teaching and dealing there was; but the message and the mission were entrusted to the company. The distress which the jealousies and rivalries of the disciples caused Jesus, and the solicitude He showed in rebuking and removing these (*e.g.* the washing of the disciples' feet, John xiii. 1-17), prove how much importance and urgency He attached to the unity of the disciples. It was to the assembled believers that the experience of Pentecost came; and belief was followed by baptism, the initiation into a society separated from the world; and after baptism, by the laying on of hands, there was a consciousness of the possession of the common treasure of the Christian Church, the fullness of the Spirit, the enthusiasm and the energy of the new life. Even when the Christian Church expanded beyond Jerusalem and Christian societies were formed in other cities, the unity was maintained; it was the same Spirit which was the common possession. Independency or Congregationalism has insisted on the independence of the local congregation; and in so doing has seized on the historical accident, and lost hold of the spiritual substance. The Church is not made up of a voluntary association of a number of separate churches; the local congregation can call itself *a church*, possessing the privileges and discharging the functions of the Church, only because it is the Church in local manifestation and activity. Its rights and duties are not derived from its separateness, but from its unity with all Christian congregations in the one Church. Sohm,[1] than whom there is not a greater authority on these questions, states the New Testament position very distinctly. 'The faith of Christians sees in every assembly of Christians gathered together in the Spirit the whole of Christen-

[1] *Kirchenrecht*, pp. 20-1, quoted by Dr. Mason in *Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry*, p. 20.

dom, the people of God, the universal society. Upon these grounds every assembly of Christians, great or little, which meets in the name of the Lord, is called *Ecclesia*, the gathering of the New Testament people of Israel. The general assembly of all the Christians of the same place bears the name *Ecclesia* because it represents, not an assembly of this local community, but an assembly of all Christendom (Israel). In the same way, an assembly of the community belonging to one house. Thus there is but one *Ecclesia*, the assembly of all Christendom; though this one Church has innumerable manifestations.' Spatial separation was not, however, allowed to destroy the spiritual unity. There was the faith in the one Saviour and Lord; there was the common possession of the one Spirit; there was the universal itinerant ministry of the Word —the apostles, prophets, teachers, evangelists (as well as the local offices—elders or bishops and deacons); there were the apostolic letters of counsel and command, assurance and comfort; there was the collection (also called the κοινωνία, 2 Cor. viii. 4) among the Gentile churches for the poor in Jerusalem, to which Paul attached such importance that he was willing to risk his life in Jerusalem that he might present it in person; there were the letters of commendation of the Christian brother from one congregation to another; there was the generous hospitality to any Christian visitor. The Council in Jerusalem is an evidence of the determination to preserve unity in maintaining liberty (Acts xv.). There was only one Church even as regards external organisations, so far as there was any organisation, and still more as regards inward inspiration. Whether the words are the words of the historical Jesus or not (the writer believes they are), the aspiration of the Church as well as the purpose of its Head is expressed in them: 'Holy Father, keep them in Thy name which Thou hast given Me, that they may be one, even as we are' (John xvii. 11).

There is one revelation of God and one redemption of man in Jesus Christ, and that can be made actual

and effective and victorious in the world in one Church, the body of Christ, the community of the Spirit. It is to be observed, then, that the New Testament gives warrant for the use of the term Church only of the one body, the one community, and of the local congregations only as its local manifestations and activities. In the Apostolic Age there was the Jewish and the Gentile type of Christianity; but the Jews who observed the Law and the Gentiles who were free of the Law did not separate and form denominations. For the use of the term Church for a denomination the New Testament offers no justification. It may be claimed, however, that as local separation did not destroy the unity, neither does theological or ecclesiastical, and that each denomination is a distinctive manifestation and activity of the one Church. Although it may now be impossible to alter common usage, yet the writer thinks it would be a great advantage to clearness of thought if the term Church were reserved for the spiritual unity of all believers, the term congregation were used for the local association, and the term communion for the denomination. To call Nonconformist denominations bodies, as Anglicans in England sometimes do, is not only offensive, but it is a denial of the central conception of the Church as necessarily one body. According to the New Testament, then, faith in Christ means and cannot but mean inclusion in the one society; all who were in the spiritual community were also within the organisation for witness, worship, and work, in which that community was manifest and active in the world. The individual relation to Christ and the Spirit was mediated by the Christian society.

(ii) The one Church was the community of the Spirit. The Spirit was the common possession of the believers in Christ; the gifts of the Spirit were for the common good, not for individual exaltation or ostentation; all the activities of the Church were directed and controlled by that Spirit; and 'the fruit of the Spirit was love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance' (Gal. v.

22-23), nearly all virtues with a distinctly social reference; in the exercise of all the gifts love showed 'the more excellent way' (1 Cor. xii. 31). While on the one hand the national limitations of the Jewish religion had been set aside, and on the other the individualism of the later prophets (Jeremiah and Ezekiel) in asserting the value of each soul had been confirmed, yet from the very beginning Christian life showed itself to be by its very nature social; there was not a subjugation of the individual to the society, as in Plato's *Republic*, but a realisation of the individual in the society. It was as brethren and sisters in Christ Jesus that believers realised their relation to God as His children. Two consequences flowed from this mutual relation of men as determined by their common relation to God.

Firstly, the differences which had before been the occasions of division were transcended in the common life in the Spirit. The agelong antagonism of Jew and Gentile was removed (Rom. i. 16; Eph. ii. 11-22). While the institution of slavery was not at once abolished, yet master and slave came into such a mutual relation as brothers in Christ, that its abolition was in principle and motive assured (Philemon). It would have brought moral scandal in the Church had traditions and conventions in regard to the relation of the sexes, especially the position of women, been at once disregarded (2 Cor. xi. 2-16, xiv. 34-36); but the spiritual equality recognised held the promise and the power of the purification of the relation from pagan corruption, and the elevation of women to a liberty and dignity which, without the safeguard of Christian character, would have been impossible (Eph. v. 22-33).

Secondly, the differences of capacity, disposition, and character, conditioning the variety of endowment as regards the spiritual gifts, contributed to the unity of the Church; it became the more a body, in which the members were able by the variety of their gifts to discharge not only different, but even complementary functions. In Romans xii. and 1 Corinthians xii.

Paul works out in some detail this analogy of the body. There is what may be called a common consciousness in this body in the mutual love, interest, sympathy, solicitude of the members for one another. The one Spirit inspiring all in their individual life and work constitutes them not only into an organism of mutually dependent parts, but into a community in which the parts are conscious of their relation to one another in the whole.

When we ask what made possible this transcendence of the divisions so persistent in human society, and this exaltation to conscious unity, characteristics so often and largely absent from the Christian Church in its subsequent history, the answer must be given in the terms of the New Testament; believers were 'filled with the Holy Spirit.' There was a vivid consciousness of the Spirit's presence and power, and the accompanying intense enthusiasm and abounding energy. The body because of this consciousness of community in the Spirit had a vitality and vigour such as has seldom, alas! marked the history of the Christian Church since. A physical analogy may be of some use here. The form of energy, heat, can be transformed into the form of energy, power, which does work, as the steam in the engine. So a high spiritual temperature is a condition of a strong spiritual activity. Distinct vision, intense emotion, and vigorous action go together. There must be certainty of truth if there is to be abundance of grace, and abundance of grace is necessary for victorious power. We need to learn the lesson the New Testament is fitted to teach us that a cold or a lukewarm Church can never rise to the height of its calling; it must be aglow with conviction and courage. This description of the Christian Church of the Apostolic Age at its best, as the greatest of the apostles conceived it, and as its worthiest members strove to make it, is an ideal which the Christian Church needs to keep before itself in all ages. The fullness of the Holy Spirit, and the human certainty, confidence, and consecration which He inspires, alone can make the Church

the society in its unity transcending all that divides men from one another, and in that unity also presenting an example of what human society should be as the community of which love is the law.

(iii) In Romans xii. and 1 Corinthians xii. Paul is addressing himself to *a church*, and it is of a local congregation that he uses the analogy of the body, although as is evident *the one Church* is also present to his mind; indeed, he probably never made the distinction which the history of the Church has unfortunately compelled us to make. In 1 Corinthians xii. 12 he identifies the body with Christ; it is Christ Himself who is present and active in the one body through all its members filled with the Spirit. In Ephesians i. 22-23 the Church is described as 'the body of Christ, the fullness of Him that filleth all in all,' or rather, the fulfilment of Him that fulfilleth all in all, for the conception is not *static*, but *dynamic*, not a state, but a process. (We may compare John xv. 1-8.) In the activity of the members of the Church, moved and equipped by the Spirit, Christ Himself is active. He has no other organ for the expression of His truth, or the communication of His grace, but the Church. It must be Voice, Hands, and Feet to Him, to speak His words, do His work, and bear His wide-world message. There are religious and moral influences in the world apart from the Church, as the community of the Holy Spirit continuing the historical revelation and redemption; but the distinctively Christian salvation for men is mediated, and can be mediated only, by the Church. (The reference here is not to any ecclesiastical organisation as the exclusive channel of truth and grace, for we are still dealing with the community of believers.) The moral and religious transformation of mankind can be accomplished by personal testimony, influence, service, and in no other way. Hence we may say with all reverence that God has willed that the enthronement of Jesus Christ as Head over all things to His Church can only be effected by His Church, which as His body shares, and will still more share, His exaltation. Central as Christ Himself is to the divine purpose in

nature and history, significant as He is for the interpretation of the universe as the manifestation of the perfection of God, essential as He is to the redemption of mankind to become the temple of God, His habitation by His Spirit, so as His body His Church is inseparable from Him in His sovereignty. According to the will of God it is also enthroned with Him. The Church is the human society, by which and in which the purpose of God in Christ and through Christ must and shall find its fulfilment. The Kingdom of God is the supreme end, but the Church is the essential means.

(iv) This is the ideal; how far did the actual fall short? Paul's letters with their rebukes and exhortations show that in the churches there were grievous defects, crying scandals. The moral corruption of paganism and its superstitions affected the new converts. But Paul does not, as we do, distinguish the actual and the ideal; he sees, despite all imperfections, the ideal in the actual. In two respects there was a correspondence of ideal and actual: all Christians were within the community in personal participation in its life and work, and there was unity, despite all differences of previous antecedents. Since the Apostolic Age, to the imperfections of experience and character which distinguished the actual from the ideal there have been added these two defects: not all Christians associate themselves with the Church in its witness, worship, and work, and divisions have marred the unity of its testimony, communion, and influence. Hence the Reformers were led to distinguish the invisible Church, the community of all believers, and the visible Church, as represented by Rome.[1] We must admit this distinction as a fact; but we should not acquiesce in it as necessary or desirable. Christ meant His Church to be one, embracing all believers, and realising the Christian perfection in all its members, both as visible and invisible. We should no more readily acquiesce in the exclusion of any believer, or the divisions in

[1] Augsburg Conf., vii.; Calvin's *Inst.*, iv. 1-10.

the Church, than in the inconsistency of life of professing Christians. It is surely the will of Christ that the invisible ideal should become the visible actual.

(v) Just as soul needs body, so does the Spirit need organs of activity in the world. The community of the Spirit must be expressed in the association of believers with one another for their common ends, in the institutions which will give permanent expression to the purposes. While the inspiration must remain primary, yet organisation is necessary to the effectiveness of the inspiration, and should in character correspond as closely to the inspiration as can be. A distinction is sometimes made between the power and the machinery of the Church in order to depreciate the latter, or, as it is sometimes put, the *dynamics* and the *mechanics*. But any such opposition is absurd. Machinery is necessary to make power effective for work : it is only steam in an engine that has driving power. There is undoubtedly the danger of the machinery being more complicated than is needful for the full use of the power available, or the machinery may remain when the power is gone. Organisation may outrun inspiration. In the Apostolic Church there was organisation as an effect of the inspiration ; the new soul grew for itself a new body. It was flexible and expansive, not uniform, but adaptable ; the intense expectation of the Second Advent in that generation kept organisation in the background. It is doubtful whether, even if the Apostolic Church had had a larger and wider historical prospect, the organisation would have been made more rigid ; for the consciousness of possessing the inspiration of the Spirit to meet each emergency as it arose would probably have prevented any unnecessary limitation of the freedom of the Spirit. It seems to the writer to be a reading back into the past of the conceptions and interests of a later age to suppose, as Bishop Gore [1] does, that either Christ Himself or any of the apostles concerned themselves about devising an organisation which would be auth-

[1] See *The Church and the Ministry*.

oritative for all time. It was when the inspiration waned that the organisation waxed. It was in the second century that there were developed the external bonds of unity and continuity in the Christian Church, the Apostolic Rule of Faith, the Collection of Apostolic Writings, and the Episcopate as an Apostolic Office,[1] which in the earliest period the community of the Spirit rendered less necessary.

(vi) There have thus emerged in the history of the Christian Church two tendencies, which are still dominant to-day, and are the most difficult problem to be solved in the interests of Christian reunion; they may be described in a general way by the terms *Catholic* and *Protestant*, although in churches claiming to be Catholic the Protestant tendency may appear, and in churches named Protestant the Catholic. The contrast is by no means absolute; it is one of more or less emphasis, and not of bare affirmation or negation. In the Catholic tendency the need of the Spirit is not denied, but stress is laid on historical unity and continuity. In the Protestant tendency the need of some organisation is admitted, but the unity and continuity insisted on is one of the indwelling Spirit. The one stands for authority, which may degenerate to tyranny; the other for liberty, which may lapse into licence. In each party there is more acute consciousness of the defects of the other than of its own. Geneva, as it were, charges Rome with tyranny, and Rome Geneva with licence. It is evident that these tendencies are not opposed, but complementary, as human history does not present the picture of a steadily advancing river, but rather of the ebb and flow of the tide. It may have been necessary that in the Jewish nation the scribal age should come after the prophetic to conserve and distribute the moral and religious gains of the prophetic movement. It may have been necessary that Fathers should follow Apostles to secure for all mankind in subsequent ages the apostolic treasures of thought and life. It may have been necessary that the period of subjugation

[1] Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Eng. trans., ii. pp. 18-93.

of the new peoples of Europe to the discipline of the Roman Church should prepare for the period of emancipation which has resulted in the many sects of Protestantism. Although prophecy is dangerous, may we not dare to believe that thesis need not always be followed by antithesis, but that there may yet be discovered the synthesis of the two tendencies, Catholic and Protestant? Attempting to approach the New Testament without prejudice or preference, the writer by his studies has been led to the conviction that the Catholic tendency cannot find justification for the claims it puts forward for a sacrosanct organisation bequeathed by Christ and His apostles. The evidence has to be distorted to force the Catholic system back into the Apostolic Age.[1] If the brief period covered by the New Testament is to be decisive, exclusively authoritative for every subsequent age, then undoubtedly many of the developments in the Church must be condemned as corruptions, as many zealous reformers have done. No Protestant Church, however, can or does reproduce exactly apostolic precepts and practices; and if any make that boast, it is convicted of ignorance of history, for the past cannot thus be reproduced, as changed conditions will affect and thwart any attempt at mere reproduction. But if Protestantism stands for the unity and the continuity of the Spirit, it needs neither to confess as fault the failure so to reproduce the past, nor to impute blame to Catholicism for any new departures. As in the process of the evolution of the universe there is creation and conservation, so in the history of the Church we may expect the creative and the conservative moments. What needs to be sought and striven for is the reconciliation of these complementary tendencies. Inspiration need not be breaking up organisation, nor organisation be putting bonds on inspiration. As God made His world a sphere of law and order, so will His Spirit in the

[1] See Lightfoot's 'Essay on the Christian Ministry' in his *Philippians*; Hutch's *The Organisation of the Early Christian Churches*; Hort's *The Christian Ecclesia*.

Church sustain authority so far as conservation is needed, and stimulate liberty so far as creation is desirable. It cannot surely be necessary that these tendencies should alternate in history or appear in opposed societies; but what the present hour calls for is the spirit of reconciliation, not of controversy, to approach all differences with a view, not to aggravate discord, but to restore harmony.

(vii) The Catholic may still maintain that a historical unity and continuity is in his judgment necessary, but that does not justify him in refusing a place within the one Church of Jesus Christ to the ministries and sacraments of communions which can show the fruit of the Spirit. The Protestant may still assert that what is alone essential is the community of the Spirit, and yet recognise as desirable that this community be made manifest in the world in the outward organisation, so far as is practicable. If the first refuse this, he is refusing, wittingly or unwittingly, to follow the Spirit's leading; for where the Spirit is, there the Church is. If the second refuse this, he is refusing that same guidance in history which has shown how much the Church has lost by division, and would gain by unity. On the basis of such mutual recognition in common faith, hope, and love, there could be secured a reunion of comprehension and not compromise. In the history of the Church three types of polity have appeared, the congregational, the presbyteral, and the episcopal.

It would be unreasonable to expect the episcopal communions to give up the episcopate, which has had a continuous history in the Church since the second century, and the value of which is estimated highly in the communions which possess it. The corruption of episcopacy—prelacy—the other Christian communions could not be expected to accept, as that would exclude all that is distinctive in their historical witness, and it was against this corruption that their protest was directed. A representative and constitutional episcopate could, however, be combined in one polity with presbyteral councils and

congregational liberty in the essential functions of the Church, the preaching of the Gospel, the observance of the sacraments, and the administration of discipline, as both these types have proved their value in history, and are too highly prized by the communions to which they belong to be surrendered. Each type of polity has a contribution to make to the common good, and until this comprehensive reunion is secured each communion should, with charity to all, consistently maintain its own witness. If amid all these divisions the community of the Spirit has persisted, would not the comprehension of differences in this more varied unity make more manifest that community; and might not the Church, restored to unity, hope for the fullness of life in the Spirit as at Pentecost?

(2) Having thus endeavoured to describe the nature of the Church as the body of Christ, and the community of the Spirit as the necessary organ of the continuation of the divine revelation and human redemption in Christ, as the human society in which God discloses His nature as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as well as fulfils His purpose for the world and man, we may now consider the functions of the Church.

(i) The charter of the Church is given in the commission in Matthew xxviii. 18-20: 'All authority hath been given unto Me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.' Even if, as many scholars now maintain, these words were not literally spoken by the Risen Christ, but express the consciousness of the Church, inspired by His Spirit, of its vocation, their value is undiminished.

(*a*) There are here three functions, the preaching of the Gospel, the administration of the sacraments, (although only one is mentioned), and the mainten-

ance of discipline, the observance of all the things commanded. John Knox in the 'Scots Confession' of 1560 mentions all three. 'The notes of the true Kirk of God, we believe, confess, and avow to be—First, the true preaching of the Word of God, in the which God has revealed Himself to us. Secondly, the right administration of the Sacraments, which must be annexed to the word and promise of God, to seal and confirm the same in our hearts. Lastly, ecclesiastical discipline uprightly ministered, as God's Word prescribed, whereby vice is repressed and virtue nourished.' In 1530 Luther and the Saxon Reformers in the 'Augsburg Confession' described the Church as 'the congregation of saints (or general assembly of the faithful) wherein the Gospel is rightly taught and the Sacraments are rightly administered.' Article XIX. of the Church of England runs thus: 'The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same.' In all these statements the preaching of the Gospel is put in the forefront. Knox's Confession quite expressly subordinates the Sacraments to the Gospel, as Paul very emphatically did: 'Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel' (1 Cor. i. 17). Knox alone adds the maintenance of discipline. If in fulfilment of that function the Reformed Churches often showed more of the legal spirit of the Old Testament than of the gracious spirit of the New, it does not follow that the Christian experience and character of the members of the Church need not be looked after, not with legal severity, but with evangelical solicitude.

(*b*) As the Commission was addressed to the Eleven, it might be maintained that the functions only of the officers of the Church are therein described. But what has been said in the previous paragraphs about the Church as a society makes such a conclusion unjustified. It is the whole community of believers to whom spiritual gifts are given, and to whom

corresponding ministries are entrusted for the common God; all believers are members of the one body, sharing in its life and its work. While there was the universal ministry, there were also special ministries—the apostles, prophets, evangelists or teachers going from church to church, and the elders or bishops and deacons, administering the affairs of the local congregation. It was a fluid and not a rigid organisation, although the apostles preserved their unique position. It is evident that whatever equality and liberty of all believers there might be within the community of the Spirit, yet as a visible society the Church needed officers endowed with authority to regulate the life and the work of the society. The functions are committed not to the special ministers exclusively, but to the whole body; and yet, while there is room for abundant and varied individual ministry, what may be called the corporate functions, what is done in the name and by the authority of the whole body cannot be discharged by any member as and when he pleases, but only by those members whom the whole body appoints as its representatives. Accordingly we must recognise in dealing with the functions of the Church the practical necessity of a representative ministry to discharge these functions as corporate, and not only individual. We must not assert a separation of clergy and laity, or a superiority of the one over the other, or still less identify the Church with the clergy, but to recognise the ministry which represents the Church in its corporate functions is not to exalt the minister above the members, but to assert the authority of the Church to determine who shall, as representative of it, discharge these corporate functions.

(ii) Following the lead of the Confessions of the Reformation, we must put in the forefront of the functions of the Church the preaching of the Gospel. (*a*) It is regarded by some persons as a proof of their intellectual superiority or their greater devoutness that they depreciate preaching. The preacher cannot say anything good enough to make it worth while

for them to hear him, or they go to church to worship God and not to hear a man talk. So runs their challenge. So far as the preacher justifies by his intellectual poverty or his spiritual feebleness such a charge, he is failing in his vocation, and his failure is the Church's reproach that it does not guard its pulpits more carefully against incompetence. But individual failure does not justify the general attitude. Every religion which has been founded by a great religious personality has spread and grown by the preaching of its founder, although that preaching has assumed different forms according to the historical conditions. Zoroaster, Buddha, Confucius, Mohammed all preached the truth with which they believed themselves charged. Jesus began His Church by preaching to the multitudes and teaching His disciples. It was the preaching of Paul and other apostles which carried Christianity from city to city in the Roman Empire. The modern missionary must also preach. Men must believe before they can worship, and they will worship as they believe. Worship without the faith which the truth and grace of Christ, as proclaimed in the Gospel, awaken, would be a mere formality, and sacraments, unless meaning is given to them by the Gospel, would sink into a magical performance. If the Gospel be a communication from God to men by men, it is not to be despised intellectually ; the man who looks down on the preacher should be prepared to show that the Gospel is not of God, and has not God's authority over reason and conscience. As speech is the most effective mode of communication among men, God has made it the organ of His revelation, and a better we cannot conceive. When it is maintained that Catholicism prefers sacraments to preaching as a means of grace, and Protestantism preaching to sacraments, we cannot agree that this is merely a question of preference. The Church has decayed when preaching has been neglected ; and religious revival and moral reformation have followed on the restoration of preaching to its foremost place in the functions of the Church.

What value the sacraments have for devout souls depends on the knowledge they have of the truth and grace of Christ through the Gospel, which enables them in faith to receive Christ Himself in the Eucharist. The sacraments are not depreciated here, as a later paragraph will show, but it is the depreciation of preaching that is deprecated.

(*b*) The most effective argument against this depreciation is to show what is meant by the preaching of the Gospel. First of all, preaching is not a man talking, giving his own opinions. It is, as Bishop Phillips Brooks defines it, 'the bringing of truth through personality.'[1] The personality must be made what he is himself by the truth; and in preaching, all he is must be under the dominion of the truth. The personality is a representative of the community, and speaks in its name and with its authority; and therefore only as he is expressing its common faith is he discharging its corporate function. We are here defining the ideal, and not describing the actual. Secondly, the truth is the Gospel. Anglicans often find a difficulty in understanding why English Nonconformists lay such stress on the Gospel, and ask why the stress should not be laid on Christ. If by the Gospel be meant a narrow plan of salvation, a rigid theory of the Atonement, or even any doctrinal statement about the Person and the Work of Christ, this reproach would be justified. One reason why Nonconformists love the word *Gospel* is that it throws into prominence the evangelical interpretation of Christianity—salvation from sin by the sacrifice of Christ—rather than the metaphysical, the sacramental, or the mystical. But the chief reason is that they believe themselves to be following the usage of Paul in regarding the Gospel not as speech about Christ, but rather as Christ's speech to men by men. It is true that Christ alone is the power and wisdom of God (1 Cor. i. 24) unto salvation, but He can be most effectually presented to men for their acceptance and appropriation in the preaching of the Gospel. Evan-

[1] *Lectures on Preaching*, pp. 5-6.

gelicals have sometimes been too narrow in recognising that to a complete presentation of Christ the other interpretations are also necessary, that He is the Word by whom all things were made (John i. 1-4), that He as the Life of God gives Himself to faith in the sacraments when received in faith (vi. 48-51), that He by His Spirit is the presence which brings comfort, peace, and joy within the soul (xv. 1-11). But to the writer they seem altogether right in insisting on these two things, that the Saviourhood by sacrifice is central, essential, crucial, and that the most effective means of exalting Christ so that He may draw all men unto Himself is the preaching of the Gospel (xii. 32). The Gospel is itself sacramental; through the physical activities of speech and hearing the spiritual good of the truth and grace of Jesus Christ is conveyed and received.

(*c*) The preaching of the Gospel is here used not in the narrow sense which is sometimes attached to the phrase, but to include all that is done by the Christian Church in the way of instructing and influencing men by presenting the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The preparatory revelation in the Old Testament and the interpretative revelation in the New are both included. It is the total reality of the nature, character, and purpose of God, and His relation to man, that is the content of the Church's message; and it may use any means of human communication that will prove most efficacious. The theological implications of the Gospel and its social applications, Christian experience and Christian character, must all be dealt with if the whole human personality is to be reached by the whole divine reality. Wide, however, as may be the circumference, there is, and can be, only one centre, Christ as Saviour and Lord; or to change the figure, varied as the body of teaching as presented may appear, it must have one vitalising soul, and that life should be felt in all the parts. In dealing in the succeeding chapters with the Christian life, the Christian hope, the Kingdom of God, we shall be further determining the content of the Church's message.

(iii) The sacraments are signs and seals, and may become to the believing recipient channels of grace. (*a*) It may be that many Protestants have failed to give to the sacraments the place which belongs to them as instituted by Christ Himself, for, despite the challenge by some scholars, the authority for their observance can be traced to Him, and as having served in the Christian Church as a means of spiritual blessing. But the Catholic position, in so far as it detaches their efficacy from the faith of the recipient, and invests them with a mysterious virtue to communicate the benefits of Christ to the recipients apart from faith, must be regarded as superstitious, as introducing magic rather than mystery. Much is made by Catholics of the sacramental principle, the conveyance of spiritual good by material channels; and grace is treated as a thing, a medicine and a nourishment of the soul, which can be so conveyed. But what has already been insisted on must here be again affirmed: grace is God's personal activity in our personal experience and character, and material channels can convey grace only as faith receives and responds to grace. A sunset can convey the beauty of God only as the poet or artist is in contact with God. He for whom God has no meaning or worth may find aesthetic satisfaction, but not spiritual benefit. The sacramental principle, rightly understood, does not justify the claims made for the sacraments of the Church. There are minds in which imagination is more dominant than intellect, to whom a symbol is more persuasive than a syllogism. As many probably are more deeply impressed through the eye than through the ear, sacraments have their distinctive value. But that the writer can explain only psychologically as regards their subjective influence, and not metaphysically as regards their objective efficacy. God cannot give us anything more or better than Christ as Saviour and Lord, than His Spirit as dwelling and working in our inner life; and in this respect what other can the sacrament offer than does the Gospel? The difference is surely subjective in the apprehension

of the recipient, not objective in the communication by the Giver. The writer has never yet been able to get from those who make these claims for the sacraments of a mysterious virtue an answer to him intelligible of what the difference is, wherein lies the superiority of the sacraments. Bread and wine can claim no higher quality materially than the air which conveys the sound, and the latter is even more vital than the former; and eating and drinking are not better than speaking and hearing as physical activities. As Christ commanded the preaching and hearing of the Gospel no less than the observance of the sacraments, their superiority cannot lie in their being of His appointment. As one baptized in childhood, the writer cannot bear witness to what the experience of baptism may mean to those for whom it is the seal of a public confession of Christ. For Paul it meant very much, and He assumed that it would mean as much for other believers (Rom. vi. 1-11). Of the ordinance of the Lord's Supper the writer can speak from experience; it has been to him a means of grace, enabling him to realise more vividly the presence of Christ, to receive in faith the gifts of His grace, and to respond in aspiration, contrition, and consecration to the constraint of His love as shown in His sacrifice. Far be it from him to depreciate the use of the sacraments as a means of grace; but what he cannot understand is how the sacraments can be regarded as superior to the Gospel spoken and heard as bringing Christ near, and making Him more real to faith. That God's contact with us passes our comprehension, that communion with Him becomes indescribable, that a symbol may seem less inadequate to the ineffable than a definition—all this may be fully conceded; but what cannot be admitted is that the personal relation of God and man can be mediated more effectively by material channels than by the channel of the Gospel in which Christ is presented to reason, conscience, heart.

(*b*) On the question of baptism there is a cleavage of opinion. The great majority of Christian com-

munions have adopted the practice of infant baptism, while all over the world there is a numerous and important communion which rejects infant baptism, and insists on believers' baptism (not adult baptism only, for a boy or girl may be baptized as soon as a personal confession of faith can be intelligently made). Baptism by sprinkling is the more common practice, while most Baptists insist on immersion. The question of mode is of quite secondary importance. That immersion was the probable mode in the Apostolic Church may be conceded; but the Christian Church need not be bound as regards the outward form. A more important issue is raised by infant baptism. The Apostolic Church as missionary grew by the addition of converts, who were baptized on confession of faith. There is no conclusive evidence that when the baptism of a household is mentioned in Acts (*e.g.* xvi. 15, 32-34), any children were included. It has been argued, however, that it would have been in accordance with Jewish custom, which treated the family as a unit, that children should be baptized with their parents, and that the way in which Paul writes about the relation of parents and children justifies such an assumption. Be that as it may, infant baptism can be justified on broader grounds. The children born and bred, taught and trained within a Christian home are not to be regarded, as Jews or Gentiles could be in the Apostolic Age, as outside of the Christian community. They are within its range of influence, and may be expected to respond in a gradual development, guided and guarded by the grace of Christ, mediated by their Christian environment till they can themselves consciously and voluntarily receive that grace for themselves in personal trust, love, and obedience towards Jesus Christ. The parents in their dedication of their children in bringing them to be baptized, and the Church in administering the ordinance, enter into a mutual pledge to make that environment so Christian that the development shall at each stage be Christian. Recent psychological inquiry has shown the value of such growth in grace,

and in the knowledge and love of the Lord Jesus Christ from the earliest years. This is in many Churches probably the more general experience than that of conscious conversion. Christian faith is reinforced by Christian hope in the expectation that the prophetic ordinance will find its fulfilment in the after life of the child. The ordinance declares symbolically both that the child belongs to a race that needs cleansing from sin, and that there is grace available for every child born into that race, and further that this grace can not only be made effective in immediate personal relation to Christ, but can be mediated through the influence of a Christian environment. The two incidents which may be reckoned amongst the most beautiful in the Gospels—Jesus receiving the babes and blessing them, and Jesus setting the child in the midst (Matt. xix. 13-15 and xviii. 1-6)—afford ample warrant for such a view of His relation to children. If not according to the letter of the Apostolic Age, infant baptism is assuredly according to the Spirit of Christ. What is here stated is not the Catholic doctrine of baptismal regeneration. The ordinance works no hidden miracle. But in accord with the recognised conditions of the child's growth, Christian influences may guard and guide the child in the Christian way. Against this doctrine the Baptist protest was justified. The practice of believers' baptism has also its full justification. There are many Christian lives which begin with a conscious conversion; there may be a deliberate and voluntary turning from darkness to God's 'marvellous light,' a passing in a crisis of the soul from death in sin unto life in God. In such an experience the mode of immersion has symbolical appropriateness (Rom. vi. 1-11). Such conversion, even apparently sudden, is no less real than the gradual development: and the two kinds of baptism represent these two types of experience. Should there be a reunion of churches—Baptist and Non-Baptist—this might be the basis, that that form shall be followed which best represents the individual's position, whether born in a Christian home, or con-

verted. While the child born within the Christian community cannot enter into full fellowship until confession is made in seeking membership, until by personal decision the dedication of infancy is confirmed, it would be well if there were an ordinance to mark that stage; the writer believes that confirmation, which in the Apostolic Church followed baptism, should be generally accepted, even in non-episcopal churches, as it need not be reserved for administration by the bishop. In believers' baptism confirmation might at once follow on baptism. Thus would be affirmed the truth that baptism stands not only for cleansing but also for renewal by the Spirit of God, that the life in the Christian Church is a Spirit-filled life. Attaching the importance which the writer himself does to the full recognition of the Spirit's presence and action, such an ordinance as confirmation would appear to him not an empty form, but a most significant witness to a reality too much ignored.

(*c*) There does not seem adequate reason for accepting the contention of a few scholars that Christ Himself did not institute the ordinance of the Eucharist as of permanent obligation in the Church. Without entering on disputed critical questions, it is not at all likely that Paul, great as was his authority, could have imposed a new practice for which Christ's command could not be claimed. What more beautiful and gracious than that He should desire to be remembered by His followers in His sacrificial, redemptive grace, whenever they met together for their fellowship in Him? It is one of the tragedies of the Christian Church that this rite, intended to be a bond of union, has become a cause of division. The Roman Catholic doctrine of *transubstantiation* involves both a metaphysic and a conception of the Person of Christ which is unintelligible and incredible to those who think in modern ways. The Lutheran doctrine of *consubstantiation*, which denies that the elements are changed into the body and blood of Christ, and yet maintains that blood and body are given *in*, *with*, and *under* the elements is also, if less, objectionable, and led the

Lutheran scholastics into a Christology which is a maze of absurdities. On the other hand, the view to which many Protestants commit themselves, that the ordinance is only a commemoration of the death of Christ, and that the elements are only symbols of His sacrifice, is quite inadequate to the experience which many Protestant believers, among whom the writer reckons himself gratefully and gladly, enjoy as they sit, the Lord's guests, at His table. This is the conception to which the writer has himself been led. *First of all*, it would be well to banish the ideas of material flesh and blood, even if glorified, as that leads us into a region of profitless speculation. *Secondly*, it would be well to avoid speaking of the *spiritual* presence of Christ as excluding a corporeal. If the Resurrection means anything, it means that the whole personality of Christ conquered death, and has entered into the unseen world, not with the natural but with the spiritual body. We know nothing of the conditions to which such a spiritual body is subject, and speculations are vain. We must not then affirm a corporeal presence, neither are we entitled to exclude it. Let us be content with saying that it is the whole Christ in all the fullness of His grace who is present. The ordinance then is not merely commemoration of an absent Saviour and Lord, it is communion with One who is present. But just as the communion of two loving human hearts is dependent on and sustained by the common life of the past days, so surely into the communion with Christ enters the remembrance of all He suffered and achieved for our salvation. As we remember all our salvation cost, as well as all our salvation won, we realise the Saviour with us. Just as in a human communion which has any worth, each loving heart communicates to the others whatever it has to give, so assuredly the present Christ bestows gifts on the believer as there is faith to receive. Hence the ordinance is more than symbolical; for as the faith which in *commemoration* and *communion* receives the *communications* of the present Christ, it is surely a channel of grace. To the writer it seems

that the stress should be laid, not on the elements, but on the acts; for the elements are material, and as such have no spiritual quality, but the acts are personal, and so can express a spiritual content. It is the giving and the receiving which express divine grace and human faith, and as symbols may accompany what they signify. Christ may be giving Himself, and may be received by the believer, as the bread is broken and the cup passed. What response can faith make to such grace besides receiving it? Surely *consecration* is what the believer brings as his thank-offering for the atoning sacrifice. It is a pity that the term *Eucharist* is so often associated with the sacramentalist view, for what it means is thanksgiving. In Scotland the term *Sacrament* is commonly used of the Lord's Supper; that too expresses dedication, the renewal of the vows of devotion and service. Such an experience in observing the ordinance surely yields all the religious and moral good that any sacramentalist theory could claim for the special grace conveyed in sacraments.

(*d*) There is one aspect of the sacraments which very often does not get the attention which it deserves. The sacraments are social acts, the acts of the Christian community through its representatives in their administration. The Lord's Supper is still more distinctively social, as it is a common meal in which the members of the Church enter into fellowship with one another in their communion with the one Saviour and Lord of all. Hence it seems a departure from the intention that baptism is sometimes administered in a private house, or at an after-service. It ought to be part of the regular worship, the welcome by the whole Christian community into the circle of its moral and religious influence, for baptism is an initiation into the Christian society. So also the administration of the Eucharist by the officiating minister to each communicant separately seems much less significant than when the elements are passed from hand to hand, each receiving and each giving, for it is surely in the mutual helpfulness of the members of the Church in

the things of the Spirit that the grace of Christ is mediated, as well as by His immediate gift to each. To be introduced into and to maintain one's standing within the community, which is the body of Christ, is a condition of enjoying fully the gifts of the Spirit. As God is Father of all, Christ is Saviour of all, and the Spirit works and dwells in all; and as the supreme law is love, to ignore the social aspect of these sacraments as marking entrance into and continuance in fellowship is to narrow and impoverish the Christian experience and character. There is a further consideration which follows from this. As there is only one Church of Jesus Christ, it is a loss incalculable that there is not fullest and freest intercommunion among the Churches. A grave responsibility is assumed by those who set up barriers between Christians approaching the same Table of the Lord, unless conscience inexorably forbids, and the writer cannot understand how the Christian conscience can forbid, while cherishing respect for the scruples of others. One of the worthiest motives of the movement towards reunion is just the desire that all Christians should be able, without let or hindrance, in love to one another to remember the love of the Saviour in dying, and to receive more fully the love of the Living Lord. Thus best of all could the spiritual unity of the Church be made visible to the world.

(iv) The term discipline, which John Knox used to describe the third function of the Church, suggests law rather than love, and belongs to a fashion of thought in which the Old Testament was held as of equal authority with the New, so that the distinctiveness of the Christian Gospel found inadequate recognition. We should rather use the phrase 'the cure of souls,' the interest in and the solicitude for the Christian character and experience of the members of the Church, which not only the minister should show, but which should be mutual among the members. This does not mean uncharitable interference, prying into and calling attention to the faults of others, a grievous defect which has been found in small fellow-

ships. But it does mean the desire and the purpose that the light shall shine, and that the salt shall not lose its savour. A merely official supervision of the conduct of members is not adequate; there must be heart-interest, and loving effort to help one another in fulfilling the Christian calling. Except in very flagrant lapses which even the common conscience condemns, formal suspension from membership is undesirable and impracticable; and even with notorious offenders there should be the patience of love, doing all that can be done to restore. For the primary consideration is not the reputation of the Church for the severity of its standards, as was sometimes thought, but the duty of the followers of Christ to follow Him in seeking in order to save the lost. What, however, is the obligation of each Church is by its testimony and its influence to maintain the highest Christian standards both of religious experience and of moral character. The preacher, if his preaching is not to be vain, must embody the truth he teaches in the tale of his own life. The pastoral function of the Christian ministry is often depreciated in comparison with his preaching and administrative activities; but while the cure of souls is not entrusted to him alone, he has a special responsibility to come into personal contact with all committed to his charge, and to make his own personality as fully a channel of the gifts of the Spirit as he can. Only as the members of the Church suffer and rejoice together, does it become the local manifestation and activity of the One Church, the body of Christ, the community of the Spirit.

(3) In the New Testament conception of the Church as a body, it is assumed that all the members have some gift of the Spirit, which enables them to share in its ministry, discharging the function which corresponds with the spiritual endowment. But, as has already been mentioned, there was also recognised the inspired ministry of the itinerant preachers and teachers, and the officers of the local church.

(i) Although the history is obscure, the local ministry in due time took over the function of the

itinerant, and one of the elders (presbyters) became bishop of the local church (*primus inter pares*), and thus the three orders of bishops, presbyters, and deacons came to be. In Ignatius the bishop is the bond of unity in the Church; in Irenaeus he is the custodian, because of his representative character, of the apostolic tradition preserved in his Church, if regarded as of apostolic foundation. It is only in Cyprian that the sacerdotal ideas of the Old Testament and paganism begin to affect the conception of the ministry, and the bishop comes to be invested with an authority as the local organ of the universal Church, which had not been claimed for him as the representative of the local Church. Into this development it is not necessary to enter further. Although the writer belongs to a non-episcopal Church, and feels no need of the bishop, yet for the sake of the reunion of the Christian Churches he is quite prepared to accept the episcopate, yet not a prelatic, but a constitutional and representative, such as has developed in Anglican communions outside of England. Such an episcopate can be combined with all that is essential in the other types of polity, the presbyteral and the congregational. It would appear that the one function which the High Anglican feels compelled to reserve for the bishop is that of ordination, although a participation of presbyters is accepted; whether confirmation should also be so reserved is a question on which there seems to be greater difference of opinion. The practice of episcopacy without any theory could be accepted by the non-episcopal Churches to end the scandal of a divided Christendom. The writer feels bound to reject the theory of the 'apostolic succession' in the episcopate, and of the sacerdotal character of the ministry. The New Testament knows neither of these theories. The unity and continuity of the Church does not depend on any succession of its officers, but on the continued presence and activity of Christ by His Spirit, and there is only one Mediator between God and man—the Saviour and the Lord.

(ii) The constructive doctrine of the ministry may

now be stated. (*a*) A view not uncommon among English Nonconformists may at once be dismissed. The minister is not just one of the members who is paid by the other members to make his preaching, organising, and visiting 'a whole-time job.' In their revolt against Anglicanism, English Nonconformists have often denied what is itself true, and rejected what is itself right. The Christian people is the Spirit-filled body, and each member can have immediate access to God, and discharge such individual services in the fellowship as the Spirit's gifts enable him. There are, however, corporate functions of the local Church, the conduct of its worship, the administration of its sacraments, the declaration of its Gospel, the confession of its faith, the direction of its common activities, which cannot be left to any individual member to be discharged as and when he pleases. The Church must have a representative, chosen, called, equipped, and appointed for the discharge of these corporate functions. This the minister is. He has no authority apart from the Church; he derives his authority in the name and on behalf of the Church, *from* the Church; but his authority is not that of one of the members only, but that of the representative of all the members, and in respecting him the members show their reverence for the fellowship of believers of which he is the representative.

(*b*) A position so responsible and influential demands special qualifications. The first of these, which is rightly insisted on in many communions as primary, is that the man has the consciousness of the call of God to dedicate himself to this service. The call may come in a personal crisis, in which necessity is laid upon him: 'Woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel' (1 Cor. ix. 16). Or the conviction may gradually be deepened that this is the will of God for him. But however the call may come, no man should take this office unto himself. It is not a profession a man may accept or refuse; it is a vocation which he can only obey. A man is not, however, the best judge of his own fitness; and accordingly

it is necessary that the inward call be confirmed by the approval of those competent to judge. The minister and members of the church to which a candidate for the ministry belongs should kindly, and yet wisely and justly, test his fitness before recommending him to go on to get the further necessary educational equipment. Experience has conclusively proved that natural gifts, without rigorous training, are not enough; accordingly, most denominations insist on a theological course, although the requirements vary almost incredibly. This is not the place to sketch an ideal course; but what must be insisted on is, that in the long run the more thorough the training the more efficient the service afterwards is likely to be. It must be practical as well as theoretical, so that the minister can use most effectively in preaching, or any other function, the knowledge which he has gathered. It is the responsibility, again, of the authorities of the theological college, not only on entrance, but also throughout the course, to be constantly testing fitness, and to turn aside from the ministry any man manifestly unfit. If a man thus shows himself unfit, we may conclude that he was mistaken in thinking himself called, and his unfitness warrants the assumption that he was likely to be mistaken. If he prove his fitness, that itself justifies the confidence of himself and others that he has indeed been called. Should a man stand the test of the theological course, his acceptableness must be tested by those to whom he seeks to minister. Imperfect as is the method of choosing a minister in many churches, and inadequate as the grounds often are on which the choice is made, yet there seems to be no other way of giving effect to the principle that it is not *apart* from the church, but *through* it, that any man can become its minister. Can a man imposed on a church fulfil this vocation as acceptably as he whom a church has itself chosen? If the Church be the body of Christ, and as such Spirit-filled, what organ more fitted for the discharge of this responsibility can be conceived? In this call of the Church

the inward call finds its final confirmation. May it not then be said that God *gives to* the church the minister chosen by it ?

(*c*) As the local congregation is but a local manifestation and activity of the one Church, although that one Church is divided into denominations, the ministry thus begun is wider than that of a local congregation. The man is called to be a minister of Jesus Christ for His universal Church; and ordination is the method by which since the Apostolic times a man is set apart to this ministry. To him who receives this ordinance worthily in aspiration, consecration, and dependence, the symbol of the Spirit's endowment will also become the channel ; and he will receive a gift to fit him more fully for his calling. As ecclesiastical barriers to the exercise of this universal ministry still exist, the local congregation will seek to be associated with the other churches of its order at least in this ordinance. A man may be inducted to the pastorate of a church in a denomination, but his ordination means, and cannot but mean, that he becomes a minister of Jesus Christ in His Church. The insistence in episcopal churches on ordination by a bishop now hinders the recognition of the fact that ordination is not to a congregation or a denomination, but to the universal Church. How this difficulty will be removed does not yet appear, but a step towards it has been taken by the recognition by representative Anglicans that the Free Churches of England have a ministry of the Word and the Sacraments within the one universal Church of Christ. The practical consequences of such a position have yet to be drawn.

(*d*) Experience can be here set against theory. Ministers in non-episcopal churches have at their ordination been conscious of the presence of the Head of the Church laying His invisible hands upon them, breathing upon them His Spirit. That ineffable experience they dare not doubt nor deny, and with all the faults and failures which they contritely confess their subsequent ministry has in some measure at

least fulfilled the promise of that solemn and sacred hour: it has not been altogether without the fruit of the Spirit. To them their ordination has proved a valid sacrament; and they cannot conceive the possibility of being re-ordained in order that something might be added of authority to their ministry that it does not by the gift of Christ already possess. The life and work of the minister after his ordination is a continued test, and, if the test be met, a repeated confirmation of the call of God. The insufficiency of his fulfilment of his calling he may need to confess constantly, but of the reality of his vocation his experience in his ordination may reassure him in times of disappointment and despondency. This view of ordination assumes no mysterious value in the ordinance itself, only that for divine grace and human faith the symbolic act may be the occasion of a real imparting and a real receiving of the gifts of the Spirit. Having been begun in the Spirit, the ministry must be continued in the Spirit; and it is only by a ministry dowered with the enthusiasm and energy of Pentecost that the Church can, amid all that tends to lessen its vitality and vigour in the world, prove itself the body of Christ, the visible organ of His presence and activity, by becoming to the world the channel of the enlightening, quickening, and renewing Spirit of God. Thus the Church, the Ministry, the Gospel may be to the world sacramental, conveying the life of God to men.[1]

(4) The definitions of the Church in the Protestant Confession omit one of its functions which to-day is regarded as of primary importance.

(i) The conception of the Kingdom of God had fallen into the background. It was Roman Catholicism which after the Reformation carried on foreign mission work: for the most part Protestantism ignored and neglected the Great Commission to 'make disciples of all the nations' (Matt. xxviii.

[1] These questions about church, sacraments, ministry, and ordination have been discussed in a volume of essays, *Towards Reunion*, by Church of England and Free Church writers.

19). It was only at the beginning of last century that the foreign missionary campaigns captured the allegiance of the Churches generally. The parable of the growth of the kingdom from the small seed to the great plant only then again came into the living thought of Christian men (Matt. xiii. 31-32). Still less was the lesson of the parable of the leaven (*v.* 33) appreciated. Lutheranism taught that a man may attain Christian perfection by faith in God and the fulfilment of his earthly calling, and denied that the monastic life was the distinctively 'religious' life. But from the beginning it has been too prone to acquiesce in the things that are as 'ordained of God'; and has failed to be a motive to social reform. Calvin did recognise the duty of the Church to remould human society to the pattern of the will of God, but unfortunately he interpreted that will in commands of law and not a purpose of love. While during last century the missionary obligation was more generally recognised, the social obligation of the Church was to a large extent overlooked. Individualism dominated thought and life in the Church as well as in the world around. With the exception of a few pioneer thinkers, most Christian teachers took for granted that all the Church owed to society around was by the cultivation of individual character to fit men to take a worthy Christian part in the world's affairs. That it had a corporate function by its testimony and influence towards society to transform its standards, customs, and institutions in accordance with the mind of Christ was a conviction which only very gradually won its way. The Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship, held in April 1924 in Birmingham, marks a stage in the Church's progress.

(ii) In the saying about the Church in Matthew xvi. 18, Peter is entrusted with the 'keys of the kingdom of heaven.' This phrase is generally regarded as a symbol for stewardship. The concerns of the Kingdom are to be the charge of the Church. We need not now discuss the attempt to impose an exclusively

eschatological sense on the term the Kingdom of God or heaven. Whether the word Βασιλεία means *rule* or *realm* makes little difference to the sense of the phrase. The Kingdom of God is God's sovereignty in human society, in all realms of human interest or activity. How can it be distinguished from the Church, and what is the relation of the Church to it? The Church is the community of the Spirit, the body of Christ; it is distinctively the *religious* society, it is concerned with man's conscious and voluntary relation to God in Christ. The Kingdom, on the other hand, brings all human relations under the authority and direction of the purpose of God. Morality, industry, art, science, culture, and civilisation are all concerns of the Kingdom. The mission of the Church is first of all to bring all men into this personal relation to God, and then to make this personal relation dominant in all other relations. The Church wins men to God, and then through them seeks to win all human life for God. Ritschl's conception is somewhat narrower. As worshipping, the Christian community is the Church; as fulfilling the law of love, and thus changing human society, it is the Kingdom.[1] There are men outside of the Church who are furthering the interests of the Kingdom, and there are members of the Church who fall very far short in meeting the demands of the Kingdom. When all men are drawn into personal relation to God in Christ, a hope we must cherish, Church and Kingdom will be co-extensive; all in the Kingdom will be in the Church also. When all who are in the Church are realising the ideal of the Kingdom, will the Church and the Kingdom be identical? Even then the two conceptions will remain distinguishable as the distinctively religious and the universally human aspect of God's relation to man. We must not regard the Church as only a means towards the Kingdom as an end, because the personal relation to God is an essential element in the human good which the term Kingdom of God describes; it is a part and a necessary part of the end,

[1] *Unterricht in der christlichen Religion*, p. 7.

and yet it is also a means by which the whole end must be reached. To emphasise the priority of the personal relation to God is at all times necessary, but not less necessary is it to insist that this personal relation is itself incomplete until it dominates the whole of life. This is the Church's double task, to win disciples, and through them to hasten the Kingdom of God.

CHAPTER III

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

(1) So individualistic has Protestant Christianity become that it may seem strange that the subject of Christian Life is being treated after, and not before that of the Christian Church ; and yet that is not only the historical, but also the theological order. A number of isolated individuals do not come together to form the society ; the society gathers individuals into its fellowship. The Church is based not on any human intentions in time, but on the eternal purpose of God. Related as it is to human history, it is not a product of any human development; it was established on earth by Jesus the Christ our Lord in fulfilment of the purpose of God ; it is sustained not merely by human volitions, but by the presence and power of the Head, who by His Spirit is the bond of unity. For Christ alone was the relation of Son to God as Father unmediated by heredity or environment ; His alone was an immediate communion with God ; for all Christians the relation to God is mediated by His grace. Even the first disciples discovered and confessed His Messiahship in companionship with Him and with one another. Since His Ascension His invisible Presence and intangible Power is mediated by the Christian society. It is His body, and His Spirit is its common possession. Accordingly, the Christian life must be thought of as dependent on and realised within the Christian society. The truth and grace of the Lord Jesus Christ come to the individual through the Christian Church, and it is in its membership that he can more fully experience and express that truth and grace. It is not to an isolated relation to Himself that Christ calls in His

Gospel, and draws by His Spirit, but to a relation which can be received and realised only in fellowship within the Christian society. As the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Him *bodily* (Col. ii. 9), not only in His personal incarnation, but even now in His continued incarnation in the Church, the habitation of the Spirit, it is as a member of that body that the believer receives of that fullness, and grace for grace. If in the believer's consciousness the body be confined to the congregation to which he belongs, or even to the denomination to which he adheres, how much is his life impoverished, because he does not discern the whole body (1 Cor. xi. 29), the unity of all believers, the communion of all the saints in the one Spirit! It is from the one Church the individual receives the gifts of Christ; it is in the one Church he makes full use of these gifts.

(2) The relation of the Christian life to the Christian Church as mediated by it and realised in it having thus been defined, its characteristics may now be described.

(i) While in the pearl of great price (Matt. xiii. 45-46) the worth of all the goodly pearls is not only recovered but enhanced, or, to speak without metaphor, while in the relation to Christ all human needs can be met, all human interests preserved, and all human aspirations fulfilled, while the human ideals of truth, beauty, holiness, and love can in the Christian life be realised (Phil. iv. 8), yet Christianity is not to be thought of as first of all and most of all perfective of all that is good in man: it is that, all that, but it is more, for it meets the human extremity as a religion which could only perfect the good could not; it is redemptive, reconciling, restorative. Jesus did not go to the respectable morally and religiously—the scribes and Pharisees—who deeming themselves righteous did not own their need of salvation; but He became the companion of the sinners and the outcasts of Jewish society, for not only great was their need, but they might be more readily brought to a sense of their need (Mark ii. 16, 17). Whether in a sinless

world there would have been an Incarnation or not is a speculative inquiry, which the writer himself would answer affirmatively. But the Incarnation as it was, was in all its activities and results redemptive; it was God's dealing with sin that He might put an end to sin. He who has no sense of sin, and feels no need of forgiveness, offers no points of contact for the truth and grace of Christ. He compels Christ to leave him alone, as He did the 'righteous' of His own earthly ministry.

(ii) Hence the first characteristic of Christian experience is *penitence*, not only a feeling of regret at the sin committed, but also a judgment of its unmitigated moral evil, and a resolve to be done with it: a man must put away in aversion the evil of which he is ashamed, and for which he grieves. The emotional intensity of this experience is no measure of its moral reality, for that depends on temperament; what alone determines the value is the degree in which the sin is denied and renounced. The theology of a former age demanded 'law-work' before 'Gospel-work'; it required the sinner to discover at Sinai the sin of which Calvary offered the forgiveness. But this was a legal and not an evangelical standpoint. Calvary is God's clearest exposure and severest condemnation of sin; for resistance of love is far more heinous than defiance of law. Sin as disobedience of law is not the distinctively Christian judgment of it; it is sin as distrust of love which is in the Christian view the greater wrong to God. It is not the transgression of commandments which will concern the Christian penitent most of all; it is the withholding from God of filial confidence and submission, for estrangement of heart is the inner motive of perversion of will. It is the Saviour in His teaching and example, His grace towards sinners, His sacrifice on the Cross, who makes the conscience sensitive to the sin in the inward parts, and brings about a penitence which is the ending of the old life and the beginning of the new.

(iii) This experience will not be exactly the same

for the man who turns from a life of sin and unbelief to God in a conscious conversion, and the child or the youth who from earliest years has received and responded to Christian influences. Yet even he whose life has been in the judgment of men blameless must have a sense of shortcoming, of failure always to be the best which he knows, and wishes himself to be. Some who have been Christian from their earliest years do pass through a crisis, in which they realise acutely how far short they have fallen, and resolve more strenuously and persistently to fulfil their Christian calling. This penitence is not a solitary act in the Christian life; it is rather a constant process. All unreality is abhorrent in the Christian life, and a man must not charge himself with positive transgressions of which he is not guilty, and of which it may be he is morally incapable. By the grace of Christ a man may be enabled to live a life without moral reproach; and yet if he scrutinises himself in the searching light of the moral glory of Jesus Christ he will ever have a sense of imperfection. Even if the good purpose is dominant in his acts, and these acts spring from a pure motive—love to God and love to man—he must ever feel that he has not yet apprehended all for which he was apprehended by Christ (Phil. iii. 12). Without any morbidness the saint will still confess himself a sinner repenting of his sin, and seeking for forgiveness. The distinctively Christian life is thus always far removed from self-conceit, self-righteousness, and self-satisfaction; for the perfection of God, disclosed in Jesus Christ, will ever be exposing its imperfection.

(3) What distinguishes repentance from remorse is that repentance is not merely sin's consequence, but God's gift. There is a sorrow for sin, which follows on sin which is unto death, and not life (2 Cor. vii. 9-10). In the sorrow that is unto life there is, and must be, the beginnings of faith, the assurance that forgiveness and deliverance are available. It is faith that changes a hopeless grief into a hopeful sorrow for sin. When Judas discovered that he had betrayed

the innocent blood he ' repented himself,' but his was not the godly repentance, for when his fellow-sinners scorned his appeal he went and hanged himself (Matt. xxvii. 3-10). When Jesus looked upon Peter (Luke xxii. 61, 62), he went out and wept bitterly, because that look of Jesus brought reproach; but his grief was not unto death, for that same look assured forgiveness. Woe to the man who discovers himself without discovering the Saviour. It is only in the Saviour's presence that self-discovery will lead to self-recovery. Hence *faith* is the root of the Christian life, for even penitence for sin must spring out of that root.

(i) The function of faith is not confined to the reception of the divine grace in the forgiveness of sin, and deliverance from its bondage, although that is primary in the Christian experience, for man as creature, subject, and child of God is dependent upon God; in no respect in his higher life is there any sufficiency in himself, he is always finding his sufficiency in God alone (2 Cor. iii. 5). Faith is not merely in contrast to sense a realisation of God whom no sense can perceive (Heb. xi. 1), it is a determination of the whole of life by the reality of God. It is the exercise of the whole personality in relation to God; it is the belief of the mind, the trust of the heart, the submission of the will. It is a receptivity, not a passive but an active; the whole self must go out to and lay hold on God and His gifts. For God's communicative perfection is not a suppression of man's imperfect capacities, but a liberation, stimulation, exaltation. A man is most himself, his truest and best self, as in faith he commits himself to God, and accepts all that God in grace through Jesus Christ offers. Such faith is not a temporary but a constant activity, for on the one hand man's necessity to receive from God is never removed, and on the other hand God's capacity to bestow is never exhausted. As faith receives grace it is the more developed to receive the still more abounding grace; the depths of that grace faith never fathoms. The penitence

which turns from sin, and the faith which lays hold on God, are the two aspects of *conversion*, the conscious voluntary turning of man from sin to God; it is dying to sin, and becoming alive to God.

(ii) Faith is the activity distinctive of religion, and faith as directed towards God in Christ as Saviour and Lord of the Christian religion. This is what distinguishes religion from morality, unless the morality feels its need of, and so is led to religion. 'The categorical imperative' postulates man's liberty, that he *can* do what he *ought to do*. If a man's ideal is lofty and wide enough, he will probably soon discover his own limitations in realising it. But we must admit that there are men who in their own estimate of themselves do live in accordance with their own standards, and so have a mind conscious of its own uprightness. Morality without religion tends to self-sufficiency and self-satisfaction. But because religion, and pre-eminently the Christian religion, on the one hand presents the divine perfection as the ideal to be realised (Matt. v. 48; Eph. v. 1), and on the other offers men conscious of how far short they fall the assurance of forgiveness and deliverance, it forbids such self-sufficiency and self-satisfaction. A pagan moralist might think of a good man as pleased with himself, as conscious of his own superiority. But the Christian thinker must insist on the grace of *humility* as the adornment of Christian goodness. Humility is a distinctively Christian grace, and inseparably accompanies Christian faith. It is not a feeling of worthlessness; it is not abject nor servile; the man marked by humility does not despise himself or despair of himself. It is his recognition of his own worth to God as by God's grace a forgiven child of God, that makes him ever conscious of his unworthiness, as falling short of his calling. God's condescension in setting so high a value on man as His child is the source of the humility of the child aware of ever proving himself as less than that value to God. Because all that he is, or hopes to be, is of grace through faith, the Christian man cannot be high-minded, conceited,

proud, or vain; in lowliness of mind he will prefer others to himself and think more generously of their attainments than of his own (Rom. xii. 3, 10, 16). If salvation were of works done by man, he might have somewhat whereof to boast; but since salvation is God's free gift, all boasting is excluded (iii. 27). Pharisaism in any and every form is opposed to the Christian attitude; it is so deadly because it is the disease which most easily assails those who seek to be good and godly. Inward health of soul can only be preserved by the humility which glories only in the gifts of God's grace.

(iii) As faith is the characteristic activity of religion with humility as its necessary accompaniment, prayer may be said to be its necessary expression. In the personal relation between God and man there must be communion; love that never spoke or heard would soon languish. That communion will include study of and meditation on the Holy Scriptures; it will include the inward vision and the ineffable adoration of God as present, as revealed in Jesus Christ; it will include a glad and quick submission to all the workings of the Spirit of God within the soul; it will find its spontaneous expression in prayer. Prayer must not be thought of primarily as petition, as asking God to give what we want. It must begin in gratitude for all God is, and does; it must end in submission to the will of God as alone good.[1] If we fully realised God's goodness, and that in His will alone is our good, we should be less eager to utter our own wishes and be content to leave all to His good will. Nevertheless, the childlike communion with God would lack freedom if we could not bring to God, that we may trustfully and obediently leave with Him, what our hearts most desire. An anxious scrutiny of every petition as to whether we should or should not present it would make prayer a burden and a yoke, and not a relief and a refuge. We must not say that prayer should be confined to spiritual blessings only, for our spiritual life is affected by our cares and desires regarding

[1] See Matt. xi. 25-27, xxvi. 39-44, for Christ's attitude in prayer.

earthly goods, regarding the health and happiness of our loved ones, and God is in His providence caring for all His creatures in nature as well as history.[1] But all petitions must always be offered not merely in passive resignation, but in active co-operation with God's will. Then prayer itself becomes a fan winnowing the chaff from the wheat of our desires, and in prayer we learn what to pray for, and to give up the wishes which we cannot offer to God in prayer. While childlike prayer must not be childish, just as an earthly parent trains the child not to be childish, God is in the communion of His children with Him training them for spiritual maturity, when their petitions will be assured of an answer, because by the enlightening of His Spirit more and more conformed to His holy and blessed will (John xv. 7).

(4) The second of the Christian graces is love.

(i) Ritschl has maintained that the relation to God and Christ is contained in faith, and that we must not speak of love.[2] There is a sentimentality in human affection which has no place in love for God. To use the language of the Song of Songs regarding Christ Himself is offensive to a reverent spirit. Paul never uses terms of endearment in regard to Christ, intimate as was his communion. But we can surely regard God as our highest good, we can share God's sorrow for man's sin and God's joy in man's recovery, we can live and labour for the coming of God's Kingdom and the doing of His will, we can give our life to God and find our life in God—that is love at its truest and best. We can adore and delight in God. As God has come so near to our humanity in Jesus Christ, God in Christ can be the object of an intense personal affection and devotion. Faith united Paul so closely to Christ, that for him to live was Christ (Phil. i. 21); he experienced his renunciation of sin as crucifixion with Christ, and his sanctification to God as resurrection with Christ (Rom. vi. 1-11; Gal. ii. 20). If this is not the usual Christian experience, it is not,

[1] *Cf.* Matt. vi. 25-34.

[2] See *Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 593-5.

however, to be regarded as abnormal, but rather as typical of what that experience may at its highest and fullest be. This love of God in Christ is blended of many elements—gratitude for grace, the forgiveness of and deliverance from sin, adoration of the perfection of God, dedication to the service of God, and satisfaction in communion with God. A Christian life is incomplete, however worthy may be the character, which does not include this experience of personal relation to God in Christ. As love is communicative as well as receptive, God's love, to which man's love so responds, will be shed abroad in the human heart; man will become a partaker in the life which is distinctive of God.[1] The love of God thus received in love by man becomes the motive and the purpose of the Christian life even in relation to men. The love of Christ (not ours for Christ, but Christ's for us) constraineth us, becomes as it were the channel in which the currents of human aspiration and endeavour are confined (2 Cor. v. 14). Jesus joined together love for God and love for man (Mark xii. 29-31). For Paul love was a more excellent way than the exercise of spiritual gifts (1 Cor. xii. 31). In the Epistles of John the test and proof of love to God is love to man. Hence the same principle is distinctive of Christian character as of Christian experience.

(ii) The definition of love already given may be recalled; it is a judgment of value, a sentiment of interest, and a purpose of good. If we love God, we seek and strive to value men as God does, to be interested in men (sharing their grief or joy) as He is, to work for their good according to His purpose. From the reality of God's love may be deduced the ideal for man's. *First of all*, God's love is a universal love; the differences of sex, class, culture, nation, race, colour which divide men from one another do not affect His love for all (Matt. v. 45; *cf.* Gal. iii. 28). Even character does not determine His general beneficence: His sun shines and His showers fall for good and bad alike; although it must be added He

[1] See 1 John iv. 7-21.

is not indifferent to the moral differences, for sinners are a sorrow to Him, and in saints is His delight. While Christianity does not abolish these differences, it transcends them in love's claim and call. Christian love overleaps all the artificial barriers which human society may set up. Class conflicts, national enmities, racial prejudices it condemns. This characteristic of Christian morality has so far been only partially realised, as the divisions among men still persist, causing strife and war. How the ideal of Christian universalism may be realised it is the province of Christian ethics to explore and expound, but lies beyond the bounds of the purpose of this volume.

Secondly, God's love is a redemptive love. God forgives sins, and saves from sin. Accordingly, no moral demand is so insistently and persistently made by Jesus in the Gospels as forgiveness (Matt. v. 38-48, vi. 14-15, xviii. 21-35; Luke xxiii. 34). As the divine forgiveness does not wait for man's penitence to make its approach and appeal, but by its generosity evokes penitence, so the Christian duty is not merely to forgive after penitence, but to offer forgiveness, if need be even with earnest entreaty, to the impenitent that they may be moved to contrition. Here again the Christian ideal is far from realisation. Where equal authority is given to the Old Testament as to the New, where the distinctiveness of the revelation of God in Christ is not appreciated, the attitude of even good men towards sinners is that of law and not of love. Forgiveness does not necessarily involve the annulment of all the consequences of wrong-doing; it may be even for the transgressor's good that he should suffer; but it does mean willingness to restore the interrupted personal relationship, the fellowship of love, as soon as that is desired and accepted. If a man shows in his own character the grace of forgiveness, he will in like measure in his own experience enjoy the gift of God's forgiveness; for the unforgiving cannot be forgiven, he cannot receive from God what he refuses to men. Nothing would so exhibit to the world the reality of God's forgiveness

as the whole Christian society distinguished by the practice of this obligation. For nothing is so severe a test and so sure a proof of love as is forgiveness.

Thirdly, God's love is sacrificial; forgiveness costs. What has been said about the Cross of Christ should here be recalled. The morally indifferent may find it easy to pass over a transgression, but that is not forgiveness. There is forgiveness only as the wrong done is morally judged as what it is, as there is indignation against it, aversion to it, condemnation of it. Love may need to go far beyond all ordinary social obligations to make the effective approach and appeal to the impenitent. Love may need to endure the contradiction of sinners (Heb. xii. 3), to make itself of no reputation, to be despised and rejected that it may move the sinner to contrition (Is. liii.). The call to sacrifice—great as in such a case it is—is not confined to the exercise of forgiveness. Life's pains and perils are such that love is called to suffer in many ways. While the self realises itself in self-sacrifice, as in no other way, the cross being the way to the crown, yet the sacrifice may be not of earthly goods only. Mental, moral, and spiritual good may need to be surrendered. A man may need to limit his pursuit of culture that he may render service to others. The cultivation of personal character may have to be subordinated to social obligations. Even communion with God may be less frequent because the need of man is so insistent. Even Jesus in the agony of Gethsemane accepted the desolation of the Cross—the loss of His joy in God's Fatherhood—as the completion of His sacrifice. On the other hand, no man can give the world a better gift than his best self, and so the sacrifice must be so measured that the service will be the fullest the man can render. No selfish interest may set bounds to the sacrifice, but the obligation to become what God means must be the guiding principle as to the good for self which is to be surrendered to secure the good of others.

(iii) While these are the distinctive features of Christian love, God's love reproduced in man's, love

is the motive of the moral life, but it is not the whole content. That must be defined in relation to the actual conditions and relations of life. Distinctive as the teaching of Jesus was, He entered into a moral inheritance, for the Old Testament is the record of a moral progress. And the Christian Church when it went out into the Gentile world found not only moral practice, but even moral theory, for Socrates is the founder of the science of ethics, reflection on what morality means and demands. So complex is the life of man, that it would be impossible to give an exhaustive account of virtue or vice, right or wrong, bad or good. Plato, the great thinker, summed up the moral life as a basis of social order, in four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Christian ethics adopted these as the cardinal virtues and conjoined them with the three graces, the theological virtues, faith, hope, and love. We should not, however, place them alongside of the three graces, but rather regard them as exercises of love.

(*a*) It is hard to do one's duty; it is often as hard, if not harder, to know what is duty. Hence the need of moral insight or wisdom. No complete code of duties can ever be devised, and it is not desirable that there should be: for the exercise of the individual conscience, with counsel and guidance when necessary, is itself an element in the good life. Less developed morally would be the personality, the actions of which were all prescribed by rules imposed by others. The Roman Catholic confessional has this disadvantage, that it hinders moral maturity through the dependence on another's judgment which it imposes. Wisdom is the quality of the conscience which can distinguish right and wrong, good and bad, which even when there is no guiding rule can discover what in any given situation the moral obligation is. There is a large body of moral experience, by which the wise in an emergency will usually be guided; but he shows his wisdom by detecting at once a situation for which there is no assured guidance, and by examining all the conditions, so that the proper moral principle may

be properly applied. If indeed 'more harm is wrought by want of thought than even want of heart,' it is evident that wisdom must take a first place among the virtues. Christian wisdom is love's insight, and love is not blind, but sees more clearly than the loveless can.

(*b*) The greatest hindrance to love of others is not love of self, which is 'self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control,' the recognition of one's own worth for God with the desire to prove worthy, but selfishness, and selfishness may be directed towards either the pleasures or the pains of life; it may be either self-seeking or self-sparing. A man may make it his aim to get as much of his own happiness out of life, or to shun as far as he can any sorrow or peril which may beset his path. He may be the slave of his wishes or of his fears, and not master of himself so as to suppress any desire which should not be gratified, or to endure any evil which may come upon him. Temperance is self-control in respect of the pleasures, and courage of the pains or perils of life. It is a misfortune that both words have in common speech been so narrowed in their use. Temperance is not merely abstinence from the use of intoxicating drinks, nor even moderation in the satisfaction of physical desires. It includes self-mastery in the inner as well as the outer life, control of temper and mood as well as appetite. It is moral proportion, the harmony of all personal interests and activities. For the Christian it has a very much wider range than it had for the Greek gentleman, who might indulge without reproach in forms of sexual vice which it would be a shame even to name. The lustful look is no less condemned than the unchaste deed; the angry word than the vengeful blow (Matt. v. 27-32). Thus temperance must be shown not merely that the personality may be properly developed, but still more that the self under complete command may be fit for any service of others which love may require, for he who indulges himself will not be so able to succour and sustain others; while the man temperate in all things (1 Cor. ix. 25) has a moral strength which can be a stay to others in their struggles.

Courage is not only the readiness to face physical dangers—as such it is often more a natural endowment than a moral achievement: it is moral constancy and endurance; to do right despite the world's frown; to refuse to sin even if companions scorn; to stand alone, if need be, for a moral principle against the world; to shrink only from sin, and to stand in awe only of God—that is what Christian courage involves. As Christian it cannot be self-regarding; it must be concerned about others. One brave man can rally the waverers in the crusade against evil; he can be a strength to weakness. Not alone on the battlefield, or amid the perils of the mine or the sea, is there the call for heroism; for Christian life in a sinful world is a constant adventure and campaign.

(*c*) It is in the virtue of justice that the relation of the individual to society is realised as it ought to be. To love one's neighbour as oneself, to do unto others as one wishes to be done unto (Matt. vii. 12)—this is the Christian rule of justice. It does not mean quantitative equality, for another man's good is not necessarily identical with one's own. A wife's good is not the same as a husband's, or a child's as a parent's, or a scholar's as a teacher's. Accordingly, the Golden Rule does not prescribe as a duty conduct to others exactly the same as the conduct which one desires for oneself. It is not a teacher's duty to desire to be taught by his scholars, or a parent's to render the obedience to his child which he requires of him. Here the analogy of the body is helpful: not all the members have the same functions, and obligation must depend on function. What justice does require is that a man shall fill his own and not another's place, and carry his own burden while he also as far as he can bears the burdens of others who have need of such support. In many cases justice will involve mercy. There are those who must make far greater demands on others than any return which they can make. It is not the mistake, but the glory of man not to let 'the weakest go to the wall,' 'perish in the struggle for existence.' The Christian love demands,

even more than the Golden Rule requires, that a man shall require from others only as much service as he must, and render to others as much service as he can. Equality here has no meaning as a measure of what justice transformed by love requires. 'The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many' (Matt. xx. 28). Sacrifice is the fulfilment of love's demand. But sacrifice involves alike temperance, the control of all desires, and courage, the acceptance of all perils and pains, and wisdom to discern whether to render or to withhold service of this kind is more for the good of another. It would be possible to deal with other virtues in the same way, as Plato's enumeration is not exhaustive; but these illustrations will serve to show how morality is transformed when the love for man, which has God's love as its motive and its pattern, becomes the regulative principle. There is a new moral creation, the old things pass away and all things become new (2 Cor. v. 17).

(iv) The discussion of virtues may be described as the psychological approach to morality; what has come into greater prominence in recent years is the sociological. Man realises himself as a personality in society; social institutions are the permanent modes of his moral activity. There is not a uniform duty in all human relationships, and even love as the regulative principle finds varied expression in different relations. These relations are of ever widening scope; within the narrower range are developed the moral capacities which will find exercise in the wider. The earliest, most enduring, and most influential social institution is the family—marriage and parenthood. Here love finds its earliest exercise, and learns its most enduring lessons. From the family the child passes to the school, in which not only intellectual capacities may be developed, but moral character may also be formed. The theory of education has in recent years become most truly Christian, less law and more love, less claim of authority for the teacher and more right of liberty for the child. When the

child as boy or girl, as youth or maiden, passes from school into industry (manufacture, commerce, professions), it seems as though he had passed beyond the region where the principle of Christian love can find application. Nevertheless, it is being recognised more than ever before that ruthless competition (regard only for self, and disregard of others) even here can secure only a temporary success, and leaves behind irreparable injury. Accordingly, even practical men are beginning to advocate co-operation instead of competition, a partnership of Capital and Labour for the service of the community. The duties of citizenship, into which the man or the woman passes beyond the earthly calling, are finding fuller recognition; and in more advanced social thinking, the organic nature of human society is being not only insisted on, but a community of interest among all classes is slowly winning recognition. The Christian truth that in one body the members suffer or rejoice together is affecting political theory, if it has not yet adequately influenced political practice. Even in citizenship love needs to be exercised. The Great War, and still more the consequences of the peace, of vengeance and not magnanimity, have made men realise that ruin alone awaits mankind, unless in international relations the spirit of reconciliation gains mastery over all the forces which make for war. It is in all relations being demonstrated that the application of the principle of love alone can avert disaster, and secure the progress of the race.[1]

(5) We can distinguish faith and love as the grace of dependence and the grace of generosity, the getting and the giving of good. It is not so easy to distinguish faith and hope, as hope is not so much different from faith; it is faith under one aspect, faith as directed towards the future, faith receiving and responding in confident expectation to the good which the future holds. If we will we may say that it is faith in God

[1] Christian morality is discussed from this sociological standpoint in the Reports (I. to XII.) of the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship, which is commonly spoken of as C.O.P.E.C.

which gives hope assurance of that future good. Faith gives substance to things hoped for, for it is the evidence of the unseen reality of God (Heb. i. 1). Great as is the Christian's present possession in Jesus Christ, greater still is his future inheritance. In the next chapter the content of the Christian hope will be dealt with. All that here needs to be done is to indicate the place of hope in the Christian life. Both in his experience of the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in his character as conforming to that grace, the Christian has a sense of his own incompleteness, and desires to apprehend that for which he has been apprehended by the Lord Jesus. Still more in the world around does he find the authority of Christ challenged, sin still abounding, and abounding grace restrained. His faith would not be so confident and his love less satisfying did not hope give the assurance that God's purpose of love in himself and the world will find fulfilment. The Christian is thus being saved by hope (Rom. viii. 24) from despondency and the indifference and indolence that despondency would breed, saved unto constancy, endurance, courage, and sacrifice. The sneer against 'other-worldliness,' justified though it may be by some of the hymns about heaven, has no ground to rest on against this attitude. It is not a depreciation of all the good that the present life holds; it is an appreciation of the greatness of man as God has made him and wills him to be, since within the bounds of time and sense he cannot realise all his possibilities and become all that he will yet be. If the ideals of truth, blessedness, holiness, and love found only their partial realisation in this life, and held no promise of perfect fulfilment, they would mock human aspiration and endeavour. The man will live the worthiest life on earth who lives not on the scale of threescore years and ten, or a little more, but only on the scale of the eternal life, to which death sets no bounds. Without hope the Christian life could not be lived at its best, for it calls man to a good so great that life here is too brief to enter into its full possession.

(6) Because penitence and faith are the initial

activities in the Christian life, it is seen to be a life in which human failure and insufficiency are changed into victory and achievement by the divine power.

(i) From beginning to end the Christian life is human activity, and not passivity, and yet it is not man acting alone, apart from God. Man can work out his own salvation only as it is God who worketh in him by His Spirit (Phil. ii. 12-13). Having looked at the characteristics of the Christian life in the human activities which are essential to it, we may now turn to consider how God works. There are different types of Christian experience, the sudden conversion from sin to God, the deliberate decision which confirms the previous development towards God, the gradual development which knows no crisis. But in none of these types is man alone active; God's Spirit is energising in all. The term regeneration should not be restricted to describe the divine energy in the sudden conversion; the regeneration, the making fully and truly spiritual the natural life of man, may be a very slow process, but on that acccount not the less real. The new birth from above (John iii. 3, 5) may seem sudden, or appear slow, but its reality does not depend on the mode of our apprehension. There may have been long preparation for the sudden conversion, what theologians called *prevenient grace*; within the gradual development there may have been unobserved moments of the intenser energy of the Spirit. This alone needs to be insisted on, that the Christian life is no natural product of heredity, environment, and individuality, but is and must ever be the work of God. If we cannot, then, regard regeneration as a solitary act, but must admit that it may be a continuous process, we cannot distinguish, still less separate, regeneration and sanctification. The analogy of physical birth cannot be pressed here; enough for us to know that the commencement and the continuance of the Christian life are both alike from God.

(ii) According to the Fourth Gospel, Jesus Himself did distinguish the life in the flesh and the life in the Spirit. 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and

that which is born of the Spirit is spirit' (John iii. 6).

(*a*) The respectable Pharisee, moral and religious, the ruler of the Jews, was still living the life of the flesh, and could not either understand or enter into the Kingdom of God, the new order of life in the Spirit (*cf. vv.* 3 and 5). The flesh does not mean a sensual or immoral life; it means a life in which God as shown and offered unto men as their highest good has not yet been received. It does not mean a life without God, but it does mean a life in which the love of God as Father in the grace of Christ as Saviour and Lord by the community (common possession) of the Spirit has not yet been experienced. A life beginning in penitence and faith, receiving forgiveness, deliverance, peace, and power, energetic in love and inspired by hope, is a life in the Spirit, and not the flesh. How many there are who make the Christian profession who by such tests are still living in the flesh, and not the Spirit! It has been to the Church's loss that this contrast has been often so disregarded and neglected; and men still in the flesh have been allowed, because they made the Christian profession, to assume to their own hurt and loss that theirs was the life in the Spirit. There is a morality, and even a religion, which is still natural, the product of human endeavour, and not spiritual, the receiving and the responding to the life of God in man by His own Spirit.

(*b*) Paul makes a further distinction; the flesh for him means the sinful life, not necessarily or exclusively sensual, the life in which sin is so dominant that there is a bondage of the will (Rom. vii. 7-25). The man in such a state is *carnal* (*sarkikos*, sometimes *sarkinos*). But there is also the *psychical* or *natural* man (1 Cor. xv. 44-49), a man such as Nicodemus, who may in his own way be good and godly, but who has not had the experience of enlightening, quickening, and renewing by the Spirit of God. He may be a very fine specimen of humanity in intellectual capacity and moral character, but he still lacks 'the one thing needful,' the immediate contact, the in-

timate communion with God, the constant dependence on and entire submission to God. He may be virtuous and conscientious (and we shall not dare to say that he is all that he is without God), but he has not consciously or voluntarily realised this relation to God. He may accept the testimony of others concerning God's existence, and on that testimony he may himself confess that God is, but he has not in his own life had any experience of God. He may be in Tertullian's phrase an *anima naturaliter Christiana*;[1] but he is still soulish, psychical, and not spiritual (pneumatic). This distinction is not a theological subtlety; it is a discriminating analysis of the facts of human life in its relation to God. It is a serious error, often made, to assume that the possession of virtues which are marks of the Christian character is itself a proof of life in the Spirit. It is said often that it does not matter what a man believes; what matters is what he does. If by belief is meant acceptance of doctrines, then assuredly the possession of character is more important. But Christian faith is not merely belief; it is as the typical Christians have understood it, such a personal union with Christ that there is both conscious communion with Him, and consequent conformation to His character (2 Cor. iii. 18). And as man was made for such conscious and voluntary relation to God, and Christ lived, taught, wrought, suffered, died, rose again, and liveth for ever more to mediate that relation, it does matter, and very much, whether the character has its motive and power in such a relation to God. Morality is completed in religion, and the moral character is at its best as it has spiritual sustenance. The natural or psychical man, however excellent morally, is not yet man at his very best, or man as God wants him to be, for God wants not only obedience to His law, but also communion with His love. The Christian Church often lacks vitality and vigour because it acquiesces in an outward conformity to Christian standards, and does not constantly pursue as its distinctive object the

[1] *De Test. An.*, 1, 2.

inward transformation of the life in the Spirit. Not only is the *natural* man incomplete in regard to his personal relation to God, the finest Christian graces are dependent on that relation; contrition and humility are not likely to mark the man who while doing justly, and loving mercy, does not walk with God at all. There are flowers of goodness, beautiful and fragrant, which can grow only in a heavenly air. Further, the man who for his goodness relies on his own sufficiency of strength will not only limit his aspiration to his own possibility of achievement, but will be much more liable to relapse even from the standard which he has set himself. There is a wide range of character and conduct represented by the natural or psychical man; at his worst he may sink to the man who is in bondage to the flesh; at his best he may rise to resemble as regards his outward life very closely the spiritual man; but the difference remains between the man who lives by and for himself, and the man whose inner life God fills with His own Spirit.

(*c*) What are the characteristics of the spiritual man? In his achievement, while the grace of God is not yet in full possession, he may as regards conduct and character fall short morally of the natural man, who by heredity, environment, and education has had, as it were, a moral start of him; but in aspiration and purpose he will be seeking and striving for such a perfection of life as becomes a child of the perfect Father. A spirituality which is indifferent to sanctification is a hollow sham. Only he is Christ's who has Christ's Spirit (Rom. viii. 9), and the fruit of the Spirit is love, which is the fulfilment of all law, which does no ill to a neighbour, but seeks to do all the good that it can (Gal. v. 22; Rom. xiii. 10). If we are to be guided in our thought by the disclosures of Christian experience in the New Testament, we may recognise two distinctive features of the spiritual life as the evidence of the presence and operation of the Spirit of God.[1] The first is *fervour, zeal, enthusiasm.* The

[1] See the volume of Essays by various writers entitled *The Spirit*, especially iii. and iv.

experience of the reality of God as love and the grace of Christ as Saviour and Lord moves the emotions; even when the first excitement subsides, there is a steady inward glow. Coldness and deadness of feeling depart. There are joy, comfort, peace, confidence, courage. A life which shows these qualities is an attractive life; it is a persuasive witness of the reality of salvation; and it is because the life of so many professing Christians is so tepid and timid that many are repelled, and not attracted, to Christ. To force feeling, to keep up excitement, is not wholesome; but there should be an exaltation of feeling as a constant tone of the Christian life of the Spirit as God within is realised in experience. Some may call this fanaticism; the eighteenth century was afraid of any enthusiasm; but then the Evangelical Revival came, and the Spirit's presence and operation were again experienced. This is the need, and also the promise, of to-day; there is a stirring among the dry bones, and the breath of God is abroad (Ezek. xxxvii. 1-14). The second mark (and the two are closely related) is *power, might, energy.* When the feelings are moved, the will is strengthened. Recent psychology has shown how much the mind can do in relieving pain, releasing from weakness, and restoring strength. When the human will, surrendered to God, becomes the channel of the activity of God by His Spirit, then divine strength is perfected in human weakness (2 Cor. xii. 9-10). The language of Paul must seem extravagant to many Christians, who have not fully trusted and so have not fully proved the sufficiency of the grace of Christ. We can be more than conquerors through Him who loves us, and in love imparts Himself to us (Rom. viii. 37). We can do all things through Him who strengthens us (Phil. iv. 13). We can gain the victory which overcometh the world through faith in Him who Himself overcame (1 John v. 4; John xvi. 33). Divine resources are at human disposal in the fully surrendered life. As an inspired life, enthusiasm and energy may be constant features, distinguishing the Christian life from every other in

which the same presence and power of the Spirit of God is not experienced.

It is the writer's conviction that what the Church needs is not a second Pentecost as regards the divine gift, but as regards the human receiving and responding to that gift, which has never been withdrawn. Not only occasionally in religious revivals, but continuously in the religious life of all Christians, may the Pentecostal blessing be claimed. Whether it be a law or not of the religious life that there should be a rise and a fall, a rhythmic movement of emotion, it is certain that the ebb of the tide goes far further than need be, and so the flow has to be more marked. Surely there need not be such extremes of depression and exaltation; but there might be, if Christians lived and walked more by the Spirit, a constant elevation in the zeal and the power of Christian experience and character. To fall under the dominion of the flesh is a danger that mature Christians should have outgrown; but even they run the peril of sinking from the spiritual (*pneumatic*) to the natural (*psychical*) level; that spiritual life needs to be nourished by the means of grace, prayer, study of the Scriptures, meditation, public worship, the use of the sacrament of thanksgiving and fellowship, the preaching of the Gospel, the communion of saints, and no less does it need to be exercised in consecration, service, and sacrifice. If the Church were ever thus distinguished from the world in the experience and character of all its members, so that the Spirit's presence and power were made manifest, Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord would be so lifted up before men that He would draw all men unto Himself out of the carnal, and even the natural, into the spiritual life.

(7) The bearing of the description of the Christian life, its characteristics and its source, on some of the controversies of the past may very briefly be indicated.

(i) The Pelagian and the Arminian controversy were both concerned with the relation between human freedom and divine grace; although it would be an

injustice to regard Arminianism as only Pelagianism revived, for the Arminians did recognise, while emphasising human liberty and responsibility, the necessity of the divine grace to salvation as the Pelagians did not. As is likely to be the case in controversy, each side was guilty of exaggeration. Man is not in so helpless and hopeless a bondage to sin as Augustine represented; he is not so free to choose and do any and every good as Pelagius contended. Heredity, environment, education, character as the result of previous conduct—all limit and restrain liberty, and so hamper the good choice. To affirm, however, that man can do no good by the exercise of his will, and that the grace of God is irresistible when it is imparted to any man, is to ignore and deny the facts of life. In Augustinianism we may see the tendency of religion carried to an extreme, and in Pelagianism the tendency of morality. The one emphasises man's dependence until it reduces him to impotence; the other emphasises man's liberty until it exalts him to sufficiency. The truth which corrects the error is that his dependence, if it is to be moral, must be free, and his freedom, if it is to be religious, must be dependent. He works out his own salvation not in spite, but because of God's working in him. Freedom must appropriate grace, and grace must sustain freedom. God and man are so immediately and intimately related that God's activity does not exclude man's, or man's God's. What led Augustine and those who followed in his steps astray, was that they thought of grace as *quasi-physical*, as power, and since it was God's power it must needs be regarded as omnipotent. But if God's grace be His personal activity in a personal relation to man, in which man is not merely passive, but must be active, then grace will be conditioned by the receptive and the responsive faith, and never will suppress but always will support freedom; for where the Spirit of God is, there is the liberty and not the bondage of man.[1]

[1] A recent admirable treatment of this problem is Oman's *Grace and Personality*.

(ii) This controversy is only one instance of the necessity of basing doctrine on experience and not on inferences from texts often misunderstood. Modern psychology enables us to examine and estimate that experience much more accurately than was possible before, and we have, therefore, always to bring all dogmas to the test of actuality. Undoubtedly, Augustine's theology was an interpretation of his own experience, as was that of Pelagius, but in both cases it was experience not adequately scrutinised, and even recklessly generalised. When we do examine experience, individual and collective, we are led to the conclusion that man has always enough liberty left to accept or to reject the grace of God which is offered to him, and so is responsible, if he is not saved by that grace, granted that the offer of salvation has been effectively presented to him, and that many men do attain good moral character without any conscious and voluntary dependence on the grace of God, but that the finest type of character, marked by contrition, humility, sacrificial love, is not attained unless as faith is ever receiving and responding to grace. The Christian life in its distinctive features is impossible without the activity of the Spirit of God, and may be regarded as the fruit of that Spirit, the divine power within expressing itself through human aspiration and endeavour in fullness, freedom, quietness, and charm in the Christian graces and virtues. It belongs to Christian dogmatics to deal with the Christian life as the work of the Spirit of God in man ; as a human task, from the standpoint of duties rather than graces and virtues as the fruit of the Spirit, the Christian life has to be dealt with by Christian ethics. And since, as has already been indicated, the approach to-day is sociological rather than psychological, what Christian ethics has to do is not so much to determine what the Christian character ought to be as to describe the ideal of what society should be to be fully Christian. It is now current usage to speak of this ideal as the *Kingdom of God.* It is the writer's intention to complete this series of three volumes on Christian

theology with a volume on the Christian Ideal of the Kingdom of God. The subject cannot be further pursued here.

(8) In the preceding pages the two ideals which have been dealt with are holiness and love. The Christian life should also be related to the other three, truth, beauty, and blessedness.

(i) By truth in the Christian life we mean generally truthfulness and faithfulness, honesty of conduct, and sincerity of motive. Besides this we should emphasise what the beatitude about the pure in heart means (Matt. v. 8). The Christian has a single motive, and not mixed motives. He is not good to gain anything else than goodness itself, praise, fame, safety, comfort, not even happiness, nor heaven. The fruit is good because the tree is good (vii. 16-20). The inner man is what the outer man shows. This is subjective truth, moral reality in the whole personality. But we must go deeper than that. 'The pure in heart shall see God,' because his moral reality is itself the revelation of what God is. The Christian life in fellowship with God and in likeness to God is reproducing the ultimate, essential, final reality. The actual has only temporary existence; the ideal has eternal reality. The Christian life is at the secret source of things. His conduct is often regarded as unpractical; and so it is and should be according to merely social standards, temporary expediencies, fleeting fashions of an hour, worldly and selfish interests. Given time and scope, however, it alone is practical, because it is in accordance with the nature of things, as determined by the will of God. God is not on 'the side of the big battalions' of force, greed, selfishness, and worldliness; He is with the good and godly man. If God is the ultimate cause and final purpose of the universe, if Christ reveals God, and if the Christian life reproduces Christ, then that life is, both subjectively as regards its motive and objectively as regards its content, *truth*: it corresponds with reality.[1]

[1] This is the conception which dominates the Fourth Gospel.

(ii) As the Christian life is truth, it will also be *beauty*. There are ugly things in the world, especially where man's wasteful methods of using nature's resources have marred and soiled its face, and there are ugly creatures in colour and shape, at least for our taste, but the world as a whole is beautiful, a unity of many differences, a harmony of many discords, a reconciliation of many contrasts. It gives aesthetic satisfaction, the emotions are not distracted but unified in pleasure. Not only so, a higher intellectual satisfaction accompanies the aesthetic; nature is expressive, it has meaning and worth for human personality. It is a symbol of eternal and infinite perfection. Men have truly spoken of the Beauty of God: [1] that is one element at least in the Biblical phrase, the glory of God, the perfection of God as manifested. Mistranslation though the phrase itself may be, there is a 'beauty of holiness' (Ps. cx. 3). A character may be more than a rival of a work of art in offering even the aesthetic satisfaction of a consistency of manifold interests and activities.[2] The word *grace* itself means charm as well as goodness. There is a legal righteousness which repels, and does not attract. But a life shaped to harmony by love will be beautiful, as was the life of Jesus. The nearer the life gets to truth, the divine reality, the more will it show beauty, the glory of God. The manner will surely be gracious as the motive is grace (Phil. iv. 8).

(iii) A Christian life in which the ideals of holiness and love, truth and beauty are realised cannot fail in attaining blessedness; not the pleasure of the moment, not the happiness of the outward lot, it may be, but the peace of God which passeth all understanding (Phil. iv. 7), which the world cannot give and the world cannot take away, the peace which Jesus claimed as His (John xiv. 27), the rest of soul (Matt. xi. 29), the joy of the Lord (Matt. xxv. 21), that joy for which He endured the Cross, despising shame (Heb. xii. 2), a

[1] This attribute of God is recognised by the Cambridge Platonists.

[2] Ruskin has analysed the conception of beauty, *Modern Painters*, Part III., Section I., chap. xiii. 1.

share in the life of the blessed God (1 Tim. i. 11). Thus in Christian life alone is human personality being perfected, all its ideals realised, not by human endeavour alone, but by divine grace, by participation in the perfection of God in the indwelling and inworking of His Spirit; and that perfecting is not individual, but collective, because that Spirit is the common possession of those who believe, who by faith are members of the body of Him who is fulfilling all the human ideals in all the human persons (Eph. i. 23).

CHAPTER IV

THE CHRISTIAN HOPE

(1) MANY religions look backwards to a Golden Age. Confucius sought to remedy the evils of his own time by recovering the wisdom of the past. The Old Testament has a forward look, to the day of Yahweh, or to the coming of the Messiah, to the resurrection of the righteous and the judgment of the wicked. Christianity took over this Jewish inheritance, but transformed it, and in the New Testament we can trace a development of thought from an eschatology closely conforming to that of Judaism to a Christian hope more consistent with the distinctiveness of the revelation of God and the redemption of man in Jesus Christ. If Christianity had no answer to the question about future destiny, individual and racial, it would be incomplete as a religion, as failing to meet an insistent demand of the spirit of man. The earlier Buddhism (the Hinayana) offered Nirvana, either non-existence or non-conscious existence; but the later Buddhism (the Mahayana) had to define the future life much more distinctly. Confucianism avoided the question, and so the Chinese add Buddhism to meet a demand Confucianism fails to satisfy.[1]

(i) From the beginnings of religion in the doctrine of animism a survival of the soul is believed; but this is not a hope but a dread, as in the abode of the dead life is cheerless, hopeless, powerless, vain. It is this belief that is the background of the Old Testament.

> 'In death there is no remembrance of Thee:
> In Sheol who shall give Thee thanks?' (Ps. vi. 5.)

[1] See *The Three Religions of China*, by W. E. Soothill.

'Let the wicked be ashamed, let them be silent in Sheol.'
(xxxi. 17.)

'Wilt Thou shew wonders to the dead ?
Shall they that are deceased arise and praise Thee ?
Shall Thy lovingkindness be declared in the grave ?
Or Thy faithfulness in Destruction (*Heb.* Abaddon) ?
Shall Thy wonders be known in the dark ?
And Thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness ? '
(lxxxviii. 10-12.)

Even the relation to God is ended in the unseen world. The interest of the Old Testament is almost entirely centred on the earthly life as the scene of God's providence, as the sphere of man's duty. It is not concerned for the most part with individual destiny at all, but with the character and condition of a nation here on earth. It is here that God is dealing with men, it is here that men must serve Him.

(ii) It is admitted by most scholars that there are a few passages which indicate a dawning hope of individual immortality. When after the fall of the nation the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel began to teach the truth of an individual relation to God, such a hope became a possibility. The passages in which it is found are obscure and uncertain. To the writer it seems probable that Psalms xvi. 10-11 and xvii. 15 do express the hope, but many scholars deny this. Most scholars do admit that Psalm lxxiii. 23-26 does rise to the hope. What may be said is that the hope was not general, even if now and then a saint in the fervour of his devotion and the strength of his faith soared above the common view, and dared to believe that his fellowship with God, his highest good, would not, and could not, be severed by death. The more generally held hope for the individual came by way of the hope for the nation. There was the expectation of a Golden Age in the future for the nation : but it seemed unrighteous and unreasonable that only the generation alive at the time of its coming should enjoy its good, and thus the hope arose that the righteous would be brought back to this earthly life to experience what they had expected.

At first the eager longing is expressed by the prophet :

> ' May thy dead live, may thy corpses arise.'

Then comes the confident assurance :

> ' Awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust :
> For thy dew is as the dew of light,
> And the earth will bring forth shades.' (Is. xxvi. 19).[1]

In the Apocalypse of Daniel a resurrection of the wicked is also declared : ' And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament ; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever ' (xii. 2-3). In this Apocalyptic literature of which the Book of Daniel is an example the eschatology of the Old Testament was further developed. The supernatural features were introduced ; individuals were included in God's dealings ; the judgment was extended to other nations, and made general ; and a system of symbolism was elaborated. Into the details it is not necessary for our purpose to enter ; but we must remember that it was not the Old Testament teaching alone which the Christian Church inherited, but also this Jewish Apocalyptic.

(2) It is noteworthy that Jesus rebuked the gross, materialistic doctrine of the Pharisees regarding the Resurrection, the absurdity of which was exhibited in the Sadducees' illustration of the woman who had been the wife of seven husbands (Mark xii. 18-27), and at the same time He affirmed the individual hope of immortality on the same ground as that given in the Old Testament.

(i) The physical conditions and the social relations of this earthly life will not be restored, but the fellowship of the saints with God will not be interrupted ; because God enters into personal relations with men, they are assured of immortality. The crude notion

[1] Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, ii. pp. 386-7.

which has sometimes been put forward in the theology of the Christian Church of a material identity of the resurrection body with the present 'vesture of our mortality' is set aside, as it is by Paul (1 Cor. xv. 42-49), in the contrast he makes between the natural and the spiritual body. This hope of continued fellowship with God in the unseen world is more fully developed in the Fourth Gospel, where the emphasis is laid on personal communion with Christ, yet also with God in Him (xiv.-xvii.). Those who believe in Him have eternal life here and now, and cannot come under the power of death. To this we must afterwards return when dealing with the later developments in the New Testament.

(ii) In the Synoptic Gospels what holds the foreground is the conception of the *Kingdom of God.* What Jesus meant by the term has been much disputed, and to follow this discussion in detail would lead us far afield. It is maintained that He conceived that Kingdom as future, transcendent, yet near at hand, to be ushered in by a supernatural intervention of God in human history. It is even contended that Jesus did not claim to be the Messiah in the earthly life, but only the herald of the Kingdom, at the coming of which He would assume that office.[1] There are, however, a number of passages which indicate that the Kingdom is already present, that it will grow, and that its progress depends not on God only, but also on the activities of men (Luke xvii. 21; the parables in Matt. xiii., etc.). If Jesus did believe Himself to be the Messiah, and accepted the confession of Peter that He was the Messiah (Matt. xvi. 16)—and the writer sees no adequate reason for doubting the fact—then in His presence in the world and His activity in and with men the Kingdom had come already, although it might yet be made more manifest in its power and glory.

(iii) That Jesus did anticipate such a manifestation is a conclusion from the available evidence which

[1] See *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, by Schweitzer, and *The Gospel and the Church*, by Loisy.

it is difficult, even impossible, to evade. He foretold not only His own Resurrection, but also His Return, His Second Advent from heaven (Matt. xvi. 28; Mark xiii. 26-27, xiv. 62). Regarding this eschatological teaching several considerations need to be taken into account. As in the Apostolic Age the expectation was very confident and intense, it is not improbable that the teaching of Jesus has been coloured by the channel of its transmission, and made more definite and certain than it at first was. The prophetic language regarding the future must necessarily be to a large extent figurative, poetry and not prose, and the Apocalyptic literature was marked by an abundant and even sometimes extravagant symbolism. Even if we have the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus we need not interpret them literally; He may have been conveying moral and religious truth in this borrowed eschatological form. Again, the promise of the future cannot be fulfilled to the letter, since freedom is a factor in all human history which God's providence does not suppress, but recognises. Even if Jesus in the exercise of His function as a prophet Himself at the time envisaged the future more nearly as it is represented in His teaching, it is no depreciation of His truth and wisdom to admit, as facts compel us to admit, that the subsequent course of history did not closely correspond with the expectations as so expressed. He did definitely anticipate the fall of Jerusalem within the lifetime of some of his hearers, and that expectation was fulfilled (Mark xiii. 30). While He appears to connect His Second Advent with that event, He does expressly confess ignorance of the exact date. 'Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father' (Mark xiii. 32). If He knew not the date, did He, and under the conditions of the Incarnation could He, literally foretell the manner of His Second Advent?

(iv) Only in the Fourth Gospel is the resurrection of the wicked to judgment connected with the Second Advent. 'Marvel not at this: for the hour cometh,

in which all that are in the tombs shall hear His voice, and shall come forth ; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life ; and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment' (v. 28-29). In view of the fact that Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. in expounding the doctrine of the Resurrection makes no mention of the wicked, that the language here expresses the doctrine in the materialistic form which Jesus expressly rebuked, and that this statement is inconsistent with the general teaching of the discourse in which it occurs, dealing as that does with the spiritual resurrection through faith in Christ, the present judgment of Christ, and the eternal life already possessed in Him, we may reject this and such like statements elsewhere as later editorial insertions, reproducing current beliefs, and not the teaching of Jesus. What is certain is that Jesus did expect a speedy Second Advent. This is a proof of His confident faith in God, and His eager desire to accomplish the task entrusted to Him. He did not fully take into account the delays and hindrances which sin and unbelief might interpose, although at times He did recognise that the lack of faith in man might frustrate the grace of God. The view of the Incarnation expounded in this volume not only permits but demands such an explanation. As the New Testament proves, Jesus did come again to His disciples as the constant and sovereign presence (Matt. xxviii. 20) ; He did continue His activity in His Spirit ; He is coming ever more fully into the world in the conquests of His truth and grace. What more there may be in the future as fulfilment of this hope of the Kingdom will be discussed later.

(3) The Christian Church took over the Apocalyptic teaching of Judaism, with this difference. It confessed that Jesus as the Christ had already come, and He in His Second Coming became the centre of the Apocalyptic drama. He would come again in power and glory as Judge of the wicked, and as Saviour of believers ; their salvation would be completed in their resurrection, and the resurrection of

those who had fallen asleep in Jesus in their participation in His Kingdom.

(i) Paul did represent the common Christian attitude in the confident expectation he often expresses of survival to the Second Advent. How he conceives the resurrection is fully set forth in 1 Corinthians xv. 42-49, although there is some dispute as to the exact meaning. Is the sowing referred to the burial in the grave, or is it in this earthly life of which the grave is the goal? Whichever it may be, what Paul emphasises is the contrast of the *natural* body (corruption, dishonour, weakness) and the *spiritual* body (incorruption, glory, power). Those who are alive at the Second Advent, too, must be changed suddenly from the natural to the spiritual body. He, however, recognises the possibility that he may die, and not be alive to experience this change. He does not expect, however, to be disembodied spirit, but to have a body, a heavenly; he will not be unclothed, but clothed upon (2 Cor. v. 1-10). He is willing to be absent from this body, that he may be at home with the Lord. We cannot say that he changed his mind, but he wavered between the two expectations according to the mood in which the state of his health placed him. For even after this utterance he reverts to the common apostolic hope (Phil. iii. 20-21). With that hope his faith-mysticism, as it has been called, is also incongruous. He is conscious of an immediate personal contact and intimate personal communion with the living Christ; to him to live is Christ, and therefore to die gain (Phil. i. 21), as bringing him still nearer to his Lord. Why then, we may ask, should he desire the visible Return? There lie in his mind together the Jewish inheritance and the Christian experience, not only unharmonised but probably for him not needing to be brought into accord (*cf.* 2 Tim. iv. 6-8). We may, however, prefer as his contribution to a constructive theology these two elements: (1) the present union of the believer with Christ, and (2) the entrance of the believer at death into a still fuller life with Christ.

(ii) Although in the Fourth Gospel there appear references to the Apocalyptic hope, these are probably to be regarded as editorial additions; the distinctive teaching of the Gospel is similar to that of Paul: the presence of Christ with the believer as the source of his eternal life, and the consequent exemption from death of the possessor of that eternal life in Him (John v. 21-24, 26-27, vi. 47-51). The question arises, how far is this teaching a report of what Jesus did teach, and how far is it a later development in the mind of the evangelist? The writer after a minute study of the Gospel [1] has reached the conclusion that this Gospel does preserve a type of teaching reserved for a few select disciples in advance of what is recorded by the Synoptists; but that pregnant sayings, remembered by one of these disciples, have been developed into more explicit statements. Both Paul and the writer of the Fourth Gospel bring Christian experience to correct the Jewish inheritance; and we need not retain what they were themselves outgrowing.

(4) The Christian Church has never formally abandoned this Jewish Apocalyptic. In every age the book of Daniel and of the Revelation have found their interpreters, who have by ingenious calculations been able to prove to their own satisfaction the literal fulfilment of the supposed predictions in these writings, and to fix the precise date of the Second Advent. As a result of the War there has been a recrudescence of this superstition, and many Christians are to-day anticipating the Lord's Second Advent very soon. As this anticipation has century after century been falsified, and the calculations by which it is supported have constantly to be revised when the alleged date is passed, we may confidently assert that a theology which desires to be intelligent and intelligible can disregard it.

(i) Christ is here and now present (Matt. xxviii. 18-20); but His presence may be made more manifest in the world through His Church, which as His body

[1] See *The Beloved Disciple*, pp. 202-204.

speaks and acts for Him in the fulfilment of the redemptive purpose of God (Eph. i. 15-23). In His truth and grace as Saviour and Lord He is coming more fully into the thought and life of mankind. There are hindrances and delays in the progress of His Sovereign Saviourhood. But it does seem to Christian faith that He is subduing the kingdoms of the world to Himself. We are not warranted in assuming that the progress will be necessarily gradual; there may be crises, years more significant for the manifestation of Him than centuries have been; but it would be contrary to the expectation, to which a study of the method of the divine providence as disclosed in history leads us to assume that the moral and religious process will be interrupted by a supernatural divine intervention. It does seem more reasonable to suppose that the consummation of the progress will be achieved by the same means as are now being used in winning the world for Christ as Saviour and Lord. On this assumption, what would take the place of the Apocalyptic hope of the Second Advent would be the confident expectation that the redemption of the human race will at last be accomplished.

(ii) To this expectation, which is probably very widely cherished as the inspiration of manifold forms of Christian service for human betterment, there are three objections to be considered. *First of all*, as has already been indicated, we are not warranted in assuming that every human soul will repent and believe, and that God can in any way compel man, if unwilling, to receive salvation. This possibility forbids a too confident hope of the whole race being completely redeemed from sin unto God. *Secondly*, it may be doubted whether this earthly life is by its very conditions fitted to be the scene of the perfect manifestation of the truth and grace of God in Christ Jesus. In view of the faults and failures even of the saints, can we be sure that there will ever be on earth a period when a sinless race will inhabit the old scene of so tragic a fall from goodness and God? Can man

in this *natural* body attain to the full stature of manhood in Christ (Eph. iv. 13)? Are not other conditions necessary for man's perfect personal development? *Thirdly*, science foretells a physical change for this earth which will make it no longer habitable by men.[1] Can we be confident that the progress of mankind will be completed before that close to earth's evolution? Can we suppose that a purpose of God could be interrupted by such a physical catastrophe? Can faith confidently meet any such challenge by asserting that, as God is Creator as well as Redeemer, the process of nature and the progress of history must both be so ordered by Him that the one subserves the other? Here we are in the region of conjecture. We must admit as an alternative view, less probable it may be, but not improbable, that the Kingdom of God will never in all its glory be manifest here, but that the history of man on earth is preparatory for a consummation of the Kingdom in the unseen world, when a redeemed race shall have been gathered home. This admission does not, however, rob us of the hope that the Kingdom of God can be advanced on earth, that by the truth and grace of Christ the race can be prepared here for that consummation though it may be in the unseen world. One advantage this alternative view may claim. The Kingdom of God may be conceived too narrowly as earthly goods and not as a heavenly good, as material advantage and not as personal perfection. And this peril would certainly be avoided by our recognition that this earth for God's purpose has a value subordinate to that unseen world for which we are here preparing.

(iii) The writer cannot himself escape the feeling (conviction would be too definite a word) that it would be fitting that this earth which has witnessed the tragedy of man's sin, and the tragedy of Christ's sacrifice, should also be the scene of the triumph of the grace of God. As regards the three objections this at least may be said. Do men who refuse the

[1] In view of the most recent developments of physics, this prediction is now less confidently maintained.

Gospel now have the love of God so presented to them as to constrain, not compel, their faith and surrender? In the unseen world, or in a future age, may not that Gospel yet be so presented as to overcome all resistance by its appeal? Again, since society is still so un-Christian, may not saints even be hindered from being the best that they can be? In a world more pervaded by the Spirit of Christ what possibilities of saintliness might there not be! It is a subtle dualism to assume that life on earth must necessarily be imperfect. The sin of the race would then appear as a natural necessity, and not a voluntary departure from the possibility of a sinless development. As to the relation of the moral and spiritual progress of mankind to the physical changes on the earth we can say nothing confidently except that God as Redeemer is one and the same with God as Creator, and so between the two orders there will be harmony. If this should all appear theological speculation, the motive of it is to find a rational justification for the religious conviction that Christ is supreme in the realms of nature and of grace alike as the Son revealing the Father and the Saviour redeeming men. Whichever of the two alternatives we may prefer, the duty is plain to do all that can be done to secure the manifestation of the truth and grace of Christ, the Kingdom of God, as fully as can be, not in isolated individuals only, but in mankind in all human relations and activities. Accordingly, it is not only in what is often called religious work distinctively that this end is to be furthered. It is the whole manhood of all mankind which is to be redeemed; and while the conscious and voluntary relation to God is the decisive, crucial interest, religion must never be only a department of life, it must be a quality given to the whole of life. The dominance of Christ in the domestic, economic, and political spheres belongs to the Kingdom of God on earth as well as to His rule within the soul of each man.

(5) Although according to the Apocalyptic hope in its Jewish forms the general judgment of men was connected with the day of Yahweh or the advent of

the Messiah, and in its Christian form with the Second Advent of Christ, even when the fulfilment of that hope was deferred, the question was not distinctly answered as to the condition of the dead until the resurrection of all mankind. Paul's phrase about those 'which are fallen asleep in Christ' (1 Cor. xv. 18) has sometimes been made the basis of teaching about an intermediate state of reduced vitality, a continuation of the common view in heathenism.[1] Paul does not make any conjectures about the condition of the wicked; but as regards himself in the passage already discussed (2 Cor. v. 1-10) he anticipates an immediate entrance to the heavenly life with Christ. Without explaining the contradiction to the Apocalyptic view, in the common belief of the Church it has been assumed that men do in the next life receive reward or punishment for the deeds done in this.

(i) While Roman Catholicism has a doctrine of a purgatory, in which souls not good enough for heaven are purified for entrance there, Protestantism has assumed generally that sinners go at death to hell, and saints to heaven. A doctrine of eternal punishment, of unceasing torment, not only for the very wicked, but for all who die unsaved by the grace of Christ, was till about fifty years ago assumed to be the only orthodox view; and there are still many Christians with whom it is an article of faith, against which their heart may protest, but which they feel they must accept as the teaching of Scripture. In this doctrine metaphors are turned into dogmas. The differences of religious condition and moral character, of personal development, in sinners as in saints individually, is ignored when the one or the other destiny is assigned to all. It is unwarrantably assumed that a physical event such as death irrevocably fixes the personality, and thus also its destiny, that there can be no recovery from sin, and no progress in goodness hereafter, that to each soul this

[1] For a speculative treatment of the intermediate state, as it has been called, see *Christian Dogmatics*, by Martensen, Eng. trans., pp. 457-62.

earthly life has offered an adequate probation, a sufficient opportunity for receiving or rejecting the grace of God, that the love of God the Father has thus arbitrarily fixed the term of His dealing with men for their salvation. The writer on the contrary believes that the love of God as revealed and realised in the grace of Christ does and will exhaust all the resources it can command to recover the son who was lost, and restore the dead in sin ; and that this earthly life for many has not offered the adequate opportunity for the pleading and the striving of the love of God, or for such a personal development as could be regarded as a final rejection and resistance of the grace of Christ. The obscure passages (1 Peter iii. 19, iv. 6) which are the basis of the statement in the Apostles' Creed regarding the descent into hell do indicate a belief, even in the Apostolic Age, that in the unseen world Christ still continues His work. The writer would base no doctrine on these texts, but finds a broad and sure foundation for the view that God's dealing with men for their salvation in Christ does not end in death, on the one hand in God's Fatherhood, which is surely love to the uttermost and to the end, and on the other hand in the incompleteness of personal development in this life. What truth there is in the doctrine of reward or punishment hereafter will be considered at a later stage of this discussion.

(ii) In revolt against this view of eternal punishment there was strenuously advocated by a few theologians the theory of conditional immortality.[1] To state the theory as briefly as possible, it is this. Man has no natural immortality. He can attain immortality only as through faith in Christ he receives eternal life from God. But here the theory may diverge in two directions. It may be maintained that the spiritual death coincides with the physical death, and that only believers survive the death of the body. A more gracious view of God may,

[1] See *Life in Christ*, by Edward White ; *Our Growing Creed*, by W. D. M'Laren.

however, lead to the modification of the theory, that even in the unseen world there may be for a time a continued opportunity of receiving the eternal life, and that the eternal death will come only when grace is finally refused. To the cruder form of the theory the two objections already offered to the doctrine of eternal punishment apply; the physical event regardless of the stage of personal development reached cannot be decisive of eternal destiny, and the importunities of God's love cannot be confined to this earthly life so long as there is any possibility of the response which brings salvation. In the more refined form the theory does not seem to stress enough the conviction that God will not abandon any soul He has made until His grace can do no more. In support of the theory reliance has been placed on taking literally the word *death* wherever it occurs in the New Testament as including spiritual as well as physical death, and in citing texts, and not enough on the general considerations as to the nature of God and His purpose for man as revealed in Christ, by which Christian theology should always be guided. While eternal life is made to depend on relation to Christ, yet what seems to be ignored is the Father-heart of God as laid bare in Jesus Christ.

(iii) Speculatively dogmatic universalism is the most satisfactory solution of the problem; and there are texts which can be quoted in support of it, such as among others the following: 'God hath shut up all unto disobedience that He might have mercy upon all' (Rom. xi. 32). 'When all things have been subjected unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all' (1 Cor. xv. 28). 'God put all things in subjection under His feet, and gave Him to be head over all things to the church, which is His body, the complement of Him that completeth all in all' (Eph. i. 22-23). 'It was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the completeness dwell; and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the

blood of His cross; through Him, I say, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens' (Col. i. 19-20). Such an inspired vision of the end is entirely congruous with the completeness of the revelation of God as Father, and of the redemption of man as son which is claimed by faith for Christ as Saviour and Lord. Such a hope, too, meets the yearnings of the Christian heart for the salvation of all. The two difficulties already mentioned alone forbid our asserting it dogmatically although we may cherish the hope confidently;[1] first, God cannot force any man to be saved, and second, man may refuse salvation. It may be we are not warranted in transporting into the unseen world conditions which we must recognise in this; it may be that 'within the veil' God's constraint of love may prove irresistible, because faith will be freed from entanglements of this earthly life. This, however, we must affirm, that in the unseen world, as on earth, God saves only in His grace, and man is saved only by faith.

(iv) Although in criticising these views the writer's own position has been indicated, a fuller constructive statement may be offered. (*a*) While recognising fully the right of science to investigate all psychic phenomena, even the most obscure and remote from ordinary experience, and prepared to accept thoroughly verified evidence, the writer must confess himself quite unconvinced that spiritualism can offer a proof of survival of death which can be the foundation of a confident hope of immortality. The results, such as they are, do not offer a very attractive picture of the unseen world and the future life. If God who is love, and hallows and blesses human affection, had willed that we should have such communion with our beloved dead, He surely would have provided a highway through what is truest and best in us, and not confined us to these dubious, if not suspicious, byways. Our human love is purified and elevated because it is, not by sense, but by faith, relying on the

[1] See Dr. Cox's *Salvator Mundi*; Farrar's *Mercy and Judgment*; also *Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen*, pp. 237-44.

reality of God in Jesus Christ, that we are sure that our loved ones are a spiritual and not a sensuous presence with us, real to our unquenched affection, even when we long for 'the touch of a vanished hand, and the sound of a voice that is still.' We are sure of God, not by sense, but by spirit, and our knowledge of our beloved dead is of the same kind, and value, because it is rooted in our faith in God. Spiritualism as such need have no moral or religious influence on him who in these devious ways seeks to communicate with the unseen. The Christian hope depends on a belief in the conservation of values, and that springs from faith in the reality of God as the absolute value. As the psalmist believed that death could not destroy the saint's fellowship with God (lxxiii. 23-26), so to the Christian, to whom to live is Christ, death is gain (Phil. i. 21), as assuring to him the clearer vision, the closer communion, and the greater resemblance to Christ. Even if the words refer to the Second Advent primarily, for the Christian to-day they hold true of his entrance into the world beyond the veil of death. 'It is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him even as He is' (1 John. iii. 2). We have this hope set on Christ (*v.* 3) because 'now we are the children of God.' 'And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ' (Rom. viii. 17). Because He triumphed over death, it has for us no terrors; because He ever liveth, we shall live also with Him. Such a faith can stand upright and needs no crutch of spiritualism for its support.

(*b*) While the Christian hope is set on Christ, we must not ignore the testimony which the human reason, conscience, and heart also offer in confirmation, a subject which in a previous chapter has been touched on. The theory of conditional immortality ignores this testimony when it so confidently denies man's immortality. We must, however, get away from the static to the dynamic view; immortality is not an inalienable possession of man; it is not a

gift of nature, but a gain of development. God destined man for immortality as the consequent of his achievement of personality; and God is doing all He can to assure man of immortality in enabling him by His grace to achieve his personality. As man grows in truth, holiness, love, doth he attain the blessedness of immortality. Man's quest of truth, his attainment of holiness, his giving and getting love, is never completed here on earth in this life, yet these ideals by their very nature demand full realisation, and thus, to use Kant's term, postulate immortality as the only adequate opportunity for their realisation. It is not man's failure to be what he ought to be that is the proof of immortality, but it is his promise of becoming what in the short span of life he had not yet become that points to the Beyond of his hope, where he shall be all that God made him to be. Now man sees the truth as 'in a mirror darkly; but then face to face.' Now he 'knows in part, but then shall he know even as also he has been known' (1 Cor. xiii. 12). Now he does not behold, or reflect as in a mirror, the glory of the Lord perfectly, but then he will perfectly be transformed into the same image from glory to glory (2 Cor. iii. 18). The purer and truer human love becomes, the more impossible is acquiescence in the severance of death. Souls have not through a common life of joy or sorrow, achievement or struggle, grown into a oneness that death can sever. While Jesus did rebuke the gross materialism of the Pharisaic view of the Resurrection, and did deny that earthly relationships as such continue unchanged (Mark xii. 24-26), He did not destroy this hope; for within marriage or any other human relationship there may develop a human affection angelic in quality, fit for and worthy of heaven. If this earthly life is not completed in the heavenly, whatever fleeting happiness the years may bring, that blessedness, that permanent and dominant inner harmony of the spirit of man, can never be attained. God made man for perfect personality, and so immortality; and his development now holds the pledge thereof.

(*c*) This proof of immortality, depending as it does on the worth of personality, is no proof of the survival of those who refuse to become perfect persons by the realisation of the ideals. It has already been shown that in the Old Testament there is only one passage, and also in the New, in which the resurrection to judgment of the wicked is taught. Eternal life is conditioned on faith in Christ, and eternal death is the wages of sin (Rom. vi. 23). Where the theory of conditional immortality in its recent forms has often failed is in making spiritual coincident with physical death, and in not allowing adequate opportunity for the acceptance of the eternal life, the achievement of immortality in the unseen world. Even for the wicked the probation is not necessarily ended at death, for God will do to the utmost all His love can do to save. While we recognise this promise of the future life, we must also maintain the possibility of a final refusal of grace, a fixity in sin and unbelief. For such souls, if any such there should be when God has done all He can, it is incredible that there should be continuance of being in the misery which their character must bring with it. The writer at least is forced to the conclusion that there will be the forfeiture of immortality.[1] Biology may here afford us an analogy. If an organism does not adapt itself to its environment, it is not suddenly killed, it dies slowly; so we need not assume any annihilation of the persistently wicked by a supernatural act of God, but only the inevitable consequence in decreasing vitality and vigour of personality, until it cease to be.[2] If redemption be the end of creation, then the creature who refuses redemption annuls the very end of his creation. Why we cannot affirm the alternative of universal salvation has already been shown. The other alternative, that God continues creatures in existence for their everlasting torment, is a supposition

[1] What does Jesus mean when He speaks of the loss or the forfeit of life (Matt. xvi. 25-26)?

[2] See *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, by Simpson, for the statement of the problem from the biological standpoint, chap. xvii.

quite incredible for any who have seen God the Father in the face of Jesus Christ. It is only by some such view as this that we can do justice both to the revelation of God's Fatherhood and the solemn warnings and passionate appeals of Christ Himself to the sinful to turn and live. There is an optimism regarding the future life which is not Christian. The wages of sin is death ; there is no peace to the wicked (Is. xlviii. 22). Only faith in Christ assures the blessed and glorious immortality.

(*d*) We may now look a little more closely at what we may assume will be the conditions of the future life. *First of all*, we must affirm continuity amid change. The man will be mentally, morally, and spiritually one and the same as he was in this life, as an event such as physical death will not of itself convert the sinner or perfect the saint. There will, however, be change. The change of conditions may be judgment ; it may allow the man to see himself as amid the shows and shams of earth he has never seen himself. It may be the moment when he is shown whether the way he is pursuing will lead to his triumph or to his undoing. The sinner's self-discovery may lead to his self-recovery as God's grace is more clearly disclosed to him. The saint's self-discovery may bring a contrition and amendment which will set him with unimpeded feet on the upward path. Degradation through continuance in sin there may be ; but surely there will be progress in the realisation of the ideals. The saint may dare to hope that sin will no longer easily beset him, that he will be able to run the race towards perfection more freely and speedily (Heb. xii. 1-3). Especially may we dare to hope for a clearer manifestation of Christ in His glory, and a closer conformity to what He is as a result of the more intimate communion (1 John iii. 2). As symbolic the poetry of many of our hymns may suggest a blessedness which words cannot define, but the figurative language of the Holy Scriptures must not be taken with prosaic literalness. This clearer manifestation of Christ to the unbelieving may prove for their deepen-

ing condemnation, if they will not suffer it to be for their growing salvation (*cf.* John ix. 39-41). Where sin continues the consequences of sin will continue, intensified it may be by a more distinct consciousness of them as the judgment of God, resulting in a more inveterate defiance instead of a penitent submission. There may thus be a widening gulf between the righteous and the wicked, who in their earthly life may not have appeared to be so far apart. Only the Christian can look forward to death with assured hope ; for the unbelieving it should have a salutary fear. Nothing in the revelation of God's Fatherhood warrants an assumption that moral differences and their consequences will be obliterated in the unseen world, or that men will not there reap the fruit of their sowing here, corruption to those who have sowed to the flesh, and only to those who have sowed to the Spirit eternal life (Gal. vi. 8).

Secondly, we should prefer the Christian idea of *resurrection* as modified by Paul to the Greek idea of the disembodied soul. Necessarily his language is very figurative : ' We know that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens ' (2 Cor. v. 1). This he elsewhere describes as the *spiritual* body (1 Cor. xv. 42-49), by which he means a body fit for and worthy of the renewed spirit of man as its organ of expression and activity. Such a conception is not so difficult for our thought to-day as it was for a former age when the rigid atomic theory prevailed. Matter and spirit seemed so opposed to one another that a *spiritual* body seemed a contradiction in terms. The hypothesis of the indestructibility of matter and of the transmutation of energy is now under revision. It is conceded that energy may be transmuted into matter, and matter may be resolved again into energy ; and the most intelligible conception we can form of energy is energy as we ourselves exercise it when we will to act. Life is ever realising energy, and we cannot now conceive life without the direction of mind.

Panpsychism is a philosophy which commends itself to many minds. Without laying stress on this possibility of making more intelligible the spiritual body, what the doctrine of the Resurrection stands for as permanent truth is that it is the whole personality in full activity and manifold relations which survives death, not an attenuated, devitalised manhood. While physical and social relations of this life will not be reproduced, yet the continuity of the entire personality surely involves that all the human relations which have fostered the development of the personality here will be continued hereafter. The Christian hope would lose much of its value for us did it not include the expectation that the affections which have made life so good here will be continued hereafter. Interests and activities which have personal value will be carried on in the unseen world, however changed may be the conditions. In more intimate communion with God all the children of God will be brought into more intimate communion with one another; and just as here the common love for all mankind does not exclude the distinctive love of husband and wife, parent and child, friend and friend, so there these differences of relationship transformed will not disturb, but contribute to the vast harmony of the one family of God.

(6) Can we bring the transformed Apocalyptic hope and the view here offered of individual destiny into closer relation to one another? Is heaven so severed from earth that it has no share in the trial and the triumph of the Kingdom of God on earth?

(i) Refusing to accept as convincing the evidence which spiritualism offers of communications from the dead, we do not need to deny their presence with us, their interest in us, their activity for us. If Christ be as He has proved to be in Christian experience a living, loving, and gracious presence, there is no ground for denying the possibility at least of such a participation of the saints with us as shall be for our help and comfort, and shall not disturb their blessedness. It need not be that they know all that we say and do, so that our sins should be their grief,

even though that we cannot deny; it may be that their receptivity and responsiveness are determined by their character and condition now, so that only what is truest, best, and worthiest in human history finds access to their loving hearts. It is surely not merely a fond fancy, but the heart's deepest craving, which has found expression in this anonymous poem, written in imitation of Swinburne's series of roundels on 'A Baby's Death,' but referring to a beloved wife:

'The tender eyes that looked in love
On me before, so meekly wise;
But from my sight death did remove
The tender eyes.
What glories now upon them rise
Beyond the brightness of these skies?
But surely they do earthward move
To rest on me. Love never dies,
Which faithful by their light approve
The tender eyes.

'The gentle hands that smoothed my brow
With soothing touch, that loosed the bands
Which bound my soul, where are they now,
The gentle hands?
As ceaseless working God's commands,
With unseen fingers weaving strands
'Tween earth and heaven. I know not how
I 'm heavenward drawn. Her love demands:
The mastery I will allow
The gentle hands.

'The willing feet that joyous sped
To give me help, by love made fleet,
Are now for ever from me fled,
The willing feet?
Now find they work that is more sweet,
Gives larger joy, makes bliss complete?
Ah, yet I think they sometimes tread
The room again, and still repeat
Their former work, by love still led,
The willing feet.'

(ii) Generalising this idea, we may ask, are the saints in heaven watching the progress of the Kingdom of God on earth? That thought is suggested by Hebrews xii. 1, and Westcott adopts it.[1] 'The writer regards

[1] *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, in loco.

himself and his fellow-Christians as placed in an arena and contending for a great prize. The image of the amphitheatre with the rising rows of spectators seems to suggest the thought of an encircling cloud. The witnesses of whom the cloud is composed are unquestionably the countless heroes of faith whose deeds have been summarised in chapter xi.' There is an interest not only of compassion, but their own blessedness is being completed as they see the fulfilment of the promise given to them in the better thing God has provided for those who follow them (xi. 39-40). We may apply the thought to the saints now in heaven, and the completion of the world's redemption in Christ. When the Kingdom of God comes in its fullness of power and glory, either here on earth, or in the unseen world, then will even the saints in heaven be perfected. ' There is joy,' as Jesus tells us, ' in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth ' (Luke xv. 10). Their full blessedness surely waits till all the prodigals are gathered home. Can Paul who was willing to be ' anathema from Christ for his brethren's sake, his kinsmen according to the flesh ' (Rom. ix. 3) be perfected in glory until ' all Israel shall be saved ' (xi. 26)? The universal consummation will also be the individual completion for the saints; will it also be the final judgment of the wicked who still oppose themselves to that fulfilled purpose of God? It would be fitting that it should so be. Such a solution of the problem has a double advantage. It does first of all retain the essential content of the Apocalyptic hope of a consummation of all things in Christ, and harmonises it with the development of Christian thought regarding individual destiny. What may be beyond that consummation, if we may be so bold as to make a conjecture, is suggested by 1 Corinthians xv. 28; but the consideration of that saying must be deferred for the conclusion of this volume. It secondly corrects a too common error of popular Christian thought. Individual destiny is detached from the universal consummation, and in some forms of pietism a man is allowed and encouraged

to rejoice in his own salvation, while indifferent to the damnation of a large portion of mankind. We cannot and we ought not to separate ourselves from our race; humanity is a body of which the members suffer or rejoice together (1 Cor. xii. 26). How could one man be completely saved himself in a world for the most part damned! How could he rejoice in his own salvation, unmoved by compassion for his lost brethren! What Christian love does demand in the Christian hope is that the consummation shall be relatively so complete that the loving heart can be satisfied, and find its share in the satisfaction of the heart of God. The grace of Christ shall accomplish all that the love of God desires in the redeemed race, the community of the Spirit, the temple of God filled with His presence.

(iii) In no department of theology is there a greater need of restatement, of abandoning the old paths of tradition and authority, and of venturing on new ways of moral and religious insight in the light of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.[1] This the writer has in this chapter ventured to do, impelled thereto not only by the interest of the mind in truth, but also by the affections of the heart for men, the love which the love of God inspires, which craves, and prays, and hopes for the salvation of all men. In what has been written here no moral or religious interest has been sacrificed. Judgment on sin so long as it is impenitent has been affirmed as a necessity of the perfection of God Himself; but grace unto the uttermost has also been asserted, a grace which will not triumph over judgment, but may even in judgment secure its triumph. Not retribution, but redemption, is God's final purpose, although retribution may serve the ends of redemption, and, with sad heart must the admission be made, retribution may be final where redemption is finally refused. Still do we cling to the hope that the victory of grace over sin shall be complete, when God shall be all in all.

[1] A recent book which attempts a restatement on similar lines is *The Other Side of Death*, by R. G. Macintyre.

CONCLUSION:

THROUGH FAITH TO REALITY

FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT ONE GOD

In the preceding pages an endeavour has been made to expound the Christian Revelation and Redemption in its historical trinitarian presentation. We have been concerned with what has been described as the *economic* in contrast to the *ontological* Trinity, with God as He has made Himself known and given Himself to men in history. We must raise the further question: Is God in His eternal nature as He has revealed Himself, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? For any 'ethical monotheism' God as He is in Himself must be unity, and so we must press the question. Can God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be conceived as one God? To use Kant's distinction, is the Trinity only phenomenal and the Unity alone noumenal, or is the one only historical appearance and the other alone eternal reality; or if both are alike noumenal and real, how is the Trinity related to the Unity? Each of these questions demands an answer, not merely to gratify a theological curiosity, but to meet the religious need of possessing God Himself as He is in Himself.

I

(1) Man in his religion seeks to reach reality, the ultimate cause, the essential nature, and the final purpose of this Universe. He cannot rest in what *seems*, but only in what *is*. Even a revelation of God which gave man less or other than God Himself would mock his need, and blight his hopes. Imperfect as he knows his apprehension to have been,

yet he believes that it is not semblance, but substance, that he apprehends. Illusive he may admit some of his religious ideas to have been as reality imperfectly apprehended, but not delusive as apprehension of unreality. As the man of science is seeking to know the world as it is, and yet is ever ready to replace one hypothesis which has guided his research so far that he discovers its inadequacy, by another hypothesis more adequate to what he now knows, so the believer is prepared to pass from one conception to another because he is confident that he is pressing nearer to the inmost shrine of what God is. If God has revealed Himself, the believer cannot admit that the revelation is concealment, that God makes Himself *appear* to man other than He *is*. That the revelation cannot be complete, that he now knows only in part, and sees in a mirror darkly (1 Cor. xiii. 12, R.V. marg., Gr., *in a riddle*), he admits; but that there is as close correspondence between what he knows and what God is as the difference between God and man allows, he must maintain. If God made man for His fellowship and likeness, the affinity between God and man is close enough to allow man to know God as He is, since God has made him capable of such knowledge, and desires to impart it to man. If the relation between God and man be as it is realised in Christian experience the *economic* is not a concealment, but a revelation, of the *ontological* trinity.

(2) Before passing further in our argument we must recognise two objections to this claim of religion, although the one has been discredited, and the other has not yet been generally recognised.

(i) *Agnosticism* as an epistemology or theory of knowledge maintains that man can know only what appears, not what is—phenomena, and not noumena. In order to clear the ground for a naturalistic explanation of the world in his *Synthetic Philosophy*, which is merely a generalisation of the science of the time, Herbert Spencer sought to relegate God to the region of the Unknown or Unknowable.[1] It is interesting

[1] *First Principles*, Part I.

to observe that in his argument he had to rely on Hamilton and Mansel, both of whom believed themselves to be abating the proud claims of philosophy in the interests of revealed religion. Much of the reasoning is but verbal jugglery. That man's knowledge is relative to man's capacity to know is a truism; what is false is the assumption that the relation of the subject knowing to the object known necessarily involves that the object is not, and cannot be, as it is known. Agnosticism arbitrarily restricts its scepticism to the knowledge of God, but if the relativity of knowledge forbids our knowing God it no less forbids our knowing the world. Science, no less than philosophy or theology, must be declared invalid on this assumption. All human thought on the last questions is a protest against this attempt to limit its activity to the data of sense, and philosophy no less than religion asserts that the world can be made intelligible because the intelligence of man is akin to the intelligence which is its cause and end.

(ii) Agnosticism is not now the intellectual fashion of the hour, and need not detain us any longer. What is much more likely to prove a formidable opponent is the recent development of psychology. (*a*) Theology had withdrawn from the basis of authority of Church and Bible, and was building on the foundation of Christian experience. But what remains if Christian, even all religious experience be merely subjective, due to suggestion (*auto-* and *hetero-*)?[1] If people can cure themselves, or be cured by others, by being led to believe that they are cured, may not prayer be simply auto-suggestion, the answer due not to God but the result of the faith of him who prays? If a man can physically invigorate himself by thinking that he is strong, may not the enthusiasm and energy which the Christian Church ascribes to the Spirit of God be self-induced? These questions involve an assumption that is itself false. It is assumed that the activity must be either man's or God's, and that if we can describe the psychical process we have got

[1] *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, by Baudouin.

rid of any cause other than man. But if God be immanent, if in God 'we live and move and have our being' (Acts xviii. 28), then is there divine activity in the psychical process. God no less works because He works *in* us. For its full efficacy the religious experience requires the belief in the objectivity of God's working. If a man be fully persuaded that he is alone, left to himself, without God, his religious experience will lose its power. We are not justified in assuming that man involuntarily is practising a fraud upon himself in this assumption of objectivity. Religion is too deep-rooted and wide-spread a fact in human history to be dismissed as a universal illusion. If faith in God rested only on individual religious experience, and were contradicted by the other facts of the world and life, it might be difficult for it to hold its own; but the interpretation theistically of all that is, is more satisfying to reason and to conscience than any other explanation which can be offered. The proof of this belongs to Apologetics, and not Dogmatics, and thus falls outside of the present purpose. When the man conscious of his own moral weakness to withstand temptation falls back on God, prays for His Spirit, and is made more than conqueror, the case of the psychologist would need to be much stronger to persuade him that all is due to himself.[1]

(*b*) The whole subject has been treated very sanely by a competent psychologist, Dr. William Kelley Wright.[2] Discussing the relation of the subconscious, as recent psychology has been exploring it, to prayer, he states: 'Only to *a certain extent* are the psychological principles similar, while *there is a profound ethical and moral difference* between prayer and the other cases. In every spiritual religion appeal is always to a *higher and more ideal self*. . . . The prayers of spiritual religion effect moral reinforcements of character through the action of the Alter,

[1] For a Christian interpretation of the conclusions of recent psychology see the volume of Essays entitled *The Spirit*, especially III.

[2] *A Student's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 266-7.

such as would be impossible to the same extent through any other agency. It follows that in some important respects prayer involves unique psychological principles. In effecting such a synthesis of moral sentiments, prayer *psychologically* has a different function from other means of tapping subconscious energy. The influx of energy due to prayer effects a more extensive and permanent co-ordination of springs to action. . . .' 'We shall have to admit a measure of truth and moral worth in all religions, and that prayer is answered in them all. But as humanity has advanced, we have found that its conception of God has advanced also. All religions contain *some* measure of goodness and truth; but *those religions that make effective the ethically best and logically most rationally conceived Alter are best and truest.*' Christianity stands the test as the truest of all the religions in two respects. First of all, its conception of God, the 'ethical monotheism' of the Hebrew prophets completed in the revelation of God as Father by Christ as Son, answers the questions of the reason, meets the demands of the conscience, and satisfies the longings of the heart as no other conception can. This is a legitimate application of the pragmatic test, *what is true works.* Secondly, the experience of the Christian of the presence and power of God by His Spirit makes that revelation of God effective in the transformation of human personality, so that the creature becomes the child of God, the sinner the saint. Christian faith receives and responds to reality as truth—the revelation of the Father in the Son; and as grace—the transformation of man so that he lives with God, and God in Him, and grows in likeness to God. Thus it *works* practically as well as theoretically.

(3) Having asserted the *objectivity* of Christian faith—its contact with reality—we must now consider its progressiveness.

(i) The New Testament does not confront us with the Athanasian Creed as a condition of salvation. The disciples were only gradually led to confess Jesus

as the Christ (the Messiah). Even if the words 'the Son of the living God' were added (Matt. xvi. 16) they must be understood in a Messianic sense. Jesus did claim to be the Son alone known by and knowing the Father, and alone able to reveal the Father to men (xi. 27), but the full significance of the saying does not appear to have been apprehended during the earthly life. After the Resurrection the official title Christ passed into a personal name, and the title Lord was added. The Christology of the early chapters in Acts has been described as Adoptionist.[1] It was Paul and the author of the Fourth Gospel who without going beyond the implications of Christian faith so developed them as to give us a Christology in which Jesus the Christ the Lord, without departing from the human region, is exalted into the divine. Christian faith has confirmed that exaltation as inevitable. What Christ means and is worth for man in his relation to God demands the confession that He is God as man. The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ is identical with the love of God as its manifestation in human history. Similarly the inward and outward change wrought in believers could not be otherwise explained than as the work of God Himself. Accordingly, the love of God, identical with and manifest in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, was realised in the life of the believer in the *Koinonia*, the common possession or the community of the Holy Spirit (2 Cor. xiii. 14). Here we are concerned, not with speculative theology, but with personal experience. The present and potent reality of God is apprehended in the Holy Spirit within Christian life, as the reality of God's Fatherhood was apprehended in the Sonship and Saviourhood of Jesus Christ. It is the one God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

(ii) The problem of theology is how to recognise adequately these differences, and yet preserve absolutely the unity. In dealing with the Dogmatic Formulation regarding the Person of Christ (Section I,

[1] 'The Acts of the Apostles,' by H. T. Andrews, *Westminster New Testament*, p. 28.

Chapter IV), the inadequacy of the philosophical categories used in the creeds has been discussed; as the treatment of the doctrine of the Spirit followed on the same lines (Section III, Chapter I), the same criticism applies there. The categories of substance and subsistence, nature and person are the best the thought of the time could offer, but can be only misleading for us and hinder our reaching the truth. We do not desire to affirm the divinity of Christ or the reality of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit less than the framers of the creeds, but we want to do this even more positively and intelligibly, less ambiguously and mysteriously. To take one illustration, Athanasius was right when he insisted on the *homoousion* to assert the unity of Christ with God, the Cappadocian fathers wrong when they allowed the term to be used with a tendency to tritheism. Much of the popular religious speech to-day, even in the pulpit, is tritheistic. There is a divine class to which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit belong, not a divine personal unity existing and manifested as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The task for constructive theology to-day is to recover the unity while not losing the reality of the differences within God which these descriptive historical terms express. What we have to do is to show how we can apprehend Christ as God, and the Holy Spirit as God, indicating the reasons for which the Church hitherto has often failed in this apprehension.

(iii) The failure of the creeds is due to the fact that while affirming the divinity of Christ they retain a conception of God inconsistent with, and even contradictory of, what Christ shows God to be. (*a*) Theologians who, like the Chalcedonian, regarded it as a 'monstrous doctrine' to teach that 'the divine nature of the Only Begotten is passible,' and in general emphasised after the manner of Greek philosophy the differences of the divine and the human nature, apart from the inadequacy of their categories, were quite incapable of thinking intelligently on the Incarnation. It is Christ's own consciousness of God as

Father which we must fully accept if we are to understand the reality of His Sonship, His unity with God. Not only has Greek philosophy intruded into Christian theology, but Old Testament ideas being accepted as authoritative have prevented a conception of God distinctively and consistently Christian. If God be conceived as love, the Incarnation ceases to be a mystery, as piety has often felt it to be, or a puzzle, as theology has sometimes done its worst to make it; it becomes a necessity. Love must give itself and find itself in the giving. It is God who gives Himself and finds Himself as man in Christ, not an inferior deity, or a being partly divine; and the humanity, so far from being a limitation of the divinity, is the very condition of God's most fully giving and finding Himself. There are three implications in this statement which must be made more explicit. They have already been dealt with more fully, but must here be repeated (Section I, Chapter VI). In the first place, God must be *personal*, and personality in God and man must have so close an affinity that the personal God can live, suffer, and act as personal man. If God's nature be other than personal, then the Incarnation is inconceivable. In the second place, as personal, human experience must have reality for God, else how could God share it, as He did in Christ? That means that human development in time must be real for God. If God's eternity means that time for Him is only appearance, and not reality, God cannot have been really in Christ as He lived, suffered, and acted on earth. Or widening our vision, and recalling that the Incarnation is the consummation of a progressive divine revelation, we may argue that cosmic evolution and human history must have reality for God. God was coming into His world in full expression of His character and purpose, and finally came in Jesus Christ; God was so immediately in Christ that Christ's experience belongs to the very reality of God Himself. This and nothing less is what the divine immanence must mean, if it be an immanence of love. God might be in the world as

wisdom, power, and goodness, and yet not so fully identify Himself with the life of man ; but love means self-identification. While in the human development the Son distinguished Himself from the Father, depended on Him, held communion with Him, submitted to Him, yet God as Son was in the human experience, and, in the intimacy of the relation of Father and Son, God as Father shared that experience. Thirdly, there must be in God eternally the capacity for such self-limitation of His infinitude and absoluteness as makes such a personal immanence in human personality possible and actual ; and as it is the self-limitation of love it is also self-realisation, for love's *kenosis* is also love's *plerosis*, to use a couple of terms that it would be well to give a permanent place in our theological vocabulary. Shall we venture to say that this kenosis for plerosis of God is the Son, as God in His infinitude and absoluteness is the Father ; but as in the historical revelation in the consciousness of Christ the Son always knew Himself one with the Father, so the transcendence and the immanence of God, His infinitude and absoluteness on the one side and His kenosis and plerosis on the other, are inseparably related, for infinitude means not unlimitedness, but self-limitation, and absoluteness does not mean unrelatedness, but self-relating ? The writer is persuaded from his own experience that we can apprehend the reality of God in Christ, the unity of the Father and the Son, as we cease thinking of God in any other ways than we learn from Christ. As we know God as Father in Christ as Son will the Incarnation become to us luminous ; if at times we feel dazzled, it is only by the excess of light that shines from that fact upon our darkness. We believe that Christ is God not because He mysteriously possessed a divine nature united to a human, but because as He is as man we find God in Him, and God finds us through Him. We behold the glory of the Only Begotten of the Father in the Word incarnate, and find Him full of grace and truth (John i. 14), God making Himself known and even giving Himself in

love to us. This and nothing less is what believing in the divinity of Christ means.

(*b*) How shall we apprehend the reality of God in the Holy Spirit? This apprehension is even more hindered than is the apprehension of God in Christ, both practically and theoretically. We must live the life of the Spirit, if we are to know God in the Spirit. It is in no way uncharitable to say that the religion of the Christian Church as a whole is not life in the Spirit; it is largely second-hand tradition and custom, and not first-hand experience. It may possibly be that there are many men under their present conditions incapable of that experience, and, therefore, necessarily dependent on the mediation of the doctrine and the ordinances of the Christian Church as an organisation visible and active in the world. What, however, is certain is that typical Christian life, which we should aspire and strive for, is a life in which Pentecost is not a tale of long ago, but a present fact. Without desiring any of the abnormal spiritual gifts, to which Paul with his characteristic wisdom assigned a secondary value, we should desire the holy enthusiasm and the holy energy of the Apostolic Church in its best representatives. Such a freedom from sin, such a fullness of holiness, such a certainty of truth, such a power for service, such a confidence of hope may come to the believer, who fulfils the conditions of dependence and submission, that he will know assuredly that this is not his achievement, that it is God's bestowal, that he is not drawing on the limited resources of his own personality, but on the inexhaustible resources of God Himself. As we must become more Christian in thought to apprehend God in Christ, so we must live more spiritually to apprehend God as Spirit.

This life in the Spirit of God distinguishes itself from much which goes by the name of mysticism in four respects. *First*, it is *objective*. God is not sought and found in the depths of human personality. It is as faith receives and responds to the truth and grace of the Lord Jesus Christ that there is the experience

of the presence and power of the Spirit. Pentecost followed on the certainty of the resurrection of Christ the Lord. The distinctively Christian experience of the Spirit of God depends on the historical revelation and redemption. *Second*, it is *normal*. The visions and voices, the raptures and trances of which much has sometimes been made as evidence of contact with God are not necessary to him who sees the Father in the Son, and is saved from sin by the Son. *Third*, it is *practical*. It does not mean withdrawal from the world for study and meditation, for any artificial process of getting nearer to God than the common life of man affords. It is amid the daily business, in the common duties of life, the service of the Kingdom, that the fruit of the Spirit is seen. Where love is as the motive and principle of life, there is the Spirit of God who is love. Accordingly, *fourth*, it is *social*: the Spirit as the common possession of believers makes them a community, a body of many members with diverse functions according to the diversity of the gifts of the Spirit. On this last feature is it specially necessary to dwell, for it is the absence of the desire for and the effort after unity which is one of the main causes of the Church's failure to continue Pentecost in its experience. The duty of Christian reunion need not be based as exclusively as it often is on the prayer in John xvii. 22-23, for unity is of the very essence of the Church as the body of Christ, and the realisation in thought, feeling, and deed of that unity, the condition of the possession in fullness of the Spirit who gives life to that body. If God be by His very nature love, if His Spirit be the Spirit of community, the divisions among the churches are hindering the completion of the revelation of God in His Spirit. The differences in creed, ritual, and polity which have emerged in history, and which many Christians regard it as a matter of conscience to preserve, would never have come to be regarded as important enough in themselves to destroy the manifest unity, unless there had been a failure to realise in experience the presence and power of the Spirit as the common possession.

A Church possessed by the Spirit would be a Church in which the sense of unity would transcend and transform differences. As the churches realise the unity of the Church, will they also apprehend the reality of God in His Spirit. As long as the differences dominate Christian thought and life, so long will the experience of the Spirit fall short of the certainty that God, God Himself in His very life of love, is dwelling and working in man. The Spirit's incarnation in the body of Christ, the Church, continues and completes the incarnation of the Son, and the revelation of the Father in the Son, and that incarnation is not yet completed since individually and collectively Christians are not fully living the life in the Spirit.

(4) When we have thus apprehended the reality of God as Father, Son, and Spirit in unity, the Father revealed in the Son, and as so revealed realised in human experience in the Spirit, then surely we are entitled to draw the inference that as God is so known to us He is and must needs be in Himself. So absolute is the value of this revelation of the love which gives itself as light to illumine and as life to inspire man, that we cannot conceive God as other than this. Not only may we infer from the fact of revelation that there is not concealment of what God is, but from the content of the revelation that it is inconceivable that God can be other in His reality than He is revealed. We may then confidently pass from the *economic* to the *ontological* Trinity, and dare to make the attempt at least to conceive what God in Himself is.

II

(1) While our conception of God must ever be dependent on the revelation which has been given us, we do want to make that conception as luminous to our minds as we can make it. Many attempts have been made to give a rational demonstration of the necessity of the doctrine of the Trinity for our thought.

(i) In our consciousness there is the duality of subject and object within the unity, the self who thinks, feels, wills, and what is thought, felt, and willed as the content of our consciousness. We cannot think of God as personal, without so thinking of His consciousness. To us most of the object is, as it were, given by the world, of which we are a part, though a part conscious of it as a whole. But unless there is an eternal world as the object for the eternal God as the subject, God must within His own consciousness be both subject and object. As we realise our personality in 'self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control' we do become less dependent on the world around, and the self gives itself a growing content, and so constitutes its own content as object; our memory of the past, our purpose for the future, our religious ideas and moral ideals become an inner world objective to ourselves. We may then conceive God as subject and object in the unity of His own consciousness, not in a temporal realisation, but as eternal reality. To many minds this will seem an abstraction of thought, very unconvincing to the religious consciousness. It has its value, however, as warding off the objection that the conception of God as difference-in-unity is irrational.

(ii) Another line of argument depends on the relation of God's immanence and God's transcendence. God is in all and through all, and yet also above all. He creates in time and space, but Himself is immense and eternal. His will is in the natural forces in a finite form, and His mind also in natural laws; yet He is Himself infinite. But we must not think God as divided in His transcendence and immanence, for the difference is within the unity of His nature. Hegel's statement of the doctrine of the Trinity [1] may here be mentioned. God in Himself as transcendent is the Father; God as going out of Himself as immanent is the Son; God as returning to Himself in the unity of transcendence and immanence is the Spirit. That too is a mode of thinking which will appeal only to a few minds.

[1] *Encykl.*, § 566.

(iii) Augustine finds an analogy to the Trinity in the human consciousness. 'Dico haec tria: esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim et novi, et volo; sum sciens et volens; et scio esse me, et velle; et volo esse, et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio videat qui potest.'[1] This analogy does show that if we are to conceive God as personal, we must conceive Him as having difference-in-unity, but would quite exclude the conception of three persons within that unity in the common acceptation of the term *person* to-day. It does fall short, however, in adequately indicating the differences which the revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit does suggest, and the original use of the term *person* tried to convey.

(iv) Much more attractive as well as helpful to our thought is the analogy from love which Augustine[2] also offers, *amans*, *amatus*, and *mutuus amor*. In love there must be the loving and the loved in mutual relation, and in that relation the difference is not submerged, but harmonised in the unity of a common life. Is *amor mutuus* a fuller reality than the *amans* and the *amatus* each by himself would be? If so, this would be more than a human analogy of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, since God is love. Does the love of Father and Son issue in the fullness of the life of the Spirit, the common life more than the sum of the life of each apart would be? The separation which the incarnation of human personality involves may make it difficult for us to conceive the common life as having the same degree of reality as each of the lives so made one in love. Father and Son must be thought as different enough to be subject and object of love in the unity of the divine consciousness, and yet not so separate as to appear as two individuals in a society.

(v) Accordingly, the orthodox terminology must be dismissed, as not only not helpful, but even a hindrance

[1] *Confessio*, xiii. 11. [2] *De Trinitate*, xiv. and xv.

to any intelligible conception. One substance may mean one entity, but it is a *static* conception, and suggests no difference-in-unity. It carries our thought no further, as does the conception of God as personal, giving and finding Himself as love. The conception of God as personal may then offer some aid to our mind in thinking Him as triune. But if we make Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each a *person*, we must, to conceive each separately, repeat this differentiation of subject and object in the unity of consciousness, and so on endlessly. The framers of the creeds never did intend person to be understood as individual, as it has come to be regarded in popular religious thought, and to-day by retaining their term with the meaning now imported into it we do not honour but defeat their intention. God is personal unity as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but to express these differences, since we should not use the term person, we have not yet found a term of general acceptance.

(2) The creeds approach the theological problem from the side of metaphysics; we may approach it from the side of psychology and sociology, and may find the categories we thus reach more adequate to make the doctrine of the Trinity more intelligible.

(i) In the First Section, Chapter VI, the modern conception of personality has been applied to the doctrine of the Incarnation. There is one aspect of that conception which may prove helpful to us in dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity. The mechanical mode of thought, dealing with reality as a whole made up of parts, was responsible for an inadequate conception. Human personality was divided into faculties, and there was a dispute early last century as to whether three or four faculties should be recognised. Was the person made up of thought, feeling, will, or must desire be added as intermediate between feeling and will? It was on the false assumption that will was a separate faculty that the dispute between determinism and indeterminism rested. It was because it was taken for granted that thought and feeling could be separated

that the popular contrast was made between the religion of the head and of the heart. Now we recognise that personality is a unity, thinking, feeling, and willing, and that there is no state of consciousness which is entirely one of the three apart altogether from the other two. There is a trinity in unity, or a tri-unity. But this illustration, while preserving the unity, does not seem adequately to recognise the differences in the Godhead. We must go further in our analysis. The mechanical way of looking at reality also affected the conception of the relation of one person to another; each was complete as a unit in itself, and relations were external. Rousseau's doctrine of the *social contract* and Hobbes' account of the origin of government illustrate this phase of thought. In the battle-cry of the French Revolution, liberty and equality were the ruling conceptions, and what fraternity involved as regards man's relation to society was not adequately recognised. Herbert Spencer, while recognising the analogy between society and a body, stopped short at a physical interdependence, and in his denial of the common consciousness relapsed to this individualism in his contention that individual happiness must be the guide for social action.[1] But, defective as was his exposition, it did assert the interdependence of individuals in a society. When we compare society to an organism, however imperfectly, the mechanical view of man as individual unit is abandoned, and we begin to think of him as complete only within the unity of society. We are learning that the individual is an abstraction of thought, as personality is realised only in social relations, and the more completely the more varied the relations are. Man as son, brother, husband, father, worker, citizen develops his own personality as apart from such relations it could not be developed. If love be, as Christianity holds, the religious and moral principle of conduct and character, we may assert that personality is by its very nature *social.*

(ii) We may now approach the subject from the

[1] *Principles of Sociology*, i. 475 *ff.*

side of sociology. It has already been necessary to refer to the displacement of the mechanical by the organic view. Mackenzie in his *Introduction to Social Philosophy* had already advanced beyond Spencer in that, while still using the conception of organism, he moved from the biological to the psychological standpoint in insisting that rational personality needs and seeks to create a rational environment.[1] M'Iver in his book on *Community* offers us a much more adequate conception. Men by their very nature have a community of interests which lead to co-operation in action; accordingly, they gather together in associations, and form institutions, or permanent modes of co-operation, to realise the community of their interests. The society has not a nervous system or a brain, but in the consciousness of each member of the society there is realised in greater or lesser degree this community. The members of the body know themselves as members and suffer or rejoice together. The individual becomes most himself as he realises in himself this community with others. The wider the range of interests in which this community is recognised, and the higher the quality of the interests, the more fully is the personality of each member completed in the society. As the community gains in distinctively personal content—art, literature, science, morals, religion—does it become a varied yet harmonised unity. Thus we may say that a society tends to become personal in its unity, to acquire personality. Personality is *social* and society is *personal* as the two develop together.

(3) There is thus seen to be a convergence of the two conceptions of personality as social and society as personal.

(i) If we apply these conceptions to the doctrine of the Trinity, the first may help us to conceive the unity-in-differences, and the second the differences-in-unity. We get the counterpart of the one substance of the creeds in social personality, and of the three persons in society as personal (as community).

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

In the one case unity is completed in differences, in the other differences are completed in unity. As applied to God each of these conceptions must be raised to the height of perfection, God perfectly social in His personal activity, and God perfectly personal in His social relations, God perfect personality and society in Himself, and the one because of the other. Because human personality and human society are both so imperfect, the two conceptions for us still lie apart; but even we in an ideal can observe their convergence, and they meet in the perfection of God. It is the Christian life in its distinctiveness as individual and collective in which both ideals should find their realisation. As the individual Christian loves others, he gives his life to them, and finds his life in them, and his personality becomes increasingly social. As in the Christian Church the community of the Spirit is realised in the virtues and graces, the society will become more personal, with a unity and a continuity of life which raise it above all atomic individualism, and give it a common aspiration, purpose, and activity. The Christian is perfected in his unity in the Spirit with all other believers; and the Church is perfected into unity through the fullness of its personal life. To speak of the Church personally as the community of the Spirit is more than mere poetic personification. As the Christian perfects himself in love, and as the Church has a universal destiny and obligation, the ideal can be realised only as all men become one in love, and the Church becomes the society which embraces all mankind. The revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can be completed only as humanity is redeemed to be the temple of God, filled with His Spirit; and until that consummation we shall not realise in experience so as to be luminous to our thought the ideal of social personality and personal society, the two converging conceptions which are leading our thought into the holy of holies—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as one God.

(ii) In the *economic* trinity or trinity of revelation the Father is mediated to us by the Son in His historical personality, and the Father-in-the-Son through the Holy Spirit in personal experience. What we primarily apprehend is difference, although the effort has been made to show how we may reach the conviction of the unity of the Father with the Son, and of both with the Spirit. Two statements of Paul's seem to carry our thought beyond the stage of mediation to a stage of immediacy. 'Now a mediator,' says Paul, 'is not a mediator of one, but God is one' (Gal. iii. 20). Does mediation so obtrude difference as to obscure unity? Is that the reason why many Christians substitute Christ for God, and do not always rise through the Son to the Father? In one of his boldest flights of thought Paul seems to expect an end to the mediation of Christ Himself. 'And when all things have been subjected unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all' (*πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, 1 Cor. xv. 28). Christ in His mediatorial sovereignty is fulfilling all in all in order that God may be all in all, perfect personality in perfect society, qualitative and quantitative completeness. What does this speculation mean? We cannot be sure that we can recapture the vision that glowed in the mind of Paul of that final glory. What can it mean to us? It can lead us a little further along the path we are now treading. In the historical revelation (the *economic* trinity) the difference is more prominent than the unity. In the eternal revelation, which will consummate the historical, the unity will be dominant. There will not be absorption in a unity without any difference, but a unity in which all differences will at last be so harmonised as to make the unity perfect. The beatific vision will be a vision of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as one God; the blessed communion will be not absorption, but the realisation of the whole manhood (*πάντα*) of all mankind (*πᾶσιν*) as the one redeemed and perfected family of God. While we still walk amid the shadows,

and wage the warfare of the Kingdom on earth, we can thus get glimpses of the coming glory and victory. To this reality faith in the fact of Jesus Christ our Lord leads us, for He and He alone brings God as Father to us, and us as children to God.

POSTSCRIPT

As the writer looks back upon the path along which he has led the reader, the conviction with which he began is deepened, that however far short he may have himself fallen in carrying out his own intentions, and however defective his work may appear to others, yet the principle and the method have been vindicated. Theology is not concerned with the world and man (cosmology, anthropology, etc.) unless as related to God; Christian theology is concerned only with God as revealed in Christ; God is revealed in Christ as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and consequently no theology can be adequately and distinctively Christian that does not make this conception of God dominant; this trinitarian conception as presented in the New Testament is not a perplexity for the intellect, nor a burden on the conscience, as it is made in the Athanasian Creed, but a blessing to the soul. The Christian Creed, the Apostolic Benediction, interpreted not through an alien philosophy, but by the Christian history and by the Christian experience, is fitted to inspire aspiration, adoration, and consecration. 'Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain to receive the power, and riches, and wisdom, and might, and honour, and glory, and blessing. . . . Unto Him that sitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb, be the blessing, and the honour, and the glory, and the dominion, for ever and ever. And the four living creatures said, Amen. And the elders fell down and worshipped' (Rev. v. 12-14).

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

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